联合国承认的也门政府武装部队在曼德海峡附近与胡塞武装发生冲突。
Armed forces of the UN-recognised Yemeni government in clashes with Houthis near the Bab al-Mandab strait.
联合国承认的政府与伊朗支持的胡塞武装之间的冲突，其影响远超该国国境。也门陷入了一场内战，战火已蔓延至世界上最重要的海上咽喉要道之一，以及沙特阿拉伯的石油设施。导火索是什么？
Conflict between UN-recognised government and Iran-backed Houthis has impacts far beyond country’s borders Yemen has been plunged into a civil war that has extended to one of the world’s most vital maritime choke points and to Saudi Arabian oil sites. What was the spark?
这场关于也门未来的半休眠冲突在夏季重燃，当时沙特阿拉伯轰炸了胡塞武装控制的首都萨那机场跑道，试图阻止一架载有参加伊朗最高领袖葬礼的也门人的伊朗飞机降落。沙特阿拉伯称包机可以降落，但伊朗拥有的飞机不行。该飞机最终飞往红海沿岸的荷台达港。胡塞武装将此次轰炸描述为沙特围困胡塞控制区也门的一部分，并誓言“以围困还围困”。
The semi-dormant conflict over Yemen’s future reawakened in the summer, when Saudi Arabia bombed the runway of the airport in the Houthi-controlled capital, Sana’a, in an attempt to prevent an Iranian plane carrying Yemenis who had attended the funeral of Iran’s supreme leader from landing. Saudi Arabia said a charter plane could land, but not an Iranian-owned one. The plane eventually flew to the port of Hodeidah on the Red Sea coast. The Houthis described the bombing as part of a Saudi siege of Houthi-controlled Yemen, and vowed “a siege for a siege”.
胡塞武装宣布对沙特阿拉伯实施海上封锁，并向该国石油设施发射导弹。自2022年以来生效的沙特-胡塞停火协议告终。在数月未能帮助其盟友伊朗应对与美国的战争后，胡塞武装开辟了一个新战场。胡塞武装随后做了什么？
The Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and sent missiles towards the country’s oil facilities. The Saudi-Houthi ceasefire in place since 2022 was over. After months of failing to help their ally Iran in its war with the US, the Houthis had opened a new front. What did the Houthis do next?
胡塞武装曾零星利用其在红海沿岸的战略位置扰乱商业航运，主要针对与以色列有关的船只。但其领导层于9月中旬决定升级局势，试图通过沿海岸线向南推进至水道最狭窄处——曼德海峡，以加强对水道的控制。他们在几天内就取得了成功。
The Houthis have sporadically used their strategic position on the coast of the Red Sea to disrupt commercial traffic, mainly linked to Israel. But its leadership decided in mid-September to escalate and to try to tighten its grip on the waterways by pushing south down the coast to the narrowest part of the waterway, the Bab al-Mandab strait. It succeeded within days.
截至9月16日，他们已攻占沿海城镇摩卡、海峡中的小岛以及一座机场。战事随即转移至瓦齐亚区，以及俯瞰海峡的高山山脉，并向泰兹省推进，包括泰兹市本身——也门第三大城市，也是联合国承认的政府总统拉沙德·阿利米的家乡。为何胡塞武装的进攻能够得逞？
By 16 September, they had captured the coastal town of Mocha and small islands in the strait, as well as an airport. The battle then moved into the al-Waz’yah district and the high mountain chains overlooking the strait and towards Taiz governorate, including Taiz itself, Yemen’s third city and the home town of the president of the UN-recognised government, Rashad al-Alimi. Why did the Houthi advance succeed?
