在朝鲜半岛军事指挥权发生重大转移的问题上，条件并不成熟，但这正是韩国总统李在明押注其领导力的关键所在。想法虽对，时机却错。
The deck is stacked against a significant shift in military control on the Korean Peninsula, yet that is exactly what South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is staking his leadership on. It’s the right idea, at the wrong time.
首尔至今仍依赖一名美军将军在战时指挥美韩联合军事行动，这是朝鲜战争留下的延续至今的遗产之一。李在明希望由一名韩国人来掌舵。然而，首尔在与特朗普第二届政府的相处中举步维艰——双方在贸易协定上存在分歧，且李在明不愿卷入美国总统在伊朗的战争。
Seoul still relies on an American general to lead combined US-South Korea military operations in wartime, one of the enduring legacies of the Korean War. Lee wants to put a South Korean in charge . Yet Seoul is having a difficult time with the second Trump administration — the two sides are divided over their trade agreement and Lee’s reluctance to get involved in the US president’s war in Iran.
这种不和正渗透进双边关系的方方面面。事实上，美国驻韩大使米歇尔·斯蒂尔形容两国关系正处于动荡之中。既然如此，当华盛顿已表示2029年有可能实现移交，且双方尚未就最终日期达成一致时，李在明为何要如此大力推动、加快接管联合部队战时作战指挥权的时间表？
That acrimony is bleeding into all aspects of the relationship. Indeed, the US Ambassador to South Korea, Michelle Steel, has described ties as being in a state of turbulence. So why is Lee pushing so hard now to speed up the timeline to take wartime operational control of the combined forces, when Washington has indicated 2029 is a possibility and the allies have yet to agree on a final date?
毫无疑问，今天的韩国已非1950年遭入侵时那般实力悬殊、生存全赖美军主导的联合国军之韩国。如今，韩国拥有精锐军队，是全球第九大主要武器出口国，正处于由人工智能驱动的芯片繁荣期之中。许多韩国人渴望这一变革——他们视其为国家主权之事。东亚研究院8月发布的一项调查显示，52%受访者支持最早于2027至2028年移交指挥权。
There is no doubt that the South Korea of today is very different to the one badly outmatched by North Korea when it was invaded in 1950, and survival depended on US-led UN forces. Today, the country has a sophisticated military, is the world’s ninth-largest major arms exporter, and is in the midst of an AI-driven chip boom. Many South Koreans want this change — they regard it as a matter of national sovereignty. A survey published in August by the East Asia Institute found 52% support a transfer as early as 2027–2028.
但要让韩国同时满足首尔和华盛顿设定的条件，韩国需要证明其有能力领导联合防卫部队，而同盟关系必须能够应对朝鲜的核威胁和导弹威胁。安全环境也必须平稳，以便实现稳定的移交。无论如何，评估军队的准备程度应当基于商定的防卫标准作出判断，而不应由李在明的政治时间表主导。这一变革长期以来一直是韩国进步派领导人的夙愿。李在明想要实现其前任未能完成的事业，将其作为其总统任期（将于2030年结束）的标志性成就。
But for South Korea to meet the conditions set by both Seoul and Washington, it will need to demonstrate it can lead the combined defense forces, while the alliance must be able to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats. The security environment must also be calm to allow for a stable transfer. Regardless, assessing how ready the military is should be a judgment based on agreed defense criteria, not driven by Lee’s political deadline. This change has long been an ambition among the nation’s progressive leaders. Lee wants to achieve what his predecessors could not, making it a defining accomplishment of his presidency, which will end in 2030.
但安全形势并不利于他。朝鲜因参与俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争而增强了军事能力，其部队获得了宝贵的实战经验，而平壤拒绝与首尔重启对话。驻韩美军司令、目前掌握联合部队战时作战指挥权的泽维尔·布伦森上将于10月14日警告称，条件已明显改变，并援引朝鲜本周早些时候的弹道导弹试射为由。同一天，平壤试射了两种潜射战略巡航导弹，进一步凸显了威胁的演变。
But the security climate is not in his favor. North Korea's military capabilities have been strengthened by its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine, giving its troops valuable battlefield experience, while Pyongyang has rejected renewed dialogue with Seoul. US Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson — the officer who currently holds wartime command over the combined forces — warned on Oct. 14 that conditions had clearly changed, citing North Korea’s ballistic missile tests earlier that week. The same day, Pyongyang tested two types of submarine-launched strategic cruise missiles, further underscoring the evolving threat.
布伦森正确认识到平壤的军事能力。但首尔警惕华盛顿移动门槛。国防部长姜信哲对布伦森的言论表示担忧，认为移交战时作战指挥权的条件并未改变。
Brunson is right to recognize Pyongyang's military capacity. But Seoul is wary of Washington moving the goalposts. Defense Minister Kang Shin-chul expressed concern about Brunson’s remarks, arguing that the conditions for transferring wartime operational control had not changed.
姜信哲的言论反映了韩国普遍希望与美国建立更平等同盟关系的愿望。尽管如此，难以忽视的是，安全局势——以及两韩关系——已被重塑。朝鲜放弃了和平统一的想法，2024年，领导人金正恩呼吁修宪，以便在战争发生时占领并吞并韩国。
Kang’s comments reflect a widespread South Korean desire for a more equal alliance with the US. Still, it’s difficult to ignore that the security situation — and the relationship between the two Koreas — has been recast. North Korea abandoned the idea of peaceful reunification and in 2024, leader Kim Jong Un called for the constitution to be revised to allow the South to be occupied and annexed in the event of war.
亚洲防长本周在菲律宾会晤，韩国国防部长官金龙显与美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯举行了双边会谈。双方重申致力于将战时作战指挥权转交给首尔，但将年度防务会议推迟到明年，且未就时间表达成一致，凸显了双方仍存在的分歧。
Asia’s defense ministers met in the Philippines this week, where Kang held bilateral talks with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. They reaffirmed their commitment to transferring wartime command to Seoul, but postponed their annual defense meeting until next year without agreeing on a timetable, underscoring the distance that remains.
在此背景下，重启关于韩国获取核动力潜艇的停滞谈判似乎不太可能。卡内基国际和平基金会核政策项目斯坦顿高级研究员安基特·潘达告诉我：“在政府最高层面，存在严重的预期错位。”潘达表示，韩国不应在潜艇问题上施压过猛，否则整个项目有崩溃的风险。
Against such a backdrop, the revival of stalled talks on Seoul’s access to nuclear-powered submarines seems unlikely. There is a serious mismatch of expectations at the highest level of government, Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me. South Korea shouldn’t push too hard on the submarine issue, Panda said, or there’s a risk the whole project could fall apart.
考虑到双方关系目前如此紧张，李在明决定将如此多的政治资本押注在一个引发美方强烈抵制的时间表上，这是一个大胆但最终充满风险的计划。风险在于，这将在其剩余任期内持续恶化。为了韩国以及半岛稳定着想，他最好还是静观其变、等待时机。
Given how uneasy their relationship is right now, Lee’s decision to tie so much political capital to a timetable that is generating such resistance from the US is a bold but ultimately fraught plan. The risk is that it will fester for the remainder of his term. For South Korea’s sake, and that of stability on the peninsula, he would be better off biding his time.