在我经历过的所有金融事件中，没有哪一件比2007年开始的全球金融危机更令我着迷。
Of all the events I have lived through in finance, none has intrigued me more than the global financial crisis that began in 2007.
2008年9月15日，雷曼兄弟倒闭后，全球股市一路暴跌。但经验让我掌握了一条基本规则：只要金融体系本身能够挽救，经济和股价终将恢复。我近距离地目睹了这一过程。
After Lehman Brothers collapsed on Sept. 15, 2008, equity markets around the world went into free fall. Yet experience had taught me one essential rule: if the financial system itself could be saved, the economy and share prices would, in time, recover. I watched that process unfold at close range.
转折点出现在人们开始习惯性地谈论“万亿美元”时——在此之前，这个计量单位几乎只出现在美国联邦预算的讨论中。
The turning point came when people began speaking routinely of "trillions of dollars" -- a unit of account that, until then, had scarcely been used outside discussions of the U.S. federal budget.
10月3日，《紧急经济稳定法案》成为法律，赋予财政部动用公共资金稳定金融体系的权力。这个最初被宣传为将银行资产负债表上的问题资产移除的方案，很快就变成了通过直接注入公共资金为银行增资的载体。
On Oct. 3, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act became law, giving the Treasury authority to use public funds to stabilize the financial system. The program, initially presented as a way to remove troubled assets from bank balance sheets, soon became the vehicle for recapitalizing banks through direct injections of public capital.
与此同时，美联储正在与世界各主要央行扩大美元互换安排。通过这些安排，美国可以向全球急需的储备货币供应美元，使关键央行能够向其管辖范围内的机构提供美元资金。
At the same time, the Federal Reserve was expanding dollar swap lines with major central banks around the world. Through those arrangements, the United States could supply the reserve currency the global system desperately needed, enabling key central banks to provide dollar funding to institutions in their own jurisdictions.
我长期以来的口号是：“让我看看钱。”要阻止银行挤兑，光靠话是不够的。你需要巨额资金。如今，美国领导人开始以这种规模行动。我得出结论，最糟糕的时期已经过去。
My refrain had long been, "Show me the money." To stop a run on a bank, words are not enough. You need money on an enormous scale. Now America's leaders had begun to act on that scale. The worst, I concluded, was over.
10月中旬，有人邀请我在慕尼黑工业大学发表演讲。他们要求我讲讲接下来会发生什么。最大的礼堂座无虚席，观众脸上写满了恐惧。我直截了当地告诉他们：“金融危机已经结束。”离开礼堂时，我心中闪过一丝怀疑。万一我错了呢？然后我再次仔细思考。不，我决定。我不可能是错的。
In mid-October, I was asked to speak at the Technical University of Munich. Tell us what happens next, they said. The largest auditorium was packed to the aisles, and fear was written across the faces of the audience. I told them flatly, "The financial crisis is over." As I left the hall, a flicker of doubt crossed my mind. What if I'm wrong? Then I thought it through once more. No, I decided. There is no possibility that I am wrong.
危机之后，我开始在华盛顿花一些时间。亲眼目睹政府如何应对危机后，我意识到投资已无法与政策分离。仅仅询问“哪里有好交易”已经不够，仅仅收集政策情报也不够。有时，政策本身必须被改变。政府面临各方压力，当政策朝着有害的方向发展时，总得有人站出来表明这违背国家利益。我把韦恩·伯曼引入公司，他是一位精通政府关系的专业人士，几乎没有人比他更了解华盛顿的运作方式。
After the crisis, I began to spend some time in Washington. Having seen with my own eyes how the government contained the crisis, I realized that investing could no longer be separated from policy. It was no longer enough to ask, "Where are the good deals?" Nor was it enough simply to gather intelligence on policy. At times, policy itself had to be changed. Governments are subject to pressure from every direction, and when policy is moving in a harmful direction, someone has to make the case that it is contrary to the national interest. I brought Wayne Berman, a masterful government relations professional who understood better than almost anyone how Washington worked, into the firm.
由于我们在全球投资，我与政客和高级官员的交往远远超出华盛顿。
Because we invest around the world, my dealings with politicians and senior officials extend far beyond Washington.
慕尼黑演讲后，当我前往机场途中时，电话响了。是法国总统尼古拉·萨科齐的一位助手。
After the Munich lecture, as I was heading to the airport, my phone rang. It was an aide to President Nicolas Sarkozy of France.
“我听说你要和一群华尔街人士去俄罗斯，与总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫会面，”他说。
"I understand you're going to Russia for a meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev with a bunch of the Wall Street people," he said.
萨科齐和我在法国南部拥有毗邻的房子，我们的妻子和我们曾一起共进晚餐。当时法国担任欧盟轮值主席国。这个请求简单但非同寻常：我要请梅德韦杰夫为欧洲的危机应对出资100亿欧元。这需要一次一对一会面。梅德韦杰夫的工作人员说他没有时间。
Sarkozy and I owned houses near each other in the south of France, and our wives and we had dined together. France then held the rotating presidency of the European Union. The request was simple but extraordinary: I was to ask Medvedev to contribute 10 billion euros to Europe's crisis response. That required a one-on-one meeting. Medvedev's staff said he had no time.
“我只需要两分钟，”我告诉他们。“告诉他，欧盟主席让我带话。”接着我被告知没有地方会面。“我会在壁橱里和他见面，”我说。
"I need two minutes," I told them. "Tell him the president of the EU wants me to deliver a message." Then I was told there was nowhere to meet.
我拿到了会面机会。我传达了口信，离开时说：“嗯，那甚至不到两分钟。”判断市场顶部并不特别难，判断底部才难。大多数人在下跌途中买入，最终只能忍受亏损。即使你在底部买入，也不能保证价格很快就会上涨。
"I'll meet him in a closet," I said. I got my meeting. I delivered the message and, as I left, said, "Well, that didn't even take two minutes." Calling the top of a market is not especially hard. Calling the bottom is. Most people buy on the way down and end up nursing losses. And even if you do buy at the bottom, there is no guarantee that prices will rise soon.
例如，从 1982 年开始，随着石油价格的暴跌，休斯顿地区的房地产价值也随之大幅下跌。当时你本可以在房价最低点买入房产，然后看着房价继续下跌；但房价其实并没有再回升。在接下来的 10 年里，你根本无法从中获利。
From 1982, for example, when oil collapsed, Houston office values collapsed with it. You could have bought at the bottom and watched prices fall no further. But they did not rise either. For 10 years, you would have made nothing.
我们的投资原则是：必须等到市场从低点回升至少 10% 之后再考虑买入。即便如此，依然有足够的利润空间可以获取。不要贪心，给市场一个至少 10% 到 15% 的上涨空间。
Our rule is to hold off buying until the market has risen at least 10 percent from its lows. Even then, there is ample profit to be made. Don't be greedy. Give the market its 10 to 15 percent.
我认为，在 2008 年 10 月就断定金融危机已经结束，实在是一个过于草率的决定。道琼斯工业平均指数直到 2009 年 3 月才触底；而黑石集团（Blackstone）直到 2010 年才重新开始承担投资风险。
To have judged, in October 2008, that the crisis was over was, I believe, remarkably early. The Dow Jones Industrial Average did not reach its final bottom until March 2009, and it was later still -- into 2010 -- before Blackstone began taking on risk again.
斯蒂芬·施瓦茨曼（Stephen Schwarzman）是黑石集团的联合创始人、董事长兼首席执行官。
Stephen Schwarzman is co-founder, chairman and CEO of Blackstone.