
2022年5月,瑞典和芬兰申请加入北约,这被誉为波罗的海正转变为“北约湖泊”。然而,自那以后,随着与俄罗斯的对抗以及对海底基础设施的干扰,该海域的紧张局势升至新高,远非风平浪静。
When Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO in May 2022, it was hailed as the Baltic Sea’s transformation into “a NATO lake.”Since then, however, the sea has been less than placid, as confrontations with Russia and interference with undersea infrastructure have raised tensions to new heights.
瑞典、芬兰及其盟友如今面临一项挑战:如何在不进一步激化紧张局势的前提下,遏制俄罗斯的行为。
Sweden, Finland, and their allies now face a challenge in countering Russian behavior without stoking tensions further.
“这是一个非常棘手的问题,因为你不想升级事态,”丹麦陆军司令彼得·博伊森少将于10月中旬在美国华盛顿特区举行的美国陆军协会年会上表示。
“It’s a very difficult question, because you don’t want to escalate,” Maj. Gen. Peter Boysen, chief of the Danish army, said at the Association of the U.S. Army annual conference in Washington, D.C., in mid-October.
波罗的海长期以来一直是混合战争的场所——这是一个宽泛的术语,指低于战争门槛且往往难以归责的恶意活动,如虚假信息、破坏、网络攻击和侵犯领土——但自2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰以来,此类活动的规模有所增加,荷兰军事情报部门今年早些时候称这造成了“非预期且因此难以控制的升级的真实风险”。其中最引人注目的案例之一是2022年9月的“北溪”管道袭击事件。
The Baltic has long been a site for hybrid warfare — a broad term for malign activity below the threshold of war that is often hard to attribute, like disinformation, sabotage, cyberattacks and territorial violations — but the scale of that activity has increased since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, creating what Dutch military intelligence earlier this year called “a real risk of unintended and therefore difficult-to-control escalation.”One of the highest-profile cases was the Nord Stream pipeline attack in September 2022.
此后,波罗的海的其他管道和电缆也遭受损毁,西方官员常将其定性为破坏行为。除了频繁的GPS干扰,北约盟国还看到俄罗斯军机侵犯领空的事件增多,以及无人机闯入军事基地和机场等敏感地点的事件增多。
Since then, other pipelines and cables in the Baltic have been damaged in what Western officials often label acts of sabotage. Alongside frequent GPS jamming, NATO allies are also seeing more airspace violations by Russian aircraft and more drone incursions at sensitive sites, like military bases and airports.
俄罗斯始终否认对这些行为负责,但北约领导人将其与莫斯科旨在削弱邻国的努力联系起来,部分原因是报复这些国家对乌克兰的支持,并且他们一直在更公开地点名指责这些努力。
Russia consistently denies responsibility for those acts, but NATO leaders link them to Moscow’s efforts to undermine its neighbors, partly in retaliation for their support of Ukraine, and they have been more vocal in calling those efforts out.
丹麦国防情报局在9月发布的一份评估报告中表示:“俄罗斯加强了破坏活动、毁灭性网络攻击的使用,并利用无人机袭击欧洲目标。”报告补充道:“混合战争正在升级。”俄罗斯也更积极地保护其用于规避制裁的“影子舰队”船只,包括派遣军舰护送它们穿越波罗的海。这导致了与北约的对峙。
In an assessment published in September, Denmark’s Defense Intelligence Service said “Russia has intensified its use of sabotage, destructive cyber attacks and is attacking targets in Europe with drones.”It added: “The hybrid war is escalating.”Russia has also been more actively protecting “shadow fleet” vessels it uses to skirt sanctions, including by sending warships to escort them through the Baltic. That has led to confrontations with NATO.
评估报告称:“俄罗斯武装力量在波罗的海地区对北约军事单位的行为日益咄咄逼人。”
“Russian forces are increasingly acting aggressively towards NATO military units in the Baltic Sea region,” the assessment said.

评估报告引述的“最近且最严重的例子”是9月14日发生的一起事件,当时一艘俄罗斯护卫舰在丹麦海岸附近向一架丹麦军用直升机发射照明弹。
“The most recent and most serious example,” the assessment cites, was an incident on Sept. 14 in which a Russian frigate near Denmark’s coast fired flares at a Danish military helicopter.
博伊森在会议的一个小组讨论活动中表示,这一事件凸显了遏制此类行为的挑战。“你们应该如何应对?对我们来说,将是降级,但我们也看到,当我们的对手在穿越波罗的海时其行动模式发生变化,你们如何以一种平衡的方式应对,既不升级[紧张局势],又能真正表明‘我们知道这不是正确的做法。我们希望将其降回常态’?”
That incident epitomized the challenge of deterring such behavior, Boysen said during a panel event at the conference. “How should your response be to that? It would, for us, be to de-escalate, but we’ve also seen that when the pattern of our adversary’s operations change when they pass through the Baltic Sea, how do you respond to that in a balanced way so you’re not increasing [tensions] but you actually say, ‘We know this is not the right way to do it. We want to decrease it back to normal’?”
博伊森补充道:“我们不想做的是将‘常态’推向一个新的强度水平。常态需要降低,这是一个非常、非常困难的问题。”芬兰国防军作战副参谋长、中将卡里·尼苏拉在小组讨论中表示,俄罗斯的战时状态以及对乌克兰远程打击的警惕,也使得“升级控制”变得困难。
“What we don’t want to do is to move ‘normal’ to a new intensity level,” Boysen added. “Normal needs to be decreased, and that’s a very, very difficult question.”Russia’s wartime footing and wariness of Ukraine’s long-range strikes also make “escalation control” difficult, Lt. Gen. Kari Nisula, the Finnish Defense Forces’ deputy chief of staff for operations, said during the panel.
