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联邦调查局和亚马逊云服务警告:攻击者正利用AI代理以“工业级规模”自动化网络犯罪Attackers are using AI agents to automate cybercrime at 'industrial scale,' FBI and AWS warn

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攻击者正在利用开源 AI 渗透测试框架 ARTEX,将针对全球银行、政府、能源和医疗服务提供商以及其他关键行业的攻击实现自动化,这是根据美国联邦调查局(FBI)和亚马逊威胁情报部门的安全警报披露的。

Attackers are using open source AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate their attacks on banks, governments, energy and healthcare providers, and other critical sectors around the globe, according to security alerts from the FBI and Amazon Threat Intelligence.

在 10 月 3 日至 11 月 5 日期间,亚马逊的 MadPot 蜜罐威胁传感器检测到两起 ARTEX 攻击活动:一起让窃贼能够以“工业规模”窃取 AI 凭证,从而免费获取模型访问权限;另一起则生成深度伪造视频,以欺骗实时自拍核验。

Between October 3 and November 5, Amazon’s MadPot honeypot threat sensors detected two ARTEX campaigns: one that allowed thieves to steal AI credentials at “industrial scale” to gain free access to models, and a second that generated deepfake videos to trick live selfie checks.

在第一起活动中,不法分子利用 AI 智能体窃取 API 密钥,随后将这些密钥输入 ARTEX 框架的模型网关,以驱动更多智能体搜寻更多 AI 模型访问密钥。AWS 首席信息安全官 CJ Moses 在周五发布的博客文章中写道:“智能体通过各提供商的令牌和身份服务验证身份,枚举存储,评估权限范围,并以托管 AI 模型服务、密钥和参数存储以及应用程序身份为目标。”

In the first one, miscreants used AI agents to steal API keys, and then feed these keys into the ARTEX framework’s model gateway to power more agents searching for more AI model access keys. “Agents validated identities through each provider’s token and identity services, enumerated storage, assessed permission scope, and went after managed AI model services, secrets and parameter stores, and application identities,” AWS Chief Information Security Officer CJ Moses wrote in a blog post on Friday.

目标包括 LLM 网关和代理平台,如 One API、New API、Veloera、Sub2API 和 LiteLLM,以及 AI 应用构建工具 Dify、FastGPT、Langflow、RAGFlow、Open WebUI、LobeChat 和 Ollama。该活动还利用云凭证获取对模型的窃取式访问。

Targets included LLM gateways and proxy platforms such as One API, New API, Veloera, Sub2API, and LiteLLM, and AI application builders Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat, and Ollama. This campaign also used cloud credentials to gain stolen access to the models.

在第二起活动中,攻击者利用 ARTEX 创建实时深度伪造视频,以欺骗两家加密货币交易所的身份验证(KYC)核查,并伪造证件照片以通过文档核查。Moses 写道:“智能体详细逆向工程了某供应商的活体检测协议,记录了其发送的人脸检测事件流、核查期间如何追踪人脸位置,以及用于告知用户移动方向的坐标系统。”

In a second campaign, attackers used ARTEX to create real-time deepfake videos to trick identity verification (KYC) checks at two cryptocurrency exchanges, and forged ID photos to pass document checks. “The agents reverse-engineered one vendor’s liveness protocol in detail, documenting the face-detection event stream it sends, how it tracks face position during the check, and the coordinate system it uses to tell the user where to move,” Moses wrote.

智能体确实设法完成了完整的动作序列,并将人脸定位在距离目标 7 个像素以内,但这一壮举仍不够,因为供应商的服务端判定在每次尝试中都拒绝了该深度伪造。在另一个会话中,智能体利用一个开源人脸动画模型,在单张消费级 GPU 上构建了实时深度伪造视频管道。该视频实现了每秒 11.5 帧,摩西表示这“接近实时视频核验的预期”。

The agents did manage to complete the full movement sequence with the face positioned within 7 pixels of the target, but this feat was not enough, as the vendor’s server-side verdict rejected the deepfake in every attempt. In a separate session, agents built a real-time deepfake video pipeline on a single consumer-grade GPU using an open-source face animation model. This video achieved 11.5 frames per second, which Moses said is “close to what a live video check expects.”

