弗拉基米尔·普京在最近的一通电话中，真的向芬兰和挪威领导人发表了一场漫长的历史讲演吗？当时他们本该讨论乌克兰和平问题。挪威首相乔纳斯·加尔·斯特勒予以否认，并要求报道此事的《金融时报》道歉。但毫无疑问的是，利用对历史的诠释来为自己的政策辩护，正是普京最喜欢做的事。
Did Vladimir Putin really treat the leaders of Finland and Norway to a long historical lecture during a recent phone call when they were supposed to be discussing peace in Ukraine? Norway’s prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre denied it, and demanded an apology from the Financial Times who reported it. But what’s in no doubt is that using an interpretation of history to justify his policies is exactly what Putin loves to do.
然而，在这个世界上的这片地区，这位俄罗斯领导人并不孤单。对于曾经处于苏联统治下的半个欧洲来说，“历史是一门科学，其教训对现在和未来具有决定性支配作用”的马克思主义理论，依然在大多数人的脑海中挥之不去。在与波兰人、波罗的海三国人民、保加利亚人、俄罗斯人或乌克兰人的每一次对话中，过去的胜利与过去的委屈都在每场争论的表面之下若隐若现。
In this part of the world, however, the Russian leader is not alone. For the half of Europe that was under Soviet domination, the Marxist theory that history is a science and that its lessons have a deterministic hold on the present and the future continues to live rent-free in most people’s heads. In every conversation with Poles, Balts, Bulgarians, Russians or Ukrainians, past triumphs and past grievances loom just below the surface of every argument.
以我上周在维尔纽斯一家格鲁吉亚餐厅与一群聪明的立陶宛精英进行的讨论为例。他们十分认真地辩称，加里宁格勒——这个波罗的海畔的前东普鲁士首府，是在1945年波茨坦会议上划归莫斯科的——应该被北约部队占领，并要求当地居民投票决定他们是想成为欧洲人还是继续当俄罗斯人。
Take a discussion I had last week with a group of clever, high-status Lithuanians in a Georgian restaurant in Vilnius. They argued quite seriously that Kaliningrad – the former East Prussian capital on the Baltic sea given to Moscow at the Potsdam conference of 1945 – should be occupied by Nato forces and the population asked to vote on whether they wanted to become European or remain Russian.
反正同意的人可以留下，而其余人口——无论如何都是战后移居那里的俄罗斯人的后代——则应该被强行打包送回祖国。我的波罗的海朋友们的理由是，加里宁格勒历史上属于立陶宛。或者也许是波兰。但无论如何，欧洲的生活显而易见比沦为普京政权的奴隶要好。
Those who agreed could stay while the rest of the population – descended from Russians imported after the war anyway – should be bundled off to the Motherland. My Baltic friends’ justification was that Kaliningrad was historically Lithuanian. Or maybe Polish. But in any case life in Europe was self-evidently better than slavery to the Putin regime.
但我试探性地提出，毫无挑衅地侵入其他国家领土，不正是我们欧洲人谴责普京的原因吗？啊，没有，回答来了。武力是野蛮的亚洲俄罗斯人唯一能听懂的语言，必须强迫他们吞下自己施暴的恶果。他们说，必须纠正战后的历史错误，如有必要，可以兵戎相见。
But, I ventured, wasn’t invading other countries’ territory without provocation exactly what we Europeans condemned Putin for? Ah no, came the answer. Force is the only language the barbarous Asiatic Russians understand, and they must be forced to take a harsh dose of their own violent medicine. A post-war, historical wrong must be righted, they said, at gunpoint if necessary.
