总统特朗普一再蔑视法律和宪法,这引发了一个问题:他是否会为自己的所作所为面临刑事指控——或是任何形式的真正问责?
President Trump’s repeated defiance of the law and the Constitution raises a question: Will he ever face criminal charges — or any kind of real accountability — for what he has done?
最高法院是否放了他一马,特别是在其对2024年“特朗普诉美国案”中关于总统豁免权的裁决之后?总统可以赦免自己吗?
Did the Supreme Court let him off the hook, especially with its decision on presidential immunity in Trump v. United States in 2024? Can the president pardon himself?
如果无法提起国会或联邦诉讼,地方检察官能将这个无法无天的人绳之以法吗?
If no congressional or federal case can be made, can state prosecutors bring this renegade to justice?
特朗普去年在X和“真相社交”(Truth Social)上声称“拯救国家的人不违反任何法律”,这种说法是否有一种反常的正当性?
Is there a kind of perverse legitimacy to Trump’s claim, made last year on both X and Truth Social, that “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law”?
鉴于下周二的选举可能会对特朗普和“让美国再次伟大”(MAGA)运动造成打击,甚至可能是沉重打击——这可能会激化他走向更极端——我向法律学者征求了看法。
With the prospect that next Tuesday’s elections will deal a blow, perhaps a serious blow, to Trump and the MAGA movement — potentially provoking him to go still further to extremes — I sought out opinions from legal scholars.
我首先联系了北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校的法学教授迈克尔·格哈特,他在这些议题上的专业知识广受认可。他通过电子邮件回复了一系列问题。
I started with Michael Gerhardt, a law professor at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill widely recognized for his expertise on these issues. He replied by email to a series of questions.
他的回答反映了法律界大部分人对特朗普行为明目张胆的违法性感到愤怒,以及那种潜在的、尽管往往没有直接表露的担忧:即他将逃脱惩罚。
His answers reflect the outrage in much of the legal community over the blatant illegality of Trump’s actions and the underlying, though often not directly expressed, fear that he will go scot-free.
特朗普是否犯下了任何可以说是属于非官方职务行为、因而在他离任后可被起诉的罪行?“是的,”格哈特回答说:证据显示,特朗普可能因多项可被合理归类为非官方行为的罪行而被起诉,其中包括他为换取特赦或接触政府高层而收受的款项;通过利益输送让自己和/或家人暴富;以及试图干预或破坏选举进程;妨碍司法公正。还有许多其他行为可能使他(及其他人)面临法律制裁,例如使他个人受益的内幕交易。
Has Trump committed any crimes that could arguably be classified as unofficial acts and therefore subject to prosecution once he leaves office? “Yes,” Gerhardt replied: Evidence shows that Trump could be prosecuted for several crimes that could be reasonably classified as unofficial acts, including payments he received in exchange for pardons or access to the administration; enriching himself and/or his family from self-dealing; and attempts to interfere with or undermine the electoral process; obstruction of justice. There are many other acts for which he (and others) could face legal sanction, such as insider trading that has benefited him personally.
他是否通过其官方行为实施了可以推翻豁免权推定(presumption of immunity)的犯罪行为?
Has he committed crimes through his official acts for which the presumption of immunity might be overcome?
特朗普实施了一些官方行为,这些行为的豁免权推定是可以被推翻的,其中包括但不限于向商业伙伴及其他人发放特赦令,以此作为对其忠诚的回报。
Trump has committed official acts for which the presumption of immunity could be overcome, including but not limited to issuing pardons to business associates and others as recompense for their loyalty.
最高法院在“特朗普诉美国案”(Trump v. United States)中赋予的豁免权,在多大程度上限制了检察官获取和呈现所需证据的能力?
How much does the immunity granted by the Supreme Court in Trump v. United States constrain the ability of prosecutors to get and present the evidence they need?
最高法院赋予总统的广泛豁免权使得起诉变得困难,因为它助长了一种动机,即总统在进行犯罪或其他不当行为时,会声称自己是在行使官方权力。特朗普在卸任前能在多大程度上通过自我特赦来保护自己?
The expansive immunity that the Supreme Court has vested in the presidency makes prosecution difficult because it incentivizes presidents to claim they were exercising their official powers when engaging in criminal or other misconduct. How much can Trump protect himself through a self-pardon before he leaves office?
