1974年，如今属于刚果民主共和国的首都金沙萨曾举办了一场盛大的拳击比赛，被称为“丛林之战”（“Rumble in the Jungle”）。如今，这座城市正陷入另一场激烈的政治冲突之中。一方是现任总统费利克斯·奇塞凯迪（Félix Tshisekedi）；另一方则是前总统约瑟夫·卡比拉（Joseph Kabila）。10月12日，卡比拉突然宣布将领导反政府武装联盟对抗奇塞凯迪，并表示“不惜使用武力”。
Back in 1974 Kinshasa, the capital of what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, hosted a lavish boxing match known as the “Rumble in the Jungle”. Today the city is gripped by a different heavyweight clash. In one corner is Félix Tshisekedi, the president. In the other is Joseph Kabila (pictured), an ex-president, who on October 12th stunned the country by announcing that he would lead a rebel coalition against his successor “by all means, including the use of force”.
卡比拉的这一举动可能会加剧该国东部地区的冲突局势，同时也会使奇塞凯迪修改宪法、试图在2028年任期结束后继续执政的企图变得更加复杂。如果其中任何一方能够“击倒”对方（即赢得这场政治斗争），那么这都将决定这个非洲第二大国家的未来——而美国对刚果的矿产资源极为感兴趣。
Mr Kabila’s move threatens to worsen the conflict in the war-riven east. It also complicates Mr Tshisekedi’s bid to change the constitution to stay in power past the end of his second term in 2028. If either man can land a knockout blow it will shape the future of Africa’s second-largest country—of great interest to America, given its quest for critical minerals.
这场争斗有着悠久的历史。最新的冲突始于2019年：当时奇塞凯迪在选举中以极其不公正的方式获胜。事后，他与卡比拉达成了一项权力共享协议，承认卡比拉在议会中的多数席位。然而该协议在2020年被撕毁，卡比拉的支持者遭到清洗，卡比拉本人也被迫流亡。在流亡期间，他多次向其他非洲领导人抱怨自己的继任者正在非法夺取权力。
The feud has a long history. The latest chapter began in 2019, when Mr Tshisekedi was declared the winner of an election with more rigging than a giant sailboat. In the aftermath he struck a power-sharing deal with Mr Kabila that recognised the former president’s majority in parliament. That pact was torn up acrimoniously in 2020. Kabila loyalists were purged and Mr Kabila ultimately went into self-imposed exile, where he complained privately to other African leaders about what he saw as a power grab by an illegitimate successor.
金沙萨的局势因东部地区的战火而进一步恶化。2021年，一支得到卢旺达支持的武装组织“M23”重新活跃起来，并在2025年初占领了戈马（Goma）和布卡武（Bukavu）这两座重要城市。对于出生于东部的卡比拉来说，这场冲突是对其继任者“专制统治”的反抗；而对于在2023年以相对公正的方式再次当选的奇塞凯迪而言，这场战争则是卢旺达的入侵行为。
Events in Kinshasa were inflamed by the conflagration in the east. In 2021 M23, a Rwandan-backed force, resurfaced after a dormant eight years, taking Goma and Bukavu, two regional capitals, in early 2025. To Mr Kabila, who was born in the east, the conflict was a reaction to his successor’s “tyrannical regime”. To Mr Tshisekedi, who won re-election less dubiously in 2023, the war was an invasion by Rwanda.
当卡比拉于2025年前往戈马时，奇塞凯迪更加确信自己的继任者实际上是卢旺达的傀儡。2025年9月，刚果政府以叛国罪缺席审判卡比拉，判处其死刑。
When Mr Kabila moved to Goma in 2025, Mr Tshisekedi saw confirmation that his successor was a Rwandan stooge. In September 2025 Congo sentenced Mr Kabila to death in absentia for treason.
在接下来的一年里，卡比拉先生和“M23”武装组织一直否认彼此之间存在任何联系。该组织政治部门的负责人科尼利·南加（Corneille Nangaa）在5月份对《经济学人》杂志表示：“卡比拉不是我们的领导人。”但实际上，卡比拉现在已经成为该组织的实际领导者。卡比拉领导的联盟中包含了“M23”武装组织，他希望通过东部的叛乱活动为金沙萨带来变革。
Over the next year Mr Kabila and M23 denied any links. “Kabila is not our boss,” Corneille Nangaa, the head of the group’s political arm, told The Economist in May. But he is now. Mr Kabila’s coalition includes M23. He wants to use the rebellion in the east to bring change to Kinshasa.
