Dr. Tunc Demirtas is a foreign policy researcher at the Ankara-based Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA).

In the spring of 2026, a 38-year-old man returned to El-Fasher to retrieve belongings from his home. Amnesty International refers to him as Hatim to protect his identity. Hatim was still suffering from a serious shrapnel wound to his jaw when fighters from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) detained him and took him to a school. He recounts being held there for approximately four months alongside some 300 other people, most of whom were women. When he attempted to escape, he was beaten, with blows to his existing wounds.

This week marks one year since the RSF captured El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, on Oct. 26, 2025, following an 18-month siege. The city had been the Sudanese army's last major stronghold in Darfur. The massacres committed in the first days after its fall attracted widespread international media attention. Yet Hatim's account represents just one part of the violence and abuses that continued over the following twelve months, largely beyond the world's attention.

Evidence of the atrocities committed in El-Fasher emerged rapidly. According to the United Nations Human Rights Office, at least 6,000 people were killed in the first three days following the city's fall. Satellite imagery examined by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab revealed reddish marks on the ground and objects consistent with human bodies within the first 24 hours. The UN Security Council's Sudan Sanctions Committee subsequently reported that an RSF commander known as Abu Lulu had recorded footage of himself killing people as they pleaded for mercy.

In February 2026, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that the RSF's actions in El-Fasher bore the hallmarks of genocide against the Zaghawa and Fur communities, involving at least three of the underlying acts constituting the crime of genocide.

Amnesty International's report of Oct. 23, 2026, shows what remains. Fewer than 70,000 people now live in a city whose population exceeded 1 million before the war. Those who fled the city this summer describe arbitrary detention, torture and forced labour. One resident who returned in June told Amnesty International, "The El-Fasher I knew is gone." The RSF maintains that civilians can safely return to the city. Amnesty International's evidence suggests otherwise.

Psychologist Paul Slovic has shown that people will work hard to save a single identifiable individual, yet become desensitized when that same individual becomes one among thousands of victims. Large numbers often fail to generate the emotional response one might expect. Susan Sontag made a similar observation about images of suffering. She argued that people turn away from such images when they come to believe that the events have nothing to do with them and that there is nothing they can do.

It may also be tempting to portray Sudan's war as a tragedy caused by a single villain. However, the reality on the ground is considerably more complex. The UN Human Rights Office recorded at least 306 deaths from drone strikes attributed to both the Sudanese army and the RSF during the first three weeks of Oct. 2026.

The Fact-Finding Mission's September report found that foreign weapons, drones and personnel had expanded the military capabilities of both sides, and it also traced how external support reached El-Fasher. It found that individuals and entities operating from or linked to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) played a significant role in supporting the RSF. Cargo and foreign contractors moved through Bosaso in Somalia's Puntland, where UAE-based entities maintained a military base, as well as through Kufra and Benghazi in Libya and Chad.

RSF fighters trained in Libya later took part in the attacks on Zamzam camp and El-Fasher, and Colombian contractors were present around the city before, during and after its fall. The UAE denies all these allegations.

The route through Chad was not new. In January 2024, a leaked report by UN sanctions monitors described the evidence that the UAE was sending military support to the RSF through Amdjarass in Chad as credible. The UAE said its flights there carried humanitarian aid to a field hospital.

Israel also belongs in this picture, although the UN has not named it as a supplier. In May 2022, an investigation by Lighthouse Reports and Haaretz traced a plane linked to the private surveillance business of a former Israeli intelligence officer to Khartoum. Sources told the investigators that it carried surveillance technology for the RSF. As the RSF killed civilians in El-Fasher, Israel's official Arabic-language account joined Emirati voices in likening the Sudanese army to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. A war sustained by external support will not end simply because people watching from afar express their sorrow.

Compassion and solidarity produce results only when they are translated into concrete, achievable demands directed at those capable of acting. The available evidence points to three steps.

First, the arms embargo that already covers Darfur should be enforced. At least part of the traffic described above could be halted within its scope, since the Mission traced foreign contractors entering Sudan through Nyala Airport in South Darfur. The current sanctions measures are due to expire on Dec. 11. Their renewal should give the UN Panel of Experts the means to monitor these routes.

Second, the networks supplying weapons and military assistance must face tangible consequences. In February, the UN Sanctions Committee designated four RSF commanders in connection with the atrocities committed in El-Fasher, including the brother of the RSF leader. Sanctions on commanders in the field will have limited impact as long as the supply routes sustaining them remain open. The Fact-Finding Mission identified Ethiopia, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan among the countries that had not responded to its requests for information. These countries should respond.

Third, there must be a visible and concrete step towards accountability. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Darfur under the UN Security Council's 2005 referral. In January 2026, the Court's Deputy Prosecutor informed the Security Council that her office had concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in El-Fasher. According to Middle East Eye, the prosecution has not filed a single application for an arrest warrant concerning crimes committed in Darfur since April 2023. The Office of the Prosecutor says such applications are kept under seal. For survivors, justice that proceeds in secret cannot be seen to progress.

People living far from Sudan can also take one practical step. They can ask their own governments where they stand on these three demands. The next test is already clear. Since June, UN officials have warned that El-Obeid, a city of approximately half a million people, could face the same fate as El-Fasher.

Hatim survived. For the first anniversary of El-Fasher's fall to carry real meaning, his testimony must be treated as evidence that demands accountability.