
据报道,英伟达董事会已明智地拒绝了黄仁勋的回归,这距离董事会施压迫使其辞去首席执行官职务仅过去一周。一场可疑的外部运动仍在试图撬开这扇大门。SpaceX的埃隆·马斯克、Y Combinator的加里·谭等科技界领袖已签署请愿书要求恢复其职务,而金融股东布拉德·格斯特纳和加文·贝克则致信英伟达董事会,敦促其“避免匆忙替换黄仁勋”。
Nvidia's board has reportedly and wisely closed the door on Jensen Huang’s return, barely a week after boardroom pressure pushed him to resign as chief executive. A dubious outside campaign is still trying to pry it open. Tech leaders like SpaceX’s Elon Musk and Y Combinator’s Garry Tan have signed a petition demanding his reinstatement, while financier shareholders Brad Gerstner and Gavin Baker have urged Nvidia's board via letter to “avoid a rush to replace Jensen.”
这扇门应当继续关闭。在33年间,黄仁勋将公司打造成人工智能时代的核心,但我们认为,他的行为仍使其职位难以维持。他因未披露的关系误导董事,并监管一家无人能够制衡的公司——这种信任崩塌在中国问题上被放大,当时他主张放宽出口管制,而受限芯片却流向了中国军方单位以及与黄爱丽丝网络有关联的上海设施。
That door should stay shut. Over 33 years, Huang built the company at the center of the AI era, but in our view, his conduct nevertheless made his position untenable. He misled directors about undisclosed relationships and oversaw a firm no one could check—a breakdown in trust that was magnified in China, where he advocated loosening export controls even as restricted chips reached Chinese military units and a Shanghai facility tied to Alice Huang’s network.
推动恢复其职务的政治施压,建立在其最著名的支持者们在其客户融资网络上押注的数十亿美元之上,以及误导性的地缘政治说辞之上,这是以牺牲真正的股东关切和国家防务为代价的。
The political push to restore him rests on the billions his most prominent advocates have riding on his customer-financing web and on misleading geopolitical spin, at the expense of genuine shareholder concerns and national defense.
秉承我们要求黄仁勋支持者保持透明的精神,我们指出,我们即将出版的新书《当机器行动:我们的智能体AI未来的希望与危险》收录了黄仁勋的原话,这些话语源自他在我们耶鲁首席执行官领导力研究院CEO论坛上的发言。
In the spirit of the transparency we ask of Huang’s advocates, we note that our upcoming book, When Machines Act: The Promise and Peril of Our Agentic AI Future, includes Huang’s own words, drawn from his commentary at our Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute CEO forums.
信任的破裂 13个月来,黄仁勋通过发言人坚称,他与主要客户Megaspeed负责人黄爱丽丝的关系纯属商业往来。只有在《金融时报》报道华盛顿对她的担忧后,英伟达首席执行官才向总法律顾问蒂姆·特特坦白了这段婚外情。即便如此,他仍向特特保证——特特随后与董事会进行了沟通——没有其他类似关系。四天后,《纽约时报》曝光了第二段婚外情。
A breach of trust For 13 months, Huang maintained through spokespeople that his ties to Alice Huang, head of major customer Megaspeed, were strictly business. Only after the Financial Times reported Washington’s concerns about her did the Nvidia CEO confess the affair to general counsel Tim Teter. Even then, he assured Teter, who spoke with the board, that there had been no others. Four days later, the New York Times uncovered a second affair.
Megaspeed 的纠葛构成了教科书式的利益冲突。Megaspeed 采购了数十亿美元的稀缺处理器,且正处于联邦调查之下,而英伟达自身的行为准则也将个人关系标记为利益冲突风险。目前公开记录中没有任何迹象表明黄仁勋曾披露过这段关系,或曾在任何涉及 Megaspeed 的决策中回避。
The Megaspeed entanglement posed a textbook conflict of interest. Megaspeed bought billions of dollars of scarce processors and is under federal investigation, and Nvidia's own code of conduct flags personal relationships as a conflict risk. Nothing currently in the public record indicates Huang ever disclosed the affair or stepped aside from a single decision involving Megaspeed.
