我刚刚花了几天时间,在阿布扎比俯瞰波斯湾的萨巴尼亚岛地区会议上,与出席的阿拉伯、伊朗、以色列、美国和欧洲的分析人士及外交官交谈。这里的氛围是我以前从未遇到过的。不是震惊与敬畏,而是震惊与恐惧。
I’ve just spent several days talking to Arab, Iranian, Israeli, American and European analysts and diplomats attending the Sir Bani Yas regional conference in Abu Dhabi, overlooking the Persian Gulf. The mood was something I’d never encountered here before. Not shock and awe, but shock and dread.
这种恐惧源于一种逐渐清醒的认识:这场由美国和以色列发起的最新对伊战争,最终将让伊朗对其邻国拥有比以往更强的支配地位。海湾阿拉伯国家从未敦促美国发动这场战争,但一旦美国开战,他们就以为美国有结束战争的计划。他们以为美国人明白,美国仅主要靠空中力量推翻的政府只有日本一个——而那还动用了两颗核弹。
The dread comes from the dawning awareness that this latest war with Iran, started by America and Israel, is going to end with Iran more dominant than ever over its neighbors. The Gulf Arabs never urged the United States to start this war, but once it did, they assumed it had a plan to finish it. They assumed the Americans understood that the only government they ever toppled primarily with air power was Japan’s — and that took two nuclear bombs.
因此,人们心中有一种隐隐的不安:美国和以色列挑起了一件事,却要么不知道如何收场,要么不再愿意付出代价去收场——而买单的将是伊朗的阿拉伯邻国,换来的是一个因能够宣称与“大撒旦”美国以及“小撒旦”以色列打成平手而更加有恃无恐的伊朗。
So, there is a gnawing feeling that the United States and Israel started something that they either don’t know how to finish or no longer want to pay the price to finish — and that Iran’s Arab neighbors will be paying instead, for an Iran that will be emboldened by being able to say it fought the “Great Satan” — America — and the “Little Satan” — Israel — to a draw.
会上一位东欧外交官向我最尖锐地表达了这种普遍情绪,他引用了冷战时期的一句格言:“作为美国的盟友,麻烦就在于你永远不知道它什么时候会转过身来捅自己一刀。”这趟行程中,如果有人问我“特朗普政府对伊朗的政策是什么?”“谁负责他们的政策?”以及“一旦民主党控制国会,美国的政策会怎样?”这类问题,每问一次给我一美元的话,我大概都够付回家的机票钱了——还是商务舱。
The prevailing sentiment was most pointedly conveyed to me by an Eastern European diplomat at the conference, citing an aphorism from Cold War days: “The trouble with being an ally of the United States is that you never know when it will turn around and stab itself in the back.”If I had a dollar for every person who asked me on this trip questions like “What is the Trump administration’s policy on Iran?”“Who’s in charge of their policy?” and “What’s going to happen to American policy once the Democrats control Congress?”I probably could have paid for my ticket home — business class.
人们很担忧。他们能把这里的种种线索联系起来,而所有这些线索似乎都指向一个未来:生活在更加有恃无恐的伊朗的阴影之下。以下是我最受触动的那些对话的记者笔记。
People are worried. They can connect the dots here, and they all seem to lead to a future living under an emboldened Iran’s shadow. Here’s my reporter’s notebook of the conversations that struck me the most.
我最大的收获 特朗普总统显然想告诉美国人民,战争基本已经结束,美国正从霍尔木兹海峡获得它想要的所有油轮并驶入公海,我们只需坐等,一边吃爆米花一边等着我们海军对伊朗的经济封锁把这个政权逼到认输,接受我们永久停火的条件。唉,从这里的实际情况看,并非如此。
The Biggest Thing I Learned President Trump clearly wants to tell the American people that the war is basically over, that the United States is getting all the oil tankers it wants out of the Strait of Hormuz and onto the high seas and that we can just sit back, pop popcorn and wait until our Navy’s economic blockade around Iran chokes the regime into saying uncle and submitting to our terms for a permanent cease-fire. Alas, that is not how it looks from here.
