在亚太经合组织（APEC）深圳会议期间，中俄美三方峰会是否可能举行？如果成行，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普表示此类会议将较少聚焦乌克兰问题，而称：“我们将举行会议讨论核武器和无核化。”这引人注目。这将如何开启？美国称中国是近年来核力量增长最快的国家。但即使北京的弹头储备如斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所估计的那样，到2025年底达到600枚，美俄两国的核弹头仍占全球核弹头总数的近90%。这就是北京坚持华盛顿和莫斯科应先进行实质性削减，然后再谈核裁军的原因。
Is a trilateral summit between China, Russia and the United States possible during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Shenzhen? If so, it is striking that US President Donald Trump sees such a meeting focusing less on Ukraine, saying: “we would have it to talk about nuclear weapons and denuclearisation.”How might this start? The US says China is the fastest-growing nuclear power in recent years. But even if Beijing’s warhead stockpile reached 600 by the end of 2025, as estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, those of the US and Russia still account for almost 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear warheads. This is why Beijing insists Washington and Moscow should carry out substantive cuts before talking about nuclear disarmament.
指望唐纳德·特朗普领导下的美国主导核裁军，犹如等待戈多。美国已宣布拥有在轨空间控制武器，并正在建设“金穹顶”系统作为防御导弹攻击的盾牌。自拜登政府以来，华盛顿将中国和俄罗斯的导弹能力归为一类，辩称面临两条战线的核威胁。这引出一个怪诞的问题：北京和莫斯科对华盛顿发动协同核打击怎么可能？
Waiting for the US under President Donald Trump to lead nuclear disarmament is like waiting for Godot. The US has announced that it possesses on-orbit space control weapons and is building a “Golden Dome” system as a shield against missile attacks. Since the Biden administration, Washington has lumped Chinese and Russian missile capabilities together, arguing it faces a nuclear threat on two fronts. That raises a bizarre question: how is a coordinated nuclear strike by Beijing and Moscow against Washington possible?
拥有世界最大核武库的俄罗斯，更缺乏削减核武器的动力。2025年以来，俄罗斯军队在东部顿巴斯许多争议地区推进甚微，面临乌克兰顽强抵抗。历史提供了一个清晰的模式：当一个核大国享有常规军事优势时，很少诉诸核恐吓。
Russia, which holds the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, has even less incentive to make nuclear cuts. Since 2025, Russian forces in eastern Donbas have advanced very little in many contested areas amid stiff Ukrainian resistance. History offers a clear pattern here: when a nuclear power enjoys conventional military superiority, it rarely resorts to nuclear sabre-rattling.
这就是为什么在冷战期间，北约拒绝了“不首先使用”核政策的提议，担心如果没有核威慑，苏联装甲部队可能会涌过北德平原，涌入西欧。这也是为什么苏联解体后，俄罗斯放弃了自己的不首先使用承诺。
This is why, during the Cold War, Nato rejected proposals for a “no first use” nuclear policy, fearing that without nuclear deterrence, Soviet armour could surge across the North German Plain and pour into western Europe. This is also why, after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia abandoned its own no-first-use commitment.
如果三方决定进行核对话，最容易做的是重申五个核武器国家于2022年1月发表的联合声明：核战争打不赢，也绝不能打。如果核战争确实打不赢，那么首先发动核打击的理由是什么？
Should the three parties decide to have a nuclear dialogue, the easiest thing to do is reaffirm the joint statement issued by the five nuclear-weapon states in January 2022: a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. If nuclear war is indeed unwinnable, what is the rationale for striking first?
这符合中国长期坚持的不首先使用政策。这也有助于改善俄罗斯的形象。尽管一直有猜测认为俄罗斯可能在关键时刻使用核武器，正如一些人所建议的那样，但总统弗拉基米尔·普京从未公开表示过这一点。
This is in line with China’s long-standing no-first-use policy. It also helps improve Russia’s image. Although there is consistent speculation that Russia might use nuclear weapons at critical junctures, as some have suggested, President Vladimir Putin has never stated this overtly.
另一个容易达成的成果是三方承诺不打击民用核电站，并交换受常规攻击保护的核设施清单。印度和巴基斯坦几十年来一直遵循这一模式，根据《关于禁止攻击核设施和设施的协定》，每年1月交换此类清单。没有明显的理由说明为何不能在此处采用同样的降低风险公式。
Another piece of low-hanging fruit would be for the three sides to pledge not to strike civilian nuclear power plants and exchange lists of nuclear facilities shielded from conventional attack. India and Pakistan have followed this model for decades under their Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, swapping such lists every January. There is no clear reason why the same risk-reduction formula could not be adapted here.
