中国是全球多个行业制造业的关键，但外国政府日益担心本国产业在中国廉价优质商品的冲击下被空心化，正纷纷采取限制措施。
China is key to global manufacturing across a range of sectors, but foreign capitals — increasingly worried about domestic industry being hollowed out in the face of cheap, high-quality goods from the country — are cracking down.
其中印度出手最为激进。印度已为本土企业设定最后期限，要求其更多地从国内采购太阳能供应链产品，尽管该国力争到2030年新增高达200吉瓦的非化石燃料发电能力。
Few are doing so more aggressively than India, which has set deadlines for local firms to source more of its solar power supply chain domestically, even as it seeks to add a whopping 200 gigawatts of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030. Beijing is mounting its defense against that strategy: This month, it proposed export controls on several technologies used to make solar equipment, and has reportedly restricted Indian firms’ access to key parts of the solar supply chain.
北京正对此战略进行防御：本月，中国提议对多种用于制造太阳能设备的技术实施出口管制，并据报道限制印度企业获取太阳能供应链关键部件的渠道。
“There’s nowhere else for us to go but to go to China and to get equipment from them that allows us then not to buy the end product from them,” Sumant Sinha, the chairman and CEO of Indian renewables firm ReNew, said in an interview.
印度可再生能源公司ReNew董事长兼首席执行官苏曼特·辛哈在接受采访时表示：“我们别无选择，只能去中国，从他们那里购买设备，这样我们就不必再从他们那里购买终端产品。当然，他们已经意识到了这一点。”
“Of course, they’ve wised up to this fact.”
辛哈警告说，尽管与霍尔木兹海峡危机不能直接相提并论，但过度依赖中国本身就是一种瓶颈。“我们都在谈论提高电气化水平……但这完全建立在对中国的依赖之上。这不是一件健康的事。”
Ultimately, though not directly comparable to the Strait of Hormuz crisis, overreliance on China is its own bottleneck, Sinha warned. “We all talk about increasing electrification … But it’s fully based on dependence on China. And that’s not a healthy thing.”
他指出，因此，像印度这样的国家只有在中国允许的情况下才能摆脱对中国的依赖。那么，“中国为什么要允许呢？”
So, as a result, countries such as India can only wean themselves off China if China allows them to, he noted. And so, “why would they?”
普拉尚特·拉奥：您能描述一下来自您自己、您的承购方或其他方面的、要求摆脱中国供应链的更大压力吗？中国供应链对你们的制约有多大？
Prashant Rao: Can you describe the kind of broader pressure, either from yourself, your offtakers, whoever, to get off the Chinese supply chain? How much does the Chinese supply chain loom over you?
苏曼特·辛哈：这与其说是个别公司的问题，不如说是一个主权问题。对我们来说，如果政府要求我们从中国购买，我们就会从中国购买。这是否会增加印度这个国家对中国的依赖？当然会。我认为主权政府，也就是印度政府，已经表明了态度：我们不希望存在这种依赖。我对此并不反对，因为为什么要依赖呢？
Sumant Sinha: It’s more of a sovereign issue than it is an individual company issue. For us, if you tell us to buy from China, we buy from China. Does that increase our dependence on China as a country? Of course it does. I think the sovereign, that is the Indian government, took a view that we did not want to have that reliance. And I don’t disagree with that because, why should you have that?
尤其是当自己的国内市场足够大时。而且与中国之间还存在着各种地缘战略问题。
Especially when your own domestic market is big enough. And there are all sorts of geostrategic issues that are going on as well with China.
他们的做法其实很有意思，就是提前发出通知。对太阳能组件他们就是这么做的。他们说，两年之后将停止进口中国组件或来自印度以外的任何组件。所以你有两年的时间来建设产能。
What they’ve done is actually pretty interesting, which is that they give you a forward notice. And that’s what they did for solar modules. They said two years from now, they’re going to stop imports of Chinese modules or any other modules from outside India. So, you have two years to set up capacity.
