
中国正在将对其掌控的多种关键材料、投入品、技术和商品武器化,迫使其他国家屈从其意志。西方以市场为基础的经济体虽然无法匹敌北京对供应的掌控,但可以在需求端展开竞争。然而,这一杠杆只有把全世界的消费者联合起来才能奏效。为了回击中国的商业打击,美国需要盟友。
China is weaponizing control over a host of vital materials, inputs, technologies, and goods, bending other nations to its will. While Western market-based economies can’t match Beijing’s hold on supply, they can compete on demand. But this lever will only work by bringing the world’s consumers together. To parry China’s commercial strikes, the US needs allies.
中国在利用其对生产的控制服务于外交政策目标方面正变得更加娴熟和强硬。2010年,在日本海上保安厅逮捕一名中国船长后,中国限制稀土出口,对日本打响了一记警告。稀土是日本庞大工业基础的关键支撑。去年美国加征关税后,中国重演并扩大了这一套路,通过收紧稀土和永磁体的出口,扰乱全球汽车、半导体及其他工业制造业,迫使特朗普政府退让。
China is becoming more adept and assertive in leveraging its control over production for foreign policy ends. It fired a warning shot in 2010 against Japan, after the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese sea captain, by curtailing the exports of the rare earths that underpin the nation's vast industrial base. After the US raised tariffs last year, it reran and expanded this playbook, disrupting global car, semiconductor, and other industrial manufacturing by constricting the export of rare earths and permanent magnets, getting the Trump administration to back down.
当欧洲和美国的国家触犯中国所认定的利益时,中国便转而惩罚这些国家的企业,例如以“两用”为由将精密制造、电机、航空航天和国防企业列入黑名单。中国还寻求扩大其胁迫工具库,提议对太阳能、人工智能、矿产精炼技术及其他产品实施新的许可制度和出口管制。
It has taken to punishing European and US companies when their countries trample on China’s perceived interests, for instance by blacklisting precision manufacturing, electric motor, aerospace, and defense businesses on “dual use” grounds. And it looks to expand its arsenal of coercive tools, proposing new licensing regimes and export controls on solar, artificial intelligence, mineral refining technologies, and other products.
美国也试图玩这场游戏。自2019年以来,美国限制向被列入实体清单的企业出口美国软件和芯片,其中包括中国电信巨头华为技术有限公司。2022年,美国更广泛地禁止向中国出口尖端半导体及其制造设备。但中国所掌握的制造业卡点之广,令美国难以匹敌。而且,禁止本国私营企业对外销售,与美国的市场经济根基格格不入。
The US has tried to play this game, too. Since 2019, it has restricted exports of American software and chips to companies on its Entity List, including Chinese telecom giant Huawei Technologies Co. In 2022, it stopped the export of leading-edge semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment to China more broadly. But it is outmatched by the breadth of manufacturing chokepoints China holds. And prohibiting its private companies from selling abroad sits uneasily with America’s market-based fundamentals.
美国也试图利用其采购力量。它禁止中国电信设备进入美国网络,将中国制造的联网汽车拒之门外,并征收广泛关税,以阻止中国商品进入。但这些单边措施并未阻止华为成为全球最大的电信设备制造商,比亚迪公司成为最大的电动汽车制造商,以及中国的全球出口升至创纪录水平。
The US has also tried to leverage its buying power. It barred Chinese telecom gear from US networks, shut out Chinese-made connected vehicles, and leveled broad-based tariffs to keep Chinese goods out. But these unilateral measures haven’t stopped Huawei from becoming the world’s largest manufacturer of telecom equipment, BYD Co. the biggest EV car maker, and China’s global exports from rising to record levels.
挑战在于,美国的采购力量,尽管巨大,却仅占全球采购总额的三分之一。这不足以单方面改变中国的经济方向或行为。中国公司可以,并且已经,将其产品转向其他市场。而且,虽然这些国家有时也进行了反击,例如欧盟对汽车进口征收关税,或限制中国制造商品在公共项目中的使用,但这种不协调的做法限制了需求端杠杆的有效性。
The challenge is that US acquisitive power, as great as it is, amounts to only one-third of all global purchases. That’s not enough to unilaterally change China’s economic direction or behavior. Chinese companies can, and have, redirected their products to other markets. And while these countries have at times pushed back as well, for instance the European Union tariffing car imports or limiting Chinese made goods in public projects, the disjointed approach limits the effectiveness of demand-side leverage.