阿联酋一位资深石油官员向我做了简报,并分享给我一张数字地图,上面显示伊朗对阿联酋拥有的油轮船队发动持续不断的袭击——不是在这些油轮通过靠近伊朗的霍尔木兹海峡时,而是在它们试图穿越阿联酋水域的波斯湾、紧贴该国东部海岸线航行时。这些袭击极为精密,主要使用巡航导弹和无人机,直接打进油轮的轮机舱使其瘫痪。每次都正中目标。阿联酋随后不得不派出拖船前去营救船员,并把瘫痪的油轮拖进港口。这种情况几乎每天都在发生。
I had a briefing from a senior Emirati oil official who shared with me a digital map of the relentless Iranian attacks on the fleet of Emirati-owned oil tankers — not when they pass through the Strait of Hormuz near Iran, but when they try to transit the Persian Gulf in Emirati waters, hugging the country’s eastern coastline. These are highly sophisticated attacks, mostly with cruise missiles and drones, that go right into the oil tankers’ engine rooms and disable them. Bull’s-eye every time. The Emirates then has to send tugboats out to rescue the crews and pull the disabled tankers into port. This is happening almost every day.
而且袭击不只发生在这里。上周末我在阿联酋期间,就在海湾稍北处,伊朗向位于巴林麦纳麦以南的里法空军基地的美国防御雷达系统及其他目标发射了无人机。周一又发动了一次。
And the attacks are not just here. Over the past weekend while I was in the Emirates, just up the Gulf, Iran fired drones at a U.S. defense radar system at Al-Riffa Air Base, south of Manama, Bahrain, and other targets. It did again on Monday.
德黑兰的策略似乎是迫使特朗普选择他想喝下哪一杯毒酒:接受一项糟糕的、保全面子的协议——给予德黑兰长期安全保障并解除制裁,以换取重新开放霍尔木兹海峡以及某种含糊的去核化承诺——或者重启战争(这场战争的不受欢迎在一定程度上让特朗普的政党输掉了中期选举),这必然会让油价再度飙升,并让他在美国人民那里的处境更加糟糕。德黑兰政权为什么还不认输?
Tehran’s strategy seems to be to force Trump to choose which poison he wants to drink: accept a lousy, face-saving deal in which Tehran is given long-term security guarantees — and a lifting of sanctions — in return for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and some vague promise on denuclearization, or restart the war (the unpopularity of which partly cost Trump’s party the midterm elections), surely sending the price of oil soaring anew and digging his hole with the American people deeper. Why Hasn’t the Regime in Tehran Said Uncle?
会议上有多位伊朗学者,其中一位经常往返伊朗。他们描绘出的这个国家,是你绝不会想与之比拼憋气的——而我们现在恰恰就处于这样的境地。
There were several Iranian academics at the conference, one of whom goes back and forth to Iran. The picture they painted was of a country with which you would not want to get into a breath-holding contest — yet that’s where we are now.
不仅是因为这个政权在多年制裁下对痛苦早已习以为常——而且掌控力如此之强,以至于伊朗人民在这件事上毫无发言权。还因为今年2月,以色列和美国联手暗杀了伊朗国内可能是唯一一个既愿意认输、又能让认输落到实处的人。
It is not only that this regime is so inured to pain after living under sanctions for so many years — and is so in control that the Iranian people have no say in the matter. It is also that Israel and America in February teamed up to assassinate possibly the only man in Iran who could say uncle and make it stick.
