
自加拿大总理马克·卡尼在达沃斯世界经济论坛发表广受关注的演讲以来,已过去十个月。在这段时间里,世界中等强国能否、以及如何帮助重建破碎的国际秩序这一问题,变得愈发紧迫。在演讲中,卡尼强调,尽管旧有的美国主导的联盟体系正在崩溃,但中等强国——即那些没有能力重塑全球政治、却仍拥有实力的国家——处于填补空白的有利位置。但卡尼认为,要做到这一点,它们需要建设“国内实力”并“共同行动”,以发挥其集体力量,即使是在缺乏世界霸权支持的情况下。
In the ten months since Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave his widely discussed speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the question of whether, and how, the world’s middle powers can help rebuild a broken international order has become increasingly urgent. In his remarks, Carney stressed that although the old U.S.-led alliance system was collapsing, middle powers—states that do not have the ability to reshape global politics but that still possess substantial might—were well positioned to pick up the slack. But to do so, Carney argued, they would need to build up their “strength at home” and “act together” to harness their collective power, even in the absence of backing from the world’s hegemon.
尽管这位加拿大总理的大胆愿景广受赞誉,但一些专家认为其议程过于雄心勃勃。他们正确地指出,要让中等强国建立一个由巴西、加拿大、南非和土耳其等差异巨大的国家组成的大联盟,将非常困难。“中等强国走向团结的道路充满坎坷,因为这个群体既包括富国和穷国,也包括小国和大国,”经济学家爱德华·普拉萨德2月写道。然而,卡尼关于中等强国未来拥有发展机遇的判断是正确的。即使在与大国结盟时,这些国家仍可通过建设国家能力和实现外部伙伴关系多元化,行使更大的自主权。
Although the Canadian prime minister’s bold vision was widely applauded, some experts thought his agenda was overly ambitious. They noted, correctly, that it would be very difficult for middle powers to build a grand alliance composed of countries as diverse as Brazil, Canada, South Africa, and Turkey. “The path to unity among middle powers is fraught because this group includes rich and poor countries, as well as small and large ones,” wrote the economist Edwar Prasad in February. Carney, however, is right that middle powers have an opportunity to thrive going forward. Even when aligning with great powers, these countries can still exercise greater autonomy by developing national capacity and diversifying external partnerships.
韩国为此提供了一个典型范例。数十年来,首尔一直奉行中等强国战略,核心在于增强国内实力、与世界各地的民主国家建立伙伴关系,同时深化与华盛顿的同盟关系。韩国展现了适应性,根据地区和全球形势的需要,重新调整其安全架构、经济战略和外交角色。这使得一个国土面积小于世界大多数国家的国家,能够发挥远超其体量的作用,在亚洲乃至更广阔的范围内行使重大影响力。
South Korea offers a prime example of this flexible approach. For decades, Seoul has pursued a middle-power strategy centered on building domestic strength and forging partnerships with democracies everywhere while deepening its alliance with Washington. South Korea has been adaptable, recalibrating its security alignments, economic strategies, and diplomatic roles as regional and global conditions require. This has enabled a country smaller in size than most of the world’s states to punch far above its weight, exercising substantial influence in Asia and beyond.
并非每个政府都能复制首尔的路径,韩国的战略也有其局限性。正如首尔自身所承认的,中等强国无法摆脱大国竞争。但该国已开始展示,当中等强国利用其伙伴关系和自身实力来维护利益、遏制更大威胁时,能够取得何种成就。并且,通过在维持甚至加强与美国关系的同时争取更大自主权,韩国证明了中等强国无需建立全新网络也能增强自身实力——这与卡尼的观点相反。
Not every government can follow Seoul’s path, and South Korea’s strategy has its limits. As Seoul itself acknowledges, middle powers cannot escape great-power competition. But the country has begun to show what middle powers can accomplish when they leverage their partnerships and their own strength to protect their interests and deter larger threats. And by maintaining and even building its ties to the United States while asserting greater autonomy, South Korea has proven that middle powers can strengthen themselves without building whole new networks—contrary to Carney’s suggestion.
