
关于“让美国再次伟大”运动是否会在唐纳德·特朗普退休后存续的问题,正以越来越高的频率被提出。但这个问题偏离了要点,因为MAGA并非一场运动,而是一个松散、庞杂的大杂烩,靠特朗普先生的个人魅力勉强维系在一起。
The question whether the Make America Great Again movement will survive the retirement of Donald Trump arises with increasing frequency. But the question misses the point, inasmuch as MAGA isn’t a movement but a loose, baggy amalgam held together by Mr. Trump’s personality.
这丝毫没有妨碍一系列智库学者、顾问和评论员试图将特朗普先生复杂、多变且往往自相矛盾的言行,打造成一个连贯的执政哲学。人们可以理解寻找统一理论的冲动,但特朗普先生不会允许。他是任命制衡自己的法官的强人,是钟情于国家规划和保护主义的自由放任资本家,是抓捕外国独裁者、轰炸敌对政权的“美国优先”孤立主义者,是亲亿万富翁的工人阶级民粹主义者。而这只是周二的情况。
That has never stopped an array of think-tankers, consultants and pundits from trying to fashion Mr. Trump’s complicated, protean and very often contradictory words and actions into a coherent governing philosophy. You can appreciate the impulse to find a unified theory, but Mr. Trump won’t allow it. He is a strongman who appoints judges who check him, a laissez-faire capitalist with a penchant for state planning and protectionism, an America-first isolationist who nabs foreign dictators and bombs hostile regimes, a pro-billionaire working-class populist. And that’s on a Tuesday.
共和党长达十年的“多面手”实验带来了胜利也招致了惨败,但其政治效果是让这个党忘记了如何向公众阐述宏大理念。除少数令人敬佩的例外,共和党政客只有在嘲讽“建制派”在过去某个时代所谓持有的信仰时,才会谈论理念和政策。
The GOP’s decadelong experiment with Mr. Multitudes has brought triumphs and debacles, but the political effect is a party that forgot how to present big ideas to the public. Republican pols, with a few noble exceptions, talk about ideas and policies only when lampooning beliefs supposedly held by the “establishment” in some bygone era.
去年,共和党通过了一项温和但在道德上站得住脚的医疗补助资格规则改革,他们有充分动机从实质上为其辩护。民主党理所当然会将此举描绘成阴暗可怕的样子,而非其本来面目:一项减少依赖的仁慈举措,以及对美国职业道德的渐进式强化。但大多数共和党只知道谈论把非法移民踢出福利名单,而实际上极少数非法移民享受福利。民主党正如所有人预料的那样,指责共和党纯粹出于冷酷无情而削减医疗补助,并收获了选举红利。
Last year, when Republicans passed a modest but morally creditable reform to Medicaid eligibility rules, they had every incentive to defend it on the merits. Democrats could be counted on to portray the move in a lurid light, rather than as what it was: a humane effort to lessen dependency and an incremental reinforcement of the American work ethic. But all most Republicans knew how to talk about was kicking illegal aliens off the welfare rolls, which very few are on anyway. Democrats, as anyone could have predicted, accused Republicans of cutting Medicaid out of sheer heartlessness and reaped the electoral rewards.
阅读各种关于“与美国契约”及1994年中期选战的记述。那整个运动——那确实是一场运动——充满了思想与政策抱负:要求预算平衡、任期限制、“量刑真相”与侵权法改革、税级指数化、对救助接受者施加工作要求,等等,不胜枚举。并非所有议程都成了法律,但几乎所有内容在选民看来都讲得通。共和党在参议院增夺8席、众议院增夺54席,比尔·克林顿从左翼人士变身为三角战略改革派。
Read various accounts of the Contract With America and the 1994 midterm elections. The whole movement—now there was a movement—teemed with ideas and policy aspirations: a balanced budget requirement, term limits, “truth in sentencing” and tort reforms, indexation of tax brackets, work requirements for aid recipients and a great deal more. Not all of the agenda went into law, but nearly all of it made sense to the electorate. Republicans picked up eight Senate and 54 House seats, and Bill Clinton went from left-winger to triangulating reformist.
