
根据对42个国家的调查,金融诈骗受害者去年损失了近5000亿美元。然而,这些惊人的数字并不是最让人警惕的地方。诈骗正变得越来越老练且全球化,将曾经零星散落的骗局演变成了庞大的跨境业务。
Victims of financial fraud lost almost $500 billion last year, based on surveys in 42 countries. Yet the staggering sums aren’t the most alarming part. Fraud is becoming more sophisticated and global, turning what was once a collection of isolated scams into a sprawling cross-border business.
在东南亚,犯罪活动高度集中:湄公河流域的某个诈骗园区——在缅甸境内,或是位于泰柬边境——可以把100多个国家的受害者作为狩猎目标。N招募本身就是一种跨境贩运。贫困、失业的人们带着合法工作的承诺被诱骗到海外,结果却被困在园区里,被迫在网上诈骗陌生人。根据联合国人权事务高级专员办事处的数据,缅甸至少有12万人、柬埔寨大约有10万人被扣押并从事这一目的。家属必须支付赎金才能让他们获释;通常,员工还必须招募自己的替补。
In Southeast Asia, criminal activities are highly centralized: A scam compound in the Mekong region — in Myanmar, or on the Thai-Cambodia border — can hunt for marks in more than 100 countries.
然而,为了逃避侦查,犯罪集团正日益分化为更小的单位,分散在酒店房间、办公室甚至咖啡馆里。在欧洲,这种网络化模式曾被一个假投资团伙所采用,该团伙在多个国家运营着20个呼叫中心。在荷兰警方于7月打击该行动之前,有700多人在中央协调下工作,每月产生约1.13亿美元的收入。
Recruitment itself is a form of cross-border trafficking. Poor, unemployed people are lured overseas with promises of legitimate work, only to be trapped in compounds and forced to defraud strangers online. According to the UN Human Rights Office, at least 120,000 people in Myanmar — and roughly 100,000 in Cambodia — have been held for that purpose. Families have to pay ransoms for their release; often employees must recruit their own replacements.
无论是集中式还是碎片化,“犯罪即服务”都是一条复杂的供应链,不同的诈骗网络共享一套通用的供应商,提供从SIM卡、服务器到银行账户和加密货币兑换等一切服务。杀猪盘、“庞氏骗局”以及针对印度中产阶级储户的一种可怕的心理骗局“数字逮捕”,都在利用恐惧、贪婪和孤独的某种组合。要想令人信服地做到这一点,仅靠一个貌似合理的故事是不够的。剧本必须针对特定的群体进行量身定制并不断更新;拨打电话的人需要具备正确的语言、口音和文化背景,才能赢得受害者的信任。
To evade detection, however, syndicates are increasingly splintering into smaller units, dispersing across hotel rooms, offices, and even coffee shops. In Europe, that networked model was deployed by a fake-investment racket operating 20 call centers across multiple countries. More than 700 people worked under central coordination, generating roughly $113 million a month before Dutch police busted the operation in July.
引人入胜的叙事和可信的角色只是开始。基础设施也必须搭建起来:需要采购虚拟专用网络和恶意域名,为工人提供住所和食物,并在银行系统内培育“骡子账户”来转移资金。然后是人工智能。根据金融行动特别工作组的一份新报告,深度伪造、声音克隆、聊天机器人、自动化脚本和多语言内容“可以进一步提高诈骗和接触受害者的规模与复杂性”。
Centralized or fragmented, crime-as-a-service is a complex supply chain, where different fraud networks share a common set of vendors providing everything from SIM cards and servers to bank accounts and crypto conversion. Romance scams, Ponzi schemes, and “digital arrests” — a terrifying psychological hoax targeting Indian middle-class savers — all exploit some combination of fear, greed, and loneliness. Doing that convincingly requires more than a plausible story. Scripts must be tailored to specific demographics and continually updated; callers need the right language, accent, and cultural cues to win a victim’s trust.
金融行动特别工作组的研究应当成为各国政府的警钟。除非当局切断整个犯罪供应链,否则他们将永远在玩打地鼠的游戏。突袭一个园区或逮捕几名操纵者只会让犯罪生意四处流散——中东和非洲正在成为诈骗的新前沿。由于数字工具的发展,犯罪初创企业发现扩张变得更加容易。例如“信币担保”,这是一个中文线上非法交易市场,为东南亚诈骗园区提供洗钱和技术服务。
Compelling narratives and credible actors are only the start. Infrastructure must be assembled, too: virtual private networks and malicious domains to be procured, workers housed and fed, and mule accounts cultivated inside the banking system to move the proceeds.
9月,美国当局对信币实施了制裁,并查封了其数字钱包。美国财政部表示,自2022年以来,该市场及其平台已处理了超过240亿美元的加密货币和法定货币,并鼓励商家使用由一家新加坡公司开发的加密消息应用程序SafeW。为了清洗赃款,诈骗分子使用了在柬埔寨构建的支付应用程序XinbiPay。
Then there’s artificial intelligence. Deepfakes, voice cloning, chatbots, automated scripts, and multilingual content “can further increase the scale and sophistication of victim targeting and engagement,” according to a new Financial Action Task Force report.