特朗普曾不止一次试探过这样一种想法,即他可以就联邦罪行特赦自己。他甚至可以利用总统拜登对其儿子亨特的特赦作为样板,来保护自己和/或盟友或家人免受联邦起诉。有令人信服的有力论点认为,总统无权特赦自己,任何此类特赦都可能成为对其进行弹劾的理由。
Trump has floated the idea more than once that he could pardon himself for federal crimes. He could even use President Biden’s pardon of his son Hunter as a model for protecting himself and/or allies or family from federal prosecutions. There are compelling and persuasive arguments that a president does not have the authority to pardon himself and that any such pardon could be grounds for impeachment.
从更广泛的全局来看这些问题,格哈特(Gerhardt)写道:特朗普滥用权力并参与不当行为,大致通过至少三种方式:首先,他进行了利益输送(self-dealing),这让他在第二个任期的前两年里,使自己的净资产增加了数十亿美元。其次,他滥用权力惩罚政治敌人,例如施压要求起诉前联邦调查局(F.B.I.)局长詹姆斯·科米(James Comey)和前联邦储备委员会主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔(Jerome Powell)。
Looking at these issues from a broader overview, Gerhardt wrote: Trump has abused power and engaged in misconduct in at least three general ways: First, he has engaged in self-dealing that has allowed him to add billions to his net worth in the first two years of his second term. Second, he has abused his powers to punish his political enemies, such as pushing for the prosecutions of former F.B.I. director James Comey and former chair of the Federal Reserve Jerome Powell.
最后但同样重要的是,他撒了数千个谎来为不当行为辩护,例如下令国民警卫队进入美国城市、在公海上谋杀无辜者,以及计划利用军队恐吓选民。他为总统可以犯下的各种可弹劾罪行写下了教科书。
Last but not least, he has told thousands of lies to justify inappropriate actions, such as ordering the National Guard into American cities, murdering innocent people on the high seas, and plans to use the military to intimidate voters. He has written the book on the many ways in which presidents can commit impeachable offenses.
密歇根大学法学教授莉亚·利特曼指出了特朗普腐败的一个典型特征:他在行使公权力威胁的同时,发起了大量行动以私人身份谋取个人利益。
Leah Litman, a law professor at the University of Michigan, pointed to a characteristic aspect of Trump’s corruption: He has initiated extensive maneuvers to personally profit as a private citizen while wielding the threat of his public power.
利特曼表示:“唐纳德·特朗普比他之前的任何一位总统都更大程度地利用其‘个人’身份行事,同时表面上挥舞其‘官方’身份,以此胁迫实体听命于他。”
“Donald Trump,” Litman said, has, to a greater extent than any president before him, traded on acting in his “individual” capacity while ostensibly gesturing to his “official” capacity in order to coerce entities to do his bidding.
例如,他能够在一些他以私人身份发起的针对媒体公司的诉讼中获得有利的和解。许多和解协议还向他个人支付了款项。这些是非官方行为。然而,毫无疑问,这些和解背后的驱动力是他的官方权力。
For example, he was able to obtain favorable settlements in some of his litigation against media companies that he initiated in his private capacity. Many of the settlements also paid money to him in his private capacity. Those are unofficial actions. Yet there’s also no question that an animating force behind the settlements were his official powers.
那么,这是官方行为还是非官方行为?这不清楚——这也是豁免权判决存在的部分问题——它未能认识到一个显而易见的事实:腐败地行使官方权力会将其从公共/官方/允许的权力转变为不允许/非官方/私人的权力。
So is that an official versus an unofficial act? It’s unclear — and that’s part of the issue with the immunity opinion — it’s failure to recognize the obvious fact that corruptly exercising official powers converts them from public/official/permissible powers to impermissible/unofficial/private ones.
另一个例子是加密货币晚宴。人们以他的私人身份向他付款——他的新闻秘书称这完全属于他的私人身份。但你认为那些人为什么参加晚宴?是为了购买接触/影响总统的机会,连同他所有的“官方”权力。这正是豁免权判决制造的困境的一部分。
Another example of this: the crypto dinner. People paid him in his private capacity — and his press secretary said this was all in his private capacity. But why do you think those people attended the dinner? To purchase access/influence to the president, with all of his “official” powers. That is part of the dilemma the immunity opinion created.
