
在所谓美国政府效率部为削减官僚机构而采取的各项努力所带来的所有灾难性后果中,没有哪一项能比得上美国提供对外援助能力的摧毁。一项全面的《柳叶刀》研究显示,美国国际开发署的援助在2001年至2021年期间阻止了超过9000万例死亡。波士顿大学流行病学家布鲁克·尼科尔斯利用死亡率模型估计,2025年美国国际开发署的解体在大约一年的时间里导致了超过70万例超额死亡。
Among all the ruinous consequences of the so-called U.S. Department of Government Efficiency’s efforts to cut bureaucracy, none has been as profound as the destruction of the United States’ ability to deliver foreign aid. A comprehensive Lancet study shows that the U.S. Agency for International Development’s assistance prevented more than 90 million deaths between 2001 and 2021. Using a mortality model, Boston University epidemiologist Brooke Nichols has estimated that the 2025 dismantling of USAID contributed to more than 700,000 excess deaths over roughly a year.
今年5月发表的一项研究发现,在美国国际开发署关停后,失去大量该机构援助的地区经历了武装冲突和骚乱的显著上升。与此同时,发展经济学家马切拉·尼科利尼和法比奥·萨巴蒂尼表明,先前享有巨额美国援助的地区的经济活动急剧下降。
A study published in this May found that after USAID’s shutdown, places that had lost large amounts of the agency’s assistance experienced a marked uptick in armed clashes and riots. The development economists Marcella Nicolini and Fabio Sabatini, meanwhile, showed that economic activity in areas that formerly enjoyed substantial U.S. aid had dramatically declined.
没有一个国家能够在没有运转良好的对外援助项目的情况下成为大国。但如今,美国没有这样的项目。在美国国际开发署90%的项目被终止、90%的工作人员被解雇后,国会正式重新拨付了专门用于美国对外援助的大部分预算资金。但管理和预算办公室并未释放所有这些拨款。更具破坏性的是,美国国际开发署用于支助援助资金的机制已经被拆除。
No country can be a great power without a functioning foreign aid program. But today, the United States does not have one. After 90 percent of USAID’s programs were terminated and 90 percent of its staff members were laid off, Congress formally reappropriated most of the budgetary funding dedicated to U.S. foreign aid. But the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not released all of this appropriated funding. More damaging still, USAID’s mechanisms for spending aid money have been dismantled.
根据皮尤研究中心的数据,在2023-2024财年至2024-2025财年之间,美国年度对外援助发放额下降了260亿美元。到2025-2026财年底,有25亿美元指定用于对外援助的拨款未能花掉。
According to the Pew Research Center, annual U.S. foreign aid disbursements fell by $26 billion between the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 fiscal years. $2.5 billion in appropriated funding designated for foreign aid went unspent by the end of the 2025–2026 fiscal year.
管理和预算办公室主任、自称基督教民族主义者的拉塞尔·沃伊特一直阻挠支持民主相关项目的资金发放,并坚坚持认为人道主义拨款只能发给两个特定的基督教非政府组织。与此同时,美国国务卿马可·鲁比奥宣布,他希望终止对美国国际开发署发展承包商、大学和当地民间社会组织的资金支持,却没有认识到其他援助资金使用方式的弊端,例如预算支持——这种方式的问责度远低得多、不具备美国特色且不以结果为导向。
Russell Vought, OMB’s director and a self-identified Christian nationalist, has stonewalled spending for programs related to supporting democracy and insisted that humanitarian grants can be sent only to two specific Christian nongovernmental organizations. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, meanwhile, announced that he wanted to end funding to USAID development contractors, universities, and local civil society organizations without understanding the downside of other options for aid dollars, such as budget support, which are far less accountable, uniquely American, and results oriented.
鉴于美国国际开发署的终结所造成的苦难,政府效率部的削减浪费和提高透明度目标未能实现,这就更加令人担忧。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普2025年的“宏伟美妙法案”抹去了政府效率部削减对外援助所取得的任何微薄节省。将美国国际开发署的职能移交给国务院的决定,迄今已导致38亿美元的美国对外援助资金被转移给联合国人道主义事务协调办公室,并通过谅解备忘录将159亿美元直接注入外国政府国库。国务院在管理援助项目方面业务系统薄弱、人员配备不足。
Given the suffering created by the end of USAID, it is even more troubling that DOGE’s objectives to slash waste and boost transparency have not been realized. U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2025 “big beautiful bill” erased any modest savings won by DOGE’s cuts to foreign aid. And the decision to move USAID’s functions to the State Department, which has weak business systems and inadequate staff to manage aid programs, has thus far led to the transfer of $3.8 billion in U.S. foreign aid money to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and $15.9 billion directly into foreign governments’ treasuries through memorandums of understanding.