黄仁勋的第二段关系同样跨越了一条同样明确的治理红线,因为对方是一名直接向他汇报工作的高管。过去,麦当劳和英特尔的董事会曾因首席执行官与员工发生关系而将其罢黜,一位协助黄仁勋回归的盟友承认:“与下属发生婚外情是可被解雇的过错。” 这些失职发生在一个似乎专门设计来让其领导人不受约束的组织内部:该组织拥有约 60 名直接下属、家族成员担任高管、且没有明确的继任者、董事会主席或首席合规官。
Huang’s second relationship crossed a similarly bright governance line in that it involved an executive who reported directly to him. In the past, corporate boards at McDonald’s and Intel ousted chief executives over relationships with employees, and an ally working on Huang’s return conceded, “Having an affair with a subordinate is a fireable offense.”Those lapses unfolded inside an organization seemingly engineered to leave its leader unchecked, with roughly 60 direct reports, family in senior posts, and no clear successor, board chair, or chief compliance officer.
当董事会不再能信任首席执行官时,将其免职便是他们的职责。我们认为,无论是否为创始人,黄仁勋的行为对任何首席执行官而言都是不可接受的。
When a board of directors can no longer trust a chief executive, removal is their duty. We would argue that Huang’s conduct would be unacceptable of any chief executive, founder or not.
中国的记录 这种信任崩塌的利害关系没有哪里比在中国更大,黄仁勋曾是华盛顿放宽出口管制的最主要倡导者。彭博社审阅的文件显示,搭载英伟达 H800、H100 和 H200 芯片的服务器位于一个与黄仁勋妻子人脉网络有关的上海设施内。据报道,部分设备先被运往新加坡官方认证的英伟达云合作伙伴 Aperia Cloud Services,随后被走私入境中国。
China’s record Nowhere did that breakdown in trust carry steeper stakes than in China, where Huang was Washington’s foremost advocate for looser export rules. Documents reviewed by Bloomberg place servers holding Nvidia's H800, H100, and H200 chips inside a Shanghai facility tied to Alice Huang’s network. Some of those units reportedly went first to Aperia Cloud Services, an official Nvidia Cloud Partner in Singapore, before being smuggled into China.
这些服务器于 2025 年 1 月被用作抵押品,当时这三款芯片均被禁止销售给中国,这距离唐纳德·特朗普总统于 2025 年 12 月——在黄仁勋游说且商务部长卢特尼克支持下——决定允许英伟达向经批准的中国买家销售 H200 并向美国政府抽成 25%,尚早近一年。
The servers were pledged as collateral in January 2025, when all three chips were barred from sale to China, nearly a year before President Donald Trump’s December 2025 decision—lobbied for by Huang and backed by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick—to let Nvidia sell the H200 to approved Chinese buyers for a 25% U.S. government cut.
更令人担忧的是,其他顶级的英伟达硬件也流入了与中国军方有关的黑名单机构,在那里美国技术可能被用于对抗美国。采购记录显示解放军部队购买了 A100 和 H100,而路透社报道,一所被列入黑名单的国防大学在九月份通过转售商购买了两台 H200。两位消息人士均未说明英伟达是否完成了这些销售。未经许可向中国军方或黑名单实体出口受控硅芯片,无论如何都是非法的。
Far more alarming, other top-tier Nvidia hardware reached a blacklisted institution with ties to China’s military, where American technology could be turned against the United States. Procurement records document A100 and H100 purchases by People’s Liberation Army units, and Reuters reports that a blacklisted defense university bought two H200s through a reseller in September. Neither source says Nvidia made the sales. Exporting controlled silicon to China’s military or blacklisted entities without a license is illegal regardless.
