美国股市有一个尴尬的事实:决定其命运的两家公司并不在股市上市交易。OpenAI筹集了大量资金,却无意上市。(其老板萨姆·奥尔特曼在9月表示,现在上市将是“不明智的”。)另一家领先的人工智能实验室Anthropic将于11月18日首次亮相,估值尚未确定。但它首先不得不发布一份长达400页的离奇招股说明书,警告投资者人类的存在以及他们的资金都面临风险。
AN AWKWARD fact about America’s stock markets is that two of the companies dictating their fortunes are not traded on them. OpenAI has raised bundles of money without bothering to list. (Doing so now would be “ill-advised”, said its boss, Sam Altman, in September.) The other leading artificial-intelligence lab, Anthropic, makes its debut on November 18th, at a valuation yet to be settled. But it first had to release a surreal 400-page prospectus warning investors that human existence, as well as their money, was at risk. Listing can be a drag.
上市可能是一种拖累。几年前,银行摩根大通老板杰米·戴蒙写道,监管、报告要求以及“加强的公众审视”可能正在“驱使公司离开公开市场”。1996年,美国约有8000家公司上市。经过数十年的退市,现在这一数字已减半。首次公开募股(IPO)变得越来越稀少。1980年至2000年间,平均每年有310家公司上市。2001年至2025年间,这一年度数字降至113家。
Regulation, reporting requirements and “heightened public scrutiny” may be “driving companies from the public markets”, wrote Jamie Dimon, boss of JPMorgan Chase, a bank, a few years ago. In 1996 some 8,000 firms were listed in America. After decades of delistings, the number is now half that. Initial public offerings (IPOs) have grown scarcer. Between 1980 and 2000 an average of 310 firms went public each year. Between 2001 and 2025 the annual figure fell to 113. The conventional explanation is that private markets, including venture capital and private equity, have become more dynamic even as public markets, with their brass bells and live tickers, have turned more cumbersome.
常规解释是,包括风险投资和私募股权在内的私募市场变得更有活力,而公开市场伴随着铜钟和实时行情显示屏,变得更加繁琐。2002年通过的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(SOX)等规则要求公司保留大量关于内部运作的文件。美国最高证券监管机构保罗·阿特金斯将此类负担归咎为阻碍新股上市的原因。他承诺“让IPO再次伟大”,包括让数百家公司豁免SOX最严格的条款。
Rules like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) passed in 2002 require firms to keep oodles of documentation on their inner workings. Paul Atkins, America’s top securities regulator, blames such burdens for discouraging debutantes. He promises to “make IPOs great again”, including by exempting hundreds of firms from SOX’s stiffest strictures. This conventional story contains holes, however.
然而,这个常规说法存在漏洞。令人震惊的退市数字忽略了并购的影响。当两家上市公司合并时,上市公司数量下降,但大部分基础资产和业务仍然存在。而当一家上市公司收购一家非上市公司时,股票投资者获得了对被收购业务的敞口。
The alarming number of delistings ignores the impact of mergers. When two listed firms combine, the count of public firms falls, yet most of the underlying assets and operations remain. And when a listed firm buys an unlisted one, stock investors gain exposure to the acquired business. After adjusting for corporate marriages, the decline in American listings between 1996 and 2020 disappears, according to a paper by B. Espen Eckbo and Markus Lithell, two academics.
两位学者B·埃斯彭·埃克博和马库斯·利特尔的论文指出,在剔除企业并购因素后,1996年至2020年间美国上市数量的下降便消失了。其他富裕国家则并非如此,即便剔除并购因素,这些国家的上市数量仍然下降。上市的成本确实存在,但看起来并不至于高得让人望而却步。哥伦比亚大学的迈克尔·尤恩斯及其合著者的一项研究考察了2000年以来私营企业上市概率的下降。
The same is not true in other rich countries, where listings have fallen even after adjusting for mergers. The costs of going public are real. But they do not look prohibitive. A study by Michael Ewens of Columbia University and co-authors looks at the decline since 2000 in private firms’ probability of listing.
他们计算得出,监管负担只占这一概率下降的7%。仅《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》一项几乎微不足道。牛津大学的卢多维克·法利普在最近的一篇工作论文中认为,更可能的罪魁祸首是充裕的私人资本。公开市场的意义在于让企业从广泛的投资者群体中“汇集”大量资本。但机构投资者已向美国私募市场投入了如此多的现金,以至于初创企业如今只需少数几个大金主就能凑齐巨额资金。
Regulatory burdens, they calculate, account for only 7% of that diminished probability. SOX alone barely registers. The more likely culprit is abundant private capital, argues Ludovic Phalippou of Oxford University in a recent working paper. The point of the public markets is to let firms “aggregate” large amounts of capital from a wide investor base. But institutional investors have ploughed so much cash into America’s private markets that startups can now piece together hefty sums from a few big benefactors.
资本的充裕模糊了传统的公私界限。一些金融机构谈到了“私人IPO”。私募融资还让早期员工得以套现部分股份,从而降低了上市的必要性。在美国,企业上市的中位年龄已从1980年至2000年的8年上升到2001年至2025年的11年。SpaceX在上市前已是一家成立20多年的公司,今年上市时估值达1.8万亿美元。保持私有状态的另一个好处是,烧钱的初创企业可以快速连续地进行多轮融资,正如法利普所指出的,这是一种“公开市场处理不善的融资模式”。
The abundance of capital has blurred the traditional public-private divide. Some finance houses speak of “private IPOs”. Private fundraising also lets early employees cash out some of their shares, reducing the urgency to list. The median age at which firms go public in America has risen from eight years in 1980-2000 to 11 years in 2001-25. SpaceX was a 20-something company before listing this year at a valuation of $1.8trn. Another perk of privacy is that cash-burning startups can raise repeated rounds of money in quick succession, a “pattern of financing that public markets handle poorly”, as Mr Phalippou points out.
2024年10月至2026年3月间,OpenAI在三轮融资中筹集了1700亿美元,每一轮都比上一轮规模更大。相比之下,上市公司必须向投资银行支付高昂费用,并承受市场的审视,而市场往往在企业表示需要更多资本时感到不满。
Between October 2024 and March 2026 OpenAI raised $170bn in three funding rounds, each bigger than the last. By contrast, public companies must fork over steep fees to investment banks and endure the scrutiny of the markets, which often displeasure when firms say they need more capital.
今年6月,Alphabet宣布将发行800亿美元新股,次日其股价下跌4%,市值蒸发1700亿美元。尽管私募市场不断发展,但与公开市场相比仍相形见绌。数据公司Preqin计算,目前北美私募市场中的资产价值近8.5万亿美元(包括私人信贷)。这是一个庞大的数字。但它仅相当于美国股市规模的12%。公开市场仍是最大的舞台。几乎所有有头有脸的人最终都会登场。只是这些初入社交界的新人往往在登场前年纪更大、也更富有。
When Alphabet announced it would issue $80bn in fresh equity in June, its share price fell by 4% the next day, wiping $170bn off its market capitalisation. Despite the growth of private markets, they are still dwarfed by their public rivals. Preqin, a data firm, calculates that the assets tucked away in North America’s private markets are now worth almost $8.5trn (including private credit). That is a big number. But it is equivalent to just 12% of the size of America’s stock markets. The public markets are still the biggest ball in town. Almost everyone who is anyone shows up eventually. The debutantes just tend to be older and richer before they make their entrance.