传统的警务和遗留的反洗钱系统正在输掉一场与时间的赛跑。根据泰国银行的数据,受害者通常需要大约20个小时才能意识到自己被骗了。他们的积蓄在三到五分钟内就会消失——通过“骡子账户”转运,兑换成稳定币,并被转移到受监管的金融系统之外。银行在几周后才对“骡子账户”提交可疑交易报告,无异于在给死钱写验尸报告。
The FATF study, , should be a wake-up call for governments. Unless authorities disrupt the entire criminal supply chain, they will always be playing whack-a-mole. Raid one compound or arrest a few operators and the business merely scatters — the Middle East and Africa are emerging as new frontiers for scamming. Criminal startups are finding it easier to expand, thanks to digital tools such as Xinbi Guarantee, a Chinese-language illicit online marketplace where merchants offered money-laundering and technology services to Southeast Asian scam compounds.
这种时间差正是金融行动特别工作组想要消除的。这个总部设在巴黎的监督机构因追查恐怖主义资助者、贩毒集团和流氓国家而闻名。多年来,它一直在追踪网络诈骗,但随着诈骗园区侵蚀了全球银行系统的信任,该工作组正要求各国追踪其资金流向。财政部长们应当听取意见,哪怕只是为了避免被列入其“灰名单”的名誉污点。
In September, US authorities sanctioned Xinbi, seizing its digital wallets. Since 2022, the marketplace and its platforms have processed over $24 billion in crypto and fiat currencies, with merchants encouraged to use SafeW, an encrypted messaging application developed by a Singapore-based firm, the Treasury said. To wash the proceeds, the scamsters used XinbiPay, a payment application built in Cambodia.
行动必须从支付和电信网络开始。电信运营商能够看到最初的警告信号——成批的欺诈电话或自动短信,它们应该向零售银行提供实时警报。与此同时,支付服务提供商需要在交易中引入更多摩擦:强制性的收款人姓名匹配、针对突然大额转账的冷静期,以及在怀疑发生欺诈时立即冻结账户。其目的很简单:在受害者被操纵着点掉一生的积蓄之前进行干预。
Traditional policing and legacy anti-money-laundering systems are losing a race against the clock. According to the Bank of Thailand, a victim typically takes about 20 hours to realize they’ve been fleeced. Their savings can be gone in three to five minutes — shuttled through mule accounts, converted into stablecoins, and spirited beyond the regulated financial system. For a bank to file a suspicious transaction report on a mule account weeks later is merely writing an autopsy on dead money. That time lag is what the FATF wants to eliminate. The Paris-based watchdog made its name pursuing terror financiers, drug cartels, and rogue states. It has tracked cyber fraud for years, but with scam compounds corroding trust in the global banking system, the task force is asking countries to trace their financial flows. Finance ministers ought to listen, if only to avoid the reputational scar of being placed on its “gray list.”Action must start with payment and telecom networks. Telcos, which see the first warning signs — bursts of spoofed calls or automated text messages — should feed real-time alerts to retail banks. Payment providers, meanwhile, need to build more friction into transactions: mandatory payee-name matching, cooling-off periods for sudden large transfers, and immediate account holds when fraud is suspected. The aim is simple: intervene before a manipulated victim can click away a lifetime of savings.
调查人员也必须适应形势。实体“迹象”——比如小型办公室外卖订单的突然激增——可能很快就会消失。就像合法商业软件的同行一样,“犯罪即服务”的运营者也可能会拥抱劳动强度较低的技术。金融行动特别工作组的报告指出:“通过采用人工智能代理,某些模式可能会降低对被贩运的大量劳动力以及维持大型实体场所相关腐败的依赖,同时变得更加依赖可靠的电力、连接和数字基础设施。”
Investigators must also adapt. Physical “tells” — like a sudden spike in food orders from a small office — may soon vanish. Like their counterparts in legitimate business software, crime-as-a-service operators may also embrace less labor-intensive technology. “Through the adoption of AI agents, some models may become less dependent on large trafficked workforces and the corruption associated with maintaining large physical sites, while becoming more dependent on reliable electricity, connectivity and digital infrastructure,” the FATF report notes.
执法部门的目标必须是扼杀犯罪集团提取、清洗和享用战利品的能力。但人工智能正在稳步提高他们的利润率、降低成本并提高整个犯罪供应链的生产力。监管机构需要在“犯罪即服务”变得更加精简且更难打击之前采取行动。
The goal of law enforcement must be to choke syndicates’ ability to extract, launder, and enjoy their loot. But AI is steadily improving their margins, lowering costs, and boosting productivity across the criminal supply chain. Regulators need to act before crime-as-a-service becomes leaner — and even harder to disrupt.