他真的能成功吗？位于戈马的非政府组织正在密切关注军队向南移动、进入矿产资源丰富的卡坦加地区的动向。然而，“M23”的武装分子们比他们的政治领导人更不愿意扩大战事范围；卢旺达也没有表现出任何扩大冲突的迹象。卢旺达或许支持卡比拉上台，因为这样能让这场跨境冲突看起来更像是一场刚果内部的冲突。
Will he succeed? NGOs in Goma are watching for troop movements south to the mineral-rich Katanga region. Yet M23’s fighters are more reluctant to expand the battlefield than their political peers. Rwanda has shown no sign of wanting to broaden the conflict either. It may have endorsed the elevation of Mr Kabila because it makes the conflict across the border look more of an intra-Congolese fight.
乌干达则是另一个重要参与者，它希望维持现有的协议，以便能够继续在刚果东北部驻军。美国今年曾因卡比拉与“M23”的关联而对其实施制裁，因此不太可能支持任何旨在破坏齐塞凯迪政权稳定的行动（毕竟美国与齐塞凯迪在矿产资源开发方面有着合作）。
Uganda, another player, wants to preserve a deal that lets it station its forces in the north-east of Congo. America, which put sanctions on Mr Kabila this year for his links to M23, is unlikely to welcome any effort to destabilise the regime of Mr Tshisekedi, with whom it has struck mineral deals.
其他刚果反对派势力也可能起到决定性作用。一个名为“C64”的反对派联盟（其名称源自刚果宪法的第64条，而非20世纪80年代流行的计算机品牌）正在反对齐塞凯迪的权力扩张行为。一些反对派人士此前曾呼吁将卡比拉纳入“全国对话”进程，但现在支持卡比拉已经变得更加困难。
Other Congolese opposition figures may prove decisive. An unwieldy coalition known as C64 (after the 64th article of the constitution rather than the popular 1980s computer) opposes Mr Tshisekedi’s power grab. Some previously called for Mr Kabila to be included in a “national dialogue”. But supporting him will be harder now.
卡比拉最大的希望或许在于：齐塞凯迪会因恐惧而变得偏执和专制，从而犯下战略性的错误（金沙萨的一些人士认为，对卡比拉判处死刑就是一个典型的例子）；这种行为可能会引发政治精英们的强烈反弹。齐塞凯迪本身已经面临巨大压力——10月14日，比利时当局以洗钱调查为由突击搜查了他亲属的住所。
Mr Kabila’s best hope might be that Mr Tshisekedi is so spooked that he becomes more paranoid and autocratic. That could prompt strategic errors—some in Kinshasa say the death sentence for Mr Kabila is an example of such a mistake—and prompt a backlash by political elites. Mr Tshisekedi is already under pressure. On October 14th Belgian authorities raided his relatives’ houses in connection with an investigation into money-laundering.
这意味着卡比拉先生正在采用一种类似于穆罕默德·阿里在1974年比赛中使用的策略：通过“借力击打”的方式来应对政治压力。阿里当时依靠拳击台上的绳索来缓冲对手的攻击，让对手乔治·福尔曼不断出拳，直到对手精疲力竭，然后再给予致命一击。阿里曾说过：“只有当你有能力做到这一点时，这样的策略才算真正的‘炫耀’。”现在，刚果民众正在等待着看卡比拉先生是否真的能够兑现他的承诺（即能否真正实现他的政治目标）。
That would amount to Mr Kabila adopting the political equivalent of the “rope-a-dope” strategy used by Muhammad Ali in 1974. By leaning on the ropes to absorb blows, Ali let his opponent, George Foreman, punch his way to exhaustion. Then he delivered a knockout blow. “It’s not bragging if you can back it up,” Ali apparently said. Congo is waiting to see whether Mr Kabila can back it up, too.