特朗普总统最近的关税措施即将面临法庭挑战。10月20日，自由正义中心代表美国食品进口商Gellert Global Group提起诉讼，质疑他依据1930年关税法第338条对加拿大商品加征关税。
President Trump’s most recent tariffs are headed to court. On Oct. 20, the Liberty Justice Center filed a lawsuit on behalf of Gellert Global Group, an American food importer, challenging his use of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose tariffs on Canadian goods.
此案暴露了美国贸易法中的一个漏洞，法院或许无法堵住，但国会已无法再对此视而不见。
The case exposes a loophole in U.S. trade law that the courts may not be able to close, but that Congress can no longer afford to ignore.
起诉书的核心论点之一是，1974年贸易法第301条实际上已取代第338条。这一法律论点要想胜诉颇具难度。但它提出了一个引人深思的问题：当一部限制较少的旧法规提供了另一条实现同一目标的路径时，国会能否对总统的关税权力施加实质性约束？
One of the complaint’s main arguments is that Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 effectively replaced Section 338. That will be a difficult legal argument to win. But it raises a compelling question: Can Congress meaningfully constrain presidential tariff authority when an older, less restrictive statute offers an alternative route to achieve the same goal?
第338条针对的是针对美国商业的歧视行为。它授权在外国对美国产品或商业实施特定形式的不平等待遇时，加征最高达50%的额外关税。这些关税必须旨在“抵消”由此产生的负担或不利影响。
Section 338 addresses discrimination against American commerce. It authorizes additional duties of up to 50 percent when a foreign country subjects U.S. products or commerce to specified forms of unequal treatment. Those duties must “offset” the resulting burden or disadvantage.
第301条的覆盖面更广。它针对的是给美国商业造成负担或限制的、不合理、无正当理由或具有歧视性的外国做法。歧视只是不公平贸易行为的一种形式，但第301条的适用范围要大得多。
Section 301 casts a wider net. It addresses foreign practices that are unreasonable, unjustifiable or discriminatory that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Discrimination is one form of unfair trade practice, but Section 301 reaches considerably further.
因此，这两部法规并非可以互换。然而，当外国歧视行为成为美国实施报复的依据时，两者的适用范围会出现重叠。这正是加拿大关税案的情况。
The statutes are therefore not interchangeable. Yet they overlap when foreign discrimination becomes the basis for American retaliation. That’s what is happening with the Canada tariffs.
国会在制定第301条时设置了保障措施。美国贸易代表通常必须对相关行为进行调查、与外国政府磋商、征求公众意见、提供听证机会，并在法定期限内作出认定。某些补救措施的价值必须与所施加的负担相当，且执法行动须接受定期审查。
Congress wrote Section 301 with safeguards. The U.S. Trade Representative generally must investigate the conduct at issue, consult with the foreign government, invite public comment, provide opportunities for hearings and make findings within statutory deadlines. Certain remedies must be equivalent in value to the burden imposed, and enforcement actions face periodic review.
第338条也存在一些限制，其中包括关于歧视行为的规定、关税抵消机制以及等待期等方面的要求。然而，该条款缺乏第301条所规定的调查、咨询、公众参与和审查程序。这种差异为法律执行留下了漏洞：既然第338条在限制较少的情况下就能达到同样的执法效果，总统为何还要选择使用第301条呢？
Section 338 has limits as well, including requirements concerning discrimination, offsetting duties and a waiting period. But it lacks Section 301’s comparable investigation, consultation, public participation and review procedures. This creates a loophole. Why would the president ever proceed under Section 301, with its procedural obligations, if Section 338 produces the same outcome with fewer fetters?
总统援引第338条来应对加拿大针对美国酒精产品、乳制品和汽车实施的贸易措施；每项相关措施都导致了50%的最高关税的征收。
The president invoked Section 338 to respond to Canadian measures affecting American alcohol, dairy products and automobiles. Each proclamation imposed the statutory maximum tariff of 50 percent.
这起诉讼质疑这些措施是否属于第338条所定义的“歧视行为”，同时也质疑政府未能合理解释为何征收相同的50%关税就能抵消这些措施所带来的不同影响。法院可能会认定政府的做法超出了第338条的法定权限。
The lawsuit challenges whether these measures constitute discrimination within the meaning of Section 338, as well as the administration’s failure to explain how identical 50 percent duties offset the different burdens identified. A court may find that the administration exceeded Section 338’s limits.
不过，诉讼的论点更为激进：它认为国会通过制定第301条这一更为全面的法规，实际上已经取代了第338条的适用范围。不过这种观点的成功可能性很低。法院通常不支持“隐含的废除”（即法律条文未明确废除旧条款而新条款仍有效的情况）；国会从未正式废除过第338条，而且这两项法规针对的是不同但存在重叠范围的外国贸易行为。新法规的存在并不必然意味着旧法规就失效了，法院仍有可能认定两者都可以同时适用。
But the complaint goes a step further, arguing that Congress effectively displaced Section 338 when it established the more comprehensive Section 301 framework. That argument faces long odds. Courts strongly disfavor implied repeals. Congress never expressly repealed Section 338, and the statutes address different, albeit overlapping, categories of foreign conduct. The mere existence of a newer, more elaborate remedy does not necessarily supplant an older one. The courts may therefore conclude that both statutes remain available.
不过，这恰恰是国会需要解决的问题。法院可能会限制政府在本案中使用第338条的权力，但极不可能直接宣布该法规本身无效。这样一来，总统在应对某些歧视性贸易行为时仍会有两种选择：一种依据第301条的严格程序规定来采取行动，另一种则受制于较为简化的程序限制。
But that is precisely the problem that Congress must address. A court may curtail the administration’s use of Section 338 in this case, but it is unlikely to invalidate the statute itself. That would leave presidents with two routes for responding to certain discriminatory foreign trade practices: one governed by Section 301’s extensive procedural safeguards, the other subject to far fewer.
国会有几个选择。它可以废除第338条，缩小其适用范围，或要求在两部法规重叠时采取可比拟的保障措施。或者，它可以明确由哪项授权管辖特定形式的歧视。每种方法都会在总统灵活性与国会监督之间达成不同的平衡。国会绝不能让这种平衡处于未解决状态。
Congress has several options. It could repeal Section 338, narrow its application or require comparable safeguards when the two statutes overlap. Alternatively, it could clarify which authority governs particular forms of discrimination. Each approach would strike a different balance between presidential flexibility and congressional oversight. What Congress must not do is leave this balance unresolved.
法院可以强制执行对第338条的限制。它们不太可能通过推定废除来解决两部法规之间的更广泛关系。这使国会面临一个选择：协调这两项授权，或接受第301条的保障措施有时可能被规避。
The courts can enforce limits on Section 338. They are unlikely to resolve the broader relationship between the two statutes through implied repeal. That leaves Congress with a choice: reconcile the authorities or accept that Section 301’s safeguards can sometimes be circumvented.
国会花费数十年时间对总统贸易报复设定限制，但第338条提供了一条潜在的绕过途径。除非立法者协调这两部法规，否则总统可能可以自由规避国会刻意写入第301条的保障措施。
Congress spent decades placing limits on presidential trade retaliation, but Section 338 offers a potential way around them. Unless lawmakers reconcile the two statutes, presidents may be free to circumvent the safeguards Congress deliberately built into Section 301.
马克·L·布施是乔治城大学沃尔什外交学院卡尔·F·兰德格国际商务外交学教授。
Marc L. Busch is the Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.