中国的顶尖人工智能实验室也在使用受出口管制的硬件来构建最新模型。他们的“创新”部分依赖于被禁止购买的美国芯片和被禁止复制的美国模型。法医研究发现,英伟达 Blackwell 芯片的指纹出现在六款中国前沿模型中,Anthropic 表示其捕捉到中国实验室在大规模蒸馏其模型——这引发了一个问题:他们的“创新”是否部分依赖于被禁止购买的美国芯片和被禁止复制的模型。该研究既未 pinpoint Blackwell 硬件的具体位置,也未确认其使用是否违反任何法律。
China’s premier AI labs built their newest models on export-controlled hardware too. Their “innovation” rests partly on American chips they were banned from buying and American models they were barred from copying. A forensic study found the fingerprint of Nvidia's Blackwell chips in six Chinese frontier models, and Anthropic says it caught Chinese labs distilling its models at massive scale—raising the question of whether their “innovation” rests partly on American chips they were banned from buying and models they were barred from copying. The study neither pinpoints where the Blackwell hardware sat nor establishes whether its use violated any law.
即使不走走私渠道,中国公司也在东南亚为其专门建造的数据中心中使用先进芯片,这一漏洞在美国商务部最近的规则出台前是合法的。《华尔街日报》报道,英伟达告知许多海外云合作伙伴,将中国客户的比例控制在 30% 至 49% 以下。了解该比例的供应商若披露这一数字,将是实现问责的基本第一步。
Even without smuggling, Chinese companies tap advanced chips in Southeast Asian data centers built expressly for them, a loophole that was legal until the Commerce Department’s recent rule. The Wall Street Journal reports that Nvidia told many overseas cloud partners to keep Chinese customers below a ceiling of 30% to 49%. A supplier policing that ratio knows the figure, and disclosing it would be an elementary first step toward accountability.
2025年5月,也就是戴尔因担心芯片被转移而切断与Aperia合作三个月后,黄仁勋坚称“没有任何证据表明存在任何AI芯片转移”。然而,做空机构Culper Research统计发现,经由新加坡开票的销售额占英伟达营收的比例在三年间从8.5%膨胀到约20%,在截至2025年7月的季度更达到22%。就在下一个季度,当英伟达改为按客户总部所在地报告销售时,新加坡这一单独列示的项目便从公司财报中消失了。
In May 2025, three months after Dell cut off Aperia over diversion fears, Huang insisted there was “no evidence of any AI chip diversion.”Yet short seller Culper Research counts billings routed through Singapore swelling from 8.5% of Nvidia's revenue to roughly 20% over three years, hitting 22% in the quarter ended July 2025. The very next quarter, the standalone Singapore line vanished from company filings when Nvidia switched to reporting sales by customer headquarters.
英伟达在财务报表中表示,在新加坡开票的受控数据中心营收中,超过99%来自美国客户。但通过美国实体下单的买家并不等同于美国最终用户。Megaspeed的大部分硬件是通过Aivres采购的,后者是中国服务器制造商浪潮的加州分支,而浪潮因支持中国军方而被列入黑名单。要说新加坡激增的开票额仅仅反映了美国需求,实在难以令人信服。
In financial statements, Nvidia has said that over 99% of controlled data-center revenue billed in Singapore came from US-based customers. But a buyer that books orders through a U.S. entity is not the same as an American end user. Megaspeed bought most of its hardware through Aivres, the California arm of Inspur, a Chinese server maker which has been blacklisted for supporting China’s military. Suggesting that Singapore’s surging billings reflected nothing beyond American demand strains credulity.
黄仁勋和英伟达均未受到正式刑事指控,公司也坚称自己遵守法律。董事会尚未完成的调查按理本应让人保持耐心,但在我们看来,即便如此仍要推动他留任,显然表明背后支持者的财务私利在驱动这一切。
Neither Huang nor Nvidia has been formally charged with a crime, and the company maintains it complies with the law. Where the board’s unfinished inquiry would ordinarily counsel patience, it seems clear to us that the push to restore him anyway points to the financial self-interest driving his backers.
这场运动背后的资金在黄仁勋治下,英伟达把自己重塑为客户的主要融资方,用《纽约时报》的话说,成了“需要芯片和资金的初创企业的中央银行”。截至7月,其股权投资从约70亿美元猛增至990亿美元。公司已同意为OpenAI俄亥俄州园区最高1050亿美元的租约提供有条件担保,一位经济学家计算,在与华尔街机构规模5000亿美元的融资计划中,英伟达为其中最高1250亿美元提供兜底。
The money behind the campaign Under Huang, Nvidia remade itself into its customers’ chief financier, “a central banker for start-ups that needed chips and funding,” as The New York Times phrased it. Through July, its equity stakes ballooned from about $7 billion to $99 billion. It has agreed to conditionally guarantee up to $105 billion in leases for OpenAI’s Ohio campus, and one economist calculates it backstops up to $125 billion of a $500 billion financing program with Wall Street firms.