观鲸 根据经典国际关系理论,大战略是大国的专属特权。美国在冷战期间遏制苏联的努力是一个典型范例;中国追求全球经济霸权是另一个。相比之下,中等强国在这类战略中几乎没有发言权。这些国家被视为在外交政策上主要处于被动应对地位,在大国的决策周围周旋,而非自行设定议程。
WHALE WATCHING According to classic international relations theory, grand strategy is the exclusive provenance of great powers. The United States’s effort to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War is a paradigmatic example; China’s pursuit of global economic primacy is another. Middle powers, by contrast, have little say in such strategies. Instead, these countries are seen as primarily reactive in their foreign policies, navigating around the decisions of the great powers rather than setting the agenda themselves.
但近代历史表明,大国与中等强国之间的界限并不像人们假设的那样泾渭分明。在实践中,中等强国在世界上有着非常明确的自主愿景。它们拥有自主决定的空间,能够决定哪些威胁对其最重要、优先与哪些伙伴合作,以及将稀缺资源投资于何处。日本对中国构成的威胁感到担忧,一直在印第安-太平洋地区悄然发挥领导作用,通过改善与邻国的关系、增加对该地区的投资和援助以及加强自身的防卫能力——这一切都是在与美国保持紧密同盟关系的同时进行的。
But recent history suggests that the division between great and middle powers is less clear-cut than has been assumed. In practice, middle powers very much have their own affirmative visions that they pursue in the world. They have the leeway to decide which threats matter most to them, which partnerships to prioritize, and where to invest scarce resources. Japan, concerned with the threat posed by China, has been quietly exercising leadership in the Indo-Pacific by improving its ties with neighbors, increasing investment and aid to the region, and strengthening its own defense capabilities—all while remaining closely allied with the United States.
印度则对中国、巴基斯坦和不断加剧的经济逆风感到担忧,它成功巩固了与美国及其他民主国家的伙伴关系,同时维持了与俄罗斯的关系。
India, worried about China, Pakistan, and growing economic headwinds, has successfully bolstered partnerships with the United States and other democracies but maintained its relationship with Russia.
与日本和印度很相似,韩国也为其邻国感到担忧。但对首尔而言,这并不是什么新鲜事。至少自19世纪后期被夹在中日俄三国之间以来,韩国领导人就一直担心卡尼在其达沃斯演讲中忧虑的事情——在大国冲突中沦为附带损害的牺牲品。该国有一句众所周知的俗语:“鲸鱼打架,虾米脊梁骨断”,这句话传达了一种情绪,即大国争端会伤害夹在中间的国家。首尔没有放弃美国的计划,至少在近期内没有。
Much like Japan and India, South Korea is worried about its neighbors. But for Seoul, this is nothing new. South Korean leaders have been concerned with the very thing Carney fretted about in his Davos speech—becoming collateral damage in conflicts between great powers— since at least the late nineteenth century, when it was caught between China, Japan, and Russia. The country has a well-known proverb, “When whales fight, the shrimp's back is broken,” that captures the sentiment that great-power feuds can harm countries caught in the middle. Seoul has no plans to abandon the United States, at least in the near future.
为应对这一威胁,首尔长期以来一直寻求通过产业政策增强自力更生。20世纪70年代,韩国从轻工业向重工业出口转型,成为化工、钢铁和造船领域的主要参与者。国家投资帮助其在当今时代成为电池和半导体的主要全球生产国。韩国对历史学家所谓的“汉江奇迹”——即该国在20世纪末从饱受战火蹂躏、贫穷落后的国家迅速崛起为富裕国家——深感自豪。如今,韩国利用国家财富在全球推广公共产品,为国际发展、全球卫生、气候政策和多边机制做出贡献。
To safeguard against this threat, Seoul has long sought to increase its self-reliance through industrial policy. The country transited from light to heavy export industries in the 1970s, turning it into a major player in the chemical, steel, and shipbuilding sectors. State investments helped it become a major global producer of batteries and semiconductors in the present era. South Korea takes great pride in what historians call “the miracle on the Han”—or the country's rapid rise from a war-torn and impoverished state to a rich one during the late twentieth century. They now use the state’s wealth to promote public goods globally, contributing to international development, global health, climate policy, and multilateral bodies.
