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非洲的经济未来不能依赖华盛顿Africa’s economic future cannot depend on Washington

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2023年11月4日,在约翰内斯堡纳斯雷克中心举行的《非洲增长与机会法案》(AGOA)会议会场外,亲巴勒斯坦示威者举着标语牌参加示威。2023年10月7日之后,巴勒斯坦人……(原文在此处中断)以来,已有数千名平民死亡,其中包括巴勒斯坦人和以色列人。Pro-Palestinian demonstrators hold placards at a demonstration outside the venue of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) meeting at the NASREC centre in Johannesburg on November 4, 2023. - Thousands of civilians, both Palestinians and Israelis, have died since October 7, 2023, after Palesti

9月2日,美国总统唐纳德·特朗普签署立法,将《非洲增长与机会法案》(AGOA)延长至2028年底,此前国会以压倒性多数表示支持。然而仅两个月后,即11月2日,其政府宣布计划从2027年1月1日起取消南非和卢旺达的该计划资格。

On September 2 , United States President Donald Trump signed legislation extending the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through the end of 2028, following overwhelming support in Congress. Yet just two months later, on November 2 , his administration announced plans to terminate the eligibility of South Africa and Rwanda for the programme from January 1, 2027.

这一决定暴露了《非洲增长与机会法案》的根本弱点:非洲经济体依赖的贸易特权,可随华盛顿政治优先事项的变化随时撤回。

The decision lays bare the fundamental weakness of AGOA: African economies depend on trade privileges that Washington can withdraw whenever its political priorities change.

《非洲增长与机会法案》是一项美国贸易法,目前涵盖33个符合条件的撒哈拉以南非洲国家。该法案于2000年5月18日颁布实施,旨在允许这些国家向美国市场免税出口数千种产品,并被宣传为促进经济增长、扩大美非贸易、鼓励经济和政治改革的战略机制。

AGOA is a US trade law that currently covers 33 eligible sub-Saharan African countries. It was enacted on May 18, 2000, to allow these countries to export thousands of products to the US market duty-free, and was promoted as a strategic mechanism to foster economic growth, expand trade between the US and the continent and encourage economic and political reforms.

《非洲增长与机会法案》初期成效显著。据估计,该法案在非洲直接支持了30多万个就业岗位,间接支持了130万个就业岗位。根据美国贸易代表办公室2024年报告,2023年美国与撒哈拉以南非洲的双向货物贸易额达475亿美元,其中根据《非洲增长与机会法案》和普惠制(GSP)进口的货物达97亿美元,其中非石油产品(如服装和农产品)达55亿美元。

AGOA initially delivered promising results. It is estimated to have supported more than 300,000 direct jobs across Africa and 1.3 million indirect jobs. According to a 2024 US Trade Representative report, two-way goods trade between the US and sub-Saharan Africa reached $47.5bn in 2023, including $9.7bn in imports under AGOA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), of which $5.5bn consisted of non-oil products such as apparel and agricultural goods.

然而,近期数据显示挑战加剧,甚至有迹象表明出现下滑。国会研究服务部(CRS)报告显示,享受《非洲增长与机会法案》免税待遇的美国进口额从2024年的79亿美元大幅下降至2025年的50亿美元。德国发展与可持续性研究所(IDOS)的另一项分析指出,在资格不确定性和短期续期窗口的影响下,享受《非洲增长与机会法案》和普惠制优惠待遇的美国自撒哈拉以南非洲进口份额,从2008年的80%以上暴跌至2021年的约24.7%。

However, recent figures point to growing challenges, with some even suggesting a decline. A Congressional Research Service report shows that US imports receiving AGOA duty-free treatment dropped sharply from $7.9bn in 2024 to $5bn in 2025. Another analysis by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) noted that the share of US imports from sub-Saharan Africa benefiting from AGOA and GSP preferences plummeted from more than 80 percent in 2008 to roughly 24.7 percent in 2021 amid eligibility uncertainty and short renewal windows.

只有少数符合条件的撒哈拉以南非洲国家获得了该计划的大部分利益。南非是最大受益国,每年向美国出口价值数十亿美元的商品,而大多数其他符合条件的国家难以充分利用其优惠待遇。

Only a few eligible sub-Saharan African countries capture most of the programme’s benefits. South Africa is its largest beneficiary, with exports to the US worth billions of dollars annually, while most other eligible countries struggle to make full use of its preferences.

