
根据最新研究显示,开放权重人工智能模型现在在入侵计算机网络方面的能力,已几乎与最好的闭源模型相当,这预示着网络安全格局中备受期待的转折点已经到来。
Open-weight artificial intelligence models are now almost as capable of hacking into computer networks as the best closed ones, according to new research that heralds a much-anticipated turning point in the cybersecurity landscape.
衡量AI能力的公司Vals着手测试不同AI模型在模拟企业网络上执行复杂、多步骤网络指令的能力。
Vals, a company that measures AI capabilities, set out to test how well different AI models could carry out complex, multi-step network instructions on mock corporate networks.
“最好的前沿模型被锁在实验室里,只能通过受信任访问计划获得,现在开始被任何人都可以下载的开放模型所匹敌,”Vals研究员尼基尔·拉维(Nikil Ravi)表示。
“The best frontier models, locked up inside the labs and available only through trusted access programs, are now starting to be matched by open models that anybody can download,” says Nikil Ravi, a researcher at Vals.
该公司的研究结果表明,闭源模型在网络技能方面不再拥有决定性优势,这意味着前沿实验室近期为限制其模型访问、从而延缓此类能力扩散所做的努力,可能实际上已变得毫无意义。
The company’s findings suggest that closed models no longer have a definitive edge in cyber skills, meaning recent efforts by frontier labs to limit access to their models, and thereby slow the proliferation of such capabilities, may potentially be moot.
考虑到美国前沿实验室(尤其是Anthropic)以“限制访问只能在先进黑客能力广泛可用前争取时间”为由,限制发布新模型(始于4月的Claude Mythos Preview版本),这一发现也颇为引人注目。
The findings are also noteworthy given that the US frontier labs, particularly Anthropic, premised the limited release of new models—beginning with Claude Mythos Preview in April—on the idea that gated access would only buy time before advanced hacking capabilities were broadly available.
Anthropic前沿红队负责人洛根·格雷厄姆(Logan Graham)4月告诉《连线》(WIRED)杂志,该公司的“玻璃翼计划”(Project Glasswing)向受信任方开放新模型的全部能力,旨在将这些工具“交到防御者手中,给他们一个领先优势”。“我们需要现在就为一个这些能力将在6个月、12个月、24个月内广泛可用的世界做准备。安全领域的许多事情都会变得不同,”他当时告诉《连线》。七个月后,这一转型似乎已按时到来。
Anthropic's frontier red team lead, Logan Graham, told WIRED in April that the company’s Project Glasswing, which gives trusted access to the full capabilities of new models, was focused on getting those tools “in the hands of defenders to give a head start.”“We need to prepare now for a world where these capabilities are broadly available in 6, 12, 24 months. Many things would be different about security,” he told WIRED at the time. Seven months later, that transition seems to have arrived on schedule.
Vals 在两个模拟场景中测试了 AI 模型,并赋予它们各种具体任务。第一个场景涉及一个可通过面向公众的网站访问的模拟企业网络。第二个场景涉及两个不同的公司网络;模型需要攻破第一个网络,以便获取对第二个网络的访问权限。
Vals tested AI models in two simulated scenarios, giving them various specific tasks to achieve. The first scenario involved a mock corporate network accessible through a public-facing website. The second involved two different company networks; a model needed to compromise the first in order to gain access to the second.
研究人员发现,OpenAI 最先进的网络安全模型 Daybreak(仅向可信合作伙伴提供)能力最强,在平均两次测试中完成了 81% 的既定任务。中国开放权重模型 DeepSeek 紧随其后,平均完成了 73% 的目标。Vals 研究人员指出,在某些任务上,这两个模型得分持平。
The researchers found OpenAI’s most advanced cyber model, Daybreak, which is available only to trusted partners, to be the most capable, completing 81 percent of the tasks it was given in an average of two tests. The Chinese open-weight model DeepSeek was not far behind, completing 73 percent of the objectives on average. The Vals researchers note that on some tasks, the two models scored equally.
