在特朗普第二任政府期间，联邦项目和资金削减近两年后，州政府官员已基本自行承担起保障2026年中期选举安全的责任。
State officials have largely taken securing the 2026 midterm elections into their own hands after nearly two years of federal program and funding cuts during the second Trump administration.
为何重要：联邦支持的减少正值人工智能工具威胁使黑客更容易发现软件漏洞、发动网络攻击，并传播破坏选举结果信任的虚假信息之际。
Why it matters: The reduction in federal support has come as AI tools threaten to make it easier for hackers to uncover software vulnerabilities, launch cyberattacks, and spread disinformation that undermines trust in election results.
现实核查：仅仅因为存在安全缺陷，并不意味着黑客能利用它来操纵选举结果。
Reality check: Just because a security flaw exists doesn't mean hackers can exploit it to manipulate election results.
- 美国几乎所有选举都保留可用于核实电子计票的纸质记录。
• Nearly all U.S. elections maintain paper records that can be used to verify electronic tallies.
威胁等级：选举官员正为从网络攻击、AI生成的虚假信息到人身威胁、后勤中断和法律挑战等各种情况做准备。
Threat level: Election officials are preparing for everything from cyberattacks and AI-generated disinformation to physical threats, logistical disruptions and legal challenges.
大局：全美州务卿协会发言人约翰·米尔霍弗告诉Axios，州选举官员依赖国土安全部门、融合中心、警方、国民警卫队单位和私营网络安全公司为中期选举做准备。
The big picture: State election officials relied on homeland security agencies, fusion centers, police, National Guard units and private cybersecurity firms to prepare for the midterms, John Milhofer, a spokesperson for the National Association of Secretaries of State, told Axios.
- 该协会和全美州选举主任协会正帮助各州交换威胁情报，并与联邦机构及私营部门专家建立联系。
• That group and the National Association of State Election Directors are helping states exchange threat intelligence and connect with federal agencies and private sector experts. Catch up quick:
快速回顾：特朗普政府缩减联邦选举安全援助后，州政府资源变得更加重要。
State resources have become more important after the Trump administration scaled back federal election security assistance.
- 美国网络安全和基础设施安全局（CISA）在2025年削减了选举安全人员和服务，而作为选举官员关键信息共享网络的选举基础设施信息共享与分析中心的联邦资金也于同年终止。
• CISA cut election security personnel and services in 2025, while federal funding for the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, a key information-sharing network for election officials, ended that year.
- 即使CISA在9月概述了恢复部分服务的计划，选举官员收到的选举专项威胁简报和直接技术援助也在减少。
• Election officials are receiving fewer election-specific threat briefings and less direct technical assistance, even after CISA outlined plans to restore some services in September.
深度聚焦：亚利桑那州州务卿办公室首席信息安全官迈克尔·摩尔告诉Axios，自2025年3月以来，该州一直没有专门的CISA网络安全顾问。
Zoom in: Michael Moore, chief information security officer for the Arizona secretary of state's office, told Axios that the state has been without a dedicated CISA cybersecurity adviser since March 2025.
- 亚利桑那州国土安全部帮助填补了这一空白，为较小的县提供安全工具和监控服务。
• The Arizona Department of Homeland Security has helped fill the gap, providing security tools and monitoring services to smaller counties.
- 摩尔表示，在选举日，亚利桑那州将召集其州网络安全团队、国民警卫队、联邦调查局（FBI）以及CISA第9区办公室的一名代表，协调应对潜在威胁。
• On Election Day, Arizona is bringing together its state cybersecurity team, National Guard, the FBI and a representative from CISA's Region 9 office to coordinate responses to potential threats, Moore said.
- 摩尔的团队已花费数年时间进行桌面推演，涵盖网络攻击、利用AI生成冒充选举官员、可疑包裹及其他干扰事件。
• Moore's team has spent years conducting tabletop exercises covering cyberattacks, AI-generated impersonations of election officials, suspicious packages and other disruptions.
深度解读：亚利桑那州还从在该领域工作的前CISA人员、选举安全非营利组织以及其他州的官员那里获取威胁情报。
Between the lines: Arizona is also getting threat intelligence from former CISA personnel who work in the space, election security nonprofits and officials in other states.
- 摩尔表示，他与新泽西州选举安全官员的关系特别有用，因为他的东海岸同行可以提前数小时警告他，威胁可能在亚利桑那州出现。
• Moore said his relationship with New Jersey's election security officials is particularly useful because his East Coast counterparts can warn him about threats hours before they might emerge in Arizona. What they're saying:
他们怎么说：一名CISA发言人在声明中表示，当州和地方政府官员（包括选举官员和选举供应商）提出请求时，该机构将提供“免费自愿服务”，如漏洞扫描和技术专长。
A CISA spokesperson said in a statement that the agency will provide state and local government officials, including election officials and election vendors, "no-cost voluntary services" like vulnerability scanning and technical expertise, when they request it.
- 该发言人补充道：“我们致力于支持州和地方选举官员，保护选举基础设施，捍卫我们的民主。”
• "We are committed to supporting state and local elections officials to protect election infrastructure and safeguard our democracy," the spokesperson added.
但也要看到：摩尔表示，他仍希望CISA恢复到2024年的人员配置水平——然后再翻倍。
Yes, but: Moore said he still wants CISA to return to its 2024 staffing levels — and then double them.
- “如果我们确实正在经历来自民族国家的网络攻击，那不应该是亚利桑那州对抗那个民族国家，”摩尔说。“我们是美利坚合众国。应该是统一的响应。”
• "If we are literally experiencing a cyberattack from a nation-state, it shouldn't be Arizona versus that nation-state," Moore said. "We're the United States of America. It should be a unified response."
美国选举创新与研究中心执行董事兼创始人戴维·贝克尔周四在简报会上告诉记者，各州已聘请供应商并建立自己的网络，以弥补联邦政府的撤退。
• David Becker, executive director and founder of the Center for Election Innovation and Research, told reporters during a briefing Thursday that states have hired vendors and built their own networks to compensate for the federal retreat.
“他们可能无法替代所有功能，”贝克尔说。“他们无法获得同等的鸟瞰式全国层面视角，来掌握潜在的虚假信息或潜在的网络事件。”
• "They might not be able to replace everything," Becker said. "They're not going to get the same bird's-eye national-level view of potential disinformation or potential cyber events."
核心要点：选举官员表示，他们已为应对干扰做好准备，即使无法阻止每一次攻击。
The bottom line: Election officials said they're prepared for disruptions, even if they can't prevent every attack.
“目标是尽可能多地预防、发现并恢复，”穆尔说。“我们将面临一定程度的干扰……我们将恢复过来。”
• "The goal is prevent as much as we can, detect and recover," Moore said. "We're going to have some amount of disruption.... We're going to recover."