
扎克海姆曾在众议院军事委员会担任工作人员,当时他三十多岁。他曾试图寻找一本专门讲述罗纳德·里根国防建设的书,但找不到。
Zakheim was a 30-something staff member at the House Armed Services Committee when he went looking for a book expressly on Ronald Reagan's defense buildup. He couldn't find one.
因此,现任里根研究所所长的扎克海姆最终决定自己写这本书。《以强制胜:里根的军事建设如何赢得冷战》一书考证详实,将吸引那些想重温战略武器限制谈判、“星球大战”计划,以及时任国防部长卡斯帕·温伯格与时任众议长蒂普·奥尼尔之间冲突等往事的读者。
So Zakheim, now the director of the Ronald Reagan Institute, eventually decided to write the book himself. "Peace through Strength: How Reagan's Military Buildup Won The Cold War" is deeply researched and will appeal to those who want to relive tales of SALT, "Star Wars" and the clashes between then-Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and then-Speaker Tip O’Neill.
然而,扎克海姆的新书不仅仅是一次对80年代典故的浅尝辄止。这是一份面向未来的论证。里根1976年和1980年竞选期间共和党内部关于外交政策的辩论,在今天依然回响。随着共和党开始考虑特朗普总统之后的未来,像扎克海姆这样的里根主义者已经在为为什么共和党应保持其国际主义灵魂奠定基础。
Zakheim's book, which is out this week, is more than just a dip into '80s lore, however. It's an argument for the future. The intra-Republican debates over foreign policy, both in Reagan's 1976 and 1980 campaigns, echo today. And as the party begins to consider a future beyond President Donald Trump, Reaganites like Zakheim are already laying the ground for why the GOP should retain its internationalist soul.
您前几天在X上发文,提到1986年中期选举与我们本月刚刚经历的美国中期选举有相似之处。您认为它们为何相似?您对白宫的反应有何建议?
You wrote something the other day on X about the echoes of the 1986 midterms and the midterms that we just had here this month in America. Why do you think they’re similar, and what’s your advice for the White House as to what their reaction should be?
听着,这完全是——正如JMart预测的那样——这是一场蓝色浪潮、海啸,无论我们如何形容。因此,人们回过头来问:“历史上的类比是什么?”我喜欢寻找历史类比,以更好地了解我们可以预期什么、应如何应对未来,大家都指向1974年。那里的失利相似,但没人关注1986年。
Well, listen, it was total — as JMart predicted, right? — this was the blue wave, tidal wave, however we’re going to characterize it. And so, people were going back saying, "Hey, what’s the historical analogy?" I like to look at historical analogies to get a better sense of what we can expect and how we should approach the future, and everybody pointed to 1974. The losses there were similar, but nobody looked at 1986.
如果看数字,当时参议院民主党占 55 个席位,众议院民主党占 258 个席位。这与 2026 年的局面有着惊人的相似。不仅数字相似,反应的差异也很大。1974 年是水门事件时期,充满自我怀疑和颓废,共和党迷失方向。而 1986 年发生了什么?里根绝没有在那种压力下屈服。中期选举后,他去见竞选团队,对他们说:“听着,‘以实力求和平’不仅是一项政策,更是我们要兑现给美国人民的承诺。我们将继续坚持追求。”他坚持了我认为是他第一、二届政府执政纲领的核心主张。
If you look at the numbers, it was 55 seats for Democrats in the Senate and [258] seats for Democrats in the House. It’s eerily similar to what we have in 2026. And it’s not just that the numbers are similar; it’s the difference in response. In 1974, that’s the Watergate era of self-doubt and malaise, where Republicans are lost. What happens in ’86? Reagan in no way buckles under that pressure. After the midterms, he goes and speaks to his campaign staff. He says to them, "Listen, peace through strength is more than a policy. It’s a promise we’re going to keep to the American people. We’re going to continue to pursue it." He stuck with what I argue is the governing thesis of his first and second administrations.
两年后发生了什么?1988 年 12 月 7 日,戈尔巴乔夫来到纽约联合国大会,宣布将单方面撤回红军。从政策角度看,里根承诺的胜利在两年内开始显现。政治上呢?随后迎来了老布什当总统。
And then within two years, what happens? On Dec. 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev comes to the U.N. General Assembly in New York City and announces that he’s going to unilaterally roll back the Red Army. Within two years, from the policy perspective, the win that Reagan promised actually begins to occur. And then what happens politically? You get George H.W. Bush as the next president.