此人就是伊朗最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊。人们常常忘记,哈梅内伊担任伊朗最高领袖近37年。他同时拥有政治和宗教权威,加之曾击退众多对手才登上最高位置并稳居其位,这种权威更加牢固。他懂得如何平衡革命卫队、正规军、文职当局和教士集团。接替他的,是他的儿子以及一种集体领导体制——这显然是一个最糟糕意义上的对手团队。彼此互相猜疑,团队中任何成员只要显得过于急于与美国达成协议,或放弃最高要价,其他人就随时准备指其为叛徒。
That was the country’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. People often forget that Khamenei was supreme leader of Iran for nearly 37 years. He enjoyed both political and religious authority, reinforced by having fought off many rivals to make his way to the top and stay there. He knew how to balance the Revolutionary Guards, the regular army, the civilian authorities and the clerical establishment. He has been replaced by his son and a kind of collective leadership that is apparently a team of rivals in the worst sense. Each is suspicious of the others, and each is ready to call a traitor any member of the group who seems overly eager to strike a deal with the Americans or to abandon maximalist demands.
特朗普和本雅明·内塔尼亚胡从未考虑过这个问题。他们只是想当然地认为,一旦斩掉旧领导层,整个伊朗体制就会崩溃,一个民主政权将从废墟中崛起。结果却是,领导层存续了下来——更愤怒、更极端、更不团结,但仍然牢牢掌权。
Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu never thought about this problem. They just assumed that when they decapitated the old leadership, the whole Iranian system would collapse and a democracy would rise from the ashes. Instead, the leadership survived — angrier, more extreme and less unified, but still very much in charge.
一位出席会议的伊朗学者将国内局势形容为“悲惨但可忍受”。你永远不应低估人们的适应能力。这位学者补充说,现在你会看到许多骑摩托车的女性不戴希贾布(传统头巾)在街上行驶,因为政权基本上已放弃强迫女性遮盖,因为它明白,在施加如此多经济困难的情况下,无法再强加沉重的宗教限制。
One Iranian academic at the conference described the domestic situation as “miserable but tolerable.”You should never underestimate people’s ability to adapt. The academic added that you now see many women on motorcycles riding around without the hijab, the traditional head covering, because the regime has basically given up forcing women to cover, understanding that it cannot impose heavy religious restrictions when it is imposing so many economic hardships.
一位偶尔前往德黑兰的伊拉克外交官向我描述了许多伊朗人对该政权以及对特朗普和内塔尼亚胡的复杂感受:“伊朗人非常民族主义,”他沉吟道。比你想象中更多的人会在政权受到攻击时支持它,而比你想象中更多的人会在战争结束后背弃它。
An Iraqi diplomat who travels occasionally to Tehran described for me the complex feelings many Iranians have toward this regime and toward Trump and Netanyahu: “Iranians are very nationalistic,” he mused. A lot more of them than you might think will support the regime when it is under attack, and more than you might think will turn on the regime when the war is over.
人们反复向我提出的问题 既然民主党控制了众议院和参议院,他们对这场战争的态度将是什么?
The Question So Many People Asked Me What will be the Democrats’ approach to the war now that they control the House and the Senate?
我认为,民主党试图切断战争资金将是一个错误,正如我认为谈论削减警察经费是一个错误一样。你削减了资金,你就得为后果负责。也就是说,特朗普将永远宣称,他曾让伊朗人陷入绝境,结果民主党却在他脚下抽走了地毯。民主党不应做任何削弱美国对伊朗施压筹码的事。这是一个病态的政权,是该地区和世界范围内真正具有破坏性、恶性的行为体,它现在正向俄罗斯提供先进无人机技术,莫斯科正利用这些技术在冬季来临前摧毁乌克兰的能源基础设施。
I think it would be a mistake for Democrats to try to cut off funding for the war, just as I thought it was a mistake to talk about defunding the police. You defund it, you own it. That is, Trump will say forevermore that he had the Iranians on the ropes and then the Democrats pulled the rug out from under him. Democrats should do nothing to weaken U.S. leverage on the Iranians. It is a sick regime and a truly destabilizing, malign actor in the region and around the world, one that is now providing Russians with the advanced drone technology that Moscow is using to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure before winter.