利特曼在《动摇总统制》一文中进一步阐述了这一论点,该文由她与宾夕法尼亚大学法学教授凯瑟琳·肖和纽约大学法学教授梅丽莎·默里共同撰写。
Litman expanded on this argument in “Unsettling the Presidency,” an article she wrote with Katherine Shaw and Melissa Murray, law professors at the University of Pennsylvania and New York University.
她们写道:“过去,讨价还价、和解及其他形式的争端解决是在法律的阴影下进行的,而新型的总统和解如今却是在无法无天的阴影下进行。”她们主张,“总统对法院职权的侵蚀”,包括利用诉讼——特别是在总统起诉媒体公司并达成和解的背景下——作为总统控制和总统权力的工具。这也包括总统试图建立影子法律程序,这些程序镜像正式法律程序,却在其之外运作,并受总统控制。
“Whereas previously,” they wrote, “bargaining, settlement and other forms of dispute resolution happened in the shadow of the law, novel presidential settlements now happen in the shadow of lawlessness.”“Presidential encroachments on the courts’ prerogatives,” they argued, include the use of litigation — particularly in the context of the president’s lawsuits against, and the resulting settlements with, media companies — as a tool of presidential control and presidential power. They also include the president’s efforts to create shadow legal processes that mirror the formal legal process, but operate outside of it and under the president’s control.
总统利用行政命令和其他行动针对知名律所和大学,以及由此产生的“和解”和“交易”,正是这种做法的典型例证。
The president’s use of executive orders and other actions targeting prominent law firms and universities, and the resulting “settlements” and “deals” they have generated, are exemplary of this approach.
三人进而警告称:“我们已超越了那种体现所有行政部门权力的单一行政首长的传统说法。取而代之的是一种前所未有的行政权力说法,它占据并行使三个政府分支的所有权力。”并非所有学者和从业者都像格哈特那样,对刑事起诉特朗普的潜在有效性抱有同等程度的信心。
The three went on to warn that “we have moved beyond the traditional account of a unitary executive that embodies all executive branch authority. Instead, what is ascendant is an unprecedented account of executive authority that occupies and wields the powers of all three branches of government.”Not all scholars and practitioners are convinced to the same degree as Gerhardt of the potential effectiveness of the criminal prosecution of Trump.
菲利普·艾伦·拉科瓦拉曾任美国副司法部长和水门事件特别检察官顾问,他认为最高法院给了特朗普一张虚拟的“免入狱卡”:尽管 2024 年特朗普豁免权案中那项完全无理且违宪的裁决声称保留了起诉总统的可能性,即(1)针对部分公务行为,(2)针对任何非公务行为,但这些例外情况在很大程度上是虚幻的——至少只要现任最高法院大法官多数派仍在任,情况就是如此。
Philip Allen Lacovara, a former deputy U.S. solicitor general and counsel to the Watergate special prosecutor, thinks the Supreme Court handed Trump a virtual get-out-of-jail card: Although the wholly unjustified and constitutionally unsound decision in the Trump immunity case in 2024 purported to leave open the possibility of prosecuting a president (1) for some official acts and (2) for any unofficial acts, these exceptions are largely illusory — at least so long as the current majority remains on the Supreme Court.
该案的多数意见构筑了一道几乎无法逾越的屏障,保护特朗普免于因腐败、共谋非法法外处决、出售赦免令、向寻求公职者募集捐款、将联邦合同授予大额捐赠者、干预选举,以及其犯罪记录中的其他任何滥职行为而被起诉。
The opinion in the case creates a virtually impenetrable barrier protecting Trump from being prosecuted for such things as corruption; complicity in unlawful, extrajudicial killing; selling pardons; soliciting contributions from prospective office seekers; awarding federal contracts to big donors; interfering with elections; and any of the other abuses in his rap sheet.
拉科瓦拉向我提供了详细的引证来支持他对“特朗普诉美国案”的批评,几乎是一份法律备忘录,遗憾的是篇幅太长,无法在此全文转载。
Lacovara provided me with detailed citations supporting his critique of Trump v. United States, virtually a memorandum of law, unfortunately too long to reprint here.