那么今天的对应情况是什么?你假设里根在 1986 年后坚持立场,继续推进军备建设,最终取得良好结果。今天的对应做法——是坚持对伊朗开战吗?
So what’s the equivalent today? You posit that Reagan after ’86 stuck to his guns, still pursued the defense buildup and ultimately got a good result. What’s the equivalent today — sticking with the Iran war?
是取得决定性胜利。我个人认为,伊朗战争确实影响了中期选举,因为油价高企,且我们没有开展能实现决定性结果的军事行动。曾有 39 天的“史诗之怒”武装冲突和 139 天的外交斡旋。如果我们反过来呢?那么,对伊朗的决定性胜利是什么样子的?
Winning decisively, yeah. My own view is that, yes, the Iran war impacted the midterms, of course, because oil prices were high and because we didn’t pursue a military campaign that could realize a decisive outcome. There were 39 days of armed conflict with Epic Fury and 139 days of diplomacy. What happens if we flip that? So what does a decisive victory look like on Iran?
是政权垮台——或加速该政权的垮台。在我看来,特朗普政府真正摧毁核基础设施,其自然结果就是如此。特朗普的目标始终如一,今天依然如此:伊朗不得拥有核武器。所以您支持额外的军事打击?
The regime crumbling — or accelerating the crumbling of that regime. To me, that is the natural result of the Trump administration really taking out the nuclear infrastructure. Trump’s goal, stated throughout and stated today, is that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon. So you would support additional military strikes?
绝对支持。是的,我会支持——以削弱他们的能力。我认为他们感受到的压力还不够,而且他们当然仍然掌权。
Absolutely. Yes, I would — to take on their capacity. I don’t think they’ve felt enough pressure, and certainly they are still in power.
我也认为还有整个里根主义;在军事上还能做更多。当你听[美国]中央司令部的[布拉德·]库珀上将讲话时,他谈到过行动是如何被叫停的。我不装作了解秘密行动的情况,但想想你拥有的“史诗之怒”和“午夜之锤”行动的机会。他们的边境从未如此松动,领空从未如此敞开,我们还能做更多来推动局势。我认为政权正在崩塌;我只是认为我们需要做得更多来加速这一进程。
I would also think there is the overall Reagan Doctrine; there’s more that can be done militarily. When you listen to Admiral [Brad] Cooper from [United States Central Command], he’s talked about how it was cut short. I don’t pretend to know what’s going on in terms of covert operations, but think about the opportunity you have with Epic Fury and Midnight Hammer. Their borders have never been more porous, the skies have never been more open, and there’s a lot more we could do to drive this. I think the regime is crumbling; I just think we need to do even more to accelerate it.
今天也有报道称,副总统万斯想重启与伊朗人的面对面谈判。这是个坏主意吗?
There are also reports today that Vice President JD Vance wants to restart in-person negotiations with the Iranians. Is that a bad idea?
嗯,里根曾与戈尔巴乔夫谈判。我们现在回看戈尔巴乔夫,会想:“哇,这位先生愿意与西方谈判,基本上主持了共产主义的终结。”他们当时不知道这一点。在他们的认知里,戈尔巴乔夫可能和他之前的每一位总理一样。撒切尔认为戈尔巴乔夫有一些希望。
Well, Reagan negotiated with Gorbachev. We think about Gorbachev now from the standpoint of, "Wow, here is this man who was willing to negotiate with the West and basically preside over the end of communism." They didn’t know that then. In their mind, Gorbachev could be like every premier before him. Thatcher thought there was some promise in Gorbachev.
关键在于:谈判时你在做什么?你如何谈判?以及你是否在谈判的同时施加压力?书中的一个章节探讨了如何使用武力的辩论——温伯格主义与舒尔茨主义。里根真正倾向于[乔治·]舒尔茨。区别是什么?
Here’s the key point: What are you doing when you negotiate? How are you negotiating? And are you putting on the pressure in parallel with negotiations? One of the chapters in the book talks about the debate over how to use force — the Weinberger Doctrine vs. the Shultz Doctrine. Reagan really leaned more toward [George] Shultz. What was the difference?
