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特朗普的经济并未给男性或本土出生的美国人带来优势Trump's Economy Isn't Giving Men or Native-Born Americans an Edge

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哪里没有工作机会。摄影师:安格斯·莫丹特/彭博社Where the jobs aren’t. Photographer: Angus Mordant/Bloomberg

统JD·万斯踏上行程,为下个月中期选举中的共和党候选人拉票时,他的竞选演讲中经常提到这样一句话:特朗普政府“创造了100万个新工作岗位”,其中“100%”都归属美国公民。但仔细审视这些数据,就不难理解为何共和党的经济主张难以打动选民。

When Vice President JD Vance hits the road to drum up support for Republican candidates in next month’s midterm elections, his stump speeches often include the line that the Trump administration has “created 1 million new jobs,” of which “100%” have gone to US citizens. Dig into those numbers, and one gets a sense of why the GOP’s economic message is falling flat.

“100万个工作岗位”这一说法基本准确,尽管存在某些前提条件,但这一就业增长速度明显慢于乔·拜登总统任期内,也慢于特朗普总统第一任期内疫情之前的水平。新增岗位绝大多数被女性获得,而这并非特朗普的核心支持群体。此外,虽然目前尚无可靠统计数据能够证实或证伪万斯所说的“100%岗位归属美国公民”这一说法,但现有的可靠数据表明,在特朗普第二任期内,外国出生的劳动者比本土出生者处境更好。

The 1 million jobs claim is spot on, albeit with qualifications, but represents much slower employment growth than during Joe Biden’s presidency or the pre-pandemic years of President Donald Trump’s first term. The overwhelming majority of the added jobs have gone to women, not exactly Trump’s base. And while there are no reliable statistics to back up or disprove Vance’s claim of 100% of jobs going to US citizens, the reliable statistics that do exist indicate that foreign-born workers have fared better during Trump’s second term than the native born.

首先,这里反映出一个早已公认的事实:总统对经济和就业市场的影响力是有限的。在特朗普重返白宫之前,就业增长就已经放缓;而当时以及此后几乎所有岗位增长都来自医疗保健行业,而女性在该行业中的比例远高于平均水平。然而,总统在第二任期内的政策选择似乎并未带来改善。

What’s at work here is, first of all, the long-established truth that a president’s ability to shape the economy and jobs market is limited. Job growth was already slowing before Trump returned to office, and the sector driving most of the gains then and virtually all since is health care, in which women are greatly overrepresented. But the president’s second-term policy choices don’t seem to be helping.

自2025年1月特朗普重返白宫以来,私营部门新增就业岗位达1,006,000个。但由于政府削减联邦岗位,非农就业总数仅增长776,000个。既然这是有意为之的政策选择,那么范斯将焦点放在私营部门数据上似乎合情合理。而这些增长平均每月仅50,300个,远低于拜登政府时期的282,469个,也低于特朗普第一任政府截至2020年2月的165,514个。

Private-sector payrolls are up by 1,006,000 since Trump returned to the White House in January 2025. But because of the administration’s federal job cuts, total nonfarm employment is only up 776,000. Since that was an intentional policy choice it seems reasonable for Vance to focus on the private-sector numbers. And those gains work out to an average of just 50,300 a month, compared with 282,469 during the Biden administration and 165,514 during the first Trump administration through February 2020.

在拜登执政的最后12个月里,月度增长放缓至68,250个;今年虽有回升(过去六个月达到令人担忧的每月66,666个),但总体而言,拿如此疲软的数据来吹嘘似乎颇为奇怪。

Growth slowed to 68,250 monthly during Biden’s last 12 months in office, and it has picked up some this year (to an ominous 66,666 monthly over the past six months), but overall it seems pretty weird to brag about such weak numbers.

