北约成员国芬兰正准备将反人员地雷重新纳入其军事装备库，一份约一百万枚地雷的合同预计将很快签署，此举紧随芬兰退出旨在消除这类武器的《渥太华公约》之后。这一举动发生在赫尔辛基试图加强领土防御，以应对长期存在的俄罗斯威胁，以及未来几年其东部边境可能出现更大规模俄罗斯军事存在的背景下。
NATO member Finland is preparing to reintroduce anti-personnel landmines into its military arsenal, with a contract for around one million examples due to be signed soon, following the country’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention that aims to eliminate these weapons. The move comes as Helsinki looks to strengthen its territorial defenses against a longstanding Russian threat and the prospect of a larger Russian military presence along its eastern border in the years ahead.
芬兰退出禁止使用、储存、生产和转让反人员地雷的条约，于今年1月10日生效。反映出北约东翼成员国对俄罗斯军事姿态以及乌克兰战争教训日益增长的担忧，波兰、立陶宛、拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚也已采取行动退出该公约。
Finland’s withdrawal from the treaty, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, took effect on January 10 of this year. Reflecting growing concern among NATO’s eastern-flank members about Russia’s military posture and the lessons of the war in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also moved to leave the convention.
2026年2月3日，两名身着冬季迷彩服的芬兰新兵在芬兰卡亚尼的卡伊努旅（Kainuu Brigade，芬兰陆军一个单位）媒体日活动中，在铺满积雪的森林里布设反人员地雷。照片由Alessandro RAMPAZZO / AFP拍摄几个世纪以来，地雷一直被用来妨碍进攻者的行动、减缓行动速度，并迫使部队投入时间和资源清除障碍。特别是反人员地雷，长期以来一直被用于防御性战役，但它们伴随着重大人道主义风险。
Two Finnish conscripts wearing winter camouflage uniforms walk through the snow-covered forest while installing anti-personnel mines during a media day event at the Kainuu Brigade, a Finnish Army unit in Kajaani, Finland, on February 3, 2026. Photo by Alessandro RAMPAZZO / AFP Mines have, for many centuries, been used to complicate an attacker’s movement, slow operations, and force troops to devote time and resources to clearing obstacles. Anti-personnel mines, in particular, have long been employed in defensive campaigns, but they come with significant humanitarian risks.
它们可能在敌对行动结束很久之后杀死或致残平民，因此在许多国家——至少在那些国家不认为存在现实入侵风险时——被视为违反国际人道法。
They can kill or maim civilians long after hostilities end, which has seen them fall foul of international humanitarian law in many countries — at least when those nations don’t see a realistic risk of invasion.
反人员地雷重新回到议程，足以说明欧洲安全环境已经恶化到何种程度。
It is a measure of how badly the European security environment has deteriorated that anti-personnel mines are back on the agenda.
芬兰国防部队此前表示，与国内国防工业的谈判以及军事人员的培训准备工作将于今年年初开始。现在他们宣布，该项目将采购两种由芬兰制造的反人员地雷。
The Finnish Defense Forces previously said that discussions with the domestic defense industry and preparations to train military personnel would begin early this year. It has now announced that the project seeks two different types of anti-personnel mines, of Finnish manufacture.
这两种武器包括一种通过绊线触发装置引爆的现代管状地雷，以及一种通过压力触发装置引爆的步兵地雷。未来，芬兰还可能采购更先进的技术型地雷，包括俄罗斯在乌克兰使用的集束地雷。总体而言，在那场冲突中，双方都广泛使用了反人员地雷；基辅尤其从美国提供的援助物资中接收了这类地雷（详情可参考相关报道）。美国和俄罗斯都未签署《渥太华公约》。
The two weapons will comprise a modern tube mine activated by a tripwire trigger, and a pressure-activated step mine. In the future, more technically advanced mines may also be procured, including cluster-type mines of the kind deployed by Russia in Ukraine. In general, anti-personnel mines have been very widely used by both sides in that conflict, with Kyiv notably receiving them as part of U.S. air packages, as you can read about here . Neither the United States nor Russia are signatories of the Ottawa Convention.
这枚被乌克兰武装部队缴获的俄罗斯MON-50反人员地雷。 正式启动，”芬兰陆军工程监察官里库·米科宁上校（Riku Mikkonen）表示。
A Russian MON-50 anti-personnel mine captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Photo by Thierry Monasse/Getty Images “The aim is for production of the new anti-personnel mines to begin in Finland in 2028,” said Col. Riku Mikkonen, inspector of engineers for the Finnish Army Command.