这些外国政府通常缺乏合理使用资金并取得成效的能力。过去,美国国际开发署监察长办公室曾严厉批评过此类选项,因为几乎不可能对这些转移资金进行审计。参与这些协议的国家中,有90%以上在透明国际的“清廉指数”中得分低于50分(满分100分),表明存在严重的系统性腐败。这或许可以解释为什么国务院的政治任命官员一直将这些健康协议的文本列为机密。
These governments often have limited capacity to spend the money wisely and produce results. In the past, USAID’s Office of the Inspector General has harshly criticized such options because it is nearly impossible to audit the transfers. Over 90 percent of the countries involved in these agreements score below 50 (out of 100) on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating serious systemic corruption. This may explain why State Department political appointees have kept the texts of these health agreements secret.
相互冲突诉求——援助应当缓解海外苦难、援助应当服务于美国军事和外交利益、援助应当产生迅速、显而易见且可量化的结果——始终让这项工作变得复杂。在美国国际开发署于1961年成立后的65年历程中,过度监管、项目控制权的中央集权化以及国会的干预,造成了一种僵硬的桎梏,使美国对地方政府和地方需求的响应能力下降。但现任美国政府所不理解的是,美国国际开发署官僚体制常常被表现为实现有效性的障碍,而实际上它是一种管理这些冲突的适应性机制。
Clashing demands—that aid should relieve misery abroad, that it ought to serve U.S. military and diplomatic interests, and that it ought to yield rapid, visible, and quantifiable results—always complicated the enterprise. And over the course of 65 years since USAID’s 1961 founding, overregulation, a centralization of control over programs, and congressional meddling created a rigid straitjacket that made the United States less responsive to local governments and local needs. But what the current U.S. administration didn’t understand was that USAID’s bureaucracy, so often presented as an obstacle to effectiveness, was in fact an adaptation to manage these conflicts.
仅仅废除该体制架构而没有替代计划,只会产生更多的混乱和浪费。与此同时,中国正竞相提供替代性的发展融资来源,而俄罗斯则在寻求通过安全伙伴关系扩大其全球影响力。美国承担不起让其对外援助机构荒废的代价。它必须对其进行重组,而不是拒绝援助。
Simply abolishing that institutional architecture with no plan to replace it has only generated more confusion and waste. Meanwhile, China is racing to offer alternative sources of development financing, and Russia is seeking to expand its global influence through security partnerships. The United States cannot afford to let its foreign aid apparatus atrophy. It must redirect it, not reject aid.
左右为难 自美国国际开发署(USAID)成立以来,华盛顿领导人对对外援助的期望,就一直与发展中国家的现实、实际援助项目的管理方式以及社会变革的速度和性质相冲突。当我在该机构20世纪60年代的档案中阅读以撰写我的新书时,我感到震惊的是,早期美国决策者对该机构提出的要求与今天如出一辙:决策者希望得到迅速、明显且可量化的结果。
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE Ever since USAID was created, the expectations that leaders in Washington had for foreign aid have conflicted with realities in the developing world, the way actual aid programs are managed, and the speed and nature of societal change. When I read through USAID’s 1960s-era archives to write my new book, I was struck that the demands early U.S. policymakers made of the institution were the same as those made today: policymakers wanted rapid, visible, and quantifiable results.
这些要求在当时和现在一样不切实际。美国总统约翰·F·肯尼迪曾希望,在国际开发署成立后短短几年内,拉丁美洲的贫困就能明显消退,因为他可以理解地担心古巴革命领导人菲德尔·卡斯特罗的马克思主义意识形态正在该地区蔓延。在该组织成立14个月后,约瑟夫·克拉夫特在报道中指出,华盛顿的决策者已经断定该机构是失败的,因为它没有带来“迅速而明显的结果”。
Those demands were as unrealistic then as they are now. U.S. President John F. Kennedy hoped that poverty in Latin America would visibly recede within a couple of years of USAID’s creation, as he was understandably worried that Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro’s Marxist ideology was spreading across the region. Fourteen months after the organization’s inception, an article by Joseph Kraft in reported that policymakers in Washington already judged it a failure because it was not delivering “quick and visible results.”
