美国密歇根州安娜堡：五十年前，大多数政府担心人口过多。如今，许多政府担心人口过少。劳动力萎缩可能拖累增长，但人口规模本身并不决定经济前景。
ANN ARBOR, Michigan: Fifty years ago, most governments worried about having too many people. Now many worry about having too few. A shrinking workforce can slow growth, but population size alone does not determine an economy’s prospects.
没有什么比较比中国和印度——世界上人口最多的两个国家——更能说明这一点。
Few comparisons make this point clearer than China and India, the world’s two most populous countries.
中国人口自2022年起开始萎缩。印度2026年的生育率将低于更替水平——即在没有移民的情况下，每一代人替代自身所需的生育水平——但印度保留了更大比例的劳动龄人口。
China’s population has been shrinking since 2022. India’s 2026 fertility rate is below replacement level – the level of childbearing needed for each generation to replace itself, in the absence of migration – and it retains a larger share of working age population.
国际货币基金组织预计，2026年中国和印度的经济增长率将分别为4.6%和6.4%。两者均高于预计的全球3%增速。如果工人健康、高产且就业时间更长，人口萎缩仍能创造高产出。
The International Monetary Fund projects economic growth of 4.6 per cent and 6.4 per cent in China and India for 2026 respectively. Both are above the projected global rate of 3 per cent. A shrinking population can still generate high output if workers are healthy, productive and employed for longer periods.
在中国，工人平均收入在进入劳动力市场后上升，在40岁左右达到峰值。印度工人的平均收入峰值较低，但这些模式指向不同的人口增长来源。印度的增长来自更多人进入劳动力市场，而中国必须通过提高生产率来抵消劳动力萎缩。对于面临人口萎缩的国家而言，提高生产率可能与提高出生率同样重要。
In China, workers’ average earnings rise after labour force entry, peaking around age 40. Indian workers’ average earnings have a lower peak but are sp These patterns point to different demographic sources of growth. India’s growth comes from more people entering the labour force, while China must offset a shrinking workforce through higher productivity. For countries facing shrinking populations, improving productivity may matter as much as increasing birth rates.
将教育红利转化为高产就业 中国实现了显著的教育扩张。其高等教育毛入学率从2012年的29%增至2024年的77%，翻了一倍多，20至24岁人群中约有一半在上大学或职业院校。这扩大了高学历劳动力的供给。更棘手的问题是，这些教育红利能否转化为高产就业。
TURNING EDUCATIONAL GAINS INTO PRODUCTIVE JOBS China has made a striking educational expansion. Its tertiary enrolment rate more than doubled from 29 per cent in 2012 to 77 per cent in 2024, while around half of people aged 20 to 24 attend university or vocational college. This expands the supply of highly educated workers. The harder question is whether those educational gains translate into productive jobs.
毕业生人数的增加只有在企业能够利用其技能生产客户想要的商品和服务时，才会提高生产力。如果学位持有者找不到合适的工作，或花费数年时间争夺极少数令人垂涎的职位，学位对产出的贡献微乎其微。
The increase in graduates will raise productivity only when firms can use their skills to produce the goods and services customers want. A degree adds little to output if its holder cannot find suitable work or spends years competing for a narrow range of coveted positions.
“内卷”这一流行词捕捉到了这种竞争加剧的现象：付出更多努力却获得递减回报。这种挫败感在中国年轻一代中尤为明显，他们在教育、就业、住房和社会流动方面展开激烈竞争。
The popular term “involution” captures this intensifying competition where greater effort produces diminishing returns. This feeling of frustration is especially visible among China’s younger generation who compete intensively for education, jobs, housing and social mobility.
中国的挑战在于，从单纯培养更多大学毕业生，转向更有效地利用他们的技能。
China’s challenge is to shift from just producing more college graduates to using their skills more effectively.
这在一定程度上关乎资本流向。多年的国家主导投资导致部分行业负债累积、产能过剩，而潜在生产力更高的企业却需要拓展空间。降低服务业准入壁垒、为企业提供更公平的竞争环境，将使投资和劳动力流向回报更高的领域。
This is partly a question of where capital goes. Years of state-directed investment have left debt and excess capacity in some sectors, while potentially more productive businesses need room to expand. Reducing barriers in services and providing a more level playing field for firms would allow investment and workers to move towards activities with higher returns.
扩大服务业不仅能吸纳毕业生、满足日益增长的国内需求，还意味着允许成功的企业成长壮大，而不是让资金和劳动力长期绑定在回报疲弱的项目上。
Expanding services can also employ graduates and meet rising domestic demand. It also means allowing successful businesses to grow rather than keeping finance and workers tied to projects with weak returns.
这也是一个需求问题。当家庭不愿消费时，企业缺乏为国内市场招聘和创新的动力——而仅靠出口无法吸纳所有新增毕业生，也无法无限期支撑中国的增长。
It is also a question of demand. When households are reluctant to spend, firms have less reason to hire and innovate for the domestic market – and exports alone cannot absorb every new graduate or sustain China’s growth indefinitely.
更强的社会保障和家庭消费将为更优质的服务创造市场，而更开放的竞争将奖励那些有效利用熟练工人的企业。
Stronger social protection and household consumption would create markets for better services, while more open competition would reward firms that use skilled workers effectively.