拉科瓦拉一针见血地指出,法院专门为特朗普最恶劣的行为开脱了责任,“即指控特朗普通过演讲和推文煽动 1 月 6 日骚乱者。”
Lacovara pointedly noted that the court specifically exonerated Trump’s most egregious behavior, “allegations that Trump egged on the Jan. 6 rioters through his speech and tweets.”
他补充说:“所谓的行为主要由特朗普以推文和公开演讲形式进行的沟通构成。”但拉科瓦拉指出,作为宪法赋予的唯一负责执行美国法律的人,总统监管——因此将经常公开谈论——涉及美国生活几乎方方面面的大量活动。
“The alleged conduct,” he added, “largely consists of Trump’s communications in the form of tweets and a public address.”But, Lacovara noted, As the sole person charged by the Constitution with executing the laws of the United States, the president oversees — and thus will frequently speak publicly about — a vast array of activities that touch on nearly every aspect of American life.
确实,总统权力一个长期被认可的方面,就是利用职位的“舆论讲坛”说服美国民众,包括通过有力或批评性的发言,以总统认为能推进公共利益的方式。甚至期望他就那些可能不直接涉及联邦政府活动的公共关切发表评论——例如,在紧急情况或悲剧发生后安抚全国民众。
Indeed, a long-recognized aspect of presidential power is using the office’s “bully pulpit” to persuade Americans, including by speaking forcefully or critically, in ways that the president believes would advance the public interest. He is even expected to comment on those matters of public concern that may not directly implicate the activities of the federal government — for instance, to comfort the nation in the wake of an emergency or tragedy.
拉科瓦拉写道,法院的裁决将阻碍对以下案件的起诉:“在这些案件中,似乎存在大量证据表明,(特朗普)利用总统办公室进行利益交换式金融交易(行贿),以谋取对他本人及其家人有利的个人财务利益。”换句话说,检察官在决定是否对特朗普提起刑事指控时所面临的障碍不仅很高,而且可能是高得令人望而却步。
The court ruling, Lacovara wrote, would prevent prosecution in cases where “there appears to be significant evidence of quid pro quo financial transactions (bribery) using the president’s office to grant favors in return for personal financial benefits for himself and his family.”In other words, the hurdles prosecutors now face when determining whether to file criminal charges against Trump are not just high, but possibly prohibitively high.
弗吉尼亚大学法学院教授达里尔·K·布朗写道,问题的一部分在于,对于总统在闭门之下的所作所为或所言,我们有太多未知之处。而且,即便许多与其他人的对话可能属于非官方行为所实施犯罪的一部分,且在理性人看来似乎属于私人性质,但这些对话依然可能被辩称为官方行为,从而受到该法院在“特朗普诉美国案”中赋予的官方行为豁免权的保护。
Darryl K. Brown, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, wrote that the problem in part is that there is so much we don’t know about what a president does or says behind closed doors. And even many conversations with others that might be part of a crime committed by unofficial acts, and that seem to a reasonable person to be private, might nonetheless be arguably official such that it would be covered by the immunity for official-acts crimes that the court granted in Trump v. United States.
一个理论上的例子可能是,一名政府官员(此人同时也是特朗普或特朗普家庭成员的商业伙伴)与特朗普之间的对话。即便总统与这样一名官员谈论的是诸如他们为赢得在另一个国家建造酒店的合同而将支付的贿赂,如果该对话发生在与该国进行更大规模外交谈判的背景下,也可能会与官方行为交织在一起。
A theoretical example might be a conversation between an administration official who is also a business partner of Trump or a Trump family member. Even a presidential conversation with such an official about, say, bribes they would pay to win a contract to build a hotel in another country might be wrapped up with official acts if it occurs in the context of a larger diplomatic negotiation with that country.
布朗接着写道,媒体广泛报道称,特朗普与俄罗斯、伊朗、以色列和其他国家的主要谈判代表——贾里德·库什纳和史蒂夫·维特科夫——在担任外交官的同一场会议中谈论了商业交易。在特朗普政府中,官方行为与非官方行为之间的界限似乎非常模糊,在法院对总统豁免权作出的广泛解释下,这可能对特朗普有利。
There have been widespread media reports, Brown continued, of Trump’s primary negotiators with Russia, Iran, Israel and other countries — Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff — talking about business deals in the same meetings in which they are acting as diplomats. The line between official and unofficial acts seems very muddy in the Trump administration, which probably works to Trump’s advantage under the court’s broad interpretation of presidential immunity.