“我们目前正在进行物资采购项目的准备工作，包括市场调研阶段。同时，我们也在制定这些地雷的技术规格，”米科宁补充道，“我们很快将进入招标阶段，以便最终通过竞争性招标程序签订合同。”
“We have a materials procurement project underway, which is currently in the preparatory and market review phase. At the same time, we are drawing up the technical specifications for the mines,” Mikkonen added.
2026年2月3日，在芬兰卡亚尼（Kajaani）的凯努（Kainuu）旅举行的媒体日活动上，里库·米科宁上校正在讲话。 。不过，一旦采购工作正式启动，芬兰国防部队的反人员地雷库存数量将恢复到2012年签署《渥太华公约》之前的水平。
“We will soon move on to the stage where we issue requests for tenders, so that we can eventually proceed to a competitive tendering process and conclude contracts.”Colonel Riku Mikkonen looks on during a media day event at the Kainuu Brigade in Kajaani, Finland on February 3, 2026.
首批新型地雷及相关训练设备预计将于2027年投入使用。最终，所有应征入伍的士兵都将接受使用反人员地雷的训练。该项目的总成本约为1.1亿美元，最后一批地雷的计划交付时间是在2030年代。
Photo by Alessandro RAMPAZZO / AFP At this point, no contracts have been signed. However, once the procurement effort is underway, the Finnish Defense Forces are set to return their anti-personnel mine stockpile to what it was before acceding to the Ottawa Convention in 2012.
赫尔辛基方面明确表示，芬兰在和平时期并不打算布设反人员地雷；米科宁表示，这些武器仅会在紧急情况下使用。
The first new mines and associated training equipment are expected to become available during 2027. Ultimately, all conscripts will be trained to employ anti-personnel mines.
2025年12月3日，在位于卡亚尼附近的武奥桑卡（Vuosanka），一名芬兰士兵正在参加北约与俄罗斯边境举行的大规模军事演习。照片由Owen Humphreys/PA Images通过Getty Images提供。
The total cost of the project is around $110 million, with the last of the mines scheduled to be delivered in the 2030s. Helsinki has stressed that it does not intend to lay anti-personnel mines during peacetime. Mikkonen said the weapons would be used only under emergency conditions.
芬兰的这一决定体现了其国防理念——这一理念长期以来一直受到苏联侵略行为的直接影响。苏联曾在1939年入侵芬兰，引发了冬季战争，并在1941年至1944年间再次与芬兰发生冲突。芬兰虽然失去了部分领土，但成功保持了独立。此后，该国继续实行征兵制度，建立了规模庞大的预备役部队，并制定了以“让任何入侵行动付出高昂代价”为目标的防御战略。
A Finnish soldier at Vuosanka near Kajaani during a major exercise on NATO’s border with Russia on December 3, 2025. Photo by Owen Humphreys/PA Images via Getty Images Finland’s decision reflects a national defense philosophy that has long been shaped by direct experience with Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, beginning the Winter War, and fought another conflict with the country from 1941 to 1944. Finland lost territory but preserved its independence, subsequently maintaining conscription, a large trained reserve, and a defense strategy built around making any invasion costly.
2022年俄罗斯对乌克兰的大规模入侵进一步加剧了芬兰的担忧：欧洲爆发大规模常规战争的可能性依然存在。芬兰于2023年4月加入了北约，该国与俄罗斯的边境线长达800多英里。
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced Finnish concerns that major conventional warfare in Europe remained a realistic possibility. Finland joined NATO in April 2023, and the country shares a little over 800 miles of border with Russia.
芬兰的防御策略历来强调快速动员军队以保卫国土，并尽可能延缓敌军的进攻速度，直到援军抵达。在这种情况下，反人员地雷的作用显而易见：它们被用来减缓步兵的移动速度，阻碍敌军在脆弱地区的推进。从理论上讲，反人员地雷的杀伤效果尤为显著——尤其是对于一个国土面积相对较小、但边境线却非常长的国家来说。
Finland’s defensive approach traditionally emphasizes rapid mobilization to defend national territory and delay a much larger attacking force until reinforcements can arrive. The role of anti-personnel mines in that scenario is clear, being sown to slow down infantry movements and hamper advances through vulnerable areas. Their disproportionate effect, at least in theory, is especially relevant for a country with a relatively tiny population compared to the length of its border.