国际开发署第二任署长戴维·贝尔在1965年回忆说,肯尼迪曾抱怨该机构“行动迟缓、效率低下,对总统的政策缺乏响应”。但外交和发展在截然不同的时间跨度上运作。几乎所有的对外援助项目都会产生外交后果,即使它们并非为此而设计。然而,当外交目标成为援助项目的主要或唯一目标时——例如,冷战期间美国的援助维持了刚果独裁者蒙博托·塞塞·塞科的统治——良好的发展往往会失败。
David Bell, USAID’s second administrator, recalled in 1965 that Kennedy had complained the agency was “slow-moving, inefficient, and unresponsive to the President’s policy.”But diplomacy and development operate on profoundly different time horizons. Nearly all foreign aid programs have diplomatic consequences, even if they aren’t designed to. When diplomatic goals become the main or only goals of an aid program, however—for instance, when U.S. aid kept Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in power during the Cold War—good development often fails.
美国在第二次世界大战后通过各种机构和项目开始将对外援助制度化,其中包括支持西欧战后经济复苏的马歇尔计划,以及旨在促进贫穷国家发展以减少其对共产主义易感性的杜鲁门政府倡议——第四点计划。一直以来,决策者们都在争辩,美国的援助项目究竟应主要旨在拯救生命和减少极端贫困,还是通过对抗敌对势力的影响来支持美国的外交政策。机构建设和政策改革应当成为援助项目的重点。
The United States began institutionalizing foreign aid after World War II through agencies and programs such as the Marshall Plan, which supported the postwar economic recovery of Western Europe, and the Point Four Program, a Truman administration initiative to promote development in poor countries to reduce their susceptibility to communism. All along, policymakers debated whether U.S. assistance programs should principally aim to save lives and reduce extreme poverty or to support U.S. foreign policy by countering the influence of hostile powers. Institution building and policy reform should be the focus of aid programs.
事实上,美国国际开发署最终在赢得冷战中发挥了关键作用。美国的援助巩固了成为苏联和中国共产主义颠覆目标的各国政府,在亚洲尤其如此。在美国总统理查德·尼克松就职进入第二年后,用于农业的援助开支被增加到美国国际开发署预算的百分之五十,且主要投向亚洲。根据发展经济学家的多项研究,这一努力拯救了超过2.45万人的生命。
In fact, USAID ended up playing a key role in winning the Cold War. American assistance strengthened governments targeted for Soviet and Chinese communist subversion, particularly in Asia. After U.S. President Richard Nixon entered his second year in office, aid spending for agriculture was increased to 50 percent of USAID’s budget and was directed primarily toward Asia. According to multiple studies by development economists, the effort saved more than 245 million lives.
在巴基斯坦、印度、印度尼西亚、菲律宾、韩国和台湾(以及其他国家和地区)历时数十年实施的绿色革命,促成了大量粮食盈余的产生,这些盈余推动了工业化和经济增长,并避免了历史上那种会导致政变或大规模起义的饥荒。
The green revolution, implemented over decades in Pakistan, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan (among other countries), helped produce large grain surpluses that fueled industrialization and economic growth and averted the kind of famines that historically produce coups or mass uprisings.
然而,在此期间,华盛顿要求援助实现外交目标——而且要迅速、显而易见——这也破坏了发展项目中最核心的要素:能力建设和政策改革。强大的机构将富裕国家与贫穷国家区分开来。前者拥有大量此类机构,而后者则没有。能力建设和政策改革本应成为援助项目的重点。但能力建设和政策改革很难衡量,需要多年才能成功实施,而且无法立竿见影。
Throughout this era, however, Washington’s demands that aid accomplish diplomatic goals—and quickly and visibly—also undermined the most important elements of development programs: institution building and policy reform. Strong institutions separate wealthy countries from poor ones. The former have them in abundance, while the latter do not. Institution building and policy reform should be the focus of aid programs. But institution building and policy reform is difficult to measure, takes many years to implement successfully, and is not immediately visible.
