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中国为泄愤于美国而援助胡塞武装China is helping the Houthis in order to spite the US

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索菲亚·扬因其对中国的报道荣获2020年玛丽·科尔文奖,她曾在中国驻扎十年。她的调查揭露了人口贩卖、非法武器转移、战争罪、恐怖主义融资以及武装网络。她的报道促成了国际制裁、资产冻结以及执法调查。

Sophia Yan received the 2020 Marie Colvin Award for her coverage of China, where she was previously based for a decade. Her investigations have exposed human trafficking, illicit weapons transfers, war crimes, terrorist financing, and militant networks. Her reporting has contributed to international sanctions, asset freezes, and law enforcement investigations.

北京时间5:26分 中国正通过支持伊朗支持的胡塞武装来施压美国。

5:26pm BST China is supporting the Iran-backed Houthis as a way to pressure the US.

该武装组织正寻求研制一枚中程弹道导弹,根据一份研究报告,该导弹将使用中国制造的部件。

The militant group is seeking to build a medium-range ballistic missile that, according to a research report, would be made with Chinese components.

根据总部位于英国的调查机构“武装冲突研究”(Conflict Armament Research)的报告,胡塞武装正寻求在国内至少部分制造伊朗“开伯尔-谢坎”(Khaibar Shekan)系列弹道导弹,该系列导弹射程超过1000公里(620英里),该机构专门追踪冲突地区的武器使用情况。

The Houthis are seeking to manufacture domestically at least part of the Iranian Khaibar Shekan series of ballistic missiles, which have a range of more than 1,000 km (620 miles), according to Conflict Armament Research, a UK-based investigative organisation that tracks the use of weapons in conflict zones.

该研究小组在近期运往胡塞武装的货物中发现了定制制造的导弹部件,以及原材料、工具和测试设备,并且还在这些部件旁边发现了列明中国供应商的运输文件。

The research group has identified custom-made missile components, as well as raw materials, tools and testing equipment, in recent shipments intended for the Houthis, and has also found these components alongside shipping documents that list a Chinese supplier.

胡塞武装一直在寻求提升国内生产能力,但这些最新发现表明,他们的能力正在实现重大飞跃,因为全球只有少数几个国家具备生产此射程导弹的专业技术。这也暗示他们正在逐步摆脱对伊朗——其主要后援国——的依赖。

The Houthis have increasingly sought to boost domestic production, but these latest revelations suggest a significant leap in their abilities, as only a few countries in the world have the expertise to produce missiles with such range. This also suggests an increasing independence from Iran, their main backer.

图左为沙赫布-3导弹,图右为开伯尔-破坏者导弹,两者在德黑兰年度耶路撒冷日集会上展出。这些发现源于也门当局拦截的货物,胡塞武装就驻扎在那里并控制着大片领土。

Shahab-3, left, and Khaibar-buster missiles displayed during the annual Jerusalem Day rally in Tehran The findings come from shipments interdicted by authorities in Yemen, where the Houthis are based and control large swaths of territory.

事实上,根据联合国报告和武器专家的研究,中国公司如今是被扣押的、原本运往胡塞武装的货物中的最大货物来源。

In fact, Chinese companies are now the largest source of goods seized from shipments bound for the Houthis, according to United Nations reports and research by arms experts.

中国公开呼吁中东和北非地区实现和平,甚至游说伊朗施压胡塞武装,要求其停止在红海的袭击行动——红海是全球贸易的关键水道,其重要性类似于霍尔木兹海峡。

China has publicly called for peace in the Middle East and north Africa, even going so far as to lobby Iran to pressure the Houthis to back down from attacks in the Red Sea, a key waterway for global trade, similar to the Strait of Hormuz.

与此同时,中国正向胡塞武装提供兼具军民两用性质的货物——这种做法与北京通过向俄罗斯运送零部件和机床以制造武器,从而物质上支持其入侵乌克兰的方式相似。

At the same time, China is supplying the Houthis with dual-use goods that have both military and civilian purposes – a similar approach to how Beijing has materially supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by sending components and machine tools to make weapons.

这种做法为北京提供了合理的否认空间,因为它可以声称自己仅仅是在参与常规的商业贸易。

This approach provides Beijing with plausible deniability, as it can say that it is merely part of regular commercial trade.

中国对胡塞武装的支持是在伊朗对胡塞武装支持的基础上叠加的——伊朗的支持主要集中在提供情报、战略和训练,以及运送成品武器。中国同样通过向伊朗运送无人机部件和火箭燃料前体物质,以及购买受制裁的石油来支持伊朗。

Chinese support comes in addition to Iranian backing for the Houthis, which has largely been focused on providing intelligence, strategy and training, and sending finished weapons. China, too, has supported Iran by sending drone components and rocket-fuel precursors, and by buying sanctioned oil.