温伯格主张压倒性地使用军事力量——我总体上赞同这一点——但他警惕将其作为外交工具。舒尔茨非常强调,他希望军队成为外交工具,施加压力以配合谈判达成有利于美国的结果。那是舒尔茨的看法,我认为现在也需要其中一些思路。
Weinberger wanted overpowering use of military force — which I generally to — but he was wary of using it as a tool for diplomacy. Shultz very much emphasized that he wanted the military to be a tool for diplomacy, applying that pressure to complement an outcome that favored the United States in negotiations. That was Shultz’s outlook, and I think some of that is what’s needed here, too.
你列举了里根国防建设时期上马的所有武器系统,这勾起了人们的回忆。但你也指出,它们已过保质期,现在需要新一轮国防建设。
You outline all the weapons that came online with the Reagan defense buildup, which brings back memories for people. But you also say that they’ve outlived their shelf life, and that there is now a need for a new defense buildup.
考虑到伊拉克、阿富汗、国内的厌战情绪、现在的伊朗、我们面临的赤字,以及两党当下的民粹主义都要求增加国内开支——一种“美国回家吧”的感觉——这真的在牌局中吗?感觉在某些方面,今天的挑战甚至比里根面临的更深刻。
Is that really in the cards given Iraq, Afghanistan, the exhaustion in this country, now Iran, the deficit we’re facing and the populism of the moment in both parties demanding more spending at home — sort of a "come home, America" feeling? It feels like in some ways today, the challenge is even more profound than what Reagan faced.
我不知道是不是更深刻——它是不同的。我们面临的安全威胁和挑战更深刻,因为中国的崛起,加上非国家行为体,加上伊朗、朝鲜,以及俄罗斯的战争机器,正在花费其经济的40%。我们现在面临多个战区的威胁,所以我认为对实力的需求与里根时代一样强烈,甚至更强。
I don’t know about more profound — it’s different. The security threats and challenges we face are more profound because of the rise of China, plus nonstate actors, plus Iran, plus North Korea and the Russian war machine, which is spending 40% of its economy. We have multiple theater threats right now, so I think the case for needing strength is as strong, if not stronger, than in Reagan’s day.
里根在经济上也很困难。利率高达14%,赤字和债务不断上升。与现在相比规模很小——2000亿美元——但当时他们为此惊慌失措。如果你设身处地想一想当时的情况,看起来相当困难。
Reagan had it pretty difficult economically. Interest rates were 14%, and you had a rising deficit and debt. It looks small in comparison — $200 billion — but they were freaking out over it. If you put yourself in the mindset of what was going on then, it looked pretty difficult.
这本书的教训就在于此,这也是我在结尾处把里根与(前英国首相温斯顿)丘吉尔作对比的原因。战争打响后再扩充军力是一回事——想想(时任总统亚伯拉罕)林肯在南北战争时期,或者(时任总统富兰克林·D·罗斯福)在波兰之后的作为。里根的教训来自他这样一个人的亲身经历:他在第一次世界大战结束时长大成人,又目睹了第二次世界大战。
Here’s the lesson of the book, which is why I end it by contrasting Reagan and [former U.K. Prime Minister Winston] Churchill. It’s one thing to build up a military once the war starts — think [then-President Abraham] Lincoln in the Civil War or [then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt] after Poland. Reagan’s lesson was learned as someone who came of age at the end of World War I and saw World War II.
1986年,他对海军学院的学员说:“这次扩军至关重要,因为我一生中亲眼看到20世纪40年代有人死去,原因就是他们之前的那一代人在30年代没有投资于实力。”这本书的教训是:尽管有许多重要的参与者,但最关键的参与者是美国总统。根据宪法第二条赋予的总司令权力,必须由总统来做出投资决策。只有他能做到这一点。我们要追赶中国是不是已经太晚了?
He said to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy in 1986: "This buildup is critical because I saw in my lifetime the people who died in the 1940s because a generation before failed to invest in strength in the 1930s." And the lesson of this book is that while there are a lot of important actors, the essential actor is the president of the United States. Under Article II commander in chief authority, it is the president who has to make the decisions for investment. Only he can do that. Is it too late for us to catch up to the Chinese?