此外,男女就业情况也存在明显差异。特朗普政府从未掩饰其将经济重新导向“男性主导型”行业——采矿、制造业和建筑业——的目标。然而自2025年1月以来,私营部门新增净就业岗位的80%都由女性填补。由于男性在联邦岗位流失中占多数,女性占据了新增净非农就业岗位的近92%。

Then there’s the division between men and women. The Trump administration has made no secret of its aim to shift the economy back toward manly jobs — mining, manufacturing, construction. But since January 2025, 80% of net new private-sector jobs have been filled by women. With men making up most of departures from federal employment, women have claimed almost 92% of net new nonfarm jobs.

究竟发生了什么?在此期间,非政府医疗机构和社会援助机构新增了998,200个岗位,几乎与私营部门的增长相当,也超过了非农就业总数222,000个;而这些机构中79%的员工为女性。其余私营部门的就业人数仅微增7,800个。尽管随着政府收紧移民政策、潜在劳动力减少,就业增长出现一定放缓本在预料之中,但这一政策本应让非移民群体受益。然而目前并无迹象表明情况确实如此。

What happened? Non-government health care and social assistance employers added 998,200 jobs in this period, almost equal to the private-sector gain and 222,000 more than the nonfarm total, and 79% of health care and social assistance workers are female. Employment in the rest of the private sector is up by a measly 7,800. And while some slowing of job growth was to be expected as the administration’s immigration crackdown reduced the potential labor force, this was supposed to redound to the benefit of non-immigrants. There’s no indication it has.

要详细说明这一点,恐怕我得先谈谈美国就业统计数据究竟来自哪里。我前面引用的数据,来自劳工统计局每月开展的“企业调查”(establishment survey),这项调查会按性别划分就业情况,但不会涉及其他人口统计类别。若想了解更详细的人口数据,就得参考美国人口普查局每月进行的“家庭调查”(household survey)。

To elaborate on that, I’m afraid I need to talk about where US employment statistics come from. Those I’ve cited are from the monthly establishment survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which breaks employment down by gender but no other demographic categories. For information on those, one must turn to the monthly household survey conducted by the Census Bureau.

家庭调查的设计更侧重于计算失业率等百分比指标。虽然劳工统计局也会据此发布就业估算数据,但这些数据之所以不如企业调查中的薪资支付数据受关注,是有原因的——它们并不可靠。

The household survey is optimized to produce percentages such as unemployment rate, and while the BLS does publish employment estimates based on it, there’s a reason why they get less attention than the payroll numbers from the establishment survey — they’re not reliable.

这就引出了范斯声称“100%的岗位都给了美国公民”的说法。目前并没有按公民身份分类的及时就业数据,因此他所说的,应该是指家庭调查的估算结果。根据截至9月的数据,自2025年1月以来,美国本土出生的居民就业人数增加了160万,而外国出生的居民就业人数则减少了58.9万。这些数据确实是官方统计,但正如我在之前的专栏中详细解释过的,它们并不可信。

Which brings us to Vance’s claim of 100% of jobs going to US citizens. There is no timely data on employment by citizenship, so he must be referring to household-survey estimates that as of September show a 1.6 million increase since January 2025 in native-born employment and a 589,000 decrease in foreign born. These are genuine government statistics, but they are not, as I have explained in depth in earlier columns, to be believed.

这些数字每年都会根据人口普查局新的人口估算进行一次调整,但早年的数据却不会修订——这意味着任何跨越一年以上时间跨期的数据对比都存在疑问。而在年度调整之间,数据的变化则依赖于调查反馈。自从特朗普重返白宫以来,这些调查似乎受到了因担心被驱逐出境而回避参与调查的移民群体的影响,导致结果出现偏差。

The numbers are adjusted once a year based on new Census Bureau population estimates, but those from earlier years aren’t revised — meaning any comparison of numbers more than a year apart is suspect. And between annual adjustments the changes are based on survey responses, which since Trump returned to office seem to have been skewed by deportation-fearing immigrants avoiding the survey.