相反,政策制定者坚持让美国国际开发署提供服务交付,从而产生了最终不可持续的宝贵人道主义项目。陷入文牍主义对美国对外援助的大多数关键分析都得出结论:美国国际开发署逐渐将重心从实质转向了流程,从而导致了过度官僚化。这些批评所忽视的是导致这种对流程的执迷的原因。一个由联邦监管和监督机构(学者们称之为反官僚机构)组成的网络,向美国的援助项目派驻了成群结队的联邦审计员、会计师、监管人员、合规官员和国会工作人员,他们致力于遏制官僚作风,并——据称——保护纳税人的资金。
Instead, policymakers insisted that USAID do service delivery, producing valuable humanitarian programs that were ultimately unsustainable. BURIED IN PAPERWORK Most critical analyses of U.S. foreign aid conclude that USAID came to focus on process over substance, resulting in excessive bureaucracy. What these critiques overlook is what caused this obsessive focus on process. A web of federal regulatory and oversight agencies (what scholars call the counterbureaucracy) loosed on U.S. aid programs an army of federal auditors, accountants, regulators, compliance officers, and congressional staffers dedicated to reining in the bureaucracy and—supposedly—protecting taxpayers’ money.
这种冲击放慢了美国国际开发署的项目实施速度,并产生了大量的文牍。它并没有使援助项目变得更有效。
This onslaught slowed down USAID’s implementation of programs and created massive amounts of paperwork. It did not make aid programs more effective.
历史上,国会最终在管理美国对外援助项目方面扮演了干预程度极高的角色。美国国际开发署曾向14个国会委员会汇报工作,这些委员会经常发生冲突,将美国国际开发署拉向不同的方向,并延缓了项目的实施。(例如,在农业游说集团的影响下,众议院和参议院的农业委员会百般阻挠改革粮食援助的努力,坚决要求粮食必须从美国出口,而来自外交事务委员会的立法拨款人和授权人则强烈支持本地采购改革。)
Historically, Congress ended up playing a particularly intrusive role in the management of U.S. foreign aid programs. USAID reported to 14 congressional committees, which often clashed, pulling USAID in different directions and slowing program implementation. (For example, the House and Senate agriculture committees, under the influence of the agriculture lobby, stonewalled efforts to reform food aid by insisting it be exported from the United States, while legislative appropriators and authorizers from foreign affairs committees strongly supported local purchase reform.)
国会还强加了干预性专项拨款——即分配给特定项目、工程或组织的限定金额。当各国请求具体的帮助时,美国国际开发署往往无法做出回应,因为大量的专项拨款意味着已经没有剩余的自主支配资金。
Congress also imposed intrusive earmarks—defined amounts allocated for specific programs, projects, or organizations. When countries asked for specific help, USAID often could not respond, because the glut of earmarks meant there was no discretionary money left.
从20世纪90年代开始,国务院试图对美国国际开发署的预算施加更多控制。例如,1998年的一项法案规定,美国国际开发署署长直接向国务卿汇报。2001年1月,国务院接管了美国国际开发署的预算。这反而导致常常不信任国务院的国会议员增加了更多的专项拨款。为了保护美国对外援助项目免受参议院对外关系委员会主席、共和党参议员杰西·赫尔姆斯这位极其敌对的官员的影响,克林顿政府指示每个内阁级部门创建自己的援助项目,使其落该委员会的管辖范围之外。
Starting in the 1990s, the State Department attempted to exert more control over the USAID budget. A 1998 statute, for instance, made the USAID administrator report directly to the secretary of state. In January 2001, the State Department took control of USAID’s budget. That only led lawmakers—who often distrusted State—to add more earmarks. To protect U.S. foreign aid programs from an especially hostile Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Republican Senator Jesse Helms, the Clinton administration instructed each cabinet-level department to create its own aid programs that would fall outside that committee’s jurisdiction.
例如,卫生与公众服务部下属的疾病控制和预防中心在全球各地建立了办事处,环境保护局在贫穷国家开发了太阳能项目,联邦紧急事务管理局与28个以上的发展中国家签署了协助灾害管理的协议。美国国际开发署当时已经在运行此类项目,这产生了职能重叠,进一步加剧了美国对外援助的混乱。
For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at the Department of Health and Human Services established regional offices around the world, the Environmental Protection Agency developed solar energy projects in poor countries, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency signed agreements with more than 28 developing countries to assist in disaster management. USAID was already running programs such as these, yielding overlapping mandates which added to the incoherence of U.S. foreign aid.
