How The Economist reported on a pivotal decade in US-Cuba relations. First: the coup that took America by surprise Part 1: 1952-57 Origins of revolution Part 1: The coup that took America by surprise When Donald Trump returned to office last year, he vowed to squeeze Cuba’s communist government. It has ruled the impoverished island with an iron grip since a revolution led by Fidel Castro in 1959. Earlier this year Mr Trump got his chance.

After dramatically capturing Venezuela’s dictator, Nicolás Maduro, he could stop the country from sending oil to Cuba, and threatened to impose tariffs on anyone who did. The resulting embargo has been punishing: blackouts and shortages of basic supplies are now chronic.

His administration hoped to make life so unbearable for Cubans that they would topple their spent and cruel regime. No uprising has taken place. Yet the blockade has had another effect: the Cuban government let the private sector import fuel for the first time since 1959. It also relies more than ever on American exports of food and remittances. After decades of hostility, America’s economic leverage over its neighbour is growing.

How does this new phase in their relations fit into the sweep of Cuban history? We delved into The Economist’s archive to see how our journalists covered the rise of Castro’s communist regime, and America’s response to it. During a crucial decade in the two countries’ history, we wrote about how the revolution transformed America’s relationship with Cuba, from economic domination centred on the sugar trade to mistrust rooted in the ideological divisions of the Cold War. The endpoint of our series, America’s support for a botched invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, serves as a reminder of the geopolitical stakes for Mr Trump’s administration as it asserts itself in Latin America.

Our timeline starts with the man who dominated Cuban politics before Castro’s revolution. Fulgencio Batista was a military leader who held sway over the island for much of the 1930s and early 1940s, initially through puppet rulers and later as president. After his preferred successor lost an election in 1944, Batista went into self-imposed exile in America, later returning to serve in Cuba’s senate. On March 10th 1952 he reclaimed power in a coup against Carlos Prío Socarrás, a democratically elected president who had grown unpopular because of economic problems, corruption and gang violence.

Days later, in its next weekly edition, The Economist had reported on Batista’s takeover. We noted that the strongman had bucked a trend in Latin America. “Today it is more fashionable for such a man to recover power not by bullet but by ballot,” we wrote, citing the example of Getulio Vargas, a Brazilian dictator who had been ousted in 1945, then elected president five years later. Batista had at first planned to follow suit: he was running as a candidate in presidential elections scheduled for the summer of 1952. His change of mind, we argued, showed both his penchant for coups—by our count it was the fifth in which he was involved—and the failure of Cuba’s elite to inspire faith in democracy.

Batista’s coup took America by surprise. But Harry Truman’s administration quickly decided to recognise the new government. Doing so had practical benefits. Batista was an anti-communist who was well disposed towards American business. Over the next seven years American industry would consolidate its already considerable stake in Cuba’s economy, taking ownership of much of the country’s mining and utilities infrastructure. It also retained roughly 40% of its sugar production, by far Cuba’s biggest export at the time. Meanwhile, American tourists flocked to the island, which had a reputation as a glamorous yet convenient travel spot just 90 miles off Florida’s coast.

Turning Cuba back into America’s playground no doubt appeals to Mr Trump’s instinct as a property mogul. In fact, the opportunity that has presented itself is a more subtle one. His administration knows that bolstering the island’s private sector could help loosen the grip of Gaesa, the state’s corrupt and vast military conglomerate. Early signs are encouraging: Cupet, the state oil company, has sold off some petrol stations to entrepreneurs.

Mr Trump may hope that American businesses can reclaim a big stake in Cuba’s economy in the process. But the 1950s are hardly a model for a free and democratic Cuba. Batista’s rule was characterised by repression and violence. In November 1954 we reported that he had reneged on his promise to hold free elections, rounded up opposition figures and sent troops into Havana. Many Cubans had grown “weary” of Batista despite the “stabler rule” he had brought. We lamented his new authoritarianism, a contrast with earlier stints in power when he had accepted some limits on his rule (including by leaving office when his term had ended in 1944).

After that broken promise, an insurgency soon formed against Batista’s dictatorship. Among the would-be revolutionaries was Castro, a law graduate who had cut his teeth in Havana’s radical student politics of the late 1940s. Castro’s initial attempts to rise up against Batista failed miserably. On July 26th 1953 he led an attack of around 165 rebels on the Moncada barracks, a military stronghold on the east of the island, which was crushed by government forces. Dozens of the rebels were killed, many after capture and torture. Fidel was arrested and, along with his brother Raúl, sentenced to 15 years in prison.

But two years later the brothers were released in an amnesty for political prisoners. Castro travelled to America and then Mexico, where he gathered rebels under the banner of the July 26th Movement, named to honour the defeat at Moncada. He was joined not just by Raúl, but also Ernesto “Che” Guevara, an Argentine doctor-turned-revolutionary. They set their sights on sailing to Cuba. In November 1956 Fidel set off with around 80 rebels in a leaky yacht called the Granma, landing on the island on December 2nd. They were swiftly ambushed by Batista’s troops, but Fidel, Raúl and Che survived and fled into the jungle.

The Economist first mentioned Castro and his guerrilleros on March 23rd 1957. We described how the ragtag rebels had recovered from their heavy losses the previous year to launch an increasingly effective guerilla campaign against the state. We felt Batista’s position was secure in the short term. The dictator retained the army’s backing, the “cordial support of business interests in the United States” and a robust economy thanks to high sugar prices. But we also sent an ominous warning to the president and his supporters. “The forces against him are getting stronger”, we wrote. ■