布朗写道,法院的豁免裁决之所以构成如此巨大的障碍,是因为法院强调,检察官为获取证据所做的一切都不能“寒蝉”总统的行为。法院多数派担心,即便只是从总统顾问那里获取关于未公开记录的陈述和行为的证词,也可能“严重损害”总统行使官方权力。在我联系的人中,拉科瓦拉最为直言不讳,他写道:最高法院已经授权特朗普在其广泛的“官方”权力范围内——即总统作为总统可能行使的职能的“外围边界”之内的一切——犯下联邦罪行。
The court’s immunity decision is such a big barrier, Brown wrote, because the court stressed that nothing prosecutors do to obtain evidence can “chill” a president’s actions. The court’s majority fears that even, say, eliciting testimony from presidential advisers about statements and actions not in the public record could “seriously cripple” the president’s exercise of his official powers. Lacovara was the most outspoken of those I contacted, writing: The Supreme Court has licensed Trump to commit federal crimes as part of his sweeping array of “official” powers — anything within the “outer perimeter” of the functions that a president may do as president.
按照最高法院多数派随后采纳的理论,如果特朗普下令海豹六队谋杀一名被他指定为国家安全威胁的政治对手,他将享有法律豁免。这是历史上许多独裁者行使过的那种对生杀大权的掌控。
Under the theory that the majority of the Supreme Court subsequently adopted, Trump would have legal immunity if he ordered SEAL Team 6 to murder a political rival whom he designated a threat to national security. That is the kind of power over life or death that many dictators over history have exercised.
特朗普继续试图表现得像个独裁者。他喜欢以法令治国——通过他的“行政行动”,比如将联邦资金用于自己的项目,全然不顾国会拨款的理由,甚至无视法定限制。他在白宫场地上的各种工程、特朗普式的凯旋门,以及他要在公共公园原址上建精英高尔夫球场的构想,都是为自己树碑立传——很像法老、罗马皇帝。
Trump continues to try to act like a dictator. He likes to govern by decree — with his “executive actions,” such as using federal funds for his own projects regardless of the reasons Congress appropriated them, and even in defiance of statutory constraints. His various projects on the White House grounds, the Trumpian triumphal arch and his concept for an elitist golf course in place of a public park are all intended as monuments to himself — much like a pharaoh, a Roman emperor.
从第一个任期开始,特朗普就刻意向美国人和全世界昭示他的威权主义和犯罪意图。到第二个任期开始时,他的报复心、贪腐、滥用公共权力和越界倾向已人尽皆知,尤其是最高法院。
Beginning in his first term, Trump pointedly alerted both Americans and the world to his authoritarian and criminal aims. By the start of his second term, his vengefulness, venality, misuse of public power and inclination toward transgression were known by one and all, most especially the Supreme Court.
这使得最高法院从一开始就给予此人刑事豁免权的裁决更加令人费解。
Which makes the court’s decision to give this man criminal immunity in the first place all the more inexplicable.
这种情况令人费解,除非你意识到法院大多数大法官对某种意识形态议程——即所谓的“单一行政理论”——的执着,甚至不惜牺牲现实。在特朗普的案例中,法院对不受限制的行政权力的承诺,无异于把一盒火柴交给一个已知的纵火犯。
Inexplicable, that is, until you recognize the devotion of a majority on the court to an ideological agenda — the so-called unitary executive theory — at the expense of reality. In Trump’s case, the court’s commitment to unrestrained executive power amounts to giving a box of matches to a known arsonist.
托马斯·B·埃德萨尔自2011年起担任《纽约时报》观点版撰稿人。他关于美国政治战略和人口趋势的文章每周二刊登。他此前曾在《华盛顿邮报》报道政治新闻。
Thomas B. Edsall has been a contributor to the Times Opinion section since 2011. His essays on strategic and demographic trends in American politics appear every Tuesday. He previously covered politics for The Washington Post.