有人指责这是前总统侄子、该地区国民抵抗力量领导人塔里克·萨利赫的背叛，但也有人认为，联合国承认的政府军内部分裂，指挥控制网络薄弱，且缺乏胡塞武装所拥有的军事情报。胡塞武装还获得了伊朗支持；他们扬言要封锁沙特从延布港出口石油，从而与伊朗的战争努力保持一致。但胡塞武装并非纯粹是德黑兰的代理人。他们对沙特在也门存在的敌意有其独立根源，兼具宗教和政治因素。沙特如何应对胡塞武装推进带来的冲击？
Some have blamed betrayal by Tareq Saleh, the nephew of Yemen’s former president and leader of the National Resistance Forces in the region, but others say the forces of the UN-recognised government are divided, suffer from poor command and control networks, and lack the military intelligence the Houthis possess. The Houthis also had Iranian support; by saying they would block Saudi oil from the port of Yanbu, they were aligning themselves with the Iranian war effort. But the Houthis are not pure proxies of Tehran. Their hostility to the Saudi presence in Yemen is self-standing and has religious as well as political roots. How did the Saudis respond to the shock of the Houthi advance?
历经三周，阿利米在周末宣布发动代号为“也门黎明行动”的大规模反攻，旨在终结“胡塞政变”。行动中，100架沙特战机为向曼德海峡推进的也门地面部队提供空中支援。战斗在至少三条战线展开，包括泰兹以西的山区、马里卜和萨那。胡塞武装已向至少五座沙特城市发射导弹。胡塞武装挫败的规模很可能被夸大了。联合国承认的合法政府与利雅得的关系如何？
It took three weeks, but over the weekend Alimi announced a broad counteroffensive called Operation Yemen Dawn designed to end the “Houthi coup”. It saw 100 Saudi jets fly in support of Yemen ground forces driving towards Bab al-Mandab. Fighting is happening across at least three fronts, including in the mountains west of Taiz, in Marib and in Sana’a. The Houthis have sent missiles towards at least five Saudi cities. The scale of the Houthi reverse has probably been exaggerated. What is the relationship between the legitimate UN-recognised government and Riyadh?
两国之间有一条长达1200公里的争议边界，直到1934年的沙特-也门战争后才得以稳固。自1967年英国撤离以来，也门一直严重依赖沙特阿拉伯，才能维持其经济上的生存能力。官方数据显示，有200万也门人作为移民在沙特阿拉伯工作。他们中的许多人将钱汇回国内，而直到最近才获得了合法身份。利雅得定期向也门政府提供援助，以防止其崩溃（过去14年累计高达126亿美元）。
The two countries share a 1,200km-long contested border, secured only after the 1934 Saudi-Yemen war. Since the British departure in 1967, Yemen has come to rely heavily on Saudi Arabia to remain an economically viable state. There are officially 2 million Yemenis working as migrants in Saudi Arabia. Many send money home and are just now being given legal status. Riyadh regularly provides grants to the Yemeni government to prevent its collapse (up to $12.6bn in the last 14 years).
这在很大程度上影响了也门领导人的选择。事实上，也门的高层领导人大多居住在利雅得的酒店里，而非亚丁，因此批评者称这种政权为“酒店合法性”。也门境内的反胡塞武装力量是否团结一致？
This heavily shapes its choice of leaders. Indeed so much of Yemen’s leadership resides in Riyadh’s hotels, instead of Aden, that critics call the administration the hotel legitimacy. Are the anti-Houthi forces inside Yemen aligned?
并非如此。也门是一个由部落、省份和宗教信仰交织而成的复杂国家，这一点也反映在其政治和民兵武装中。关于哪支部队能够宣称领导这次反攻的争议，也暴露了政治上的分歧。不过，南部势力在其中占据重要地位，尽管他们战斗的目标是将胡塞武装从一块并不属于独立南部国家的领土上驱逐出去。
No. Yemen is a maze of tribes, governorates and religious beliefs, which is reflected in its politics and militia armies. A dispute over which force can take credit for leading the counteroffensive also reflects political rivalries, but the southern forces are prominent, even though they are fighting to dislodge the Houthis from land that would not form part of a separate southern state.