民主党人应发挥其在国会中的优势,坚持对这场的战争的方方面面展开调查,让美国人民了解这场战争计划得多么糟糕、它对该地区美军存在实际造成了多大损害(国防部长皮特·赫格塞思试图掩盖这一点),以及为何指挥这场战争的庸才们必须被解职。这些努力从长远看将有助于增强美国的实力,并对伊朗施加更大压力。
Democrats should play to their strength in Congress and insist on investigating every aspect of this war, enabling the American people to understand just how ill planned it was, just how much damage it has actually done to the U.S. military presence in the region (which Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has tried to hide) and why the incompetents who directed it need to be fired. Those efforts will help strengthen America’s hand over the long run and put more pressure on Iran.
民主党人请记住:即便在赞同拜登政府从阿富汗撤军的美国人当中,那场混乱的撤军行动导致塔利班掌权,这一阴影在拜登余下的任期内始终挥之不去。特朗普对华失败的贸易战与对伊朗失败的热战有何共同之处?
Remember Dems: Even among Americans who agreed with the Biden administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, the chaotic execution that left the Taliban in charge haunted Biden the rest of his term. What Do Trump’s Failed Trade War With China and Failing Hot War With Iran Have in Common?
答案:一位治理国家如同经营自家公司一样的总统——没有明确的权力层级,决策随意、冲动,几乎不做任何情景规划。
Answer: a president who runs the country the way he ran his companies, with no clear lines of authority, haphazard, impulsive decision making and virtually no scenario planning.
让我来解释。任何对波斯湾做过战略规划的人都知道,伊朗若受到威胁,可以选择用水雷或导弹封锁霍尔木兹海峡——全球约四分之一的石油和五分之一的天然气供应经由该海峡运输。但伊朗从未这样做过,因为它担心引发美国和全球的大规模军事反应。正因如此,即便在2025年6月22日的“午夜之锤”行动之后,德黑兰也没有这样做。那次行动中,美国巡航导弹和B-2隐形轰炸机打击了伊朗位于福尔多、纳坦兹和伊斯法罕的三处核设施。
Let me explain. Anyone who had done strategic planning around the Persian Gulf knew that Iran, if threatened, could choose to close the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly one-quarter of global oil and one-fifth of global gas supplies flowed — with mines or missiles. Iran had never done it, though, because it feared triggering a large-scale U.S. and global military response. That is why Tehran did not do so even after Operation Midnight Hammer on June 22, 2025, in which American cruise missiles and B-2 stealth bombers struck three Iranian nuclear sites at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan.
但在遏制伊朗核计划的谈判失败、特朗普于2026年2月28日与以色列军队联手发动第二次打击——“史诗之怒”行动——之后,伊朗决定赌一把,接管霍尔木兹海峡。那次行动打击了伊朗的核设施和弹道导弹基础设施,并消灭了其大部分高层领导。
But after negotiations to curb Iran’s nuclear program failed and Trump launched a second attack on Feb. 28, 2026 — Operation Epic Fury — alongside Israeli forces, targeting Iran’s nuclear sites and ballistic missile infrastructure and wiping out much of its senior leadership, Iran decided to roll the dice and take over the Strait of Hormuz.
既然伊朗已成功打出这张牌,它就将成为伊朗武库中一件永久性的武器。无论如何,即便达成和平协议,该地区所有人都知道,伊朗知道,美国知道,伊朗随时可以再次动用这件武器。
Now that Iran has played that card successfully, it will be a permanent weapon in its arsenal. No matter what, even if a peace deal is struck, everyone in the neighborhood knows that Iran knows that America knows it can use this weapon again anytime.
唉,我刚刚在北京——同样的故事,不同的自然资源。特朗普在第二任期伊始,于2025年2月4日对所有中国进口商品加征10%的关税,随后在2025年3月将税率翻倍。中方没有太大反应。接着,2025年4月2日——特朗普称之为“解放日”——他在现有关税基础上又对中国商品加征34%的关税。
Alas, I was just in Beijing — same story, different natural resource. Trump began his second term by imposing, on Feb. 4, 2025, a 10 percent tariff on all Chinese imports, later doubling it in March 2025. The Chinese did not respond much. Then on April 2, 2025 — what Trump called “Liberation Day” — he added a 34 percent duty on Chinese goods on top of existing tariffs.