当俄罗斯军队在波罗的海行动时,“他们试图通过防空措施、部队防护措施来保护自己,我认为他们有点担心导弹会击中他们的舰船之类的,这很正常,”尼苏拉说。“从升级-降级的角度来看,这是一个非常困难的环境。”虽然波罗的海周边的紧张局势并非新事物,但对混合威胁日益增长的担忧促使北约加强了在那里的警惕性和合作。
When Russian forces operate in the Baltic, “they try to defend themselves [with] air-defense measures, force-protection measures, and I think they are kind of afraid that a missile will hit their ships and that kind of thing, which is quite normal,” Nisula said. “It’s a very difficult environment from an escalation-de-escalation perspective.”While tensions around the Baltic Sea are not new, growing concern about hybrid threats has led NATO to increase its vigilance and cooperation there.
2024年10月,德国成立了“波罗的海特遣队指挥部”,这是一个多国指挥机构,旨在协调海军活动,并向盟友提供最新的海上态势感知信息。大约在同一时期,北约盟军转型司令部成立了“X-波罗的海特遣队”,以加快无人系统的部署和人工智能的整合,从而更好地保护水下基础设施。2025年1月,北约启动了“波罗的海哨兵”行动,这是一项无限期行动,旨在加强联盟在该地区的存在和反应能力。
In October 2024, Germany set up Commander Task Force Baltic, a multinational command to coordinate naval activity and provide up-to-date maritime situational awareness to allies. Around that time, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation set up Task Force X-Baltic to accelerate employment of uncrewed systems and AI integration to better protect undersea infrastructure. In January 2025, NATO began Baltic Sentry, an open-ended operation to enhance the alliance’s presence and responsiveness in the region.

北欧国家,特别是瑞典和芬兰,也在合作以更好地监测和保卫其领土。瑞典陆军司令、少将约翰·佩卡里在小组讨论中表示,今年夏天,针对芬兰和其他北约国家发生的一系列无人机入侵事件,斯德哥尔摩授权其军方协助赫尔辛基维护“领土监视和领土完整”。
Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland in particular, are also collaborating to better monitor and defend their territory. This summer, in response to a spate of drone incursions in Finland and other NATO states, Stockholm authorized its military to help Helsinki maintain “territorial surveillance and territorial integrity,” Maj. Gen. Johan Pekkari, commander of the Swedish army, said during the panel.
佩卡里说:“以空军为例,我们将空中资产交由芬兰空军作战指挥部指挥,由他们领导出击任务并处置那些无人机。”佩卡里表示,瑞典最终也可能为此提供反无人机系统。“这是我们在应对这类挑战时如何合作的一个例子。”博伊森表示,除了“能够投射力量”,探测和识别恶意活动的能力对于在不引发升级的情况下应对俄罗斯活动也是必要的。
“To use the air force as an example, we leave air assets to the air operational command of Finland, and they lead their sorties and [take] care of those drones,” Pekkari said. Sweden could eventually lend counter-drone systems to that effort as well, Pekkari said. “That is one example of how we cooperate when it comes to that kind of challenge.”Boysen said that alongside “being able to project power,” the ability to detect and identify malign activity is necessary to counter Russian activity without sparking escalation.
“能够将光照射到对手身上,让对手知道我们清楚你们在做什么——我认为这是缓和局势的途径,”博伊森说。“如果你什么都不做,如果你无法探测,我认为你会让自己陷入非常糟糕的境地,这将改变‘常态’,使其成为一种新常态,实际上我认为这会增加对你的威胁。”北约内部有人认为,强调来自俄罗斯的威胁可能只会助长克里姆林宫在联盟内制造恐惧、削弱对乌克兰支持的努力。
“Being able to put light on the adversary, to tell the adversary we know what you are doing — I think that is the way to de-escalate it,” Boysen said. “If you don’t do anything and if you are not able to detect, I think you put yourself in a very bad situation, and that would change ‘normal’ and make it a new normal, which is in effect an increase, I think, in the threat to you.”Some in NATO argue that highlighting the threat from Russia may only boost the Kremlin’s efforts to sow fear within the alliance and erode support for Ukraine.
联盟内其他人则表示,透明度对于让本国民众保持关注、维持对抗衡莫斯科努力的支持是必要的。尽管存在这场辩论,但很少有北约官员——尤其是来自前线国家的官员——预期俄罗斯会改变路线。
Others in the alliance say that transparency is necessary to keep their publics engaged and to maintain support for efforts to counter Moscow. Despite that debate, few NATO officials, especially those from frontline countries, expect Russia to change course.
“说到普京及其计划,2014年至2022年间发生过混合攻击。2022年后混合攻击数量不断增加,我认为我在呼应我的同事们——在芬兰——的谈法时说,我们近期可能不得不预期会有更多的混合攻击,”芬兰驻美大使莱娜-凯萨·米科拉9月在大西洋理事会和挪威驻美大使馆在华盛顿特区联合举办的一场活动上表示。“我引用我们国防部长几天前说的话:波罗的海局势‘相当活跃’。”
“When it comes to Putin and his plans, there were hybrid attacks between 2014 to 2022. There were an increasing number of hybrid attacks after 2022, and I do think that I’m echoing how my colleagues are talking in Finland when I say that we might have to expect even more hybrid attacks in the near future,” Leena-Kaisa Mikkola, Finland’s ambassador to the U.S., said at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council and the Norwegian Embassy in Washington, D.C., in September. “I quote what our defense minister said a couple of days ago: the situation in the Baltic Sea is ‘quite lively.’”