过去四年半以来，欧洲家门口的这场战争一直困扰着决策者。然而，他们一直将其视为一种迫在眉睫的威胁，而不是一种正在侵蚀欧洲赖以立足的基础的威胁。
For the past four-and-a-half years, the war on Europe’s doorstep has haunted policymakers. Yet they have treated it as a looming threat rather than one already eroding the very foundations on which Europe stands.
尽管前线推移缓慢，俄罗斯的战争已经摧毁了乌克兰南部和东部的大部分地区。然而对欧洲而言，挑战从来不仅限于战场。支持乌克兰和遏制俄罗斯考验着该大洲的经济资源和政治团结。如今，随着美国总统唐纳德·特朗普试图强迫基辅接受一项不利的协议，并一再威胁要撤回美国的支持，欧洲正面临着独自承担更多这种负担的前景。
Russia’s war has devastated much of Ukraine’s south and east, even as the front lines have shifted only slowly. For Europe, however, the challenge has never been confined to the battlefield. Supporting Ukraine and constraining Russia have tested the continent’s economic resources and political unity. Now, as United States President Donald Trump seeks to force a disadvantageous settlement on Kyiv and repeatedly threatens to withdraw US support, Europe faces the prospect of shouldering even more of that burden alone.
即使最新危机得以避免，欧洲也不能再假设华盛顿会保证其安全。它必须具备维持乌克兰防御的财政能力、自卫的工业实力以及遏制莫斯科的经济影响力。为了应对这些挑战，欧洲必须建立战时经济。
Even if the latest crisis is averted, Europe can no longer assume that Washington will guarantee its security. It must develop the financial capacity to sustain Ukraine’s defence, the industrial strength to defend itself and the economic leverage to constrain Moscow. To meet these challenges, Europe must build a war economy.
过去四年的经历为欧洲如何为这样一项努力提供资金提供了经验教训，但也发出了可能破坏该努力的分裂警告。欧盟已经走在近期为乌克兰提供资金的前沿，从2024年在七国集团（G7）500亿美元“特别收益加速（ERA）”贷款中占有的181亿欧元（合210亿美元）份额，到今年4月最终敲定一项新的900亿欧元（合100亿美元）贷款——该贷款在没有美国承诺的情况下达成。
The past four years offer lessons in how Europe can finance such an effort, but also warnings about the divisions that could undermine it. The European Union has already been at the forefront of Ukraine’s recent financing, moving from an 18.1-billion-euro ($21bn) share of the G7’s $50bn Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans in 2024 to finalising a new 90-billion-euro ($100bn) loan this April, one that came without US commitment.
然而，在诸多问题上，特别是在涉及遏制俄罗斯的问题上，内部仍存在分歧。本月，欧盟通过了其有史以来规模最大的制裁名单。但尽管这些措施增加了创纪录数量的列管对象，却几乎没有扩大受限活动的范围，也没有加速淘汰俄罗斯能源进口，管道天然气进口甚至仍被允许持续到2027年秋季。欧洲领导人还对特朗普决定放弃新的涉俄制裁表示担忧，因为他正试图应对其外交政策所带来的成本。
Yet internal divisions remain over numerous issues, particularly as they pertain to constraining Russia. This month, the EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings. But while the measures added a record number of designations, they did little to broaden the scope of restricted activity and did not accelerate the phase-out of Russian energy imports, with pipeline gas imports still permitted until autumn 2027. European leaders have also expressed concern over Trump’s decision to waive new Russia-related sanctions as he seeks to grapple with the costs his foreign policy has wrought.
然而，美以对伊朗的战争充其量表明，欧洲针对俄罗斯碳氢化合物的措施本可以走得更远。今年2月之前，每天约有2000万桶的原油和石油产品以及每年约1100亿立方米的液化天然气（LNG）通过霍尔木兹海峡。相比之下，俄罗斯在9月份出口了约650万桶的原油和石油产品，去年出口了约430亿立方米的液化天然气——分别约为霍尔木兹海峡石油和液化天然气运量的三分之一和五分之二。
However, the US-Israel war on Iran has, if anything, shown that Europe’s measures against Russian hydrocarbons could have gone further. Before February, some 20 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude and oil products and roughly 110 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) passed through the Strait of Hormuz. By comparison, Russia exported about 6.5 million bpd of oil and products in September, and some 43bcm of LNG last year – about a third of Hormuz’s oil and two-fifths of its LNG.
