Saudi Arabia’s war with the Houthis, as well as America’s ongoing conflict with Iran, have overlapped with, and drawn increasing attention to, simmering rivalries and outright conflicts on the Horn of Africa.

The historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore rightly has asserted that “In this scramble for Africa, the empires are no longer European but Middle Eastern and African.”Indeed, there is no shortage of players in the cauldron that is the Horn. They include Somalia and Somaliland, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Israel and Turkey, as well as Saudi Arabia.

But the Horn hosts extra-regional actors as well. Djibouti, which borders Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia and has coastlines along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, is brimming with foreign facilities. It is host to five extra-regional states — the U.S., China, France, Japan and Italy — all of whom pay hefty fees to station forces there. Camp Lemonnier, the primary U.S. military base in Africa, is home of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa headquarters, as well as the Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central infrastructure hub.

China is upgrading what it calls the People’s Liberation Army Support Base. France has maintained a military presence of about 1,500 troops in Djibouti since it granted the country independence in 1971; it is the largest French base in Africa. Japan’s base is its only such facility outside the Japanese mainland. And Italy operates a military support base in the country.

In addition, Turkey maintains its largest overseas base in Somalia, which it has provided with military and economic support since 2011. Israel, the only state to recognize Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia in 1991, officially has no base there, but it has reportedly operated from its territory against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. For its part, the government of Somaliland is seeking Israeli air defense systems to counter what it claims is a buildup of Turkish drones and aircraft in Somalia.

The United Arab Emirates has not formally recognized Somaliland. But like Israel, to which it has close ties, it provides it with military and economic support and has done so since the early 1990s. Most importantly, the Dubai government-owned Dubai Ports World operates the port at Berbera, once a major Soviet naval base until 1977 when Somalia expelled the USSR, and then an American naval base from 1980 to 1990. The Emiratis are currently expanding their air and naval presence at Berbera.

While Djibouti may host the most foreign foreign facilities within its relatively small territory, it is Somaliland that is at the center of one of the Horn’s major rivalries. Last month its president accused Turkey of lobbying states not to recognize its independence. Turkey is a longtime supporter of Somalia; Mogadishu accuses Israel, and to a lesser extent the United Arab Emirates, of promoting Somaliland’s independence.

With Israel and Turkey at loggerheads, especially in Syria — where both countries have a military presence and where Israel has struck a Syrian airbase and drawn Turkish condemnation — the prospects of a clash between the two regional superpowers is very real.

Additionally, the United Arab Emirates openly supports Ethiopia against the rebel Tigray People’s Liberation Front. At the same time, Addis Ababa accuses neighboring Eritrea of supporting the rebels. Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia in 1993 and went to war with it two years later.

Perhaps not coincidentally, given the Emiratis’ longstanding relationship with Somaliland, and the close ties to Jerusalem of both Ethiopia and Somaliland, landlocked Ethiopia almost reached an agreement with Somaliland for access to the Red Sea. Turkey blocked that agreement. Turkish president Recep Tayyib Erdogan has openly opposed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Eritrea now fears that Ethiopia, given its trade and military ties to Israel, and having been foiled in its attempt to access the sea through Somaliland, might attempt to do so through its own territory.

Among its many mediation efforts, the Trump administration has been trying, thus far without success, to create a deconfliction mechanism among Israel, Turkey and Syria. Yet Washington might consider extending its efforts to reduce long-standing Israeli-Turkish tensions on the Horn of Africa, which at any moment could explode into a new war between any two of the countries that are at loggerheads there and that could then draw in both of those powerful states.

Should Israel and Turkey clash in the Horn, their conflict could extend to Syria, destabilize that country and create new opportunities for further Russian intervention or a return of Iranian proxies. That would certainly not be in America’s interest.

Both Israel and Turkey are close American allies. Israel is formally a non-NATO ally, and Turkey is a member of NATO. Washington should make every effort to mitigate, if not reconcile, the two rivals on the Horn of Africa as in Syria, before the current war of words between them explodes into real hostilities in either or both regions.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.