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10月7日如何改变了黎巴嫩和真主党的政治现实How October 7 changed Lebanon and Hezbollah’s political reality

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真主党于10月8日决定参战,导致其长期领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉及其继任者哈希姆·萨菲丁以及大部分军事领导层被暗杀,并改变了黎巴嫩的政治现实[文件:法新社]Hezbollah's decision to enter the war on October 8 led to the assassinations of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah and his successor Hashem Safieddine, along with much of its military leadership, and changed the political reality in Lebanon [File: AFP]

在2023年10月7日对以色列的袭击以及随之而来的以色列对加沙的种族灭绝战争开始后一天,真主党决定加入战争,声称是为了支持巴勒斯坦人民。分析人士表示,这一决定永远改变了黎巴嫩的政治格局。

A day after the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the beginning of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, Hezbollah made the decision to join the war, in what it said was support of the Palestinian people. It is a decision that analysts say has forever shaped Lebanese politics.

专家指出,该组织低估了以色列在战争前的情报渗透深度,后者在2024年9月的血腥分页攻击以及暗杀包括秘书长哈桑·纳斯鲁拉在内的大部分真主党领导层中得以显现。

Experts said the group had underestimated the depth of Israel’s intelligence penetration in the run-up to the war, which later manifested in the bloody September 2024 pager attack and the assassination of much of Hezbollah’s leadership including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

“大卫·布兰福德(Nicholas Blanford),大西洋理事会的非驻地高级研究员、真主党专题书籍作者,在接受半岛电视台采访时说:‘真主党被卷入了一个漩涡,最终导致其领导层被斩首,南黎巴嫩被入侵。’这对真主党的民众支持造成了重大打击,并促成了约瑟夫·阿翁当选总统以及组建了对该组织采取更强硬立场的新政府。”

“Hezbollah got sucked into a vortex which culminated in the decapitation of their leadership and the invasion of south Lebanon,” Nicholas Blanford, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of a book about Hezbollah, told Al Jazeera. “That dealt Hezbollah a major blow to their popular standing and galvanised the election of Joseph Aoun as president and the formation of a new government that took a much stronger line against [the group].”

真主党的决定使其在政治上受到削弱。虽然分析人士认为该组织并未被击败,尽管一些批评者声称相反,但它已不再是黎巴嫩曾经的政治或军事霸主。‘一连串的事件’在10月7日之前,真主党——代表黎巴嫩庞大什叶派社区的组织——是该国内最强大的政治和军事力量。这个得到伊朗支持的组织的影响力遍及整个地区。真主党是叙利亚阿萨德政权的重要盟友,帮助其从反阿萨德的反对派手中夺回领土。它还与伊拉克、也门等地的盟友保持联系。

Hezbollah’s decisions have left the group politically weakened. And while analysts say the group has not been defeated, despite claims to the contrary from some critics, it is no longer the political or military hegemon in Lebanon it once was. ‘A motion of events’Before October 7, Hezbollah – a group representing Lebanon’s large Shia community – was the strongest political and military actor inside the country. The Iranian-backed group’s influence stretched across the region. Hezbollah was a key ally of the al-Assad regime in Syria and helped it retake territory from anti-Assad opposition groups. It also had connections with allies in places such as Iraq and Yemen.

真主党在黎巴嫩拥有关键的选举影响力,它经常利用这种影响力来组建或推翻政府。该组织也不排斥派遣支持者对抗反对它的运动。例如,2019年,其支持者在贝鲁特街头采取行动,击退了要求对该国教派制度进行政治改革的抗议者。自1990年黎巴嫩长达15年的内战结束以来,真主党已成为这一体系中的关键角色。

Hezbollah had key electoral influence in Lebanon, where it often wielded its power to elect or collapse governments. It was also not against deploying its supporters against movements opposed to it, as in 2019 when they took to the streets of Beirut to beat back protesters calling for political reform of the country’s sectarian system, in which Hezbollah has become a key player in the years since the end of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war in 1990.

2023年10月之前的几个月里,真主党的自信展露无遗。布兰福德指出了一些例子,例如真主党在黎巴嫩南部举行的军事演习,以及该组织在舍巴阿农场搭建帐篷——这片土地被黎巴嫩视为被以色列占领的领土。

In the months leading up to October 2023, Hezbollah’s confidence was on clear display. Blanford pointed to examples such as a military parade in south Lebanon conducted by Hezbollah, and the group erecting tents in the Shebaa Farms – on territory that Lebanon considers occupied by Israel.

当时,以色列正陷入抗议浪潮之中,而纳斯鲁拉则发表演讲,预言以色列即将覆灭。2023年10月8日,黎巴嫩决定加入对抗以色列的战斗,这场战争后来被称为“支持战争”。

At the time, Israel was roiled by protests, and Nasrallah was delivering speeches predicting the imminent doom of Israel. The decision to join the fight against Israel in what became known in Lebanon as the War of Support came on October 8, 2023.

