
SaaS 面向托管服务提供商的 ConnectWise 在检测到未经授权的访问后,对其部分产品启动了“服务中断”。ConnectWise 提供针对托管服务提供商(MSP)需求定制的 ERP,以及他们可用于管理客户环境的工具。Cloud Backup 是其中一种工具,能够对本地、云端或 SaaS 服务(如 M365 和 Google Workspace)中存储的数据进行备份,功能正如其名称所示。
SaaS-for-managed services providers ConnectWise has initiated a “service interruption” for its some of its offerings after detecting unauthorized access. ConnectWise offers ERP tailored to the needs of managed services providers (MSPs), plus tools they can use to manage their customers’ environments. Cloud Backup is one of those tools and does what it says on the tin for data stored on-prem, in the cloud, or in SaaS services like M365 and Google Workspace.
10 月 16 日,该公司发布了一则安全公告,透露其在 10 月 15 日“在 ConnectWise Cloud Backup 环境中发现了对应用身份的未经授权的访问”。“服务中断影响使用 Cloud Backup(前身为 SkyKick)的合作伙伴和客户。由于 SaaS 安全和云管理与 Cloud Backup 集成,出于谨慎考虑,这些服务也已暂停,直至我们的调查和修复工作完成。”公司建议称。
On October 16, the company published an advisory revealing that on the 15th it “identified unauthorized access to application identities within the ConnectWise Cloud Backup environment.”“The service interruption affects partners and customers using Cloud Backup, formerly known as SkyKick. Because SaaS Security and Cloud Management are integrated with Cloud Backup, those services have also been suspended out of an abundance of caution while our investigation and remediation continue,” the company advised.
暂停服务并不意味着 MSP 或其客户应假设其环境已被入侵,只是表明 ConnectWise 目前无法确信能够安全运行其服务。截至 10 月 18 日 16:00 UTC,这些服务仍不可用,这意味着最终用户无法备份数据、访问存档或恢复数据。“现有存档仍保持加密、隔离和保存状态,且没有未经授权访问的证据。我们的团队继续监控受影响的环境,进行取证分析和威胁搜寻,并开展修复工作,”该公司安全运营副总裁 Jason Ferguson 在 Reddit 上写道。
The suspension does not mean MSPs, or their customers, should assume that their environments were compromised, just that ConnectWise isn’t confident it can operate its services safely at this time. As of 16:00 UTC on October 18, the services remain unavailable, which means end-users can’t back up data, access their archives, or restore data. “Existing archives remain encrypted, isolated, and preserved, with no evidence of unauthorized access. Our teams continue monitoring affected environments, conducting forensic analysis and threat hunting, and carrying out remediation activities,” the company’s veep of security operations, Jason Ferguson, wrote on Reddit.
ConnectWise 对此事件未披露太多细节,仅发布了一些它认为与少数 IP 地址及第三方应用集成相关的妥协指标。此外,该公司还禁用了 Cloud Backup 与 Exchange、Teams、SharePoint Online 及其自身产品之间的部分集成。
ConnectWise has not offered much detail on the incident, other than to publish some indicators of compromise it thinks are tied to a handful of IP addresses and integrations with third-party apps. It has also disabled some integrations between Cloud Backup and Exchange, Teams, SharePoint Online, and its own products.
安全公司Huntress的观点更为尖锐,并写道:“ConnectWise Cloud Backup的一个Microsoft 365凭证已被泄露,Huntress已确认该凭证正被用于未经授权访问客户的M365环境。”“在一个Huntress合作伙伴租户中,第二个ConnectWise应用程序ConnectWise Cloud Management - MS Teams(应用程序ID 24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640)授予了自身全局管理员权限,然后向该租户中的另外两个应用程序添加了新凭证,其中之一是仅属于该合作伙伴的单租户Huntress应用程序。”
Security outfit Huntress offered a starker view and wrote “A Microsoft 365 credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup has been compromised, and Huntress has confirmed it is being used to gain unauthorized access to customers' M365 environments.”“In one Huntress partner tenant, a second ConnectWise application, ConnectWise Cloud Management - MS Teams (Application ID 24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640), gave itself Global Administrator and then added new credentials to two other applications in that tenant, one of them being a single-tenant Huntress application unique to this partner.”
该公司警告称:“禁用M365应用程序,包括被滥用的ConnectWise应用程序,不会移除已添加的凭证。”“您必须审查所有M365应用程序上的凭证。”ConnectWise表示,目前“无法讨论威胁行为者归因问题”,因为其专注于“调查、修复以及支持受影响的合作伙伴及其客户”。不过,它已呼吁客户检查其管理的任何M365环境,查看是否存在被攻破的迹象。
“Disabling M365 apps, including the abused ConnectWise apps will not remove credentials that were already added,” the firm warns. “You must review the credentials on all of your M365 applications.”ConnectWise says it “cannot discuss threat actor attribution at this time” because it is focused on “investigation, remediation, and supporting affected partners and their customers.”It has, however, called on its customers to probe any M365 environments they manage for signs of compromise.
问题就在这里变得棘手,因为ConnectWise对这些设置一无所知——这很合理,因为它是平台提供商,而其MSP客户管理最终用户关系。因此,它只能依赖MSP做正确的事。MSP没有义务披露其用于提供服务的平台。事实上,对某些组织而言,与MSP合作的吸引力在于能够获取无需学习或担心的打包服务。因此,可能对ConnectWise对其业务的贡献浑然不觉的最终用户组织,处境十分尴尬。
This is where things get tricky, because ConnectWise has no knowledge of those setups – as is proper because it is a platform provider and its MSP clients manage end-user relationships. It’s therefore relying on MSPs to do the right thing. MSPs are under no obligation to disclose the platforms they use to deliver their services. Indeed, for some organizations the allure of working with an MSP is to access packaged services they never need to learn or worry about. End-user organizations that may be happily oblivious about ConnectWise’s contribution to their business are therefore in an awkward position.
为MSP提供服务的企业是攻击者的常见目标,攻击者将攻破ConnectWise之类的平台视为可能渗透其所有合作伙伴及这些服务提供商最终用户的途径。2021年对Kaseya的攻击是此类事件最臭名昭著的例子。ConnectWise 将希望它不会夺得冠军。®
Businesses that serve MSPs are a frequent target for attackers, who see the chance to compromise the likes of ConnectWise as a possible route to crack all of their partners and those service providers' end-users. The 2021 attack on Kaseya is the most notorious example of such an incident. ConnectWise will be hoping it doesn't take the crown. ®