不,绝对不是。问题在于如何追赶。我们完全能够追上中国。甚至“追赶”这个说法都可能让特朗普总统不快,因为他认为我们的军队更优越——在很多方面确实如此。但就你说的这一点而言,数字不会说谎。他们的数量更多,在某些方面,质量也一样好。这正是里根当年面对苏联时的情况。
No, absolutely not. The question is how. We can absolutely catch up with the Chinese. Even that formulation might make President Trump bristle, because he believes we have a superior military — and in many respects we do. But to your point, numbers don’t lie. Their quantity is greater, and in some ways, the quality is as good. That’s what Reagan faced with the Soviet Union.
在军备竞赛中——这也是泰德·肯尼迪之流与里根团队之间的一场大辩论——重点从来不是与他们一坦克对一坦克、一战斗机对一战斗机地持平。关键在于在质量和战略上胜过他们。当时是这样,这也是我们今后面对中华人民共和国时必须做的。
In the arms race — and this was a big debate between the Ted Kennedys of the world and Reagan’s team — it was never about matching them tank for tank, fighter for fighter. It was all about outperforming them in quality and in strategy. That was true then, and that’s what we’re going to have to do with the People’s Republic of China.
以造船能力为例——他们已经超过我们,达到我们能力的200多倍。我们如何追上这一点,还是你认为我们不必追?
Take shipbuilding capacity, for example — they’ve already passed us by more than 200 times our capacity. How do we catch up with that, or do you think we don’t have to?
不,我确实认为我们需要能够做到这一点,有几点原因。他们具备相应能力,但我们仍拥有远超他们的海军,因为我们能在航母作战运用上做到的事——他们无法与之匹敌——最重要的是,他们无法与我们的水下作战能力匹敌。这是我们当前的优势,尽管趋势正如你所描述的那样。
No, I do think we need to be able to, so a couple of things. They have the capacity, but we still have a far superior navy because of what we’re able to do operationally with aircraft carriers — they can’t compete with that — and most importantly, they cannot compete with our undersea capability. That is an advantage for us today, though the trend line is what you describe.
这就是为什么我们必须做两件事。这源自里根总统的思路:这是一个“且”的关系。不是“我们要保留航母,还是转向自主系统?”,而是“保留航母,并整合自主系统”。特朗普的预算将极大推进这一点;他的1.5万亿美元预算将增加40%。现在,我知道你正看着我,心想这根本不可能通过民主党控制的国会。没错。但他要求增加40%,所以即便只实现一部分,也将影响深远。我们能在未来30年避免与中国爆发热战吗?
This is why we have to do two things. I get this from President Reagan’s approach: It’s an "and." It’s not, "do we keep carriers or go to autonomous systems?" It’s "keep the carriers and integrate autonomous systems." Trump’s budget would go a long way toward doing this; his $1.5 trillion budget would be a 40% increase. Now, I know you’re looking at me right now thinking there’s no way that gets through a Democratic Congress. Right. But he’s asking for 40% above, so if they even get partway there, it would be highly consequential. Can we avoid a hot war with the Chinese in the next 30 years?
我们可以避免任何事情。问题是,那将是一种怎样的和平——是否允许我们在社会中繁荣发展,不仅是繁荣,更是占据主导。我们这一代人——你我同龄——在这个国家享受了前所未有的和平与繁荣。鉴于中国正在进行的军力建设、其野心和触角延伸,我们将不得不竞争——而且要全力以赴地竞争。让我问你几个人。你认为万斯是里根主义者吗?他当然不推崇这一点。他可能是,但这不是他强调的重点。国务卿马尔科·鲁比奥是里根主义者吗?
We can avoid anything. The question is whether it will be the sort of peace that allows us to thrive in society — not just thrive but dominate. Our generation — you and I are in the same age group — has enjoyed unprecedented peace and prosperity in this country. With what China is doing with their buildup, their ambitions and their reach, we’re going to need to compete — and compete hard. Let me ask you about a couple of people. Do you think Vance is a Reaganite? He certainly doesn’t advance it. He may be, but that’s not what he’s emphasizing. Is Secretary of State Marco Rubio a Reaganite?