当我在2001年担任美国国际开发署署长时,我发现了一个外国援助项目,其资金被近250项国会专项拨款(earmark)严加束缚,这一总额超过了美国国际开发署的总拨款。当时,埃塞俄比亚是世界上粮食不安全问题最严重的国家之一。然而在2007年,美国国际开发署只有1.5%的预算用于农业发展,1.5%用于经济增长,还有1.5%用于治理改革;国会专项拨款使得资助这些项目以满足埃塞俄比亚政府的请求成为不可能。
When I became USAID administrator in 2001, I discovered a foreign aid program whose funds were straitjacketed by nearly 250 congressional earmarks, a sum exceeding USAID’s total appropriation. At the time, Ethiopia was one of the most severely food insecure countries in the world. Yet in 2007 only 1.5 percent of USAID’s budget was devoted to agricultural development, 1.5 percent to economic growth, and 1.5 percent to governance reform; Congressional earmarks made it impossible to fund these programs to match the Ethiopian government’s request.
错误的解决办法 尽管存在所有这些阻碍,外国援助仍然是美国外交政策的关键组成部分。国防部与美国国际开发署有着成效显著的伙伴关系,认识到在激励叛乱分子实现和平方面,外国援助可以和武力一样重要。美国国际开发署在阿富汗的项目效果深远,但其成形需要较长的时间跨度,而国务院和国防部对此都没有任何耐心。
THE WRONG FIX Despite all these impediments, foreign aid remained a critical component of U.S. foreign policy. The Department of Defense had a particularly productive partnership with USAID, recognizing that foreign aid could be as important as force in incentivizing insurgents to make peace. The effects of USAID projects in Afghanistan were profound but took shape over long time horizons neither the State nor Defense Departments had any patience for. (USAID’s Afghanistan media-development program, for instance, was a great success, as documented in a Harvard Kennedy School study by the David Rohde.)
(例如,正如大卫·罗德在哈佛肯尼迪学院的一项研究所记录的那样,美国国际开发署的阿富汗媒体发展项目取得了巨大成功。)大型学术研究表明,在伊拉克,由美国国际开发署过渡时期倡议办公室(OTI)开展的社区发展项目雇用了大量原本可能被招募进民兵组织的年轻男子,从而减少了美国军人在暴力水平最高的省份中的伤亡。
Major academic studies have shown that in Iraq, community development projects undertaken by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) employed large numbers of young men who might otherwise have been recruited into militias, reducing U.S. military casualties in the provinces with the highest levels of violence.
2004年,陆军将军彼得·基亚雷利称赞管理该项目的美国国际开发署官员柯克·戴为挽救士兵生命的“英雄”。
In 2004, Army General Peter Chiarelli called the USAID officer managing the program, Kirk Day, a “hero” for saving his soldiers’ lives.
DOGE团队去年废除了国际开发署过渡计划办公室(OTI),以及无数其他在全球范围内减轻苦难和提升美国软实力的项目。当国会恢复了对对外援助的许多削减时,它并没有恢复美国国际开发署(USAID)的老员工、历史档案、业务系统、实地存在,或是由大学、国际非政府组织、当地公民社会团体和国际发展承包商组成的执行伙伴网络。
The DOGE team abolished OTI last year, along with innumerable other programs that alleviated suffering globally and enhanced U.S. soft power. When Congress restored many cuts to foreign aid, it did not reinstate USAID’s veteran staff, historical archives, business systems, field presence, or implementing partner networks of universities, international nongovernmental organizations, local civil society groups, and international development contractors.
将项目移交给国务院,只会加剧长期困扰美国对外援助的矛盾。很少有国务卿(或国防部长)具备任何发展背景、经验或技术知识,而且矛盾的是,当援助被仅仅视为外交或防务的工具,而不是其本身的目的时,它所能带来的外交利益就会受到损害。美国国际开发署在伊拉克的项目减少了美军的伤亡。
The transfer of programs to the Department of State only exacerbated the contradictions that have long bedeviled U.S foreign aid. Few secretaries of state (or secretaries of defense) have any development background, experience, or technical knowledge, and paradoxically, when aid is seen simply as a tool of diplomacy or defense rather than an end in itself, the diplomatic good it can do is compromised. USAID projects in Iraq reduced American military casualties.