第三项协议可以是联合宣布禁止反卫星武器试验。中国、美国、俄罗斯和印度都曾通过实弹试验展示反卫星攻击能力。与此同时，世界上在拥挤的近地轨道上运行着数万颗卫星，且这一数字还在不断攀升。
A third agreement could be a joint announcement of a ban on anti-satellite weapons tests. China, the US, Russia and India have all demonstrated anti-satellite attack capabilities through live tests. Meanwhile, the world operates tens of thousands of satellites in crowded low Earth orbit, and the figure keeps climbing.
目前没有任何国家能够完全瘫痪另一国的卫星网络，但仅摧毁少数几颗卫星就会产生碎片，对所有轨道资产构成危险。在这方面，攻击一国卫星就是攻击所有国家。这三国还应建立针对高风险事件的早期预警通报规则，例如卫星近距离遭遇、碎片碰撞威胁以及在轨定向能武器试验。
No nation can yet fully disable another’s satellite network, but destroying only a few satellites would produce debris dangerous to all orbital assets. In this regard, an attack on one is an attack on all. The three nations should also put in place early-warning notification rules for high-risk incidents such as close satellite encounters, collision threats from debris and in-orbit directed-energy weapons testing.
第四步可以是导弹发射通报。华盛顿和莫斯科已运行此类机制，北京和莫斯科也是如此。美中达成协议将为统一的三边通报机制铺平道路。2024年9月和11月，中美就各自的洲际弹道导弹试验交换了预先警告。这是一个罕见的、积极的建立互信里程碑。
A fourth step could be notification of missile launches. Washington and Moscow already operate such arrangements, as do Beijing and Moscow. A US-China deal would pave the way for a unified trilateral notification regime. In September and November 2024, China and the US exchanged advance warnings for their respective intercontinental ballistic missile tests. This was a rare, and positive, confidence-building milestone.
此类通报只有在预先通知旨在防止意外惊吓、而非向对手提供击落导弹所需信息时才有效。如果华盛顿确实建造部署了轨道武器的“金穹顶”，这种理解就会破裂。特朗普的“金穹顶”建立在他妄想美国能主宰外层空间的基础上，但美国和以色列的导弹防御系统已反复证明，在伊朗导弹和无人机袭击面前远非坚不可摧。
Such notifications only work when the advance notice is meant to prevent accidental scares, not to give an adversary the information needed to shoot down the missile. If Washington does build the Golden Dome with weapons in orbit, that understanding would break down. Trump’s Golden Dome is built around his delusion that the US can dominate outer space, yet US and Israeli missile defences have repeatedly proven far from invulnerable against Iranian missile and drone strikes.
最后一个问题是人工智能（AI）可能如何被不必要地卷入核领域。一想到智能体AI也许有一天会操纵核指挥控制系统，就令人毛骨悚然。这就是为什么国家主席习近平和时任美国总统拜登在2024年同意保持核指挥控制系统有人在回路的要求。中美还同意就AI风险举行定期对话。
The final issue is how artificial intelligence (AI) might be unnecessarily involved in the nuclear domain. It makes one’s blood run cold to think that agentic AI might one day manipulate nuclear command-and-control systems. This is why President Xi Jinping and then US president Joe Biden agreed in 2024 to keep a human-in-the-loop requirement for nuclear command-and-control systems. China and the US have also agreed on regular talks on AI risks.
如果莫斯科能加入这一框架将是可取的，我看不出它有什么理由会不愿这样做。对话应就三条核心规则建立共识：禁止触发核打击的完全自主 AI 算法；将 AI 限制在支持威胁评估功能上；制定共同标准，以防范针对核指挥、控制和通信基础设施的网络攻击。
It would be desirable if Moscow could join this framework, and I see no reason why it would be reluctant to do so. Dialogue should build a consensus on three core rules: banning fully autonomous AI algorithms that trigger nuclear strikes; limiting AI to supporting threat assessment functions; and drawing up shared standards to guard against cyberattacks targeting nuclear command, control and communications infrastructure.
这三个大国还可以在即时热线沟通方面树立全球榜样，以化解 AI 引发的核误警和核交换，并就军事 AI 在核行动中的界限进行交流。核裁军仍遥不可及，但深圳峰会可能启动遏制核风险的努力，以免核风险反过来遏制我们。
The three powers can also set a global example on instant hotline communications to defuse AI-induced nuclear false alarms and exchanges on the boundaries of military AI in nuclear operations. Nuclear disarmament is still far away, yet the Shenzhen summit could kick-start efforts to contain the nuclear risk before it contains us.