马尔科·鲁比奥大谈自由,而对里根来说,自由就是一切。里根称他的军力建设为“以实力求和平”,并说军队是危险世界中自由的庇护之臂。鲁比奥的表述正是这种方式。
Marco Rubio talks about freedom a lot, and for Reagan, freedom was everything. Reagan called his military buildup "peace through strength," and he said that the military was the sheltering arm of freedom in a dangerous world. That’s the way Rubio talks.
里根时代之后很长一段时间里,关于共和党的国家安全观及美国在世界上的角色,实际上不存在什么争论。他们主张在海外投射力量,发挥领导作用。我们大家过去对该党的立场和主张所抱有的那些预设,现在似乎都变得扑朔迷离。关于该党在国家安全上将成为什么样的政党——是干预主义还是孤立主义——似乎确实存在一场真正的辩论。这场辩论将在2028年拉开帷幕,并在2030年代展开。
For a long time after Reagan, there was really no debate about the Republican Party’s view of national security and America’s role in the world. They wanted to project force abroad and take a leadership role. Those assumptions that all of us had about what the party was and what it stood for do seem to be up in the air now. There seems to be a real debate about what kind of party this is going to be on national security — whether it’s going to be an interventionist party or an isolationist party. That debate will start in ’28 and play out in the 2030s.
我不会用你刚才那种方式——孤立主义对干预主义——来界定这件事。情况比那更微妙。“以实力求和平”根本上关乎我们如何摆姿态,以便不必成为干预主义者——以便在不诉诸战斗的情况下实现我们所需的稳定与安全。这就是其核心所在。
I wouldn’t frame it the way you just did — isolationist vs. interventionist. It’s more nuanced than that. Peace through strength is fundamentally about how we posture ourselves so we don’t have to be interventionists — so we can realize the stability and security we need without combat. That’s what it’s about.
左派和右派人士的担忧是:“以实力求和平”行得通吗,还是实力只会把我们拖入无休止的战争?两党总统都曾那样谈论过。我认为,特朗普总统是里根总统以来首位以“以实力求和平”为竞选平台的总统,这是非常积极的,因为这表明实力能威慑对手。对里根总统而言,这是一个能跨越“更克制还是更投入世界”分歧的公式。它具有足够的可塑性和包容性,让所有派系都能在这面旗帜下感到自在。
The concern from people on the left and on the right is: Is peace through strength viable, or does strength simply lead us into endless wars? We’ve had presidents in both parties talk about it that way. I think it’s very positive that President Trump is the first president to run on a peace through strength platform since President Reagan, because it says that strength deters adversaries. That was a formula for President Reagan that bridged divides over whether to be more restrained or more engaged in the world. It’s malleable and comprehensive enough that all factions can feel comfortable under that banner.
嗯,你会说伊拉克、阿富汗,以及现在伊朗的起诉和结局,给里根主义事业制造了麻烦。
Well, you would say that the prosecution and outcome of Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran have created difficulties for the Reaganite cause.
伊拉克和阿富汗确实制造了困难,因为“伊拉克综合征”,就像里根面对“越战综合征”一样——这种观念认为我们赢不了,或者我们的军队不值得支持。里根所做的,以及特朗普总统试图做的,是让美国民众和我们的对手明白:我们会赢。
Iraq and Afghanistan have absolutely created difficulty because of the Iraq syndrome, just like Reagan was dealing with the Vietnam syndrome — this notion that we can’t win, or that our military isn’t worthy of support. What Reagan did and what President Trump is trying to do is make the American people and our adversaries understand that we will win.
我还没准备好给伊朗问题画上句号。你的语气听起来像是认定这是一场失败,但我认为从结构上讲,特朗普总统所做的事情将让美国变得更强大、更安全,实际上也让我们在应对面临的挑战时拥有更多选择余地。我们现在离具体细节太近了;从结构上讲,我们已经严重削弱了一个做了许多有害事情的政权。确实感觉里根共识在共和党国防政策的底层默认立场上已近尾声。
I’m not ready to close the book on Iran. Your tone suggests it’s a loss, but I think structurally, President Trump has done something that is going to make America much stronger and safer, and actually give us more optionality in dealing with the challenges we face. We’re too close to the details right now; structurally, we have severely weakened a regime that was doing a lot of harmful things. It does feel like the Reagan consensus is sort of at an end in terms of the underlying default position of the Republican Party on defense.
