美国仅靠偶尔的外交访问和矿产交易，无法在非洲与中国竞争。它需要一套持久的经济战略，将非洲国家视为伙伴，而非奖品。
The United States cannot compete with China in Africa through occasional diplomatic visits and mineral deals alone. It needs a durable economic strategy that treats African countries as partners, not prizes.
中国在拉美的崛起本应给华盛顿上了一课，这一课的意义远超西半球：战略影响力很少凭一次戏剧性的举动建立，而是通过贸易、基础设施、金融、技术以及多年深化的关系逐步积累。深入报道——中期选举正酝酿之际。关注最新的中期选举新闻、分析和专家观点，享受无限访问。已经是会员？
China’s rise in Latin America should have taught Washington a lesson that extends far beyond the Western Hemisphere: strategic influence is rarely built in a single dramatic move. It accumulates through trade, infrastructure, finance, technology, and relationships that deepen over years. In-depth coverageas the midterms take shape. Follow the latest midterm news, analysis, and expert perspectives with unlimited access. Already a member?
北京早在华盛顿之前就明白这一点。基础设施支撑贸易，融资打开投资之门，商业关系为长期合作留下空间。
Beijing understood this long before Washington did. Infrastructure supported trade. Financing opened doors to investment. Commercial relationships created room for longer-term cooperation.
这并不是说每一项中国投资都是地缘政治操作，也不是说拉美和非洲可以互换。它们并非如此。关键在于，经济参与可以在危机显现其重要性之前，就为战略选择提供可能。非洲正是美国下一步必须运用这一经验的地方。
The lesson is not that every Chinese investment is a geopolitical maneuver, or that Latin America and Africa are interchangeable. They are not. It is that economic engagement can create strategic options long before a crisis reveals their importance. Africa is where the U.S. must apply that lesson next.
中国外交部称，2024年中非贸易额创下2956亿美元的纪录。该数字并不证明政治上的一致，但显示了双方关系的规模。核心问题并非中国投资的金额有多少，而是这些投资是否帮助非洲经济建立持久的生产能力。
China-Africa trade reached a record $295.6 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The figure does not prove political alignment, but it shows the scale of the relationship. The central question is not simply how much China invests. It is whether those investments help African economies build lasting productive capacity.
人们常通过关键矿产——钴、铜、锂、石墨以及其他对电池和先进制造业至关重要的资源——来讨论非洲的重要性。但仅以获取原材料为核心的战略，风险在于把非洲经济当作他人工业未来的供应方。
Africa’s importance is often discussed through critical minerals: cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite, and other resources essential to batteries and advanced manufacturing. But a strategy focused principally on securing raw materials risks treating African economies as suppliers to somebody else’s industrial future.
非洲国家日益希望实现本地加工、制造和技能发展。这些雄心并非美国商业利益的障碍，而可以成为更持久伙伴关系的基础。如果华盛顿想要可靠的供应链，就应帮助生产这些资源的经济体提升加工和运输能力——不仅投资矿山，还要投资电力、港口、数字基础设施、技术教育和本地企业。
African countries increasingly want local processing, manufacturing, and skills development. These ambitions are not obstacles to American commercial interests. They can be the foundation of a more durable partnership. If Washington wants reliable supply chains, it should help the economies producing these resources become more capable of processing and transporting them — investing not only in mines but in electricity, ports, digital infrastructure, technical education, and local enterprises.
美国支持的洛比托走廊，将刚果（金）和赞比亚的矿产产区与安哥拉大西洋海岸连接起来，展示了基础设施如何同时服务于商业和战略目标。其长远价值将取决于它所带动的经济活动和区域贸易，而不仅仅是它运输的矿产量。走廊应当连接经济体，而不应仅仅把开采点与出口码头连起来。
The U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor, linking mineral-producing areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola’s Atlantic coast, shows how infrastructure can serve both commercial and strategic objectives. Its lasting value will depend on the economic activity and regional trade it enables, not merely on the volume of minerals it moves. A corridor should connect economies, not simply extraction sites to export terminals.
美国在私人资本、技术和既有关系方面拥有真正优势。但优势不会自动转化为影响力。企业需要可预期的规则，以及与生产性产业建设周期相匹配的融资。政府需要的合作伙伴，是在峰会结束、政府更迭或大宗商品需求暂时激增之后，依然保持参与的伙伴。
The U.S. has real advantages in private capital, technology, and established relationships. But advantages do not automatically become influence. Businesses need predictable rules and financing that match the time it takes productive industries to build. Governments need partners who stay engaged beyond a summit, a change of administration, or a temporary spike in commodity demand.
华盛顿应研究中国做法的连续性，而非照搬其模式。美国可以提供独特主张：有竞争力的私人投资、透明的协议和市场准入。但私人投资的承诺不是投资，宣布的倡议也不是已完成的项目。
Washington should study the continuity of China’s approach without copying its model. America can offer a distinct proposition: competitive private investment, transparent agreements, and access to markets. But promises of private investment are not investments, and announced initiatives are not completed projects.
非洲也不是单一市场。肯尼亚的机遇不同于尼日利亚或安哥拉。严肃的战略必须因国制宜，同时支持区域一体化，包括非洲大陆自由贸易区。
Nor is Africa a single market. Opportunities in Kenya differ from those in Nigeria or Angola. A serious strategy must be country-specific while supporting regional integration, including the African Continental Free Trade Area.
最重要的是，华盛顿必须避免将非洲视为美国击败中国的战场。非洲各国政府都有自己的利益诉求；他们会权衡各种提议，并根据自己的发展优先事项来做出决策。华盛顿不应要求非洲国家在建立合作关系时必须选边站队。相反，美国应该提供足够有吸引力的合作条件（包括积极倾听非洲国家的意见、提供投资支持，以及帮助非洲经济从单纯出口资源转向生产高附加值产品），从而让非洲国家有实际的理由选择与美国合作。
Above all, Washington must avoid framing Africa as the arena in which America must defeat China. African governments have their own interests. They will weigh competing offers and decide based on their development priorities. Washington should not demand that they choose sides as the price of partnership. It should make its offer compelling enough that they have practical reasons to choose it — by listening as well as investing, and by helping African economies move from exporting resources toward producing higher-value goods. CHINA HAS A STRANGLEHOLD ON AMERICA’S WEAPONS.
中国在美军的武器采购方面占据着主导地位；而得克萨斯州则掌控着美国军火制造业的关键环节。对美国来说，非洲的重要性不应仅仅体现在华盛顿担心自己会在与中国的竞争中处于劣势时才被提及；事实上，非洲经济正在塑造全球市场格局，因此非洲对美国而言具有至关重要的意义。
TEXAS HOLDS THE SCISSORS Africa should not matter to America only when Washington fears losing ground to Beijing. It should matter because African economies are shaping global markets. China played the long game in Latin America.
中国在拉丁美洲实施了长期的战略布局；美国面临的下一个挑战是：它能否建立起属于自己的、具有持久影响力的合作关系——这种合作关系不仅是为了与中国竞争，更是为了让非洲国家有理由选择与美国合作。战略影响力并非通过“抓住机会”就能获得的；而是需要通过实际行动（如积极参与、明智投资以及持之以恒地推进合作）来实现的。
America’s next test is whether it can build something enduring of its own — not simply to compete with China, but to establish partnerships African countries have reason to choose. Strategic influence is not secured by recognizing an opportunity. It is secured by showing up, investing wisely, and staying the course.