果不其然，到期限结束时，我们现在已拥有接近200吉瓦的太阳能组件制造产能。这非常好。
Lo and behold, at the end of that time period, we now have close to 200 gigawatts of solar module manufacturing. Which is great.
现在他们对电池片也采取了同样的做法。电池片的限制将于今年12月生效。两年之后，他们将对硅片和硅锭采取同样措施。所以他们正一步步向价值链上游攀升。他们可能在未来某个时候也会对多晶硅这样做，或者可能会出台其他激励措施。
Now they’ve also done the same thing for cells. So that cell restriction is coming into place this December. And from two years from now, they’re going to do the same thing for wafers and ingots. So they’re slowly, slowly going further up the value chain. They may do it for polysilicon as well at some point in time, or they may give some other incentives.
我想说，三到四年后，他们将拥有完全本土化的太阳能供应链。他们还在尝试对电池及电池组件等领域采取类似的做法。这对你们的成本有什么影响？
I would say that three to four years from now, they’ll have a fully domestic supply chain for solar. And they’re trying to do similar things for batteries and the battery components and so on as well. How does that affect your costs?
显然我们的成本高于中国。比如说，中国的生产成本在这里，而我们的生产成本略高一些。你觉得比例是多少？比如1.2倍？
Obviously our costs are higher than China’s costs. Because let’s say the cost of production in China’s here, our cost of production is slightly higher. What would you say the ratio is? Like 1.2?
高出20%。但他们的售价只有80%到90%。也就是说，他们在以大幅折扣销售，而且顺便说一句，如果他们想确保印度本土制造无法崛起，还可以进一步加大折扣力度。而我们则按照正常的利润率来定价销售。
It’s 20%. But they are selling at a price of 80% to 90%. So, they’re selling at massive discounts, which they can, by the way, increase if they want to make sure that no Indian manufacturing comes in. And we are selling at whatever is the regular margin to sell at.
所以，按销售价格对销售价格来比较，我们可能比他们贵30%。但这是因为中国企业正在承受巨额亏损。
So, on a sales price to sales price basis, we’re probably 30% more expensive than that. But that is because Chinese [companies] are making massive losses.
归根结底，我们的成本确实略高一些。但只要这对行业内的每个人都一视同仁，那就无关紧要。因为这意味着我们只需将成本转嫁给最终消费者。
Bottom line is our costs are a little bit higher. But as long as it applies to everybody in the industry, it doesn’t matter. Because what that then means is that we just pass on the cost to the end consumer.
因此，最终由终端消费者承担这笔成本。现在，你可能会争辩，为什么终端消费者要支付更高的成本？终端消费者之所以支付更高的成本，是因为这最终能让我们实现供应链本地化。您如何评价贵公司目前对中国技术的依赖程度？
Therefore, the end consumer ends up paying that cost. Now, you may argue why should the end consumer pay a higher cost? The end consumer pays a higher cost because ultimately that allows us to localize the supply chain. How would you characterize your current reliance on Chinese technology?
我们仍在进口设备。因此，即使我们开始自产电池片——我们现在正在这么做——在我们开始在印度制造硅片之前，仍将不得不购买硅片，这还需要再过两年时间。
We are still importing equipment. So, even if we start making cells ourselves, which we are doing right now, we will still have to buy wafers until such time that we start manufacturing wafers in India, which will take us another two years.
制造所有这些产品所需的大量设备来自中国。因此，我们需要从中国进口。这种依赖是存在的。因为多年来，中国不仅开始制造组件、电池片以及所有这些清洁技术设备，还开始制造生产所有这些产品所需的资本设备。随后，又逐步掌握了制造资本设备的研发能力，等等。
A lot of the equipment to manufacture all these items comes from China. And so, we need to import from China. So that reliance is there. Because over the years, what’s happened is that China not only started making modules and cells and all of these clean tech equipment, but they also started making the capital equipment to make all of these things. And then over time, the R&D to make the capital equipment, and so on.