黄仁勋或许亲手搭建了这座金融大厦,但在丑闻爆发之前,裂缝就已经显现。到8月,英伟达正在就数十亿美元的担保进行谈判,对象是那些无力直接购买其硬件的买家。英伟达前首席财务官、现任临时首席执行官科莱特·克雷斯将英伟达对OpenAI的初始承诺减半,并于当月晚些时候暂停了对云运营商的某些信贷支持。
Huang may have personally assembled this financial edifice, but the fractures were showing before the scandal broke. By August, Nvidia was negotiating billions in guarantees for buyers unable to afford its hardware outright. Colette Kress, Nvidia former finance chief and now interim CEO, halved Nvidia's initial commitment to OpenAI, and late that month the firm paused certain credit backstops for cloud operators.
没有黄仁勋,规模较小的“新云”运营商可能面临痛苦的清算。英伟达的支持被广泛视为一种对冲,以防被其最大客户所俘获——这些超大规模云厂商包括微软、亚马逊和谷歌,合计约占其营收的一半。像CoreWeave这样负债沉重的新云公司依赖一位庇护者,而英伟达持有CoreWeave 7%的股份,黄仁勋是它们最大的支持者之一。
Without Huang, smaller “neocloud” operators could face a painful reckoning. Nvidia's backing was widely seen as a hedge against capture by its largest customers—hyperscalers such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, which together account for about half its revenue. Heavily indebted neoclouds such as CoreWeave, in which Nvidia holds a 7% stake, depend on a patron, and Huang was among their biggest champions.
如今,黄仁勋最响亮的辩护者就身处这张网中。截至6月30日的公开文件显示,英伟达是格斯特纳的Altimeter最大持仓,同时配有约6亿美元的CoreWeave。贝克的Atreides也同时持有这两家公司,此外还持有SpaceX的主导性股份——约占其报告投资组合的三分之一。反过来,英伟达在6月持有SpaceX 210亿美元的股份,而马斯克的公司是英伟达芯片的大买家。
Now, Huang’s loudest defenders sit in that web. Public filings as of June 30 show Nvidia as the largest holding at Gerstner’s Altimeter, paired with roughly $600 million of CoreWeave. Baker’s Atreides owned both names too, alongside a dominant stake—roughly a third of its reported portfolio—in SpaceX. Nvidia, in turn, held a $21 billion stake in SpaceX in June, and Musk’s company is a major buyer of Nvidia's chips.
当然,财务上的利益关系并不自动意味着这些投资者错了,但读者理应把他们诉诸正当程序的呼吁,与他们在保持融资水龙头敞开方面的利益放在一起权衡。“其中许多交易是与黄仁勋握个手就达成的,”马斯克在社交媒体上警告说。依赖一个人握手达成的供应协议,会让一家企业的稳健程度完全取决于这个人的判断力。
Of course, financial exposure does not automatically make these investors wrong, but readers deserve to weigh their appeals to due process beside their stake in keeping the financing spigot open. “Many of those deals were a handshake with Jensen,” Musk warned over social media. Supply deals that hang on one man’s handshake leave an enterprise only as sound as his judgment.
让英伟达董事会履行其职责。其次,还有一种说法是黄仁勋成了政治打击的受害者。特朗普总统周一让混乱进一步加剧,他在谈到黄仁勋时对记者说,“没有人证明她是间谍”,并且国家安全“没有受到威胁”,尽管他自己的国务卿马尔科·卢比奥据报道负责一份警告她是间谍的备忘录。无论如何,英伟达董事们的行动依据更为坚实——黄仁勋向董事会作出的保证显然不实。
Let Nvidia's board do its job Then, there is the claim that Huang fell victim to a political hit. President Trump added to the confusion on Monday, telling reporters that “nobody’s proven that she’s a spy,” in reference to Alice Huang, and that national security “was not put at risk,” despite his own secretary of state, Marco Rubio, reportedly overseeing a memo warning that she was one. Regardless, Nvidia's directors acted on firmer ground—Huang’s assurances to the board clearly seem to have been false.