与此同时，反人员地雷只是更广泛的防御系统中的一个组成部分；该防御系统还包括火炮、空袭、工程障碍物、防御工事以及预备部队。值得注意的是，芬兰还拥有大量反坦克和反车辆地雷，其中大部分都是本土制造的。
At the same time, anti-personnel mines would form only one part of a much broader defensive system incorporating artillery, airstrikes, engineering obstacles, fortifications, and reserve forces. It should be noted that Finland also has a considerable armory of anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines, most of which are of local manufacture.
2025年2月22日，在芬兰库沃拉附近，美国陆军国民警卫队的士兵们在芬兰陆军卡累利阿旅的教官指导下，学习了快速及有条不紊地布设反坦克地雷的各种技术。照片由美国陆军国民警卫队军士长马克·希顿（Marc Heaton）拍摄。
Virginia Army National Guard soldiers train on multiple techniques for both the hasty and deliberate emplacement of anti-tank mines with trainers from the Finnish Army’s Karelia Brigade during Exercise Arctic Forge 25, on February 22, 2025, near Kouvola, Finland. U.S. Army National Guard photos by Staff Sgt. Marc Heaton
总体而言，莫斯科一直在重组其军事指挥体系，并开始为在北欧地区加强常规军事存在奠定基础。2024年，俄罗斯重新设立了“列宁格勒军区”——这一举措显然是对芬兰和瑞典加入北约的反应。
In general, Moscow has been restructuring its military command arrangements and starting to establish the foundations for a larger conventional presence across northern Europe. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District, an apparent response to Finland’s and Sweden’s subsequent entry into NATO.
“列宁格勒军区”负责管辖一个具有战略意义的区域，该区域涵盖了通往圣彼得堡的通道、与芬兰接壤的地区，以及延伸至北极地区的领土。这一军区的重新设立为俄罗斯提供了一个专门的指挥机构，用于协调在该地区对抗北约部队的行动。
The Leningrad Military District is responsible for a strategically important region that covers the approaches to St. Petersburg, areas bordering Finland, and territory extending toward the Arctic. Its reestablishment gives Russia a dedicated command structure for managing forces facing NATO across this northern sector.
2020年6月20日，俄罗斯士兵参加了在圣彼得堡市中心举行的胜利日阅兵式前的演练。照片由奥尔加·马尔采娃（OLGA MALTSEVA）通过法新社（AFP）提供。
Russian servicemen take part in a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade in downtown St. Petersburg on June 20, 2020. Photo by OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP via Getty Images
虽然设立新的军区本身确实增强了俄罗斯的军事力量，但这并不一定意味着其作战能力会随之显著提升。
While significant, the creation of a military district does not necessarily generate additional combat power.
俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争仍在持续消耗其人力资源、装备以及后勤资源等。尽管如此，莫斯科的长期计划仍指向在面对芬兰及整个北约联盟的地区大幅扩充其地面部队和军事基础设施。
Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to drain resources in terms of personnel, equipment, logistics, and more. Nevertheless, Moscow’s longer-term plans point toward a substantial expansion of its ground forces and military infrastructure in areas facing Finland and the wider NATO alliance.
俄罗斯军事重组的一个核心要素是在卡累利阿共和国组建第44军，该共和国位于芬兰东部边境附近。该军于2024年成立，是加强俄罗斯在西北部军事存在的更广泛努力的一部分。
A central element of Russia’s reorganization is the formation of the 44th Army Corps in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland’s eastern border. The corps was established in 2024 as part of the wider effort to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the northwest.
俄罗斯更广泛的军事发展还包括科拉半岛和通往北极的通道，那里的设施为北方舰队及其战略核潜艇部队提供支持。
Russia’s wider military development also encompasses the Kola Peninsula and approaches to the Arctic, where facilities support the Northern Fleet and its strategic nuclear submarine force .
去年的卫星图像显示了坎达拉克沙附近卢普切-萨维诺驻地的建设情况，其中包括用于容纳一个炮兵旅以及至少部分工程兵的设施。该地点位于芬兰边境以东约70英里处。
Satellite imagery last year showed construction at the Lupche-Savino garrison near Kandalaksha, including facilities intended to accommodate an artillery brigade and at least part of an engineering brigade. The location is approximately 70 miles east of Finland’s border.