研究还显示,使用开放权重模型执行此类任务的成本要低得多。Vals 表示,GPT-6-Sol 执行一次攻击的 Token 成本为 17 美元至 46 美元,而 DeepSeek 仅为 2 美元至 3 美元。开放模型通常更便宜,因为它们可以在自己的硬件上运行。Vals 首席执行官 Rayan Krishnan 表示,这也为防御方使用开放模型而非专有模型提供了强有力的激励。OpenAI 未立即回应置评请求。
The research also showed how much cheaper it is to use an open-weight model for this kind of task. Vals says it costs $17 to $46 in tokens for GPT-6-Sol to carry out an attack compared to $2 to $3 for DeepSeek. Open models are generally cheaper because they can be run on one’s own hardware. Rayan Krishnan, CEO of Vals, says this also provides a strong incentive for those playing defense to use open models rather than proprietary ones. OpenAI did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
今年网络安全领域的大部分发展正如预测那样展开,AI 将核心黑客任务自动化,帮助攻击者和防御者均发现了海量新代码漏洞,并能快速探测网络弱点。虽然发现的速度和规模、以及修复被揭示软件缺陷的强度都有所增加,但专家们仍在争论 AI 是否从根本上改变了网络安全防御的概念基础和原则。换句话说,目前仍不清楚 AI 工具是构成了一种新型威胁,还是仅仅放大了长期存在的安全挑战。
Much of the year in cybersecurity has played out as predicted, with AI automating core hacking tasks to help both attackers and defenders find a massive number of new vulnerabilities in code and rapidly probe networks for weaknesses. While the speed and scale of the findings, and the intensity of fixing uncovered software flaws, have all increased, experts are still debating whether AI has fundamentally altered the conceptual foundation and tenets of cybersecurity defense. In other words, it’s still not clear whether AI tools pose a new kind of threat or amplify the security challenges that have long existed.
开放权重模型如今开始赶上闭源模型这一事实,对于理解犯罪黑客如何利用 AI 以及企业和开发者应如何应对至关重要。但在实践中,近几个月来对网络犯罪和国家支持的黑客活动的现实观察一再表明,攻击者正在做他们一贯做的事:节约资源,总体上凭借旧的、能力较弱的模型——无论是专有的还是开放的——完成其大部分活动。即使有严格的管控,防御者也必须假设资金最充足、动机最强烈的攻击者一直以来至少已获得了一些闭源模型的访问权限。
The fact that open-weight models are now starting to match closed ones is crucial for understanding how criminal hackers can harness AI, and how companies and developers should respond. But in practice, real-world observation of cybercriminal and state-backed hacking activity has repeatedly shown in recent months that attackers are doing what they always do by conserving their resources and generally making do with older and less capable models—both proprietary and open—for most of their activity. And even with strict controls, defenders must assume that the best-funded and most highly motivated attackers have already had at least some access to closed models all this time.
“总体上我同意开放权重模型目前能够生成高级攻击和漏洞,特别是考虑到那些通过修改权重来禁用安全训练的‘去安全化模型’,”云安全公司 Edera 的联合创始人兼首席技术官 Alex Zenla 表示。“我的保留意见是,闭源实验室很可能已经训练了额外的、未发布的模型,其能力超过了这些开放模型。所以我非常倾向于把这看作一场猫鼠游戏。实验室认为自己在快速前进以超越开放权重模型,以便在开放权重模型发现漏洞之前修复它们。不幸的是,我认为这可能正是危险安全格局的开端。”
“I am in general agreement that open-weight models are capable of producing advanced attacks and vulnerabilities today, especially when you consider the abliterated models that disable safety training by modifying weights,” says Alex Zenla, cofounder and chief technology officer of the cloud security firm Edera. “My caveat to this is that it is likely that the closed labs have trained additional, unreleased models exceeding these capabilities. So I would put this very much like a cat-and-mouse game. The labs see themselves as moving fast to outpace the open-weight models, to be able to secure vulnerabilities before the open-weight models find them. Unfortunately, I do think this may be the beginning of a dangerous security landscape.”