市场经济体需要规模才能发挥其消费力量。如果美国与欧洲、日本、韩国、加拿大和澳大利亚联手,他们将共同掌握超过全球一半的消费力。再加上巴西、墨西哥、印度、英国和阿根廷,该集团将占据全球消费支出的三分之二以上。
Market-based economies need to scale to flex their consumption power. If the US joined with Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia, together they would wield more than half of global consumption. Add Brazil, Mexico, India, the UK and Argentina, and the group would top two-thirds of all global consumer spending.
这样的买家俱乐部将限制中国亏损企业以甩卖价格出口商品的空间,关闭中国出口强劲势头目前的替代方案之门。这个更大的网络将有助于抵消用廉价中国商品替代品所带来的通胀影响,通过重新布局的国际供应链保持规模经济和专业化分工。而且,它将使各国在面对潜在的中国报复时,能够抱团取暖。
Such a buyers’ club would give less running room to China’s unprofitable firms exporting goods at fire-sale prices, closing the door to the current workaround for the Chinese export juggernaut. This bigger network would help to offset the inflationary effects of substituting cheap Chinese goods by maintaining economies of scale and specialization with rerouted international supply chains. And it would afford nations safety in numbers against potential Chinese retaliation.
这是一个动员的时刻,因为中国制造业产能过剩正在淹没全球经济。一位善于外交的美国可以充分利用开放经济体的不满,尤其是欧盟日益增强的强硬姿态。但要团结其他国家,美国需要给他们一个加入的理由。对首尔、东京和布鲁塞尔以及北京同时加征关税,会让商业上的团结合作更加困难。而且,华盛顿需要谨慎选择其经济战场,因为全面征税和禁令会削弱合作的益处,增加合作的成本。
This is a moment to mobilize as China's manufacturing overbuild swamps the global economy. A diplomatically entrepreneurial US could make the most of open economies’ frustrations and in particular the EU’s increasing assertiveness. But to rally other countries, the US needs to give them a reason to join. Tariffing Seoul, Tokyo and Brussels alongside Beijing makes commercial camaraderie all the harder. And Washington needs to pick its economic battles as blanket levies and prohibitions dull the benefits and raise the costs of collaboration.
一个初步的结构在9月30日于密尔沃基签署的框架中出现,该框架由美国、欧盟、日本、韩国以及二十多个其他国家在G20贸易部长会议期间签署,他们同意调查全球钢铁产能过剩问题(中国生产了大约一半的钢铁,其产能预计将继续增长)。随后,一个更狭窄的联盟——包括印度、墨西哥和欧盟——迅速发表了单独声明,针对汽车、电池、化学品、传统半导体和太阳能电池板。
A nascent structure emerged in a framework signed on Sept. 30 in Milwaukee by the US, EU, Japan, South Korea and two dozen other nations on the sidelines of the G20 trade ministers’ meeting, where they agreed to investigate global steel overcapacity (China produces roughly half of all steel and its capacity is projected to grow). It was quickly followed up by a separate statement from a narrower coalition — including India, Mexico, and the EU — targeting cars, batteries, chemicals, legacy semiconductors and solar panels.
这些最初的自愿协议缺乏约束力。但各国可以增加具有约束力的执行机制,包括协调关税、配额或进口禁令。它们可以促进成员之间的投资,并匹配补贴。这样一个消费者俱乐部将成为一种强大且不对称的工具,中国无法与之匹配。事实上,中国愿意就汽车进口与欧洲达成协议,反映出其希望遏制更加协调和层层递进的反击(这对中国来说是一笔好交易,上限高于去年的总进口量)。
These initial voluntary agreements lack teeth. But countries could add binding enforcement mechanisms, including coordinated tariffs, quotas, or import bans. They could facilitate investment between members and match subsidies. Such a club of consumers would become a potent and asymmetric tool that China couldn’t match. Indeed, China’s willingness to make a deal with Europe on car imports reflects its desire to ward off a more coordinated and cascading pushback (and it was a good deal for China, the cap being higher than last year’s overall imports).
在生产武器化方面,美国今天无法击败深圳。但如果共同努力,世界各国市场经济体可以削弱它。
In the weaponizing of production, the US today can’t beat Shenzhen. But working together, the world’s market-based economies could blunt it.