
与伊朗的战争正在中期选举前重塑美国--它将如何影响投票站的美国选民?我们与政治和全球记者现场直播,回答您的问题或注册加入对话卡夫卡狗问道:越来越明显的是,特朗普的精神状况不佳,允许他进一步继续担任自己的角色可能(可能吗?)如果民主党能够在参议院获得60多个席位,那么他们是否应该追求第25条?
The war with Iran is reshaping America ahead of the midterms – how will it affect US voters at the polls? We’re live with political and global correspondents to answer your questions or sign up to join the conversation KafkasDog asks: As it’s increasingly clear that Trump is not mentally fit, and that allowing him to continue in his role further may (likely?) decimate the economy, if the Dems can secure, say, 60+ seats in the Senate, should they pursue Article 25?
劳伦:60多票!当然,民主党的情况看起来不错,但情况并不好。但由于我住在洛杉矶,特朗普昨晚开玩笑说他可能会“让他们拿走”--我会回答这个问题。许多民主党人长期以来一直认为(自特朗普1.0以来)他不适合任职。但就像现在一样,实际上非自愿援引第25修正案的过程源于副总统和内阁,而不是国会。仅这一点就应该告诉您这种可能性有多大。
Lauren: A 60-plus majority! Sure things are looking good for Democrats, but not good. But as I’m based in Los Angeles, a city Trump just last night joked he might “let them take out” - I will indulge the question. There are many Democrats who have long believed (since Trump 1.0) that he was not fit to serve. But then like now the process for actually involuntarily invoking the 25th Amendment originates with the vice president and the cabinet, not Congress. That alone should tell you how likely it is.
即便如此,如果它要到达国会(只有在总统与副总统和内阁之间就其任职能力发生争议的情况下才会到达国会),国会将需要参众两院三分之二的多数票才能任命副总统而不是总统。
Even then, if it were to reach Congress, which it would only if there was a dispute between the president and his vice president and cabinet over his capacity to serve, Congress would need a two-thirds majority in both chambers to install the vice president over the president.
我认为民主党更有可能面临的问题是他们是否应该再次对总统进行弹劾。在这个问题上,该党确实存在分歧。虽然许多人认为他犯下了可弹劾的罪行,但他们也认识到,他们的地位仍然很低,选民希望就他们最关心的问题--经济-采取行动。鉴于参议院几乎不可能获得足够大的多数席位来对总统定罪,我认为民主党人认为,这条途径可能比利用他们的政治资本推动立法更没有成效,他们希望这些立法能够修复他们的地位,在2028年之前给他们一些可信度,对他们来说,最好是这样的特朗普运动。
I think the question Democrats are more likely to confront is whether they should again pursue impeachment against the president. And on that question, the party is really divided. While many believe he has committed impeachable offenses, they also recognize that their standing remains low and voters want action on the issues they care most about - the economy. Given that there is almost no likelihood of a Senate majority great enough to convict the president, I think Democrats feel this avenue is likely less fruitful than using their political capital to push through legislation that they hope will repair their standing, give them some credibility ahead of 2028, and ideally for them, knee-cap Trump’s movement that way.
罗伯特:简单的问题,没有简单的答案。国会确实有权阻止或限制其尚未投票支持的战争。但伊朗冲突的特殊轨迹,加上特朗普对共和党控制的立法机构的强大控制,给了他更多的灵活性。1973年的战争权力决议最初是在越南战争后通过的,旨在遏制所谓的“帝国总统”,规定政府必须在48天内通知国会承诺采取军事行动,并必须在60至90天内撤出部队,除非国会投票授权战争或延长时间框架。
Robert: Simple question, to which there is no simple answer. Congress does have the power to impede or limit a war for which it has not voted. But the particular trajectory of the Iran conflict combined with Trump’s powerful grip on a Republican-controlled legislature has given him added flexibility. The 1973 War Powers Resolution - originally passed in the wake of the Vietnam war and intended to rein in a so-called “imperial president” - lays down that the administration must inform congress within 48 of committing forces to military action and must withdraw the forces within 60 to 90 days unless Congress votes to authorize the war or extend the time frame.
特朗普一直能够通过法律手段绕过这些限制。例如,最初的冲突在4月初--在60天期限到来之前--被事实上的停火所暂停,后来通过伊朗和美国之间的谅解备忘录正式化。当该协议随后崩溃时,白宫认为60天的门槛再次从头开始。更广泛地说,特朗普援引了宪法第二条第2款赋予他的宪法权力,该条款声称总统有权在未经国会授权的情况下下令进行有针对性的打击,保卫海外美军或应对海外威胁。
Trump has been able to circumvent these restrictions through legal sleight of hand. For example, the original conflict was suspended in early April - before the 60-day period had been reached - by a de facto ceasefire that was later formalized through theg of a memorandum of understanding between Iran and US. When that agreement subsequently collapsed, the White House argued that the 60-day threshold started again from scratch. More generally, Trump has invoked his constitutional powers under Article II, Section 2 of the constitution, which asserts that the president is empowered to order targeted strikes, defend US forces abroad, or respond to threats abroad without congressional authorization.
特朗普还能够将自己的行动重新定义为“防御性”,将战争的主要目标转向重新开放霍尔木兹海峡,霍尔木兹海峡是一条战略水道,是世界五分之一石油的管道。伊朗因受到袭击而关闭该地区,这对美国和全球经济构成了重大挑战。简而言之,国会没有批准这场战争,虽然其宪法和立法权力赋予其挑战和阻碍特朗普行为的能力,但总统职位固有的权力并没有赋予其阻止战争本身的权力。
Trump has also been able to reframe his actions as “defensive” by switching the primary goal of the war to re-opening the strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway that is a conduit for one-fifth of the world’s oil. Iran’s closure of it in response to being attacked has presented a major challenge to the US and global economy. In short, the Congress did not approve the war, and while its constitutional and legislative powers give it the ability to challenge and hamper Trump’s actions, the power inherent in the presidency does not invest it with the powers to stop it per se.