首尔还建立了一支强大的军队,专家始终将其列为世界上最强的军队之一。如今,韩国正在考虑为自卫发展核武库,尽管韩国名义上仍处于美国的核保护伞之下。该国同时利用其军事实力深化与美国盟友的关系。例如,首尔与欧洲买方签署了数十亿美元的军售协议,成为重建北约工业能力的关键伙伴。2025年,韩国是欧洲北约成员国的第二大武器供应国(仅次于美国)。
Seoul has also built up a formidable military, one that experts consistently rank as among the strongest in the world. Today, the country is considering developing a nuclear arsenal for self-defense, even though South Korea officially remains under Washington’s nuclear umbrella. The state has simultaneously used its armed prowess to deepen relations with U.S. allies. Seoul, for example, has inked multibillion-dollar arms deals with European buyers, making it a key partner in rebuilding NATO’s industrial capacity. In 2025, it was the second largest supplier of weapons to European NATO members (after the United States).
韩国还在中东和东南亚建立了国防伙伴关系,拓宽了首尔的选择,减少了对任何单一市场的依赖。换句话说,韩国通过扩大伙伴关系、增强在国际机构中的发言权、帮助塑造全球规则和规范,成功将其经济资源和官僚能力转化为更大的影响力。
South Korea has also forged defense partnerships in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, widening Seoul's options and reducing its dependence on any single market. South Korea, in other words, has been able to convert its economic resources and bureaucratic capabilities into greater influence by expanding its partnerships, strengthening its voice in international bodies, and helping shape global rules and norms.
但即使在开辟自身道路的同时,首尔也没有计划放弃美国,至少在近期内不会。事实上,美韩关系的不可侵犯性是韩国历史上的一项重大叙事。许多韩国人将这一同盟视为血浓于水的纽带,这要归功于两国在朝鲜战争期间做出的牺牲,当时它们共同努力,阻止了由中国和苏联支持的朝鲜吞并南方。大多数韩国人正确地认为,美国在该国持续的军事存在——目前有2.85万名美军驻扎在半岛上——在过去的七十年里对遏制朝鲜的侵略发挥了重要作用。
But even as it charts its own path, Seoul has no plans to abandon the United States, at least in the near future. In fact, the sanctity of the U.S.-South Korean relationship is a significant historical Korean narrative. Many South Koreans see the alliance as a bond inked in blood, thanks to the sacrifice both countries made during the Korean War, when they worked to stop North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, from overrunning the south. Most South Koreans correctly believe that the continued U.S. military presence in the country—currently, 28,500 American troops are stationed on the peninsula—has played a major part in deterring North Korean aggression over the past seven decades.
两全其美 初看之下,韩国的策略似乎相互矛盾。一方面,该国希望深化与美国的合作,其安全依然依赖美国;但另一方面,它又寻求更大的自主权。
BEST OF BOTH WORLDS At first glance, South Korea’s strategy may seem contradictory. On the one hand, the country wants to deepen its cooperation with the United States, on which it still depends for security. But on the other, it seeks greater autonomy.
然而,这两个目标实际上并不冲突。通过培植与华盛顿的关系,首尔获得了先进的军事能力和技术的准入,以及扩大其地区和全球利益的更大外交平台。例如,部分正是因为这种关系,韩国在向克罗地亚、爱沙尼亚、芬兰、挪威、波兰和罗马尼亚等多个北约成员国出售武器方面才取得了如此巨大的成功。(首尔也凭自身实力建立了一个强大的外交机构。)
Yet these twin goals are not actually at odds. By cultivating ties with Washington, Seoul has gained access to advanced military capabilities and technologies as well as a larger diplomatic platform to expand its regional and global interests. It is in part because of this relationship, for example, that South Korea has had such success at selling weapons to multiple NATO members, including Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Poland, and Romania. (Seoul has also built up a formidable diplomatic apparatus in its own right.)
与此同时,韩国向美国提供包括半导体芯片在内的宝贵技术,从而使这项协议对美国而言物有所值。首尔还与华盛顿合作,帮助复兴美国造船业,并同意向美国该行业投资1500亿美元。
At the same time, South Korea helps make this compact worthwhile for the United States by providing it with valuable technology, including semiconductor chips. Seoul has also partnered with the Washington to help revive the American shipbuilding industry, agreeing to invest $150 billion in the U.S. sector.
