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澳大利亚“中国威胁”论的缺陷The flaw in Australia’s ‘China threat’ thesis

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澳大利亚为可能与中国发生冲突所做的准备,反映出“一种相对肤浅的理解”,著名经济学家约翰·爱德华兹指出。他提到,欧洲、加拿大、印度尼西亚、马来西亚和印度都没有为这种冲突做准备。澳大利亚为什么要准备?

Australia’s preparations for a possible conflict with China reflect “a relatively superficial understanding”, argues prominent economist John Edwards. Europe, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia and India, he notes, are not preparing for such a conflict. Why should Australia?

爱德华兹曾任前工党总理保罗·基廷的高级经济顾问,他在10月发布的一份洛伊研究院报告以及一次报纸采访中提出了上述观点。

Edwards, a former senior economic adviser to former Labor prime minister Paul Keating, makes the observation in a Lowy Institute paper released in October and in a newspaper interview.

相反,他认为美中竞争可能是一个优势。澳大利亚处于安全伙伴华盛顿和主要经济伙伴北京之间,只要堪培拉不选边站队,这种地位就能支撑澳大利亚未来25年的繁荣。

Instead, he sees US-China rivalry as a potential advantage. Sitting between a security partner in Washington and a major economic partner in Beijing can underpin Australian prosperity for 25 years – provided Canberra does not pick sides.

他在《大修:澳大利亚如何适应不断变化的世界经济》一文中写道,两大强国的“激烈竞争和间歇性对抗”对澳大利亚人来说“主要是焦虑的来源”。然而对澳大利亚而言,美中竞争是“一种馈赠”:两个超级大国保持平衡,胜过只有一个主导大国。如果关系变得对抗,澳大利亚不会有好结果,其经济外交应旨在帮助防止这种情况发生。

In “Overhaul: How Australia can adapt to a changing world economy, he writes that the powers’ “vigorous competition and intermittent antagonism” have been “mostly a source of anxiety” for Australians. Yet for Australia, US-China competition is “a gift”: two superpowers in balance beat one dominant power. Australia would not do well if relations became antagonistic, and its economic statecraft should aim to help prevent that.

在接受《卫报》采访时,爱德华兹表示,两国在未来25年仍将是最大的经济体,处于一场谁也赢不了的竞赛中。小国从拥有两个大伙伴中受益。“我们能做的最坏的事就是在两者中选边站队,”他说。

In a Guardian interview, Edwards said both would remain the largest economies in 25 years, in a race neither can win. Smaller countries benefit from having two large partners. “The worst thing we could do is pick one over the other,” he said.

他补充道,澳大利亚不应“软弱地接受”中国的经济制裁,也不应“特意去挑衅”北京。堪培拉一直偏向国家安全而非经济外交,应更加开放地对待外国投资。

Australia should not “meekly accept” Chinese economic sanctions, he added, nor go “out of our way to provoke” Beijing. Canberra has favoured national security over economic statecraft, and should be more open to foreign investment.

爱德华兹不出所料地延续了其前老板的偏好,主张外交政策不应受美国主导。基廷大声疾呼,批评日益军事化的同盟关系。基廷等批评者认为,“奥库斯”将澳大利亚的国防能力和技术与美国紧密绑定,实际上使澳大利亚丧失了独立作战决策的能力。

Edwards unsurprisingly shares his former boss’ preference for a foreign policy free of US domination. Keating loudly criticises the increasingly militarised alliance. Critics such as Keating argue Aukus binds Australia’s defence capabilities and technology so tightly to the US that it effectively forfeits independent operational decision-making.

澳大利亚国防军严重依赖美国的装备、情报和技术——一些分析人士称,这种结构性依赖使其无法在现实中独立于美国体系之外进行作战。

The Australian Defence Force relies heavily on American hardware, intelligence and technology – a structural dependency, some analysts say, that leaves it unable to realistically operate independently of US systems.

独立评论人士还批评澳大利亚战略政策研究所等智库——其资金来源包括澳大利亚政府和外国防务承包商,其中包含美国实体——其安全叙事与华盛顿的优先事项高度一致,尤其是在涉华问题上。

Independent commentators also fault think tanks like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute – funded by the Australian government and foreign defence contractors, including US entities – for a security narrative closely mirroring Washington’s priorities, particularly on China.