他们做得非常聪明。除了去中国，我们别无去处，只能从他们那里获取设备，而这些设备又让我们不必再向他们购买最终产品。当然，他们也已经意识到了这一点。所以，实际上不可能摆脱对中国绿色供应链的依赖？
They’ve done that very intelligently. There’s nowhere else for us to go but to go to China and to get equipment from them that allows us then not to buy the end product from them. Of course, they’ve wised up to this fact. So, it’s functionally impossible to wean yourself off the Chinese green supply chain?
如果他们允许我们从中国引进技术，[但]他们为什么要允许？问题就在这里。我们得看看该怎么办。事情没那么简单。
If they allow us to transfer technology from China, [but] why would they? That’s the point. We have to see what to do about it. It’s not that straightforward.
我发现非常令人惊讶的是，在清洁技术领域，世界其他地区的供应链完全依赖中国。我们都在谈论增加电气化，有整个缔约方大会（COP）进程和可再生能源产能翻三倍的目标。但这一切完全建立在对中国的依赖之上。这不是一件健康的事。
The thing that I find very surprising is that the rest of the world is fully dependent on China for supply chains in clean tech. We all talk about increasing electrification, and we have this whole COP process and tripling renewables targets. But it’s fully based on dependence on China. And that’s not a healthy thing.
我们都看到了高度集中的供应链会带来什么后果。看看欧洲在天然气方面发生了什么，以及欧洲至今仍在经历的来自美国天然气的情况，这都不是健康的局面。我们需要多元化的供应链。
We’ve all seen what’s happened to concentrated supply chains. When you look at what happened to Europe on gas and is still happening to Europe on gas from the US and so on, it’s not a healthy situation. We need diversified supply chains.
但问题在于，世界上没有其他国家在尝试开发或鼓励中国以外的供应链发展。因为大家只是买能买到的最便宜的东西，而那正是中国产的。
But the problem is that nobody else in the world is trying to develop or encourage the development of the supply chain outside China. Because people are just buying the cheapest thing that they can buy, which is Chinese.
因此我们正走向一个在供应链上依赖且脆弱的世界。如果你认为霍尔木兹海峡是个咽喉要道……这略有不同，对吧？因为如果你买了太阳能电池板，阳光依然在。
And so we are heading into a world of dependence and vulnerability on supply chains. And if you think that the Strait of Hormuz is a chokehold…It’s slightly different though, right? Because if you buy a solar panel, you still have the sun.
是的。那是“流量”，这是“存量”。但显然，这只是我们尝试清洁能源体系的开始。电力大约只占能源的 20% 到 25%。而在电力领域，全球清洁能源比例顶多只有 15% 到 20%，也就是说 25% 的 15% 到 20%，大约只有 4% 到 5%。
Yes. That’s flow and this is stock. But obviously, this is just the beginning of trying to clean our energy system. Electricity represents maybe about 20-25% of energy. And in electricity, we have as a world maybe only 15-20% at max clean, which means 15-20% of 25%, which means maybe four or five percent.
其余部分仍有待完成。这将需要几十年时间。但如果整个局面都取决于一个以单一国家为基础的供应链，那显然不是健康的局面。
The balance still has to be done. It will take decades for us to do that. But if that entire situation revolves on a supply chain that is based on one country, then that is clearly not a healthy situation.
我可以从 10 个不同国家购买化石燃料。价格由全球供需决定。但在清洁技术领域，我只能从中国或中国控制的公司购买太阳能组件。它们定价、决定卖给谁。我最终摆脱化石燃料、转向更清洁能源供应体系的整个进程，完全取决于中国。
I can buy fossil fuels from 10 different countries. Pricing is globally determined based on global demand and supply. In clean tech, I can only buy solar modules from China, or Chinese-controlled companies. They set the price, they decide who to sell to. My entire move away from fossil fuels eventually or towards having cleaner energy supply systems is entirely dependent on China.