与此同时,智能体还致力于身份证件核验,构建了合成相机元数据,使其图像尺寸与 JPEG 文件内部的真实数值相匹配,并保留了原始相机压缩表——这些表通常会在重新保存编辑过的图像时被替换。虽然最终目标是窃取加密货币,但该活动展示了 ARTEX 如何同时运行多个会话,让多个智能体朝同一结果努力。“一个搜索套现途径,一个致力于清空账户余额,一个搭建深度伪造视频管道,一个实施验证绕过,”摩西写道。

Meanwhile, agents also worked on the ID document checks, building synthetic camera metadata whose image dimensions matched the real values inside the JPEG file, and preserving the original camera compression tables that are usually replaced by re-saving an edited image. While the end goal was stealing cryptocurrency, the campaign illustrates how ARTEX runs several sessions simultaneously, with multiple agents working toward the same result. “One searched for ways to cash out, one worked on clearing account balances, one set up the deepfake video pipeline, and one carried out the verification bypass,” Moses wrote.

这些攻击技术均非新事物,但这两起活动均表明,AI 智能体能提升攻击者的速度与持久性。“智能体在基础安全卫生缺失的环节取得了成功,包括默认或硬编码凭证、遗留在代码和公开制品中的密钥、未经认证的接口和推理端点,以及未修补的软件,”摩西补充道。“做好这些基础工作仍是最有效的防御。”

None of the attack techniques are new, but both of these campaigns show how AI agents can boost the speed and persistence of the attacker. “The agents succeeded where basic security hygiene was missing, including default or hardcoded credentials, keys left in code and public artifacts, unauthenticated interfaces and inference endpoints, and unpatched software,” Moses added. “Getting those fundamentals right remains the most effective defense.”

FBI 也在另一份周五发布的警报中重申了这一信息,指出“ARTEX 显著缩短了串联攻击技术所需的时间,部分入侵从最初的目标锁定到获取特权访问不足三小时”。联邦警方引用了 8 月针对韩国金融机构的攻击,该攻击窃取了约 6.7 万人的个人数据。

The FBI weighs in The FBI also hammered this message in a separate Friday alert noting “ARTEX significantly reduces the time required to chain attack techniques, with some intrusions progressing from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours.”The federal cops cited the August attacks against South Korean financial institutions that stole personal data belonging to about 67,000 people.

FBI 还强调了 9 月份的一起 ARTEX 活动,该活动以 ConnectWise Cloud Backup 客户为目标,通过供应链攻击最终导致 2250 多个下游 Microsoft 租户受到入侵。这些安全漏洞公开后,ARTEX 的原始开发者于 10 月删除了 GitHub 代码库。然而,分叉版本、本地化变体以及商业版本仍然存在,截至 11 月 4 日,互联网扫描服务 Censys 发现有 1465 台主机运行着暴露在公网的 ARTEX 控制台。

The FBI also highlighted a September ARTEX campaign that targetedd ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers in a supply chain attack that ultimately compromised more than 2,250 downstream Microsoft tenants. After these security breaches became public, the original ARTEX developer removed the GitHub repository in October. However, forked and localized variations plus a commercial version remain, and as of November 4 internet scanning service Censys identified 1,465 hosts running an exposed ARTEX console.

FBI 指出,如果算上防火墙后面或私有网络中的系统,部署总数“很可能要高得多”。联邦当局敦促所有组织——尤其是运营面向互联网的应用程序、自助服务门户、云基础设施以及合作伙伴或供应商系统的组织——实施其 Flash 警报中列出的一系列缓解措施。这些措施包括:通过将敏感服务限制在受信任网络、专用连接或专用管理路径中来减少外部攻击面,并将企业应用程序置于零信任访问策略和权限之后。®

And the total number of deploymentsis “likely significantly higher when including systems behind firewalls or in private networks,” according to the FBI. The feds urged all organizations – especially those operating internet-exposed applications, self-service portals, cloud infrastructure, and partner or supplier systems – to implement a series of mitigation measures outlined in its Flash alert. These include reducing external attack surfaces by restricting sensitive services to trusted networks, private connectivity, or dedicated administrative paths, and moving enterprise applications behind zero-trust access policies and permissions. ®

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