基廷对“奥库斯”协议及其价格高昂的核动力潜艇尤为批评,这些潜艇将由澳大利亚纳税人买单。他认为,这些潜艇更适合在南海进行进攻性行动——意指针对中国——而非保卫澳大利亚大陆。

Keating is especially critical of Aukus and its excessively priced nuclear-powered submarines, to be paid for by Australian taxpayers. He argues the subs will be more suited to offensive operations in the South China Sea – read, against China – than for defence of the Australian continent.

同样,曾在吉拉德工党政府中担任外交部长的鲍勃·卡尔在2023年的一次网络访谈中表示,台湾绝不应成为澳大利亚开战的理由。“如果台湾人民面临的最坏结果,无非是如今香港的现状,那么我们就没有开战的理由,”他说。他希望香港的《国家安全法》被废除,但该城市“依然基本保留着自己的制度”,这是他可以接受的台湾前景。

Similarly, Bob Carr, foreign minister in Julia Gillard’s Labor government, said in an online interview in 2023 that Taiwan should never be a cause for war for Australia. “If the worst thing that faces the people of Taiwan would be what prevails in Hong Kong today, then we haven’t got a cause for war,” he said. He would like the national security law lifted in Hong Kong, but the city “still has substantially its own system”, an outcome he could accept for Taiwan.

卡尔表示,一个中国政策维护了地区和平与台湾的自治:“在这个由智者于1972年谈判达成的小小外交公式架构下,我们承认中国对台湾作为一个省份的主权主张。这是一个维持了和平的外交公式。”然而,太多既得利益者兜售一个虚构的“中国威胁”——针对邻国、地区和世界;针对民主、基于规则的秩序、西方、文明本身。一种同类的叙事坚称必须为民主而捍卫台湾,仿佛台湾的陷落会危及所有民主国家。

The one-China policy, Carr said, preserved regional peace and Taiwan’s autonomy: “Under the architecture of this little diplomatic formula negotiated by wise men in 1972, we recognise the Chinese claim on Taiwan as a province. That’s a diplomatic formula that has kept the peace.”Yet too many vested interests peddle a mythical “China threat” – to neighbours, the region and the world; to democracy, the rules-based order, the West, civilisation itself. A kindred narrative insists Taiwan must be defended for democracy’s sake, as if its fall would imperil every democracy.

基廷和卡尔指出了显而易见的事实:只有当堪培拉像在“奥库斯”框架下那样,通过追随美国协助点燃亚太地区的热点,中国才会威胁澳大利亚的安全。按这个逻辑,还有多少其他国家受到中国威胁?

Keating and Carr state the obvious: China would only threaten Australia’s security if Canberra helps ignite Asia-Pacific flashpoints by joining the Americans, as under Aukus. By that logic, how many other countries are threatened by China?

这里藏着一个障眼法。在西方,尤其是在美国,中国成了一个方便的转移视线的靶子,用来掩盖日常生活中切实的艰难处境,从飙升的生活成本到西方社会内部巨大的不平等。要把一个抽象的威胁包装成迫在眉睫的威胁,需要一场规模惊人的虚假信息运动。

Herein lies the conjuring trick. In the West, but especially in the US, China is a convenient diversion from the tangible hardships of everyday life, from the soaring cost of living to the yawning inequalities within Western societies. It takes a disinformation campaign of remarkable scale to turn an abstract threat into an imminent one.

真实的图谋依然隐藏在幕后。台湾部分势力寻求“独立”;华盛顿想要维护霸权。二者的目标一致,却都无法公开宣示,于是都被重新包装成一场为民主而战的斗争——听起来越崇高越好。鲜有局外人愿意为美国的首要地位或一个独立的台湾献出生命,正如鲜有人愿意为一个巴勒斯坦国献身,无论他们的同情心如何。

The true agendas remain out of sight. Some in Taiwan seek independence; Washington wants to preserve hegemony. Their aims align, yet neither can be declared plainly, so both are repackaged as a struggle for democracy – the loftier it sounds, the better. Few outsiders would lay down their lives for American primacy or an independent Taiwan, any more than for a Palestinian state, whatever their sympathies.

但一旦告诉民众,他们自己的国家安全——无论如何定义——岌岌可危,局面就会彻底改变。每当有人提出“中国威胁”时,请追问:究竟什么利益受到威胁——以及威胁的是谁?

But tell people their own national security, however defined, hangs in the balance, and the picture shifts entirely. Whenever the “China threat” is raised, ask: what is truly at stake – and for whom?

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