拆解美国国际开发署(USAID)并未消除对技术专业人员和官僚体系的需求。2025年5月,美国国务院监察长发布了一份令人生畏的报告,详细列出了该部门为胜任管理外援项目必须采取的措施,这是一份它将难以满足的要求清单。而就在今年9月,美国政府问责局(GAO)发布了一份措辞严厉的审计报告,批评国务院对外援项目的管理不善,发现该部门缺乏决定终止哪些援助项目的书面标准,无法提供自身人员配备的数据,且对拨款和协议的记录不完整或不准确。
Dismantling USAID did not abolish the need for technically knowledgeable staff and bureaucratic systems. In May 2025, the State Department inspector general issued an intimidating report detailing what the department will have to do to competently manage foreign aid programs, a list of demands it will have difficulty meeting. And in September this year, the Government Accountability Office issued a highly critical audit of the State Department’s inadequate management of foreign aid programs, finding that the department lacked documented standards for deciding which aid programs to terminate, could not produce data on its own staffing, and maintained incomplete or incorrect records on grants and agreements.
考虑到国务院是一个外交政策机构,而非项目管理机构,这一结果并不令人意外。将美国国际开发署并入国务院,正如将微软与埃克森美孚合并一样缺乏道理,鉴于这两个机构运作的时间跨度截然不同,且使命声明和业务体系也大相径庭。
This result was unsurprising, given that the State Department is a diplomatic policy institution, not a program management agency. Merging USAID into the State Department makes as much sense as merging Microsoft with ExxonMobil, given the disparate time horizons on which the two institutions operate and their differences in mission statements and business systems.
国务院一直在寻求分配援助的替代安排,以减少直接管理的需求。例如,它已与发展中国家政府签署了36份谅解备忘录,将美国援助资金转交给其卫生部,由它们自行支出项目资金。但作为这些转移的回报,华盛顿要求这些国家向美国政府提供私人医疗数据,接受美国政府驱逐的无证移民,并在某些情况下,给予美国矿业公司开采其稀土矿产的权限。因为卫生项目关乎生命,其分配应基于需求,而非基于狭隘、交易性的美国要求。
The State Department has pursued alternative arrangements for distributing aid that require less direct management. For example, it has negotiated 36 memorandums of understanding with governments in developing countries to transfer U.S. aid funds to their health ministries, so they can spend the program money themselves. But in return for these transfers, Washington has asked these countries to send private health-care data to the U.S. government, accept undocumented immigrants the U.S. government deports, and, in some cases, give U.S. mining companies access to their rare-earth minerals. Because health programs save lives, they should be distributed based on need, not on parochial, transactional American demands.
许多国家理所当然地抵制了这种交易。美国国际开发署拥有能够评估外国政府负责任管理资金能力的技术人员。在实践中,该机构对其合作的外国政府的几乎方方面面都进行了详细而彻底的审查。相比之下,国务院仅根据法律最低标准进行审查,并将外国政府视同国际或美国本土非政府组织。国务院的方法将增加资金被缺乏确保问责制所需的控制系统的当地政府部门盗窃的风险。
Many countries have understandably resisted this kind of bargain. USAID had technical staff that could assess a foreign government’s ability to manage funds responsibly. In practice, it ran a detailed and thorough vetting of nearly every aspect of the governments it partnered with. The State Department, by contrast, only vets according to the legal minimum and treats foreign governments as it treats as international or U.S.-based NGOs. State’s approach will increase the risk that funds are stolen by local government ministries that lack the control systems needed to ensure accountability.
精简繁文缛节 特朗普以及政府效率部(DOGE)昔日的领导人埃隆·马斯克对美国国际开发署的廉洁度和管理方式进行了公开且极其不准确的攻击,这些攻击严重损害了该机构的声誉,以至于仅仅将其复活都将十分困难。但华盛顿的援助机构体系也需要比以往更有条理的组织。政治学者詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊在其名著——我的书正是围绕该书的结构展开的——中主张,强大的美国部门或机构需要“相对自主权”:即它们与其他机构没有实质性重叠的、界定清晰的使命。
CUT THE RED TAPE The very public and grossly inaccurate attacks on USAID’s integrity and management by Trump and DOGE’s erstwhile leader, Elon Musk, have damaged the agency’s reputation so extensively that simply resurrecting it will be difficult. But Washington’s aid apparatus also needs more coherent organization than it was afforded in the past. In his celebrated work , on which my book is structured, the political scientist James Q. Wilson argues that strong U.S. departments or agencies need “relative autonomy”: clearly defined missions they do not substantially share with other agencies.