中国在先进制造业的成功表明，其受过训练的劳动力能够支撑创新。挑战在于将这些成果推广到更多企业和行业，而非假设少数领军产业就能雇佣所有毕业生。
China’s successes in advanced manufacturing show that its trained workforce can support innovation. The challenge is to spread those gains across more firms and sectors rather than assuming that a few leading industries can employ all its graduates.
印度面临不同的瓶颈：陷入低生产率工作。其庞大的适龄劳动人口本是机遇，但大部分劳动力仍停留在低生产率岗位。2023年7月至2024年6月期间，46.1%的就业者从事农业，仅11%在制造业就业。
STUCK IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY WORK India faces a different bottleneck. Its large working-age population is an opportunity, but much of the labour force remains in low-productivity work. Between July 2023 and June 2024, 46.1 per cent of workers were in the agriculture sector while only 11 per cent worked in manufacturing.
企业必须具备大规模招聘能力，才能将工人转移至薪酬更高的工作，然而新增就业岗位集中在中小型及非正规企业，或低生产率行业。
Firms must be able to hire at scale to move workers into better-paying jobs, yet new jobs are concentrated in small and informal businesses or low-productivity sectors.
印度历来在教育投入不足，目前用于该领域的GDP占比仍相对较低，低于许多其他国家。尽管过去二十年教育支出有所增加，但2025年仍仅为GDP的4.1%，规模依然有限。
India has historically underinvested in education and continues to spend a relatively low share of its GDP on this sector compared with many other countries. Though educational spending has increased over the last two decades, it remains modest at 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2025.
仅靠增加教育投入无法提高生产率。虽然大学毕业生人数持续增长，但受过高等教育的青年难以找到与其学历和预期相匹配的工作。
More education alone will not increase productivity. Though university graduate numbers continue to grow, college-educated youth struggle to find jobs that match their qualifications and expectations.
由于教育质量和技能培养存在薄弱环节，部分毕业生未能掌握雇主所需技能。印度定期劳动力调查估计，2025年印度15至29岁毕业生的失业率为22.3%。
Some graduates do not acquire the skills employers need because of weaknesses in education quality and skill development. India’s Periodic Labour Force Survey estimated 22.3 per cent unemployment among Indian graduates aged 15-29 in 2025.
当女性无法从事有薪工作时，印度也会损失生产能力。印度女性劳动力参与率仍处于全球最低水平之一，这降低了生产能力。
India also loses productive capacity when women are unable to take paid jobs. Indian women’s labour force participation remains among the lowest in the world, which reduces productive capacity.
许多女性受制于家庭照料责任、不安全或困难的通勤条件，以及有限的正规信贷获取渠道，尤其是在寻求非农业有薪工作时。更好的交通、托儿服务和融资渠道将有助于女性进入并留在有薪工作岗位上，在无需增加出生人口的情况下扩大实际劳动力规模。
Many women are held back by domestic care responsibilities, unsafe or difficult commutes and limited access to formal credit, especially when seeking non-agricultural paid work. Better transportation, childcare and access to finance would help women enter and remain in paid work, expanding the effective workforce without more births.
有利的年龄结构创造了增长机遇，但这还不够。1965年至1990年间，东亚人均GDP增长约三分之一归因于年轻化的年龄结构。
A favourable age structure creates growth opportunities, but more is needed. A young age structure accounted for about one third of East Asia’s per capita GDP growth during 1965 to 1990.
印度人口结构的变化在1997年至2023年间对人均GDP增长贡献了约六分之一。印度不断增长的劳动年龄人口支撑了经济增长，但进一步改善仍取决于劳动者能否进入生产性就业领域。
Yet changes in India’s age structure accounted for roughly one sixth of per capita GDP growth during 1997 to 2023. India’s growing working-age population has supported growth, but further improvements depend on whether workers can move into productive employment.
对于印度和中国而言，核心问题不仅仅是劳动力数量，更是如何更高效地利用这些劳动力。
For both India and China, the central issue is not the number of workers alone but how productively they can be employed.
中国需要将日益受教育程度提高的劳动力与不断扩张的企业以及更强的国内需求连接起来。印度则需要能够成长和招聘员工的企业，以及培训和实践支持，使更多人——尤其是女性——能够胜任这些工作。
China needs to connect its increasingly educated workforce to expanding firms and stronger domestic demand. India needs firms that can grow and hire, alongside training and practical support that enable more people, especially women, to take those jobs.
生育率固然重要，但更强的增长不会仅仅来自多生孩子。更持久的道路在于充分利用每个国家已经拥有的劳动力和技能，创造更多机会，让人们从事生产性、有报酬的工作。
Fertility matters, but stronger growth will not come simply from having more babies. The more durable path is to make better use of the people and skills each country already has by creating opportunities for productive, well-paid work.
薛清（周雪青）是密歇根大学的研究学者。KS詹姆斯是普林斯顿大学健康与福祉中心的访问学者。莱克斯·里夫是曾任美国财政部经济学家的学者。本文为评论
Xueqing (Zoey) Wang is Research Fellow at University of Michigan. KS James is Visiting Scholar at the Center for Health and Well-Being, Princeton University. Lex Rieffel is former economist at the United States Treasury Department. This commentary