
惠誉国际评级于2025年6月下调非洲进出口银行评级,引发了关于全球评级机构对多边开发银行评估方式的激烈争论。随后在2月,穆迪投资者服务公司提出了针对此类银行评估方法的修改建议。
Fitch’s downgrade of the Africa Export-Import Bank in June 2025 sparked a furious debate about the assessments of multilateral development banks by global rating agencies. Then in February, Moody’s proposed changes to its methodology for assessing these types of banks.
自7月起实施的修订引入了一项潜在的两级降级规则:如果一家银行没有大型、高评级且非借款股东,可能面临降级两级。这可能使非洲自主的开发银行在不引入非非洲股东的情况下难以获得更高评级,实际上迫使这些贷款机构放弃部分所有权和控制权。
The revisions, applied since July, introduced a potential two-notch downgrade if a bank does not have large, highly rated, and non-borrowing shareholders. This could make it difficult for African-owned development banks to secure higher ratings without bringing in non-African shareholders, effectively forcing these lenders to surrender part of their ownership and control.
信用评级旨在对机构偿还债务的能力和意愿提供独立评估。在多边银行的评估中,评级方法论存在偏向非非洲股东的倾向。这实际上暗示,无论非洲政府展现出怎样的财务承诺,都无法为其建立的机构提供足够的资本。
Credit ratings are intended to provide an independent assessment of an institution’s capacity and willingness to repay its obligations. In the case of assessments of multilateral banks, rating methodologies have a bias towards non-African shareholders. In effect suggesting that African governments, irrespective of their demonstrated financial commitments, cannot provide sufficient capital to the institutions they have established.
股东国籍可能与风险分析相关,但不应成为考察基本面的替代指标。如果机构拥有强大的风险管理和治理结构、充足的资本金、优质资产和高流动性,股东来自何处应当不那么重要。外资投资和股东多元化固然有价值,但这应当是机构自身的战略选择,而非信用评估架构隐性强加的条件。
The nationality of shareholders may be relevant to risk analysis, but it should not become a substitute for examining fundamentals. If the institution has strong risk management and governance structures, adequate capitalization, quality assets, and high liquidity, where the shareholders come from should be less important. Foreign investment and diversity of shareholding are valuable, but they should be a strategic choice for the institutions themselves rather than a condition implicitly imposed by the architecture of credit assessment.
一个更根本的问题是,股东实际缴纳的实收资本与股东承诺在需要时提供的可催缴资本之间存在差异。非洲进出口银行就是一个很好的例子。股东资金约为90亿美元,而其2026年上半年的净收入增长了30%。非洲股东的承诺也同样可观。据该行领导层称,截至2025年底,非洲各国政府额外缴纳了约26亿美元的实收资本。2026年又有5.26亿美元已以现金形式缴纳或承诺缴纳。此外,股东还承诺了大量可催缴资本。这是债权人的另一层重要保护。
A more fundamental issue is the difference between paid-in capital that shareholders have actually contributed and callable capital that they have promised to provide if there is a need. Afreximbank is a good example. Shareholders’ funds stand at approximately $9 billion, while its net income increased by 30% in the first half of 2026. The commitment of African shareholders is also significant. According to the bank’s leadership, African governments contributed approximately $2.6 billion in additional paid-in capital by the end of 2025. A further $526 million had been paid or committed in cash contributions in 2026. In addition, shareholders have committed substantial callable capital. This is another important layer of protection for creditors.
但穆迪的新方法仍然更看重来自外国高评级股东的可催缴资本,而非来自非洲股东的大量实收资本。更平衡的评估应当认可资本出资和其他有形财务承诺,而不论股东的信用状况如何。
But Moody’s new methodology still places more value on callable capital from foreign highly rated shareholders than substantial paid-in capital from African shareholders. A more balanced assessment should recognize capital contributions and other tangible financial commitments regardless of the creditworthiness of shareholders.
如今的评级方法将地域集中和只专注于非洲商业环境视为高风险的指标。这给非洲所有的多边开发银行造成了进一步的结构性劣势,因为这些银行的使命要求它们服务于非洲经济体。为了获得更高的信用评级,这些机构需要减少对它们正是为支持而设立的那些经济体的贷款。这将削弱它们的作用和宗旨。
Today’s rating methodologies characterize geographical concentration and an exclusive focus on the African business environment as indicators of high risk. This creates a further structural disadvantage for African-owned multilateral development banks whose mandates require them to serve African economies. To secure higher credit ratings, these institutions need to reduce lending to the very economies they were established to support. This will diminish their role and purpose.
不应指望评级机构忽视非洲在治理、资本充足性、流动性或风险管理方面的弱点。独立性和分析诚信对于评级行业的公信力仍然至关重要。为了保持这一点,有必要做出三项改变。
Rating agencies should not be expected to overlook weaknesses in African governance, capital adequacy, liquidity or risk management. Independence and analytical integrity remain essential to the credibility of the ratings industry. To maintain this, three changes are necessary.
第一,评级应准确且一致。非洲机构不应仅仅因为其股东是非洲人并在非洲运营就受到惩罚。国籍不应成为财务能力和支付意愿的替代指标。
First, ratings should be accurate and consistent in their assessments. African institutions should not be penalized simply because their shareholders are African and operate in Africa. Nationality should not be a proxy for financial capacity and willingness to pay.
第二,非洲各国政府必须继续以资本支持其机构,并确认通过其协议和条约确立的法律承诺:这促使评级机构根据多边银行的法律和运营优势进行评估。
Second, African governments must continue to support their institutions with capital and affirm their legal commitments established through their agreements and treaties: This pushes rating agencies to assess multilateral banks based on their legal and operational merits.
最后,非洲国家必须加强其多边金融机构之间的合作,深化国内资本市场,并支持发展独立的非洲信用评级能力。只要所有机构保持严格标准,更大的竞争和分析多样性将提高信用评估的质量。
Lastly, African countries must strengthen cooperation among their multilateral financial institutions, deepen domestic capital markets, and support the development of independent African credit rating capacity. Greater competition and analytical diversity will improve the quality of credit assessments, provided all agencies maintain rigorous standards.
如果获得认可的价格是将所有权和控制权交给外国股东,非洲就无法建立自己的强大多边金融机构。
Africa cannot build its own strong multilateral financial institutions if the price of recognition is surrendering the ownership and control to foreign shareholders.