此外,由于美国单方面管理该计划的优惠待遇,而非通过双边条约,华盛顿可以根据自身的评估和标准(包括市场改革、人权和劳工标准)排除或恢复任何符合条件国家的资格。

Furthermore, because the US administers the programme’s preferences unilaterally, rather than through a bilateral treaty, Washington can exclude or reinstate any eligible country based on its own assessments and criteria, including market reforms, human rights and labour standards.

自该计划启动以来,一些被暂停AGOA资格的国家批评了其被移除的影响。例如,埃塞俄比亚2022年被暂停资格导致成衣行业数千个就业岗位流失。

Since the programme’s inception, some countries suspended from AGOA have criticised the impact of their removal. Ethiopia’s suspension in 2022, for instance, led to the loss of thousands of garment sector jobs.

实际上,在资格决定中,华盛顿的地缘政治利益往往比AGOA声明的标准更具分量。

In practice, Washington’s geopolitical interests often carry more weight in eligibility decisions than AGOA’s stated criteria.

特朗普政府决定终止南非和卢旺达的AGOA资格,便是一个明确的例证。这两国都推行了与华盛顿利益相冲突、且被该政府视为威胁的政策。南非加强了与美国竞争对手中国和俄罗斯的经济和政治联系,同时面临华盛顿关于阻碍美国贸易和投资的指控,以及特朗普关于“白人种族灭绝”的指控。

The Trump administration’s decision to terminate South Africa’s and Rwanda’s AGOA eligibility is a clear case in point. Both countries have pursued policies that conflict with Washington’s interests and that the administration regards as a threat. South Africa has strengthened its economic and political ties with US rivals such as China and Russia, while facing accusations from Washington of obstructing American trade and investment, alongside Trump’s allegations of a “white genocide”.

卢旺达被指支持刚果民主共和国东部的M23反叛组织,这也使其与美国在该地区关键矿产方面的利益发生冲突。

Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has also brought it into conflict with US interests in the region’s critical minerals.

AGOA 进口额大幅下降、美国贸易政策不稳定以及短期延期,使非洲出口商处于高度脆弱的境地。失去 AGOA 资格会立即导致关税挫折,包括部分产品关税上涨 15% 至 20%。归根结底,这些不可预测的延期阻碍了 AGOA 建立自给自足的非洲工业基础,使加快实施非洲大陆自由贸易区(AfCFTA)成为该大陆当务之急。

Sharp declines in AGOA import values, unstable US trade policies, and short-term extensions leave African exporters highly vulnerable. Losing AGOA access triggers immediate customs setbacks, including tariff increases of 15 to 20 percent on some products. Ultimately, these unpredictable extensions prevent AGOA from building a self-sustaining African industrial base, making accelerated implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) an urgent priority for the continent.

非洲的经济愿景不能继续沦为更迭政府政策或国外单方面决定的人质,因为该大陆需要建立战略韧性和经济独立性。AfCFTA 是一项历史性贸易协定,于 2018 年 3 月 21 日在卢旺达基加利,在非洲联盟(AU)主持下签署,于 2019 年 5 月 30 日正式生效,2021 年 1 月 1 日开始贸易。

Africa’s economic vision cannot remain hostage to changing administrations’ policies or unilateral decisions made abroad, as the continent needs to build strategic resilience and economic independence. The AfCFTA is a historic trade agreement signed under the auspices of the African Union (AU) on March 21, 2018, in Kigali, Rwanda, which officially entered into force on May 30, 2019, with trading beginning on January 1, 2021.

该协定旨在将非洲联盟成员国纳入一个拥有 13 亿多人口、国内生产总值(GDP)合计超过 3.4 万亿美元的统一市场。

The agreement aims to bring African Union member states into a unified market of over 1.3 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) exceeding $3.4 trillion.