感觉我们回到了1976年,而在2028年——或者可能是2032年,因为2028年可能只是又一场特朗普的竞选——在两次初选中的某一次,我们将重演1976年的对决:杰拉尔德·福特对里根。福特、亨利·基辛格和缓和政策对里根。
It feels like we’ve gone back to 1976, and that in 2028 — or maybe 2032, because 2028 may just be one more Trump race — in one of those two primaries, we’re going to have ’76 all over again: Gerald Ford vs. Reagan. Ford, Henry Kissinger and détente vs. Reagan.
完全正确。这正在到来。有新里根主义者——或者叫纯正里根主义者——和新缓和主义者。你提到1976年,这是个绝佳的参照,因为当年里根竞选总统并挑战福特时,他挑战的就是缓和政策。竞选期间,福特随后告诉他的幕僚,“你们不能使用‘缓和’这个词。”所以这产生了影响,正如你所知,这是里根提出的外交政策道德纲领。
Absolutely. That’s coming. There are neo-Reaganites — or say, pure Reaganites — and neo-détentists. You reference ’76, and it’s a great reference because when Reagan ran for president and challenged Ford, he challenged détente. Ford after that told his staff during the campaign, "You can’t use the word détente." So it made an impact, and it was the morality in foreign policy plank that Reagan brought forward, as you know.
这是一个拥有许多不同阵营的政党,你会看到这场辩论。我们在里根研究所做过这方面的民调。里根非常重视信任“我们人民”,并深信美国人民渴望胜利,他们乐观向上,认为只要我们制定不预设我们局限性的政策——而缓和政策从根本上就是这么做的——美国就能做到。美国人民总体上支持参与世界事务、支持强大的国防、以及维持一支前沿部署、维护我们利益的军队。所有这些都非常受欢迎。
It’s a party with lots of different camps, and you have that debate. We do polling on this at the Reagan Institute. Reagan was big on trusting "we the people" and believed deeply that the American people wanted to win, that they were optimistic and that America could do it if we put policies in place that didn’t predetermine our limitations — which détente fundamentally did. And the American people generally are supportive of engaging in the world, backing a strong national defense, and maintaining a military that’s forward-present and protecting our interests. All these things are very popular.
万斯基本上站在福特阵营。2028年可能不会有这场辩论,但这场辩论正在为你们的党而来。
Vance is basically in the Ford camp. There may not be this debate in ’28, but this debate is coming for your party.
不过,还有一场更深层的辩论:美国是一个理想,还是基本上是一个族群国家?如今,你听到民主党人引用里根的告别演说,比听到共和党人引用的还要多。
There’s a deeper debate, though, which is: Is America an ideal, or is America a sort of ethnic state, basically? And you hear a lot more Democrats today citing Reagan’s final speech than you do Republicans.
是的,我不同意你的看法。我不觉得民主党人还在引用他。我在国会山待的时间很多,也花很多时间跟州长以及保守派阵营的其他人交谈。他们都热爱里根,都在谈论里根。这从特朗普总统身上就能看出来。看看特朗普总统谈论“让美国再次伟大”时,身后站着谁——正如你所知,“让美国再次伟大”这句口号源自里根。在椭圆形办公室里,特朗普总统身后就是里根总统的画像。所以我认为,情况并没有你所说的那么分裂,或者均等分裂。我真的认为我们仍处于多数派地位。我们的民调显示是这样。
Yeah, I disagree with you. I don’t see Democrats quoting him anymore. I spend a lot of time on Capitol Hill, and I spend a lot of time talking to governors and other people involved in the conservative camp. They all love Reagan; they all talk about Reagan. It starts with President Trump right now. Look who’s over President Trump’s shoulder when he’s talking about MAGA — as you know, "Make America Great Again" came from Reagan. Over the shoulder of President Trump in the Oval Office is President Reagan. So I don’t think it’s as divided or evenly divided as you’re suggesting. I really think we’re still in the majority. Our polling shows that.
如果万斯在2028年成为提名人,情况也是这样吗?还是说这是一个“等待福特”的时刻?
Is that the case if Vance is the nominee in 2028, though, or is that a waiting-for-Ford moment?