今年早些时候，芬兰媒体Yle的另一篇报道发现，俄罗斯军方正在扩建新维尔加镇的一个基地，以容纳多达6000名俄罗斯士兵。该基地距离芬兰边境约100英里。突发新闻：俄罗斯究竟在哪里建造其庞大的新军事驻地？
Earlier this year, a separate report by the Finnish Yle media outlet found that the Russian military was expanding a base in the town of Novaya Vilga to hold as many as 6,000 Russian troops. It is located about 100 miles from the Finnish border. Breaking News: Where exactly is Russia building its massive new military garrison?
在芬兰东部边境后方，一座全新的基地正在拔地而起，这是首次出现这样的情况，该基地将容纳多达6000名士兵。来看看首批卫星数据：
For the first time, a completely new base is going up behind Finland's eastern border, set to hold up to 6,000 soldiers. Take a look at the first satellite data: #russia pic.twitter.com/2UvQXheaAP
— Mika Mäkeläinen (@Mikareport) June 10, 2026 For Finland, the situation could change dramatically if the war in Ukraine winds down, and the Russian military assembles in greater strength closer to its borders.
芬兰《2026年军事情报评估》认为，俄罗斯的军事改革尚未显著增强其近邻地区的军事能力。但该评估仍预计，在条件允许的情况下，俄罗斯的军事能力将大幅提升，并认定芬兰是战后未来力量发展的一个主要方向。
Finland’s Military Intelligence Review 2026 assesses that Russia’s military reforms have not yet significantly increased its capabilities in its immediate vicinity. But it still anticipates a substantial increase in Russian military capabilities as circumstances permit and identifies Finland as a major direction for future force development after the war.
乌克兰停火或达成和解，并不会自动使俄罗斯能够对芬兰发动重大进攻。停火可能会减轻俄罗斯眼前的军事压力，但对克里姆林宫而言，仍将构成严重的经济和政治挑战。俄罗斯的战时开支维持了国防工业的生产和就业，但削减这笔开支可能会暴露结构性弱点。
A ceasefire or settlement in Ukraine would not automatically enable Russia to launch a major offensive against Finland. A ceasefire could ease the immediate military pressure on Russia while still creating a serious economic and political challenge for the Kremlin. Russia’s wartime spending has sustained defense-sector production and employment, but winding that spending down risks exposing structural weaknesses.
即便达成停火或和解，莫斯科仍需重建部队、更换装备、补充人员，并建立维持大规模行动所需的后勤能力。不过，迹象表明，这一过程至少在一定程度上已经开始。
With a ceasefire or settlement, Moscow would still need to rebuild units, replace equipment, replenish personnel, and establish the logistical capacity to sustain large-scale operations. However, there are indications that this is already happening, at least to a degree.
例如，最近的影像分析显示，位于距芬兰边境约450英里处的第22中央坦克储备基地，正在大量新交付的俄罗斯装甲车辆，包括新型T-90M坦克。
Recent imagery analysis indicates , for example, a significant buildup of newly delivered Russian armor, including new T-90M tanks, at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base, located around 450 miles from the Finnish border.
请注意，配备T-90M、BTR-82A和BMP-3M（也许还有BREM）的第22基地，只是最新一个正在重新装填的储存基地。还有主要装备2S19的第80基地，以及自2025年起位于芬兰边境附近、装备2S43和2S44的第374基地……——Jompy（@Jonpy99）2026年10月15日芬兰计划采购反人员地雷，是为应对潜在未来冲突而做更广泛准备的一部分。
Mind you, the 22nd with T-90Ms, BTR-82As and BMP-3ms (and maybe BREMs) is just the latest storage depot beign refilled. There's also the 80th mainly with 2S19s and the 374th near the Finnish border with 2S43s and 2S44s since 2025…— Jompy (@Jonpy99) October 15, 2026 Finland’s planned acquisition of anti-personnel mines fits into a broader effort to prepare for a potential future conflict.
芬兰——以及其他北欧国家——国防规划者心中最为牵挂的事实是，俄罗斯正在重建支持其在北约北部边境附近部署更大规模军事存在所需的指挥结构和基础设施，尽管乌克兰战争限制了其眼前这样做的能力。
Prominent in the minds of Finnish — and other Nordic — defense planners is the fact that Russia is rebuilding the command structures and infrastructure needed to support a larger military presence near NATO’s northern frontier , even as the war in Ukraine limits its immediate ability to do so.