Investors are talking about the risk of a fresh debt crisis in the euro area, and this time the focus is France, not Greece.

A measure of French bond risk soared this month to levels not seen since late 2011, the height of Greece’s travails. Violent protests on Oct. 17 have left citizens on edge, and a polarized parliament is obstructing the government’s debt-cutting plans. With an election just six months away, France has become the biggest pain point in European markets, just as Greece was 15 years ago.

Beyond the superlatives, France’s woes have little in common with the Greek crisis that threatened the entire euro project. That’s no comfort to bearish investors, who warn that France poses a bigger stress test for the European Union because it’s the bloc’s second-biggest economy, it has a massive €3.6 trillion ($4.0 trillion) debt load and its bonds are widely owned internationally.

French debt has been pummeled this year, handing investors bigger losses than any other major government bond market. The yield on 10-year OATs hit 5% this month for the first time since 2002. While the moves are partly down to an energy shock that’s forced the European Central Bank to lift interest rates, it’s also a reflection of souring investor sentiment toward France itself.

The situation is still nothing close to what happened in Greece when its fiscal problems became apparent. The extra yield that investors demand to hold French bonds over German securities spiked to 1.78 percentage points this month. The equivalent measure for Greece peaked above 35 percentage points. And while Greece was shut out of bond markets as buyers balked, France can still issue new debt.

France’s debt is smaller relative to the size of its economy. At the start of its crisis in 2009, Greece’s debt was equivalent to around 129% of its gross domestic product. It surged in the following years to peak at over 200% during the coronavirus pandemic. But the ratio is falling fast, while France’s is rising and — at 119% — is far above the euro area average of 87%.

The key difference is the amount of debt at stake. France has a far bigger footprint in global bond markets than Greece ever did, which is one reason why investment firms such as Franklin Templeton Inc. are fretting that a fresh crisis could be worse. France’s €3.6 trillion of debt is about 10 times Greece’s in 2011. Some 60% of the bonds are held outside France, meaning the effects of a bond crisis would ripple around the world.

France’s deficit is significantly narrower than Greece’s was at the start of its crisis. Athens’ mis-reporting of the size of the gap shook investor confidence at the time.

While there is no evidence France has lied about its challenges, the country repeatedly missed public finance targets in recent years as tax receipts disappointed, growth slowed and minority governments struggled to get backing for belt-tightening measures.

Even the goal of a minor narrowing of the deficit to 5% of economic output this year from 5.1% in 2025 has been abandoned, with the government now predicting a gap of around 5.4%.

France’s tax revenues are among the highest in Europe as a proportion of national output, meaning there’s less scope than elsewhere to raise taxes further without damaging growth. And unlike France, Greece suffered from widespread and systematic tax evasion, so a crackdown gave it greater potential to boost revenues.

France’s focus is therefore on spending, which is second only to Finland in Europe at 57% of economic output. But it’s challenging to contain outlays which are on an upward trend due to structural factors such as an aging population and rising health costs.

Making cuts to welfare has also proven difficult due to political opposition. Last year’s social security budget scraped through parliament with a much wider deficit than planned and after the government suspended a reform to raise the retirement age.

“Ultimately, France requires a discussion about pension reform, and more broadly, a discussion of the size of what the government can provide,” Rodrigo Valdes, the head of the International Monetary Fund’s fiscal affairs department, said this month.

While Greece’s economy relied heavily on tourism, shipping and agriculture at the onset of its debt crisis, France’s is significantly larger, more diversified and spans highly lucrative industries including luxury goods, aerospace and finance. BNP Paribas SA highlights that the country is also a European leader in logistics and technology, contributing to a surplus in services trade.

Overall, France’s current account — a broad measures of trade and income flows with the rest of the world — is close to balance. In 2009, Greece had a deficit of around 12% of GDP.

France is also less dependent on fossil fuels than other countries as it produces the bulk of its electricity with nuclear energy and renewables. The IMF predicts that growth will stabilize around 1% in the long term, which would help offset the fiscal challenge.

France’s soaring sovereign risk has raised concerns for the health of the country’s banks, which typically own large chunks of government debt. Sinking bond prices can directly affect lenders’ solvency and financial strength ratios. But French banks are much more diversified, resilient and regulated, with chunky capital cushions designed to protect their balance sheets in the event of losses.

It’s a very different scenario to Greece, where a “doom loop” set in. Greek banks were heavily exposed to their own government’s debt, and losses on those holdings during the sovereign restructuring effectively wiped out their capital base. That made them less able to lend to businesses and households, and a deep recession sent non-performing loans soaring, leaving the banking system in need of extensive recapitalization.

One of the most striking differences to the sovereign debt crisis is how the euro area’s architecture has evolved. When Greece and other countries ran into trouble, governments created a bailout facilities for the currency bloc from scratch, including the European Stability Mechanism. The facility, which was used by Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece, can still provide loans in return for economic reforms, and other tools are available as well.

Another line of defense is the ECB. Then-President Mario Draghi made history in 2012 by announcing the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. That promise was later translated into an unlimited bond-buying program known as the Outright Monetary Transactions plan, although it’s never been used and would come with stringent conditions.

Explainer: Why ECB Is Wary of Stepping Into French Bond Turmoil The ECB’s Governing Council came up with another such tool after the coronavirus pandemic, when the ECB was preparing to raise interest rates and Italian debt yields soared above those of their peers. Known as the Transmission Protection Instrument, it allows the bank’s officials to buy sovereign debt when they deem that market moves aren’t justified by economic fundamentals and hamper the transmission of monetary policy.

So far, the ECB has waved off any speculation that it is about to step in, stressing that it’s up to France to fix the situation.

The sequencing is different, but there are political parallels between France in 2026 and Greece in 2009. In both countries, the fiscal problems were unfolding as establishment parties unraveled and populists stood ready to take power.

In Greece, the traditional center-right party was ousted by the left-wing firebrand Alexis Tsipras in 2015. In the final act of the crisis, his showdown with the rest of the EU almost forced Greece out of the euro before he accepted dramatic cuts as a condition of the third and final bailout. In France, Emmanuel Macron in 2017 pushed aside the two parties that had held the presidency since the dawn of the Fifth Republic. Far-right nationalist Marine Le Pen is the favorite to succeed him in next year’s election, while many polls put far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon in second.