分裂主义的派系——南方过渡委员会——将于10月23日通过一次民众动员来检验其潜在的支持力度，这或许将决定其领导人艾达鲁斯·祖贝迪是否敢于从流亡中返回。今年1月，他因试图建立一个分裂国家而被也门合法政府指控犯有叛国罪。由于担心被沙特逮捕，他逃往了阿联酋。他的助手们担心，他曾经的军事盟友阿布·扎拉已经与利雅得站到了同一边。阿联酋在其中扮演什么角色？
The separatist political wing, the Southern Transitional Council, will test its latent support with a popular mobilisation on 23 October and this may determine whether its leader, Aidarous al-Zubeidi, can risk returning from exile. He has been charged by the legitimate government with high treason for trying to set up a secessionist state in January. Fearing arrest by the Saudis, he fled to the UAE. His aides fear his one-time military ally Abu Zara has aligned himself with Riyadh. What is the role of the United Arab Emirates?
阿联酋在2015年加入海湾联盟，以推翻胡塞武装从萨那的控制权，但随着沙特的做法变得越来越不受欢迎，阿联酋逐渐保持了距离。它自身拥有反穆斯林兄弟会的议程，并将伊斯拉哈党（在也门政府中占据强势）视为穆斯林兄弟会的分支。它慢慢地与南部分离主义者保持了联系，主要是为了在也门获得更多的影响力，就像沙特阿拉伯在1994年也门内战中所做的那样。
The UAE joined the 2015 Gulf coalition to dislodge the Houthis from Sana’a but, as Saudi methods became ever more unpopular, the UAE distanced itself. It had its own anti- Muslim Brotherhood agenda and regarded the Islah party – strong in the Yemeni government – as an offshoot of the Brotherhood. It slowly aligned itself with the southern separatists, largely as a way of gaining leverage inside Yemen, just as Saudi Arabia ironically did during the 1994 Yemen civil war.
它训练了南也门革命委员会和国民抵抗力量。阿联酋于2026年1月离开了也门。它仍然对沙特的意图保持警惕。为什么美国如此不愿介入？
They trained the STC and National Resistance Forces. The UAE left Yemen in January 2026. It remains wary of Saudi intentions. Why is the US so reluctant to intervene?
它忙不迭，且由于伊朗战争，弹药储备已经耗尽。在中期选举之前，唐纳德·特朗普不想发动另一场永远的战争。2025年春季对胡塞武装进行了50天的轰炸后，他与胡塞武装达成了双边停火协议——一项排除了以色列的协议。他两次拒绝沙特的请求，称胡塞武装的命运是世界性的问题。还有其他国家参与吗？
It has its hands full and its munitions stocks are empty due to the war in Iran. Ahead of the midterms, Donald Trump does not want to launch another forever war. After bombing the Houthis for 50 days in spring 2025, he struck a bilateral ceasefire with the Houthis – a deal that excluded Israel. He has twice rejected Saudi pleas that the fate of the strait is a matter for the world. Is anyone else involved?
是的。包括英国在内的欧洲国家正在为沙特的战机提供一些空中加油。更重要的是，土耳其、沙特阿拉伯和巴基斯坦于2026年8月7日签署了新的麦加联合防御协议。
Yes. European countries, including the UK, are providing some air refuelling for Saudi jets More importantly, rumours swirl around the new Mecca joint defence agreement, signed on 7 August 2026, by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
其目的非常清晚：填补美以在伊朗战争暴露出的海湾安全真空，但其对也门的相关性则较为不明确。有报道称巴基斯坦正在向亚丁运送武器。谁会获胜？
Its purpose is clear: filling the Gulf security vacuum exposed by the US-Israeli war on Iran, but its relevance to Yemen is sketchy. There are reports Pakistan is sending weaponry to Aden. Who will win?
许多人怀疑沙特阿拉伯是否有能力坚持到萨那。沙特的能源基础设施容易受到攻击。9月11日从伊拉克领土发动的袭击沙特东西输油管事件表明，更广泛的地区对抗可能为利雅得打开多个战线。近二十年来，胡塞武装已经证明自己是地面作战的高手。但也门现在已成为国际冲突的一部分，因此许多假设都值得重新审视。
Many doubt Saudi Arabia has the staying power to reach Sana’a. Saudi energy infrastructure is vulnerable. The attack on the Saudi east-west pipeline on 11 September from Iraqi territory showed how a broader regional confrontation could open multiple fronts for Riyadh. Over nearly two decades the Houthis have shown themselves to be the masters of ground combat. But Yemen is now part of an international conflict and so many assumptions are up for review.