这一次,中国基本上用罗伯特·德尼罗在电影《出租车司机》里的那句台词回应了特朗普:“你在跟我说话吗?”中国对特朗普的34%关税采取了同等反制,还对七种中重稀土元素及由其制成的磁体实施了出口限制。中国生产全球90%以上的稀土磁体,以及目前受出口管制的七种稀土元素各自98%至100%的产量。美国汽车制造商哪怕制造一辆汽油动力汽车也要用到稀土,而半导体、商用飞机、光纤、无人机、激光器、机器人以及许多其他先进技术的制造商,都需要这七种稀土,而中国现在正限制其供应。
This time the Chinese basically responded to Trump with that Robert De Niro line from the movie “Taxi Driver”: “You talkin’ to me?”The Chinese matched Trump’s 34 percent tariffs, plus they placed export restrictions on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements and magnets made from them. China produces over 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth magnets, and between 98 and 100 percent of each of the seven rare earths now under export controls. U.S. automakers use rare earths to build even a single gasoline-powered car, while makers of semiconductors, commercial aircraft, fiber optics, drones, lasers, robots and many other advanced technologies all require the seven rare earths whose supplies China is now limiting.
正如《纽约时报》北京分社社长布拉德舍(Keith Bradsher)在其即将出版的关于稀土的书中写道:“出口管制以一种连中国官员都感到惊讶的速度,引发了全球性的短缺,这种短缺波及了美国经济,并蔓延至欧洲和亚洲其他工业化民主国家的经济体。”
As the Times Beijing bureau chief Keith Bradsher writes in his upcoming book on rare earths: “With a rapidity that surprised even Chinese officials,” the export controls “caused a global shortage that rippled through the American economy and across the economies of other industrial democracies in Europe and Asia.”
特朗普政府最终与北京达成休战,促使中国重启了稀土供应,但中国同时也留下了一个非常明确的信息:我们随时可以再次这样做。伊朗和霍尔木兹海峡的情况也是如此。在对待伊朗和中国的问题上,特朗普由于没有预先多想两步,让德黑兰和北京给他上了地缘政治中最显而易见、但如今代价高昂的一课:“敌人也有发言权。”当一个分裂的中东进一步碎片化时会发生什么?
The Trump administration eventually reached a truce with Beijing that got China to restart the flow of rare earths, but not without China leaving a very clear message: We can do this again anytime we want. Ditto with Iran and Hormuz. When it came to both Iran and China, Trump — by not thinking two steps ahead — allowed both Tehran and Beijing to teach him one of the most obvious, yet now expensive, lessons of geopolitics: “The enemy gets a vote.”What Happens When A Divided Middle East Fragments Even Further?
我不记得中东曾有过像现在这样每个角落似乎都在碎片化的时刻。该地区现在被分裂成许多小块,每一块都因技术而比以往任何时候都更有力量,以至于没有任何大国能够将它们整合进一个连贯的战后框架中,从而使美国能够脱身并留下某种稳定的地区秩序。
I cannot recall a time when the Middle East seemed to be fragmenting in every corner. The region is now broken into so many little pieces, each piece more empowered than ever by technology, that no power has the ability to aggregate them into a coherent postwar framework that would allow the United States to disengage and leave behind some kind of stable regional order.
环顾四周:海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会——该地区的主要联盟结构,由沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、巴林、卡塔尔、科威特和阿曼组成——基本上已经破裂。两个新的联盟正在形成。一个是包括以色列、阿联酋、希腊、塞浦路斯和印度的联盟。另一个是由沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和巴基斯坦组成的“麦加防御联盟”。卡塔尔和阿曼则各自寻求与德黑兰达成自己的协议。
Just look around: The Gulf Cooperation Council — the main alliance structure for the region, comprising Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman — has basically fractured. Two new alliances are emerging. One is Israel, the Emirates, Greece, Cyprus and India. The other is the “Mecca Defense Alliance,” made up of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Qatar and Oman are each looking to cut their own deals with Tehran.
