Some in Washington would like to believe the Houthis are somebody else’s problem. It is easy to understand why. America is already deeply engaged in the war with Iran, and there is little appetite for widening the battlefield with the midterm elections approaching. The Houthis have also cynically given Washington a reason to limit its involvement by signaling that American shipping will not be targeted.

But Yemen is not a separate conflict. The Houthis—a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization aligned with Iran and armed and supported by Tehran—are waging a campaign against Yemen’s Saudi-backed government that forms part of the same regional confrontation.

The good news is that the war is beginning to move in the right direction for the Yemeni government, although the battle will be challenging and, like all battles, will have its ups and downs. Government forces, supported by Saudi air power, have expelled the Houthis from some strategically important areas around the Bab el-Mandeb and are demonstrating their capacity to operate effectively. These gains remain vulnerable, but the battlefield momentum is encouraging.

SAUDI ARABIA TELLS TRUMP NOW IS THE TIME FOR MILITARY ACTION AS IRAN-BACKED HOUTHIS ADVANCE It also changes the calculation about American involvement. The United States is already providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting support while stopping short of direct strikes. That assistance is valuable. American satellites and other surveillance systems can help locate missile batteries, drone facilities, command centers and mobile launchers.

Direct American air power could make that intelligence considerably more effective. U.S. aircraft can operate directly within American intelligence, surveillance and targeting networks, allowing information gathered by satellites and other sensors to move rapidly through the sensor-to-shooter chain. Saudi aircraft can also receive sophisticated U.S. and allied targeting information, including through interoperable systems, but intelligence shared with a partner may require additional dissemination, release and command steps before reaching the aircraft assigned to strike.

Even a short delay matters when a mobile missile launcher can fire, relocate and disappear within minutes.

Placing American aircraft directly inside this sensor-to-shooter loop could therefore shorten the time between detecting and attacking a target. A limited American role could concentrate on mobile missile launchers, drone facilities and other time-sensitive assets rather than expand into a large or open-ended campaign. It would allow intelligence Washington is already collecting and sharing to be exploited with greater speed and effect.

Direct U.S. Air Force involvement would therefore be very helpful, but it is not critical to the campaign’s success. Saudi Arabia has the aircraft, intelligence capabilities and resources necessary to support the Yemeni government, while Yemeni troops are proving capable of conducting the ground fighting themselves. Washington, however, could make the campaign faster and more effective without assuming responsibility for the war.

IRAN-BACKED HOUTHI THREAT IN RED SEA COULD LEAD TO MAJOR US POLICY SHIFT, ANALYSTS SAY This distinction matters. The case for American support should not rest on the claim that Saudi Arabia and Yemen cannot succeed without it. It should rest on the fact that the United States has a clear interest in helping them succeed.

Geography makes Yemen difficult to ignore. The Houthis have strengthened their position along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. Their ability to threaten Saudi shipping has consequences far beyond Yemen. Roughly 22 percent of global seaborne container trade passes through the Red Sea. When the route is disrupted, ships must travel around Africa, lengthening journeys and raising freight and insurance costs.

HOUTHIS ENTER US 'KILL BOX' AFTER SEIZING RED SEA 'CORK,' FORMER PENTAGON OFFICIAL WARNS There is also another worrying development. The Houthis are building ties with al-Shabaab in Somalia, al Qaeda’s wealthy East African affiliate. American officials have warned of weapons transfers, training in drones and explosives, and tactical coordination between the groups. This raises the prospect of a militant network operating on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. Its targets may be Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s government today, but there is no reason to assume that its priorities will remain unchanged.

Energy security makes the issue even more consequential. Saudi Arabia exports oil through the Strait of Hormuz, but its East-West Pipeline also carries crude across the kingdom to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The pipeline provides an alternative route when Hormuz becomes dangerous. Its strategic value declines sharply if the Houthis can threaten the Red Sea simultaneously.

OIL SQUEEZE TIGHTENS AS IRAN-BACKED ATTACKS CRIPPLE HORMUZ ESCAPE ROUTES Iran and its allies could therefore apply pressure at two critical chokepoints: Tehran around Hormuz and the Houthis around the Bab el-Mandeb. This is not merely a Saudi or Yemeni problem. China depends heavily on Gulf energy flows, Europe relies on the Red Sea and Suez trading system, and American energy production does not insulate American consumers from global oil prices.

The current fighting also exposes the magnitude of the mistake made at Hodeidah in 2018. Saudi- and Emirati-backed Yemeni forces had advanced to the outskirts of the city and placed the Houthis’ principal Red Sea port under severe pressure. Western governments feared that fighting around the port would interrupt supplies of food, fuel and medicine. Those concerns were legitimate, but the solution imposed was strategically disastrous.

SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER WARNS HOUTHI THREAT GOES GLOBAL AS TRUMP HOLDS FIRE Under intense Western pressure, the offensive was stopped. The Stockholm Agreement froze the fighting and called for forces to redeploy from Hodeidah. That withdrawal never occurred as intended. The Houthis retained the port, preserved their economic and military lifeline and used the following years to consolidate their rule, strengthen their relationship with Iran, and acquire increasingly sophisticated missiles and drones.

Stopping the Hodeidah offensive was a grave mistake. It rescued the Houthis at a moment of vulnerability and transformed what might have been a containable Yemeni insurgency into a strategic threat to Saudi Arabia and international shipping.

The lesson is not that humanitarian concerns should be ignored. It is that stopping a successful military campaign without an enforceable political settlement does not create peace. It allows the weaker party to recover. A ceasefire that preserves the aggressor’s military infrastructure may postpone suffering only to produce a larger and more dangerous war later.

That mistake must not be repeated. The Yemeni government and its Saudi backers now have momentum. They will use it to push the Houthis away from the Bab el-Mandeb, deprive them of the ability to threaten international shipping and place sustained pressure on the infrastructure that enables their missile and drone campaign.

American intelligence and, where appropriate, limited air support would be helpful. The Yemeni government is demonstrating that it can succeed when its forces are unified, supplied and backed consistently by Saudi Arabia. Washington should support that effort because the outcome affects American interests.

The Houthis are not somebody else’s problem. Nor, however, are they a threat that only American forces can defeat. Local forces are increasingly demonstrating that they can confront them, while carefully applied U.S. air power would serve as a powerful force multiplier.