不过,韩国在外交政策上日益追求更大独立性的努力,确实与美国产生了一些不易轻易化解的紧张关系。例如,当前政府推动在战争发生时,由韩国而非美国掌握两国在朝鲜半岛的部队作战控制权,遭到了美军的拒绝。美军指挥官倾向于在韩国证明其具备领导联合防御的能力后,基于条件进行控制权移交,而非设定固定日期。双方也尚未就韩国若台湾遭中国攻击或封锁时应扮演什么角色达成共识。适应性强的中等国家可以借助本国的民族叙事来发现自身优势。
Still, South Korea’s growing push for more independence in its foreign policy does result in some tensions with the United States that cannot easily be resolved. For instance, the current government’s push to give Seoul, not Washington, operational control over both states’ forces on the peninsula in the event of war has been rebuffed by the U.S. military. American commanders instead favor a conditions-based transfer after South Korea has proven it has the capabilities to lead a joint defense, rather than setting a fixed date. The two sides also have not reached a consensus on what role South Korea would play if Taiwan is attacked or blockaded by China. Adaptive middle powers can draw on their national narratives to find their strengths.
迄今为止,首尔在管理这些分歧方面做得相当有效。例如,在第二任期内,美国总统唐纳德·特朗普多次指责美国的盟友,包括韩国,依赖美国且未付出应有份额。为了从美国的伙伴那里榨取更多利益,特朗普实施了惩罚性关税。作为回应,韩国本可以像其他美国盟友那样采取对抗态度并实施报复性限制。但韩国总统李在明没有斥责总统,而是努力满足美国的要求,并以此加深两国的相互依赖。
Yet so far, Seoul has done an effective job at managing these differences. For example, in his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly accused Washington’s allies, including South Korea, of leeching off the United States and not paying their fair share. To extract more from Washington’s partners, Trump has implemented punishing tariffs. In response, South Korea could have been defiant and slapped on retaliatory restrictions, as other U.S. allies did. Instead, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung avoided rebuking the president and worked to meet American demands in ways that heightened the two states’ mutual dependence.
例如,李在明承诺向美国投资3500亿美元,以推进美国的经济和国家安全利益,包括购买更多美国军事装备,并增加韩国对驻韩美军的经济支持。
For instance, Lee pledged to invest $350 billion in the United States to advance American economic and national security interests, including by purchasing more U.S. military equipment, and to increase South Korean economic support for locally stationed American forces.
首尔的战略并非完全取得了成功。尽管韩国经济实现了增长和多元化,但依然容易受到美国和中国施加的压力。朝鲜正在扩充其核武及导弹力量,并加深与俄罗斯的军事联系,这带来了新的安全难题,而首尔对此仍需美国的协助。该国政治呈两极分化态势,导致政策剧烈转向,进而可能破坏长期战略规划。它还面临着全球最低的生育率,这对其税基和军队规模构成了威胁。
Seoul’s strategy has not been a uniform success. The South Korean economy remains exposed to American and Chinese pressure despite its growth and diversification. North Korea is expanding its nuclear and missile forces and deepening military ties with Russia, creating new security headaches for which Seoul still needs U.S. assistance. The country is politically polarized, resulting in sharp policy shifts that can undermine long-term strategic planning. It also suffers from the lowest birthrate of any country in the world, threatening its tax base and the size of its armed forces.
除此之外,韩国未必能为所有中等强国提供理想的样板。并非该类别的每个国家都拥有相似的经济资源、网络或与美国的联系。
Beyond that, South Korea may not provide the ideal template for every middle power. Not every country in this category has similar economic resources, networks, or ties to the United States.
但总体而言,韩国的大战略是有效的,因此它具有更广泛的启示意义。一方面,它展示了适应力强的中等强国如何能够利用各自的国家叙事来寻找自身优势并规划前进道路。或许更重要的是,它确凿地证明了,即使不按照卡尼敦促的那样通过合作建立一个中立的第三极,中等强国也能够发挥影响并获得一定程度的自主权。它还表明,中等强国在保持与美国坚定结盟的同时,也能发展自身独立的能力。因此,韩国证明了国家能够降低自身的脆弱性并拓宽政治选择。
But on the whole, South Korea’s grand strategy has been effective, and it thus carries broader lessons. For one, it shows how adaptive middle powers can draw on their respective national narratives to find their strengths and to chart a path forward. Perhaps more important, it is proof positive that middle powers can exercise influence and achieve a measure of autonomy even without working together to build a neutral third pole, as Carney urged. It also illustrates that middle powers can remain firmly allied with the United States while developing their own independent capabilities. South Korea, then, demonstrates that states can reduce their vulnerability and widen their political options.