按照这一逻辑,如果美国想要一个高效、有条理的对外援助项目,它就必须首先将所有援助职能整合到一个部门内。
By this logic, if the United States wants a high-functioning, coherent foreign aid program, it must first consolidate all aid functions within one department.
撤销常驻外地办事处(被称为美国国际开发署驻外机构)也使得管理援助项目变得困难得多,削弱了美国在发展中国家的真正问责制和影响力,并降低了美国援助项目的能见度。必须重新建立这些国家办事处,向当地美国大使汇报。在华盛顿,国会应创建一个向总统负责的新的内阁级部门,负责管理政府所有的援助项目,这将使精简人员、简化项目实施以及避免政策不连贯成为可能。
Abolishing field offices (called USAID missions) also made administering aid programs much more difficult, blunted true accountability and U.S. influence in the developing world, and reduced the visibility of U.S. aid programs. These country missions must be reestablished, reporting to the local U.S. ambassador. In Washington, Congress should create a new cabinet-level department reporting to the president that manages all the government’s aid programs, which would make it possible to trim staff, streamline program implementation, and avoid policy incoherence.
该新部门至少百分之八十的人员应部署在海外,而不是华盛顿。美国将始终需要能够发起具有明确外交目的和短期视野的援助项目,国务院应决定这些项目及其开支水平。但它应将项目的管理留给新的援助部门——就像冷战时期美国国际开发署独立于国务院时那样。
At least 80 percent of this new department’s staff should be deployed abroad, not in Washington. The United States will always need to be able to launch aid programs with an expressly diplomatic purpose and short time horizon, and the State Department should determine these projects and their spending levels. But it should leave the programs’ management up to the new aid department—as it did during the Cold War, when USAID was independent of State.
这个新部门还应向较少的国会委员会汇报——即每个立法机构中的一个外交事务授权委员会和一个拨款小委员会。必须减少将具有国内吸引力的专项拨款强加给美国对外援助预算的做法——这种做法阻碍了援助响应外国自身的需要。
This new department should also report to fewer congressional committees—a Foreign Affairs authorizing committee and a appropriations subcommittee in each legislative body. The practice of burdening the United States’ foreign aid budget with domestically appealing earmarks—which prevents aid from responding to foreign countries’ own needs—must be reduced.
过去,受反官僚机构诉求驱使的外援过度监管和官僚化,将流程置于项目之上,将合规置于发展成果之上。新的援助部门必须获得监管豁免。实现这一目标的一个方法是,由国会设立特许使团,类似于特许学校,作为一项实验,以观察问责制是否会恶化。这些不受监管的特许使团将免受反官僚机构所要求的繁重报告要求的束缚。近年来,世界银行尝试了类似的方法,并发现它在没有增加欺诈的情况下提高了项目的有效性。
In the past, the overregulation and bureaucratization of foreign aid driven by the demands of the counterbureaucracy prioritized process over programs and compliance over developmental outcomes. The new aid department must be given regulatory relief. One way to do that is for Congress to set up charter missions, similar to charter schools, as an experiment to see if accountability deteriorates. These deregulated charter missions would be free from burdensome reporting requirements the counterbureaucracy demands. In recent years, the World Bank has tried a similar approach and found it improved its programs’ effectiveness without increasing fraud.
美国对外援助的现状无法持续。但华盛顿不能回到旧现状,正是这种现状引发了决策者的不满,并最终导致其被解散。如果新民主党国会和未来的政府能够展现出前瞻性的视野,现在正是通过这些改革为美国对外援助项目带来更多连贯性的时刻。
The status quo for U.S. foreign aid cannot last. But Washington cannot revert to the old status quo, which generated the kind of dissatisfactions among policymakers that helped lead to its dismantling. Now is the time to bring more coherence to U.S. foreign aid programs with these reforms, if the new Democratic Congress and future administrations shows a forward-looking vision.
编者按 本文改编自布鲁姆斯伯里出版社2026年11月出版的著作。
Editor’s Note This essay is adapted from Bloomsbury, November 2026.