据沙特外交部称,10月26日,沙特国防大臣哈立德·本·萨勒曼亲王、巴基斯坦陆军参谋长赛义德·阿西姆·穆尼尔以及土耳其最高情报官员易卜拉欣·卡林前往德黑兰,与总统马苏德·佩泽希齐扬和伊朗最高国家安全委员会主席穆赫辛·雷扎伊举行会谈,目的是“缓和当前危机各方之间的紧张局势”,并“鼓励对话和外交解决方案”。
On Oct. 26, the Saudi defense minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief, Syed Asim Munir, and Turkey’s top intelligence official, Ibrahim Kalin, traveled to Tehran to hold talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Mohsen Rezaei, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in order to “de-escalate tensions between the parties to the current crisis” and “encourage dialogue and diplomatic solutions,” according to the Saudi Foreign Ministry.
看到沙特人如此迅速地向德黑兰低头,阿联酋官员感到相当震惊。此举也没有奏效。伊朗支持的胡塞武装实际上加大了对沙特的攻击力度——11月中旬对利雅得的哈立德国王国际机场和沙特东西向输油管道发动了多次无人机袭击。
It was pretty shocking to officials in the Emirates to see the Saudis bending the knee to Tehran so quickly. It also didn’t work. The Iranian-backed Houthis actually stepped up their attacks on Saudi Arabia — launching multiple drone strikes in mid-November on the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and the Saudi East-West oil pipeline.
与此同时,以色列政坛的分裂程度罕见;目前尚不清楚由加迪·艾森科特领导的反对派联盟或内塔尼亚胡的执政联盟能否组建政府。黎巴嫩有出色的总理和总统,但什叶派与其他黎巴嫩穆斯林和基督徒之间的断层线——伊朗利用并试图扩大这一断层线——正阻止贝鲁特政府解除亲伊朗的真主党民兵的武装,这支民兵不断将黎巴嫩拖入一场没有黎巴嫩人投票支持的与以色列的战争。伊拉克则分裂为民选政府与不受选举约束的亲伊朗民兵,后者按自己的规则行事。
Meanwhile, Israeli politics has rarely been more fractured; it is not clear that either the opposition coalition, led by Gadi Eisenkot, or Netanyahu’s governing coalition can form a government. Lebanon has an outstanding prime minister and president, but the fault line between Shiites and other Lebanese Muslims and Christians — which Iran exploits and seeks to widen — is preventing the Beirut government from disarming the pro-Iranian Hezbollah militia that keeps dragging Lebanon into a war with Israel that no Lebanese voted for. Iraq is split between an elected government and unelected pro-Iranian militias, who play by their own rules.
巴勒斯坦人也是分裂的,不仅分裂为哈马斯和巴勒斯坦权力机构两派,还分裂为腐败的权力机构与正在崛起的年轻一代巴勒斯坦人两派,后者希望清除腐败的权力机构,举行选举,产生一个干净、合法的巴勒斯坦领导层。
The Palestinians are divided, not only between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, but also between the corrupt authority and a rising young generation of Palestinians who want to see it purged and elections held for a clean, legitimate Palestinian leadership.
波斯湾国家越是发现无法再把自身安全外包给华盛顿,其安全就越取决于彼此合作的能力。遗憾的是,它们仍困在古老的部落对抗、宗教和政治宿怨以及相互竞争的联盟之中。这个邻里真的需要一些睦邻关系——因为确实有一场风暴正从西方袭来。
The more the Persian Gulf countries discover that they can no longer outsource their security to Washington, the more their security will depend on their ability to cooperate with one another. Unfortunately, they remain trapped in old tribal rivalries, religious and political feuds and competing alliances. This neighborhood really needs some neighboring — because there really is a storm coming out of the West.