“10月7日引发了一系列事件,而黎巴嫩的政治体系并未做好妥善应对的准备,”来自黎巴嫩南部纳巴蒂耶的政治分析人士贾德·迪拉蒂对半岛电视台说道。“10月8日,真主党完全单方面地宣布支持加沙,既没有经过内阁决议或政府共识,甚至也没有顾及那些深受这些行动影响的南部地区民众的立场。”

“October 7 set in motion a chain of events that Lebanon’s political system was not properly prepared to manage,” Jad Dilati, a political analyst from Nabatieh in southern Lebanon, told Al Jazeera. “Hezbollah opened its support front for Gaza on October 8 completely unilaterally, without any cabinet decision or governmental consensus or even taking into account the positions of the southern [Lebanese] residents who were most affected and still are most affected by these actions.”

“10月8日,真主党宣布支持加沙,当时它确实以为自己处于强势地位,”迪拉蒂补充道。“多年来,真主党一直在发展精准导弹技术、修建复杂的地下隧道网络,还宣称其导弹能够击中特拉维夫的每一栋建筑。正因如此,南部地区的多数民众都以为真主党确实具备强大的实力。”在随后的11个月里,以色列与真主党互相发动攻击,不过以色列的打击频率是真主党的五倍以上。数万名黎巴嫩南部和以色列北部的居民被迫逃离家园。

“Hezbollah opened the support front on October 8, genuinely believing that it was operating from a position of strength,” Dilati said. “Most of the South believed that Hezbollah was operating from a position of strength after it had spent years building precision missile capabilities, an elaborate tunnel network and these missiles that we were told can hit every building in Tel Aviv.”Israel’s re-invasion For the next 11 months, Israel and Hezbollah traded attacks, albeit with Israel hitting Lebanon more than five times for every Hezbollah attack. Tens of thousands from southern Lebanon and northern Israel fled their homes.

然而2024年9月,以色列单方面加大攻击力度。以色列发动的袭击迅速且猛烈,仅9月23一天就有近500人丧生。据媒体报道,黎巴嫩官员称当时纳斯鲁拉已同意停火,但以色列随即下令暗杀他,并命令对贝鲁特南部郊区的部分区域实施疏散。“就在纳斯鲁拉同意停火之际,以色列仍在发动攻势,根本无意恢复此前的状态,”布兰福德说道。

But in September 2024, Israel unilaterally intensified attacks. The Israeli-induced carnage came quickly and heavily, with nearly 500 people killed on September 23 alone When Nasrallah was said to have accepted a ceasefire – according to Lebanese officials quoted in media reports – Israel ordered his assassination and the evacuation of areas of Beirut’s southern suburbs“When Nasrallah was amenable to a ceasefire, Israel was on the offensive and wasn’t going to return to the previous status quo,” Blanford said.

2024年10月,以色列入侵黎巴嫩南部,并在11月达成停火协议后仍驻扎在黎巴嫩领土上超过两个月。尽管已停火,以色列仍继续摧毁黎巴嫩南部的房屋和基础设施,并拒绝从黎巴嫩领土上的五个地点撤军。在邻国叙利亚,2024年12月阿萨德政权的垮台也对该组织造成了沉重打击,因为其从伊朗获取武器和资金的地面路线被切断。

Israel invaded southern Lebanon in October 2024 and stayed in Lebanese territory for more than two months after a ceasefire was agreed in November. Despite the ceasefire, Israel continued to destroy homes and infrastructure in southern Lebanon and refused to pull its troops out of five locations on Lebanese territory. Next door in Syria, the fall of the al-Assad regime in December 2024 also dealt a blow to the group, as its land routes to receive weapons and funding from Iran were disrupted.

在接下来的14个月里,以色列违反停火协议超过10,000次。随后在2026年3月,以色列再次升级对黎巴嫩的战争。此次袭击发生在真主党时隔一年多后首次向以色列发射火箭弹之后,此举旨在回应频繁的停火协议违反行为,以及伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊的遇刺事件——真主党视其为宗教和政治领袖。

Over the next 14 months, Israel violated the ceasefire more than 10,000 times. Then in March 2026, Israel reintensified its war on Lebanon. The attacks came after Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel for the first time in more than a year as a response to the myriad ceasefire violations and the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whom Hezbollah viewed as a religious and political leader.

此后,以色列再次入侵黎巴嫩,并对该国发动大规模攻击。自2024年以来,以色列在黎巴嫩已造成超过9,000人死亡,超过120万人流离失所,导致整个地区被彻底清空。

Israel then invaded Lebanon again and launched widespread attacks on the country. It has killed more than 9,000 people in Lebanon since 2024 and displaced more than 1.2 million people, emptying entire regions of the country.