我认为,副总统万斯——就像任何寻求提名的人一样——需要一个持久的联盟。从特朗普总统以下,联盟中有许多人认同里根总统所代表的东西,无论是“以实力求和平”、取胜,还是谈论自由。毫无疑问,关于政府角色存在辩论。对里根而言,政府是问题,不是解决方案,当然有一批保守派正在对这一点提出异议和挑战。好吧,这没问题——这些是值得进行的辩论。但这个品牌相当强劲,人们喜欢它。里根主义品牌?是的,而且很明显,总统也喜欢。
I think Vice President Vance — like anybody seeking the nomination — needs a durable coalition. From President Trump on down, there are many in that coalition who like what President Reagan stood for, whether it’s peace through strength, winning, or talking about freedom. Now, there’s a debate over the role of government, no doubt. For Reagan, government was the problem, not the solution, and certainly there are a bunch of conservatives out there who are contesting and challenging that. All right, that’s fine — these are debates worth having. But the brand is pretty strong, and people like it. The Reaganite brand? Yeah, and it’s clear that the president does too.
你认为,如果我们坐在这里,是五年后还是十年后,共和党会更接近罗纳德·里根的版本,还是更接近德国的“选择党”或法国的“国民联盟”?还是说这属于真正的不确定性,将在未来几年得到诉诸法庭般的检验?
Do you think if we were sitting here five years from now or 10 years from now, the Republican Party would look closer to the Ronald Reagan version than the AfD of Germany or the National Rally of France? Or is that a matter of real uncertainty that’s going to be litigated in the years to come?
我看不出它会走德国选择党(AfD)的路子。我真不这么认为。那是个边缘政党——它在德国确实赢得了一些地盘,但仍属边缘政党。民粹主义冲动依然存在,没错,但请记住:帕特·布坎南(Pat Buchanan)从未当选美国总统。我们的民调显示,布坎南那套主张在党内顶多只能得到 15% 到 20% 的支持。
I don’t see it going the way of the AfD. I really don’t. That’s a marginal party — it’s making some ground in Germany, but it’s still a fringe party. You still have these populist impulses, sure, but let’s remember: Pat Buchanan was not president of the United States. Our polling shows that the Buchanan outlook is, at best, 15 to 20% of the party.
我知道共和党人、保守派和美国人能够支持的是什么:个人自由、经济机会、以实力求和平、美国自豪感,以及自由与民主。这些原则对保守派——我认为对所有美国人——今天依然像几十年前一样持久、崇高且极具激励力。它们是共和国的核心。
Here’s what I know Republicans can get behind, conservatives can get behind and Americans can get behind: individual liberty, economic opportunity, peace through strength, American pride, and freedom and democracy. Those things are as durable, as ennobling, and as motivating for conservatives — and I think all Americans — today as they were decades ago. They’re the heart of the Republic.
关于我们在欧洲的军事姿态,我们是否应该在欧洲保持强有力的驻军存在?100%。存在即威慑。
On our posture in Europe, should we have a robust troop presence in Europe? 100%. Presence deters.
小布什(布什 43)政府时期我在武装力量委员会工作,先后有多位欧洲盟军最高司令进来汇报:“我们可以将驻军从 8 个旅级战斗群削减到 4 个,再从 4 个削减到 2 个。”他们不断称之为“可控风险”。可控风险?可控给谁?给弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)。驻军削减与普京的所有冒险行径之间,界限分明。
I worked on the Armed Services Committee during the Bush administration, Bush 43, and had successive European supreme commanders coming in and saying: "We can reduce our presence from eight brigade combat teams to four. Then from four to two." And they kept on referring to it as "manageable risk." It was manageable risk. You know for who? Fricking Vladimir Putin. You can draw the line between reduction of presence and all of Putin's escapades.
对我来说非常清楚:北约的存在、美国的前沿部署就是威慑。它不会招致武装冲突,反而能以非常实质的方式推进我们的利益。我有个坏消息告诉你:你进不了万斯(Vance)总统的内阁。你知道,人是会变的。
It is very clear to me that NATO presence, U.S.-forward presence is a deterrent. It doesn't invite armed conflict. And it advances our interests in very meaningful ways. I have bad news for you: You are not going to have a slot in President Vance's Cabinet. You know, people change.