一个我从未在这里听人问过的问题:人工智能将如何影响这个地区和这场冲突?这就是正在到来的风暴——它已经让弱小者能够采取真正大规模的的行动。
A Question I’d Never Heard Asked Here Before How is A.I. going to impact this region and this conflict? That is the storm that is coming — and it is already enabling the small to act really big.
联合国专家估计,截至2024年,也门活跃的胡塞武装战斗人员——即该运动的核心成员——约有35万人。借助廉价的精确制导武器,他们得以恐吓人口约3500万的沙特阿拉伯,并控制曼德海峡,从而掌控红海的进出通道。
U.N. experts estimated the number of active Houthi fighters in Yemen — the core movement membership — at around 350,000 as of 2024. Leveraging cheap precision weaponry, they have been able to terrorize Saudi Arabia, with a population of about 35 million, and take control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait to control access into and out of the Red Sea.
分析人士卡比尔·塔内贾和西达尔特·亚达夫在题为《点击与卡拉什尼科夫步枪:胡塞武装、人工智能与一场新的安全辩论》的评论文章中指出,Anthropic的一项研究显示,胡塞武装“使用Claude实施了三个武器研发项目:一种制导火箭、一种射程超过2000公里的弹道导弹,以及一种包含高超音速滑翔飞行器型号的多型号导弹”。
In a commentary entitled “Clicks and Kalashnikovs: The Houthis, A.I. and a New Security Debate,” the analysts Kabir Taneja and Siddharth Yadav noted that a study by Anthropic revealed that the Houthis “used Claude to implement three weapons-development programs: a guided rocket, a ballistic missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers and a multivariant missile that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.”
现在想象一下到2027年底可能发生什么:前沿模型可能开始实现递归式自我改进,基本上把人类甩在后面并自行训练——而人形机器人也变得越来越像人。随着这类技术扩散,好吧,如果沙特人现在就和胡塞武装有麻烦,那就再等一年看看。
Now imagine what could happen by the end of 2027, as frontier models possibly begin to achieve recursive self-improvement, basically leaving humans behind and training themselves — and humanoid robots get more humanlike. As that technology proliferates, well, if the Saudis have a problem with the Houthis now, wait a year.
我在这里采访到的最有意思的人物之一,是乌克兰前国防部长米哈伊洛·费多罗夫,他也在会上发了言。他解释说,乌克兰在无人机创新上实现大跨越的关键,是它制定了一系列法律,让创办无人机公司变得极其容易,而且有利可图。
One of the most interesting people I interviewed here was Ukraine’s former defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who also spoke at the conference. He explained that the key to Ukraine’s great leap forward in drone innovation was that it wrote a series of laws that made it incredibly easy and profitable to start a drone company.
“2022年,”他告诉我,“乌克兰有七家私营无人机公司。到了2026年,现在有700家。”这正以疯狂的速度推动创新。他给我看了一段视频,画面中一名无人机步兵高速穿过布满沟壑的地带,看上去令人毛骨悚然。
“In 2022,” he told me, “there were seven private drone companies in Ukraine. In 2026 there are now 700,” which is driving innovation crazy fast. He showed me a video of a drone infantryman traversing a ditch-laden area at high speed that was spooky.
他说,未来的战场将是“成群的自主无人机、自主机器人和人工智能代理,它们会锁定任何移动的步兵”。所以你必须用机器人取代人类步兵,因为成群的无人机不会让任何人类士兵活下来。据报道,去年12月,乌克兰使用这类工具在一个月内就使约3.5万名俄罗斯士兵死亡或重伤。天哪,你听到什么有希望的事了吗?
The future battlefield, he said, will be “swarms of autonomous drones, autonomous robots and A.I. agents that will target any infantry that moves.”So you will have to replace human infantry with robots, because swarms of drones would leave no human soldier standing. Last December, Ukraine reportedly killed or seriously wounded some 35,000 Russian soldiers — in one month — using these kinds of tools. Geez, Did You Hear Anything Hopeful?