安杜里尔创始人帕尔默·拉基提出的战斗口号同样没有说服力:“中国想让詹森下台,所以我想让他留任。”实际上,中国希望黄仁勋留任。诚然,北京的安全机构限制英伟达的采购以偏向华为,但无论北京的产业规划者想要什么,中国的AI公司想要黄仁勋的芯片,并且得到了。包括卢比奥和斯科特·贝森特在内的政府鹰派人士施压,要求执行黄仁勋游说放松的那些限制。
No more persuasive is the rallying cry offered by Anduril founder Palmer Luckey: “China wants Jensen out, so I want him in.”In reality, China wanted Huang to stay in. True, Beijing’s security agencies curbed Nvidia purchases to favor Huawei, but whatever Beijing’s industrial planners may have wanted, China’s AI companies wanted Huang’s chips, and got them. Administration hawks, including Rubio and Scott Bessent, pressed to enforce the very restrictions Huang lobbied to loosen.
《华盛顿邮报》查阅的财务披露显示,截至8月底,特朗普持有英伟达股票价值在1300万至6200万美元之间,高于2024年底的61.5万至130万美元,而在此期间,其政府允许该公司在中国销售先进芯片。白宫对《邮报》表示,独立管理人负责打理他的投资组合。尽管如此,制定美国芯片政策的人与从中获利的人存在令人不安的重叠。
Financial disclosures reviewed by the Washington Post suggest Trump held between $13 million and $62 million in Nvidia stock at the end of August, up from $615,000 to $1.3 million at the end of 2024, a period when his administration let the company sell advanced chips in China. The White House told The Post that independent managers handle his portfolio. Still, the people setting America’s chip policy and those profiting from it overlap uncomfortably.
黄仁勋的辩护者退而求其次,诉诸一种相关的宿命论,称华盛顿别无选择,只能继续向中国出售先进处理器以换取稀土。然而,美国在这些矿产上对中国的依赖并没有人们通常想象的那么大。美国缺少的是持续投资来开采和加工这些矿产。一项行业估计认为,建立从矿山到磁体的国内供应链需要数百亿美元,随着时间推移将升至1000亿美元。相比英伟达自10月峰值以来蒸发的1.9万亿美元市值——约为这一最高数字的20倍——建设国内产能看起来代价低廉。
Huang’s defenders fall back on a related fatalism, arguing Washington had no choice except to keep selling advanced processors to China in exchange for rare earths. However, America depends less on China for these minerals than commonly imagined. What it lacks is sustained investment to extract and process them. One industry estimate puts a domestic mine-to-magnet supply chain at tens of billions of dollars, rising toward $100 billion over time. Against the $1.9 trillion erased from Nvidia's market value since its October peak, roughly 20 times that top figure, building domestic capacity looks cheap.
一个可以被请愿推翻的董事会毫无作用。英伟达的董事们多年来对黄仁勋言听计从,干预得太晚,如今在外部压力下改弦更张,只会延续唯命是从的惯性。相反,董事会应当让其调查完成,恢复单独披露新加坡营收,并择优选出继任者。黄仁勋花了33年打造了一家AI时代不可或缺的企业。现在,一家伟大公司面临决定性考验——它能否比缔造它的人存续得更久。
A board that can be overruled by a petition has no function. Nvidia's directors deferred to Huang for years and intervened late, and reversing course under outside pressure now would merely extend a habit of deference. Instead, the board should let its investigation finish, restore standalone Singapore revenue disclosures, and select a successor on the merits. Huang spent 33 years building an enterprise the AI era cannot do without. Now comes the defining test of a great company—whether it can outlast the person who built it.
从卡尔·马克思到约瑟夫·熊彼特,各种政治派别的经济学家都曾主张,资本主义的贪婪本性会导致其自身灭亡。迄今为止,历史证明他们错了。
Economists across the political spectrum, from Karl Marx to Joseph Schumpeter, have argued that the rapacious nature of capitalism leads to its own demise. History has proven them wrong so far.