在本周举行的华沙安全论坛上，北约最高盟军司令亚历克苏斯·G·格林凯维奇将军详细阐述了北约如何抵御俄罗斯入侵的清晰构想。
In a speech at the Warsaw Security Forum this week, General Alexus G. Grynkewich, the supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, laid out a compelling vision of how the alliance might repel a Russian invasion of its territory.
格林凯维奇明确表示，他并不认为与俄罗斯的战争不可避免或即将爆发。但在我看来，他成功地向外界展示了：一旦莫斯科派遣军队侵入任何北约成员国的主权领土，北约便有一套切实可行的应对方案。（需要说明的是：格林凯维奇曾是我担任北约最高盟军司令期间，美国欧洲司令部核心幕僚团队的重要成员。）这一方案被格林凯维奇称为“胜利理论”，包含三大核心要素：阻截、压制与瓦解。
Grynkewich made clear that he does not see war with Russia as either inevitable or imminent. But to my eye, he successfully demonstrated that NATO has a coherent blueprint should Moscow send troops into the sovereign territory of any member state. (Full disclosure: “Grynch” was a key member of my US European Command staff when I was supreme allied commander.) The concept, which Grynkewich called a “Theory of Victory,” has three key pillars: block, blunt and break. “Block” is stopping any Russian ground advance by swiftly moving NATO forces to the point of incursion, holding up the assault and cutting off a further influx of troops.
“阻截”即迅速派遣北约部队赶赴入侵地点，阻止俄军推进并切断其后续增援；“压制”则是借助无人机、太空技术、网络战及人工智能等新技术，全面掌控战场主动权；“瓦解”则是彻底摧毁俄军长期作战的能力。
“Blunt” involves using new technologies — drones, space, cyberwarfare and AI — to establish supremacy over the entire battlespace. “Break” is destroying the Russians’ ability to wage a longer-term conflict.
其中“瓦解”环节堪称整个计划中最具攻击性的部分。该环节可能借助“战斧”导弹、“海马斯”发射系统及其他武器实施大规模远程打击，同时出动空军力量——很可能是F-35战斗机，并辅以B-1“枪骑兵”等重型战略轰炸机提供支援。这些空中打击不仅会针对前线阵地，还会直击支撑俄军作战的后勤补给链。
That last pillar is the most aggressive part of the plan. That could involve overwhelming long-range strikes with Tomahawk missiles, Himars launchers and other systems, as well as air forces, likely F-35 fighters backed up by heavy strategic bombers such as B-1 Lancers. These air attacks would strike not only the front lines but also the logistics chains supporting the Russians’ forward fight.
制定一套适用于欧洲的全面作战方案这一理念对我而言并不陌生。2009年我刚到任北约时，拉脱维亚、立陶宛和爱沙尼亚三国的军队首脑便组成代表团前来拜访。寒暄过后，他们直截了当地道出了此行的目的：北约尚未制定出切实有效的东北侧防线防御预案。他们的判断完全正确——这确实是当时北约规划中的重大漏洞。2008年俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚的事件令这些国家深感不安。
This idea of developing a comprehensive combat approach in Europe is familiar terrain for me. Soon after I arrived at NATO in 2009, I received a delegation of the military chiefs of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. After we exchanged pleasantries, they bluntly stated the reason for their visit: NATO did not have a viable contingency plan for defense of its northeastern flank. They were right — it was a gaping hole in our planning. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 had put them on edge.
我和我的团队花了整整一年的时间来制定这个防御计划。计划的细节仍然属于机密，但总体思路还是基于冷战时期的军事思维：大规模的部队调动、海上轰炸、压倒性的空袭。当时的网络战、无人机以及特种部队的作用远不如现在强大；高超音速导弹和人工智能技术也还不存在。
My staff and I spent the next year compiling a plan. The details remain classified, but in essence it was based on Cold War thinking: massive troop movements, naval bombardment, overwhelming air strikes. Cyberwarfare, drones and special forces weren’t nearly as effective as they are now. Hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence weren’t an option.
虽然战场上仍然存在许多传统的作战方式（如战壕、坦克、榴弹炮、近身格斗），但战争的胜负已经迅速转向了速度、机动性和技术的较量。回想起乌克兰和中东地区的战争局势，我不禁感叹战争形式的变化之快。
There are still plenty of the old ways of war on the battlefields (trenches, tanks, howitzers, hand-to-hand combat), but the balance has shifted rapidly toward speed, mobility and technology. I think back and shake my head at how warfare has changed in front of our eyes in Ukraine and the Middle East.