随着危机持续且特朗普寻求额外的俄罗斯供应，欧洲必须将其遏制莫斯科的努力与加大对自身安全的投资结合起来。
As the crisis continues and Trump seeks additional Russian supplies, Europe must complement its efforts to constrain Moscow with greater investment in its own security.
第一步、也是最重要的一步，是建立一个常态化的欧盟联合借款框架——不仅要为乌克兰持续的防御提供资金，还要为欧洲维持自身防务所需的国防工业提供资金，并在必要时战胜来自俄罗斯的未来威胁。危机催生创新，正如新冠疫情期间所证明的那样，当时欧盟成员国抛弃了长期以来对共同化借款的厌恶，于2020年创立了750亿欧元的“下一代欧盟”复苏基金。
The first and most important step is to establish a standing framework for joint EU borrowing – not only to finance Ukraine’s continued defence, but also to fund the defence industry Europe will need to sustain its own defence and, if necessary, prevail against future threats from Russia. Crisis begets innovation, as demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic, when EU member states pushed past their long-held aversion to mutualised borrowing, creating the 750-billion-euro NextGenerationEU recovery fund in 2020.
欧盟对ERA贷款以及今年90亿欧元融资机制的贡献（两者均由欧盟共同借款出资），将这一逻辑延伸到了战时财政。但这些仍然是针对危机的权宜之计。深化财政与资本市场联盟，并建设一个真正的财政军事国家，将为欧洲的实力及其威慑和赢得战争的能力奠定基础。
The EU’s contribution to the ERA loans and this year’s 90-billion-euro facility, both financed by common EU borrowing, extended that logic to wartime finance. But these remain crisis-by-crisis improvisations. Deepening fiscal and capital markets union and building a genuine fiscal-military state would provide the foundations of Europe’s power and its ability to deter and win wars.
同样的逻辑如今在美国也在上演，那里深厚的资本市场赋予了SpaceX等公司发展诸如星链网络等重塑现代战争的技术的空间——这些公司在看到回报之前进行了多年的巨额投资。这种技术的重要性现在在乌克兰的战场上得到了深刻的体验，基辅的通讯一直依赖于一个受制于一个人（即SpaceX首席执行官埃隆·马斯克）意愿的网络。因此，欧洲需要具备财政能力来资助自身的的技术开发和采购。
The same logic plays out in the US today, where deep capital markets have given companies such as SpaceX, which invested heavily for years before seeing returns, the space to develop technologies such as its Starlink network that have reshaped modern warfare. The importance of this technology is now keenly felt on Ukraine’s battlefields, where Kyiv’s communications have rested on a network subject to the whims of one man, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk. Europe therefore needs the fiscal capacity to fund its own technological development and procurement.
对于法国和英国等欧洲国家现有的债务水平，人们产生可以理解的担忧。然而，俄罗斯被冻结的主权资产为支持进一步借贷提供了一种潜在途径。在动用这些资产的问题上，各方依然存在分歧；持有绝大部分此类资产的欧洲清算银行所在地比利时就反对这种做法，担心会遭到俄罗斯的法律诉讼，并损害其在全球金融体系中的地位。
There are understandable jitters about the existing indebtedness of European states such as France and the United Kingdom. However, Russia’s frozen sovereign assets offer a potential way to support further borrowing. Divisions remain over using these assets, with Belgium, which hosts the lion’s share at Euroclear, opposing such a move over fears of Russian legal action and damage to its position in the global financial system.
欧盟各成员国必须团结一致来分担这一风险，无论如何，这种风险被夸大了。并非所有的欧盟财政支持都需要以直接共同债务的形式出现。大幅扩大欧盟资本市场联盟，并在整个地区为国防企业和技术创新者建立税收优惠结构，可能会被证明更加有效。
The bloc must come together to share that risk, which is overblown in any case Not all EU fiscal support needs to come in the form of direct joint debt either. Greatly expanding the EU capital markets union and creating tax-advantaged structures across the region for defence firms and technological innovators may prove even more effective.