认为如今的共和党能尝试任何如此宏大、实质性且不含流行语煽动的举措,会让共和党老一辈发笑。许多人想怪特朗普导致该党在政策上文盲,这有一定道理。但共和党2016年聘用他并非为了推行任何一套政策,唯独移民限制除外。他人气的根源在于2014-15年的文化剧变,从婚姻的重新定义、“性别转换”的突然常态化,到高校因系统性种族主义爆发抗议,以及品味引领者对“黑人的命也是命”骚乱的点头称许。
The idea that today’s Republican Party could attempt anything so ambitious, substantive and free of buzzword-laced demagoguery will draw a laugh from GOP oldsters. Many will want to blame Mr. Trump for the party’s illiteracy on policy, and there’s something to that. But Republicans didn’t hire him in 2016 to push any set of policies, excepting only immigration curtailment. The origins of his popularity lay in the cultural convulsions of 2014-15, from the redefinition of marriage and sudden normalization of “gender transitioning” to university protests over systemic racism and the tastemakers’ nodding approval of Black Lives Matter riots.
特朗普的参选在2000年和2012年均告无果,却在万事皆感混乱的时刻变得合理。共和党聘用他作为一名全能抵抗战士。十年后,党内相当大一部分人,包括一群网络拳师,想永远处于游击战状态。战争自有其功能——进步左派这十年来并未变得不那么激进。但选民在11月3日明确表明,他们根本不知道共和党代表什么。目的论真空让共和党变得难以理解、毫无吸引力。
Mr. Trump’s candidacy, which had come to nothing in 2000 and 2012, made sense at a moment when everything felt haywire. Republicans hired him as an all-purpose resistance fighter. A decade later, a hefty chunk of the party, including an assortment of online pugilists, wants to remain in a state of perpetual guerilla warfare. Warfare has its function—the progressive left hasn’t become any less aggressive over the past decade. But the voting public made clear on Nov. 3 that it has no idea what the GOP stands for. A teleological vacuum has made the GOP unintelligible and unattractive.
未来一两个月,关于共和党前途与保守主义走向的研讨会将在华盛顿接连举行,但最亟待解决的争论比任何具体政策都更为基础。国务卿马尔科·鲁比奥每当发表演讲或讲话,其前提都是认为美国及其资产阶级资本主义经济从根本上讲是好的,而海外敌人从根本上讲不是,他每一次发声都在为这场争论选边站队。
Confabs about the future of the Republican Party and conservatism will proliferate in Washington over the next month or two, but the argument that most needs resolution is more basic than any set of policies. Secretary of State Marco Rubio takes a side in this argument each time he delivers a speech or makes remarks premised on the belief that America and its bourgeois capitalist economy are fundamentally good and our enemies abroad fundamentally are not.
几年前你绝不会相信,右翼内部如今出现了另一种声音。并非少数的保守派——虽远未成多数,却极其喧嚣——不太喜欢美国,或者不喜欢美国现有的体制,又或者认为得等到未来某场文化革命之后,美国才值得捍卫。
You wouldn’t have believed it a few years ago, but there’s now another side on the right. A not insignificant number of conservatives, far from a majority but extremely loud, doesn’t like America all that much—or doesn’t like the way it’s configured, or thinks it’ll be worthier of defense after some coming cultural revolution.
鲜有人直白表态,但你能从一些所谓“国家保守主义者”和“后自由主义者”的宣言中听到这种声音:他们想要自上而下的经济,对美国的文化颓废抨击得如此猛烈,让人不禁怀疑他们为何还不移民匈牙利。你也能从副总统JD·万斯对JD·万斯之前美国政治和决策中一切事物表现出的蔑视中听到这种声音。塔克·卡尔森作为阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德的支持者,为这种怀疑美国的观点提供了最纯粹的注脚——在这种视角里,对以色列的厌恶恰如其分地契合其中,鉴于那个国家与这个国家的相似之处。
Few put it so straightforwardly, but you hear it in the pronouncements of some so-called national conservatives and postliberals who want a top-down economy and who rail at America’s cultural decadence so vehemently that you wonder why they haven’t yet emigrated to Hungary. You hear it in Vice President JD Vance’s expressions of contempt for everything in American politics and policymaking that came before JD Vance. Tucker Carlson, backer of Abdul El-Sayed, gives purest voice to the America-skeptical outlook—one in which dislike of Israel fits snugly, given the similarities between that country and this one.
共和党的在职官员和候选人若想从这后一派思潮中寻找政治信息,尚未充分考虑到:美国已有一个主要政党致力于对美国进行彻底批判——而那不是他们的政党。
Republican officeholders and candidates tempted to find a political message in this latter school of thought haven’t sufficiently considered that America already has a major party given to root-and-branch criticisms of the United States—and it isn’t theirs.