那么，我们21世纪00年代末制定的波罗的海地区防御战略中，哪些内容仍然具有现实意义呢？我们曾计划让美军在波罗的海各国进行轮换部署，并部署F-15和F-16战斗机（部队轮换行动始于2014年）。我们还增加了在波罗的海海域的海军演习，并从地中海基地派遣更多军舰参与这些演习。
So what elements of our late-2000s Baltic defense strategy remain relevant? We planned rotations of US troops in the Baltic states themselves, including deployments of F-15 and F-16 fighters. (Troop rotations began in 2014.) We added larger naval exercises and deployments of warships into the Baltic Sea from the Mediterranean-based Sixth Fleet.
如今，北约可以考虑将位于意大利维琴察的第173空降旅的部分兵力永久性地重新部署到波罗的海地区的某个基地。未来的军事重点应该放在那些轻便、机动性强的部队上，所有这些部队都应直接隶属于盟军最高指挥官的指挥之下。目前约有8万名美军驻扎在欧洲，他们要么是长期驻扎在那里，要么是进行轮换部署。这样的部署规模似乎已经足够了；不过，任何削减美军驻欧兵力的计划都将是错误的。
Today, NATO could look at permanently repositioning elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Vicenza, Italy, to a base in one of the Baltic countries. The focus should be on light, maneuverable units — all under the direct command of the supreme allied commander. There are roughly 80,000 US troops in Europe, either permanently stationed or on rotational deployments. That seems adequate — but any plans to cut the force would be very misguided.
同样，调整我们的海军战略也是十分必要的。芬兰和瑞典加入北约后，不仅为北约带来了新的军事资源和基地，还延长了需要防御的边境线及海岸线长度（数千英里）。美国应该考虑将四艘“阿利·伯克”级导弹驱逐舰从西班牙的罗塔基地调往瑞典、芬兰或德国的港口进行部署。目前驻扎在德国和英国的空军部队也可以更多地利用芬兰的基地开展作战行动。
Likewise, adapting our naval strategy makes good sense today. The additions of Finland and Sweden to the alliance added not just new resources and bases but also thousands of additional miles of border and seacoast to defend. The US should consider deployments of four Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers out of their homeport in Rota, Spain, and to stations in Sweden, Finland or Germany. Air forces now stationed in Germany and the UK could spend more time operating from Finnish bases.
这些新型作战技术——无人机、网络战手段、人工智能以及太空系统——应当被纳入一个独立的作战指挥体系。爱沙尼亚目前已是北约主要的网络安全中心所在地，因此自然成为该指挥部的理想选址。该指挥部应下辖多个营级单位（每单位兵力500至1000人），专门负责操控各类无人化空中、海上及地面作战平台。
The new battle technologies – drones, cyberwarfare, artificial intelligence, space-based systems — should fall under a standalone warfare command. Estonia, which already houses NATO’s main cybersecurity center, is the obvious headquarters choice. This command should include several battalion-sized units (500 to 1,000 troops) focused on operating unmanned air, sea or ground platforms.
虽然这些先进的新装备确实令人瞩目，但任何成功的作战计划都离不开传统的训练工作——从桌面推演开始，进而迅速过渡到全规模实地演习。
And while all this glamorous new machinery is great, any successful plan will need the old-fashioned grunt work of training — starting with tabletop exercises and proceeding rapidly to full-scale field maneuvers.
毫无疑问，北约拥有足以遏制莫斯科的力量。32个北约成员国每年的国防开支总额超过1.5万亿美元；即便处于战时状态，俄罗斯的国防支出也仅约2000亿美元。格林凯维奇选择在波兰发表演讲十分恰当，因为该国国防开支占GDP的比重在所有成员国中名列前茅。
There is no question that NATO has the resources to keep Moscow at bay. The combined annual defense budget of the 32 NATO countries is greater than $1.5 trillion; Russia, even on a war footing, spends around $200 billion. It is appropriate that Grynkewich gave his speech in Poland, which spends more on defense as a percentage of GDP than any other member state.
不过归根结底，要有效威慑莫斯科，仅靠将北约战略重心转向东北方向、加强训练以及加大对新技术的投入还远远不够。这还需要坚定的政治决心——而这恰恰是北约长期以来的软肋。但愿格林凯维奇在华沙的这次及时演讲能够促使全部32个成员国都认同并践行“胜利理论”。
But in the end, deterring Moscow will require more than shifting NATO’s focus to the northeast, increasing training and spending on more on new technologies. It will also need political will, often the alliance’s Achilles’ heel. Let’s hope Grynkewich’s timely presentation in Warsaw can help get all 32 member states on board with the Theory of Victory.