真主党的合法性危机:目前,以色列占领了黎巴嫩大片领土,某些地区从边境算起最远可达10公里(超过6英里)。数十个曾经充满农业活动和人口的村庄,如今只剩下无人居住的废墟和尘土。仍有数十万人被迫流离失所。

Hezbollah’s legitimacy crisis Israel now occupies large swathes of Lebanese territory, stretching up to 10 kilometres (more than 6 miles) from the border at some points. Dozens of villages, once filled with agriculture and people, are now uninhabited piles of dust and rubble. Hundreds of thousands remain displaced.

这一局势对黎巴嫩造成了巨大影响。世界银行表示,2026年该国经济萎缩超过6%。在2024年冲突之后,世界银行曾指出黎巴嫩需要约110亿美元用于恢复和重建,而这一数字如今可能要高得多。

This has had a massive impact on Lebanon. The World Bank says the country’s economy has contracted by more than 6 percent in 2026. After the 2024 conflict, the World Bank said Lebanon needed around $11bn for recovery and reconstruction. That figure is likely much higher now.

在以往与以色列的战争之后,例如2006年,真主党曾能够为其社区和大量支持者提供援助。提供社会福利一直是该组织维持其支持者和民众信任的关键。

In the aftermath of past wars against Israel, such as in 2006, Hezbollah was able to support much of its community and supporters. Providing social welfare has been key to the group’s ability to maintain popularity and belief among its constituents.

不过自2024年起,黎巴嫩政府以及国际社会的许多成员都在努力拓展本国的各项公共服务。此外,作为与以色列达成的框架协议的一部分,黎巴嫩政府还公开宣称正着手解除真主党的武装,尽管该组织对此表示反对。

But since 2024, the Lebanese state, along with much of the international community, has been working to expand its own services. The state is also openly claiming it is working to disarm Hezbollah, despite the group’s objections, as part of a framework agreement with Israel.

“真主党正面临前所未有的合法性危机,”迪拉蒂说道。“虽说目前尚未出现社会分裂或全面的政治重组,但数十年来一直支持该组织的民众中,有很大一部分认为伊朗抛弃了他们;这场战争是在他们的土地上为他人的利益而打的,如今他们再也不想经历战争了。”不过,尽管反对真主党的声音日益高涨,分析人士指出,该组织依然是黎巴嫩什叶派穆斯林中最受欢迎的代表。

“Hezbollah is in a legitimacy crisis that it has not faced before,” Dilati said. “I wouldn’t say that there is a rupture in the community or a complete political realignment, but a big part of the communities that supported it for decades are saying that Iran left them behind, the war was fought on their land for someone else’s interests, and that they don’t want wars anymore.”Still, while grumbles against the group are growing louder, analysts said Hezbollah remains the most popular representative among Lebanon’s Shia Muslims.

“总体而言,真主党满足了什叶派民众的需求,目前该群体也找不到其他政治选择,”布兰福德说道。“促使什叶派民众继续支持真主党的原因在于:数十万什叶派民众被迫离开家园,如今生活在非什叶派聚居区,在那里他们并不受欢迎。这种处境让他们产生不安全感,自然就会把真主党视为保护自己的依靠,不管这种认知是否合理。”

“Hezbollah is providing for their needs by and large, and there is no alternative politically for the Shia community at the moment,” Blanford said. “What is binding them to Hezbollah is the fact that several hundred thousand Shias were booted out of their homes and are living in non-Shia areas where they do not feel particularly welcome, and this can create a sense of vulnerability that naturally makes them gravitate to Hezbollah as communal protection, rightly or wrongly.”

此外,真主党仍保持着作战能力;尽管有批评者称该组织已风光不再,但分析人士及外国外交官认为,外界对其实力的低估有些过头了。该组织的未来很大程度上取决于地区局势的发展,尤其是美以两国对伊朗采取的行动。不过分析人士指出,目前这种状态——即黎巴嫩政府与以色列展开谈判并试图扩大自身在黎巴嫩全境的影响力,而真主党则不得不应对国内影响力不断下降的局面——可能对该组织不利。

The group also maintains fighting capacity, and despite critics calling it a spent force, analysts and foreign diplomats say its weakness has been overstated. Much of the group’s future depends on the outcome of regional events, particularly regarding the US-Israeli war on Iran. But analysts said the status quo – in which the state is negotiating with Israel and trying to extend its influence across Lebanese territory, and Hezbollah adapts to waning domestic influence – could work against the group.

“关键在于,这场占领很可能持续很长时间。届时,那些不仅失去了家园,还失去了村庄、果园、香蕉种植园以及烟草田的人们,可能会怀念过去的日子,进而开始指责真主党,”布兰福德说道。

“The key thing is this looks like a long occupation, and you may get a situation where people who have not only lost their home but lost their village, orchards, banana plantations, tobacco fields and the rest of it may think life was good before and may start blaming Hezbollah,” Blanford said.