除了资产本身，欧洲还必须对其与俄罗斯持续的经济联系施加更大的控制。这意味着在诸如奥地利中央合作银行等案例中进行更加积极的干预。2025年，在俄罗斯一家法院作出裁决后，超过21亿欧元的资金从奥地利中央合作银行的俄罗斯子公司被划走，以赔偿与受制裁寡头奥列格·杰里帕斯卡有关联的公司拉施佩里亚。
Beyond the assets themselves, Europe must also take greater control over its continued economic linkages with Russia. That means intervening far more actively in cases such as that of Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank. In 2025, following a Russian court ruling, more than 2.1 billion euros were taken from Raiffeisen’s Russian subsidiary to compensate Rasperia, a company tied to the sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska.
维也纳法院上个月的一项裁决现在为奥地利中央合作银行寻求从欧盟境内被冻结的拉施佩里亚资产中获得赔偿铺平了道路——这一过程利用了相同的制裁豁免条款，欧洲清算银行曾凭借该条款在2025年释放了约30亿美元的资金。正是这种与莫斯科进行合法化交易的行为，才使得针对比利时的威胁依然具有可信度：如果克里姆林宫能够扣押欧洲资产，并促使欧盟境内被冻结的俄罗斯相关资产得以释放，那么每一次征用都将成为一张筹码。
A Vienna court’s ruling last month now paves the way for Raiffeisen to seek compensation from Rasperia’s frozen assets in the EU – using the same sanctions derogation through which Euroclear released some $3bn in 2025. It is precisely this kind of legalised dealing with Moscow that keeps threats like those levelled at Belgium credible: if the Kremlin can seize European assets and prompt the release of Russian-linked assets frozen in the EU, every expropriation becomes a bargaining chip.
此外，英国和欧盟越来越多地采取具有美国次级制裁某些特征的反规避措施。欧洲现在应该更加坚定地表明，协助俄罗斯规避制裁的企业将面临失去欧洲金融体系和市场准入资格的风险。即使特朗普豁免更多制裁，美国企业也会选择欧洲而不是克里姆林宫。
Furthermore, the UK and the EU have increasingly made use of measures against circumvention that share some features with US secondary sanctions. Europe should now be more assertive in making it clear that firms helping Russia evade its sanctions risk losing access to European financial systems and markets. US firms will choose Europe over the Kremlin, even if Trump waives more sanctions.
最后，欧洲应该设法减少美国对其外交和安全关系的影响。美国驻土耳其大使汤姆·巴拉克本周在卡塔尔发表讲话时表示，华盛顿正在放弃数十年来以安全换取海湾石油的交易。欧洲或许无法提供同等水平的安全保障，但它可以提供一个照顾到双方关切的互利伙伴关系。而且，正是欧洲目前在海湾地区加大投入，英国和法国部署了战机、防空系统和空中加油支援，以帮助沙特阿拉伯抵御胡塞武装的袭击。
Finally, Europe should seek to reduce US influence over its foreign and security relationships. Speaking in Qatar this week, US Ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack said Washington was moving away from its decades-old bargain of security for Gulf oil. Europe may not be able to offer the same level of security, but it can offer a mutually beneficial partnership that addresses both sides’ concerns. And it is Europe that is now stepping up in the Gulf, with the UK and France deploying jets, air defences and refuelling support to help Saudi Arabia against Houthi attacks.
与华盛顿不同，欧洲可以承诺在未来建立更深层次的伙伴关系，并充当海湾石油和天然气出口的可靠买家，作为交换，海湾国家应通过加强制裁合规性，以及首先也是最重要的是终结克里姆林宫在“欧佩克+”中的角色，采取更多行动来解决欧洲对俄罗斯的安全关切。
Unlike Washington, Europe can promise a deeper partnership in the future and serve as a reliable buyer of Gulf oil and gas exports in exchange for Gulf states doing more to address Europe’s security concerns about Russia through enhanced sanctions compliance and, first and foremost, ending the Kremlin’s role in OPEC plus.
欧洲拥有为自身安全提供资金的手段。它现在必须找到为此进行借贷的意愿。
Europe has the means to finance its own security. It must now find the will to borrow for it.