人口普查局的人口估算则来自其他渠道。去年1月,当就业数据根据最新的人口估算进行调整后,政府此前大肆宣传的本土出生居民就业激增现象,反而变成了46.6万的就业下降。我推测,明年1月的就业报告很可能也会出现类似情况。

The Census Bureau’s population estimates are derived from other sources, and when last January’s jobs numbers were adjusted to reflect the latest population estimates the boom in native-born employment the administration had been trumpeting turned into a decline of 466,000. I suspect something similar will happen with next January’s employment report.

与此同时,我们还有更可靠的百分比数据可供参考,而这些数据并不支持范斯的说法。自2025年1月以来,外国出生人口的失业率持续下降,而本土出生人口的失业率则在上升。

In the meantime, we have the more-reliable percentages to look at, and they don’t back up Vance. The unemployment rate has fallen for the foreign born since January 2025 while rising for the native born.

衡量劳动力市场状况最全面的标准——劳动年龄人口就业比率——也显示出自2025年1月以来,尤其是今年,出现了类似的分化趋势。

The best all-purpose labor market measure, the prime-age employment-to-population ratio, shows a similar divergence since January 2025 and especially this year.

外国出生人口的失业率和就业人口比率是否也可能因未回应调查而存在偏差?这是有可能的。如果目前唯一参与调查的移民是那些几乎不担心被驱逐出境的人(即已入籍公民和绿卡持有者),那么外国出生人口的就业数据很可能会因此改善。但移民在如今的就业市场中表现更好,也有简单的经济原因。他们就业的主要竞争对手是其他移民,因此移民流入量的大幅减少,很可能对已经在美国的移民有利。

Could the unemployment rate and employment-population ratio for the foreign born also be skewed by non-response? Possibly. If the only immigrants now responding to the survey are those with little fear of being deported (naturalized citizens and green-card holders), that would probably improve foreign-born employment numbers. But there are also simple economic reasons why immigrants would be doing better in today’s job market. Their main competitors for jobs are other immigrants, so a sharp reduction in inflows is likely to benefit those already In the US.

此外,外国出生劳动者还有一个优势:所有新增就业岗位都集中在医疗和社会援助领域,其中43%属于移民比例较高的家庭护理服务和老年人及残疾人社会服务行业。

Another plus for foreign-born workers is that all the job growth is in health care and social assistance, and 43% of that is in the immigrant-heavy fields of home health care services and social services for the elderly and disabled.

本土出生人口就业市场数据的恶化更有可能反映现实,因为这些数据不会受到移民回避家庭调查的影响。但为何这些数据会恶化呢?政府削减规模的举措无疑是其中一个因素。大多数联邦政府职位不对非公民开放,因此裁员对本土出生人口的影响尤为严重。此外,本土出生的美国人构成了劳动力的绝大多数,而特朗普通过一系列抑制增长的措施不断阻碍这一劳动力市场的发展——从持续变动的高关税,到与伊朗的冲突,再到本应帮助本土出生人口的驱逐行动。

The deteriorating job market readings for the native born are even more likely to reflect reality, as they wouldn’t be skewed by immigrants avoiding the household survey. But why have they deteriorated? The administration’s government-downsizing effort is surely one factor. Most federal jobs aren’t open to noncitizens, so the cuts have disproportionately affected the native born. Native-born Americans also make up the great majority of a labor force that Trump keeps waylaying with growth-reducing actions ranging from high and ever-changing tariffs to war with Iran to the very deportation campaign that was supposed to help the native born.

左倾机构“经济安全项目”的政策与研究副总裁迈克·康查尔最近梳理了10个劳动力市场指标,这些指标原本被驱逐政策的支持者视为本土出生人口可能受益的领域,但他并未发现任何相关证据。所以,这确实不是一个值得在竞选活动中夸耀的就业市场。

Mike Konczal, vice president for policy and research at the left-leaning Economic Security Project, recently ran through 10 different labor market indicators where deportation advocates expected to see some payoff for the native born and found evidence of none. So yeah, that’s not really a job market to brag about on the campaign trail.