依托庞大的区域市场将减轻外部冲击的影响,例如撤销 AGOA 等优惠贸易协定或突然征收高额关税。鉴于非洲国家间贸易目前仅占该大陆贸易总额的约 15% 至 18%,AfCFTA 旨在逐步取消 90% 税目上的关税,从而刺激内部贸易,并为因关税波动导致的西方市场下滑提供缓冲。

Relying on a vast regional market would mitigate the impact of external shocks, such as the revocation of preferential trade agreements like AGOA or the sudden imposition of steep tariffs. Given that trade between African nations currently accounts for only about 15–18 percent of the continent’s total trade, the AfCFTA aims to progressively eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of tariff lines, thereby stimulating internal commerce and providing a buffer against declines in Western markets caused by tariff fluctuations.

AGOA 和许多其他外部协定在很大程度上使非洲长期处于原材料供应商的角色。相比之下,AfCFTA 鼓励发展区域价值链,即一个非洲国家生产原材料,另一个国家将其加工成成品,最终产品在较少关税壁垒的情况下销售给大陆内的消费者。

AGOA and many other external agreements have largely kept Africa in the role of a raw material supplier. In contrast, the AfCFTA encourages the development of regional value chains, where one African nation might produce raw materials, another processes them into finished goods, and the final product is sold to consumers within the continent, with fewer tariff barriers.

非洲大陆自由贸易区(AfCFTA)在制定大陆贸易所需工具方面取得了显著进展。参与该协定项下贸易倡议的国家数量已增至包括南非、埃及、尼日利亚、加纳、肯尼亚、卢旺达和突尼斯,这些国家正利用其优惠关税安排。

AfCFTA has made notable progress in developing the instruments needed for continental trade. The number of countries participating in trade initiatives under the agreement has grown to include South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Tunisia, making use of its preferential tariff arrangements.

泛非支付与结算系统(PAPSS)于2022年1月13日启动,使银行和金融机构能够以非洲货币进行跨境交易,减少了对美元等外币的依赖。

The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), launched on January 13, 2022, enables banks and financial institutions to conduct cross-border transactions in African currencies, reducing reliance on foreign currencies such as the US dollar.

非洲联盟还于2023年2月通过了竞争政策议定书,并于2024年2月通过了数字贸易议定书,旨在促进公平竞争和便利电子商务。2026年8月,AfCFTA秘书处签署了一项协议,以实现海关系统的现代化和数字化。AfCFTA调整基金也已启动,预计融资需求为80亿至100亿美元,旨在支持发展中国家和中小企业(SME)适应单一市场的要求。

The African Union also adopted protocols on competition policy in February 2023 and digital trade in February 2024, aimed at promoting fair competition and facilitating e-commerce. In August 2026, the AfCFTA Secretariat signed an agreement to modernise and digitise customs systems. The AfCFTA Adjustment Fund has also been activated, with an estimated financing requirement of $8bn–$10bn, to support developing countries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as they adapt to the requirements of the single market.

为了使AfCFTA发挥其作用,并减少对优先考虑西方利益而非非洲利益的易变全球贸易协定的依赖,非洲大陆仍需通过消除关税和非关税壁垒、协调贸易和监管政策,加快经济一体化进程,以促进商品和服务的顺畅流动。

For AfCFTA to serve its purpose and reduce dependence on volatile global trade agreements that prioritise Western interests over those of Africa, the continent still needs to accelerate economic integration by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and harmonising trade and regulatory policies to facilitate the smooth movement of goods and services.

为改善本地市场,非洲国家必须进行建设跨境基础设施所涉及的昂贵且高风险投资,以降低非洲国家间商品和服务流动的成本。数字能源网络将成为这一基础设施的关键组成部分,与道路和铁路同等重要。

To improve local markets, African countries must undertake the costly and risky investments involved in building cross-border infrastructure to reduce the cost of moving goods and services between African countries. Digital energy grids will be essential to this infrastructure, alongside roads and railways.

非洲必须从单纯出口原材料转向建设强大的区域价值链,专注于本地制造和创新。满足该大陆庞大市场的需求将增强其经济自给自足能力,并降低其对外部政治决策和单边贸易协定到期的脆弱性。

Africa must shift from simply exporting raw materials to building strong regional value chains focused on local manufacturing and innovation. Meeting the needs of the continent’s vast market would strengthen its economic self-sufficiency and reduce its vulnerability to external political decisions and the expiration of unilateral trade agreements.

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