也门马里卜省一处地点的车辆残骸,胡塞武装军事媒体称这是针对政府军装甲车辆的袭击所致。所有这些行动都帮助伊朗维持生存,并为该政权支持其代理组织提供了基础,使得中伊关系形成闭环——中国单独支持伊朗的非国家行为体,如胡塞武装。

Wreckage of a vehicle in a location given as Marib Governorate, Yemen, after what Houthi Military Media said was the targeting of government forces’ armoured vehicles All this has helped Iran to stay afloat, and underpins the regime’s ability to support its proxy groups, which brings the relationship full circle with the Chinese separately supporting Iran’s non-state actors, such as the Houthis.

“中国对胡塞武装的支持最好被理解为外交保护、选择性执行和战略机会主义的结合,”总部位于美国的风险咨询机构《巴沙报告》创始人穆罕默德·阿尔-巴沙说道。

“Chinese support for the Houthis is best understood as a combination of diplomatic protection, selective enforcement, and strategic opportunism,” said Mohammad al-Basha, founder of the Basha Report, a US-based risk advisory.

“中国似乎愿意对胡塞武装使用中国商业人工智能技术、由据称与中国政府有关联的公司提供的卫星服务,以及双用途设备持续流入也门的行为视而不见。”这些商品包括用于制造武器的精密机床、可用于导弹推进剂的大量肥料、用于导弹部件的特种金属以及用于无人机生产的电子产品,他指出。

“China appears willing to turn a blind eye to the Houthis’ use of Chinese commercial artificial-intelligence technologies, satellite services provided by companies with reported links to the Chinese government, and the continued flow of dual-use equipment into Yemen.”These goods include precision machine tools to manufacture weapons, large quantities of fertiliser that could be used in missile propellants, specialised metals for missile components, and electronics used in drone production, he noted.

专家表示,胡塞武装近年来与中国的关系有所加深,建立在也门长期贸易商在中国所拥有的关系基础之上。该武装组织还选派成员学习汉语,以改善关系。

Experts say the Houthis have boosted ties with the Chinese over recent years, building upon the relationships that longtime Yemeni traders have in China. The militant group has also chosen members to learn Mandarin in an effort to improve relations.

作为回报,中国已获得胡塞武装的承诺,确保中国商业航运船只安全通航,这对全球最大出口国持续的经济健康至关重要。

In return, China has secured promises from the Houthis for Chinese commercial shipping vessels to transit safely, which is important for the continued economic health of the world’s largest exporter.

胡塞武装支持者乘坐载有最近在冲突中阵亡战斗人员灵柩的卡车,参加在萨那周六举行的葬礼游行。这也使北京能够保持与胡塞武装的潜在有用关系,该武装组织若中国入侵台湾——北京宣称其为领土的岛国——可能会派上用场。

Houthi supporters ride in a truck carrying the coffin of a fighter who was recently killed in conflict, during a funeral procession in Sana’a on Saturday It also allows Beijing to preserve a potentially useful relationship with the Houthis, an armed group that could prove useful if China were to invade Taiwan, an island nation that Beijing claims as its territory.

例如,胡塞武装可能威胁世界上最重要的海上通道之一,并将美国海军资产和资源从印太地区转移开去,使美国难以提供军事援助。

The Houthis, for instance, could threaten one of the world’s most important maritime corridors and divert US naval assets and resources away from the Indo-Pacific region, making it difficult for the US to send military assistance.

但中国在胡塞武装问题上正在玩火。虽然北京目前通过支持胡塞武装换取红海安全通行,但这种情况可能不会永远持续下去。

But China is playing with fire when it comes to the Houthis. While Beijing enjoys safe passage through the Red Sea for now in exchange for its support for the Houthis, that may not hold forever.

不过,更大的担忧是保持对美国的反对立场。中国不能冒险让人认为它站在美国一边。因此,北京必须继续对华盛顿保持抵制。

Still, the greater concern is to remain in opposition to the US. China cannot risk any perception of being on side with the US. Thus, Beijing must continue putting up resistance against Washington.

巴沙表示,中国的活动必须“置于大国竞争的更广泛背景中来理解”。

China’s activities must be “understood within the broader context of great power competition”, said Mr Basha.

“对北京而言,胡塞武装可能代表一种相对低成本的手段,用于在不投入中国军队或公开与美国正面冲突的情况下,对美国及其地区伙伴施加间接压力。

“For Beijing, the Houthis could represent a relatively inexpensive means of exerting indirect pressure on the US and its regional partners without committing Chinese military forces or openly confronting Washington.

“与其与伊朗的关系类似,中国有可能在限制直接暴露和成本的同时获得战略杠杆作用。”

“Much like its relationship with Iran, China can potentially gain strategic leverage while limiting its direct exposure and costs.”

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