听到了。它来自萨利赫·埃尔·马赫努克,黎巴嫩圣约瑟夫大学比较政治学讲师。他一直直言不讳地倡导黎巴嫩与以色列之间的和平,并主张让黎巴嫩摆脱真主党的致命控制。长期以来,真主党一直威胁任何胆敢主张黎巴嫩与以色列正式和平的黎巴嫩人。
I did. It came from Saleh El Machnouk, a lecturer in comparative politics at the Université Saint-Joseph in Lebanon, who has been an outspoken advocate for peace between Lebanon and Israel and for freeing Lebanon from the death grip of Hezbollah, which has long threatened any Lebanese who dares advocate for a formal peace between Lebanon and Israel.
“多年来,各地区强国劫持了黎巴嫩,让我们与以色列的和平进程”服从于它们的利益和任性,马什努克告诉我。但他补充说,最近的民调显示,大约一半的黎巴嫩人,包括大多数逊尼派穆斯林,而不仅仅是基督徒,支持与以色列达成和平协议——这一比例大约是一年前的两倍。“我们想成为一个相互联系、繁荣、在政治和宗教上都宽容的中东的一部分——如果我们因为这符合伊朗及其在黎巴嫩的代理民兵真主党的利益,而陷入与以色列的战争泥潭,这根本不可能实现。”
“For many, many years, various regional powers hijacked Lebanon and made our peace process with Israel” subject to their interests and whims, Machnouk told me. But recent polls show roughly half of Lebanese, including a majority of Sunni Muslims, not just Christians, support a peace agreement with Israel — roughly double the share from a year ago, Machnouk added. “We want to be part of a Middle East that is interconnected and prosperous and politically and religiously tolerant — and that cannot happen if we are stuck waging war on Israel because it serves the interests of Iran” and its proxy militia, Hezbollah, in Lebanon.
马什努克的观察并不让我感到意外。我在年轻巴勒斯坦人身上发现了类似的务实态度,他们要求举行选举、改造巴勒斯坦权力机构——只想推进进程:在以色列旁边建立一个巴勒斯坦国。
Machnouk’s observation does not surprise me. I am finding a similar practicality among young Palestinians who are demanding elections and a transformation of the Palestinian Authority — and just want to get on with it: a Palestinian state next to Israel.
如果某种方式能解除伊朗的致命控制——它总是愿意为其病态的伊斯兰法西斯主义意识形态战斗到最后一个巴勒斯坦人和最后一个黎巴嫩人——同时也能解除犹太原教旨主义者和哈马斯原教旨主义者的僵硬控制,那么整个地区对彻底变革的意愿就会存在。
If somehow the deadly grip of an Iran always ready to fight to the last Palestinian and the last Lebanese for its sick Islamo-fascist ideology can be lifted, along with the dead hand of the Jewish and Hamas fundamentalists, the will for radical change all over this region will be there.
这场与伊朗的战争本不该在没有盟友、没有全球合法性、没有“B计划”、不了解伊朗内部动态的情况下发起。但它如何结束至关重要,因为这将影响该地区每个国家的政治——余震将波及全球。
This war with Iran should never have been started with no allies, no global legitimacy, no Plan B and no understanding of Iran’s internal dynamics. But how it ends is extremely important, because it will impact the politics of every country in the region — and the aftershocks will be felt globally.
托马斯·L·弗里德曼是外交评论专栏作家。他于1981年加入本报,曾三次获得普利策奖。他是七本书的作者,包括获得国家图书奖的《从贝鲁特到耶路撒冷》。@tomfriedman
Thomas L. Friedman is the foreign affairs Opinion columnist. He joined the paper in 1981 and has won three Pulitzer Prizes. He is the author of seven books, including “From Beirut to Jerusalem,” which won the National Book Award. @tomfriedman •