关于遗产、正义和记忆，一场更漫长、更深远、也更严肃的类似历史争论，已经在波兰和乌克兰政府之间展开了数月。在军队中极端民族主义势力的压力下，弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基一直在迎合一项议程，即将二战时期乌克兰反抗军（UPA）的战士塑造成民族英雄——甚至追授死后被运回国内的该组织阵亡领导人遗骸勋章。
A longer, deeper and more serious version of a similar historical argument about legacy, justice and memory has been unfolding for months between the governments of Poland and Ukraine. Under pressure from ultranationalist elements in the army, Volodymyr Zelensky has gone along with an agenda of turning the fighters of the Second World War Ukrainian Insurgent Army or UPA into national heroes – even posthumously decorating repatriated remains of its dead leaders.
问题在于，许多乌克兰反抗军曾站在纳粹一边作战，并屠杀了数千名波兰平民以及犹太人。因此，波兰威胁要切断对基辅的援助，并撤回对乌克兰加入欧盟的支持。
The problem is that many UPA forces fought on the side of the Nazis, and massacred thousands of Polish civilians, as well as Jews. As a result, Poland has threatened to cut off aid to Kyiv and withdraw support for Ukraine’s EU bid.
当然，历史也给西欧带来了沉重负担（正如殖民罪责辩论所显示的那样）。但在这里，我们常常把过去视为羞耻和罪责的来源——出于明显的历史原因，这一趋势始于战后的德国。北爱尔兰或许还有巴斯克地区是区域性的例外，几个世纪前的历史仍然对现代政治辩论保持着窒息般的控制。但作为一般规律，我们的政治争论往往立足于当下——例如，英国应该退欧的辩论，不是为了追求我们独特而自豪的独立海岛传奇，而是为了探讨我们是否能通过退欧以某种方式拯救国民保健制度。
Of course, history weighs on Western Europe too (as the colonial guilt debate shows). But here we all too often see the past as a source of shame and guilt – a trend that began, for obvious historical reasons, in Germany after the war. Northern Ireland and perhaps the Basque country are regional exceptions where centuries old-history still maintains a stranglehold on modern political debate. But as a rule, our political arguments tend to be based on the here and now – for instance the debate that Britain should leave the EU not to pursue our uniquely proud and independent island story but whether by doing so we can somehow save the NHS by leaving the EU.
东欧则截然不同。历史学家蒂莫西·斯奈德将俄罗斯和德国之间的领土称为欧洲的“血地”——这里是本世纪最严重的屠杀、驱逐和种族灭绝的发生地。在这片领土边界不断变化、帝国兴衰交替、民族认同充满流动性的地方，过去并没有消失。它甚至算不上过去。一些塞尔维亚人会向你大谈1389年的科索沃战役，当时他们将欧洲从奥斯曼恶势力手中拯救出来。
Eastern Europe is very different. Historian Timothy Snyder calls the territory between Russia and Germany Europe’s “blood-lands” – the scene of the century’s worst massacres, deportations and genocides. In these realms of shifting borders, rising and falling empires and fluid national identities, the past is not gone. It’s not even past. Some Serbs will lecture you on the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 when they saved Europe from the Ottoman hordes.
显然，这就是为什么他们的国家至今仍肩负着抗击阿尔巴尼亚人的神圣使命。一些乌克兰人会向你发送历史地图，将俄罗斯南部的罗斯托夫和克拉斯诺达尔标为乌克兰哥萨克酋长国的领土。
This is why, apparently, their country still has a God-given mission to stand against Albanians. Some Ukrainians will send you historic maps showing the south Russian cities of Rostov and Krasnodar as parts of the Ukrainian Hetmanate.
马克思主义的心理遗产与狂热的、新近出炉的民族主义相结合，是一个易燃的组合。上周，普京要求基辅放弃顿巴斯的其余地区，因为这些是“历史上属于俄罗斯的土地”。对于普京以及所有抱持这种想法的人来说，过去那只僵死的手拒绝松开对现在的掌控。
The psychological inheritance of Marxism married to febrile, new-forged nationalism is a combustible combination. Last week Putin demanded that Kyiv give up the remainder of Donbas because these were “historically Russian lands”. For Putin, and all who think like him, the dead hand of the past refuses to release its grip on the present.