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B-1B突然从英国空军基地撤离,凸显出飞机掩体投资严重不足的问题Glaring Lack Of Investment In Aircraft Shelters Highlighted By B-1B’s Sudden Retreat From U.K. Airbase

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2026年7月29日费尔福德皇家空军基地的卫星图像,显示12架B-1轰炸机在露天停机坪上相对紧密地排列在一起。图片版权 © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。A satellite image of RAF Fairford on July 29, 2026, showing 12 B-1 bombers packed relatively tightly together out in open parking spaces. PHOTO © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

目前有多份报道称,由于伊朗可能发动近距离无人机袭击的威胁,美国空军B-1“枪骑兵”轰炸机已于周末离开英国。这种袭击方式与乌克兰的“蜘蛛网行动”极为相似,而该行动曾重创俄罗斯轰炸机。尽管许多具体细节尚未得到证实,但TWZ多年来一直警告称,这种攻击方式完全有可能发生。

Multiple reports now say that U.S. Air Force B-1 Lancers left the United Kingdom over the weekend due to the threat of an Iranian-directed near-field drone attack broadly akin to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb that decimated Russian bombers. Though many specific details are still unconfirmed, this is an entirely plausible mode of attack that TWZ has been warning about for many years now .

针对停在地面上飞机的短程和长程无人机威胁,如今已完全从理论变为现实。在与伊朗的冲突中出现的损失也证明了这一点,甚至非国家行为体也越来越多地展现出此类能力。尽管露天停机坪上的飞机面临的风险日益增加,五角大楼却迟迟不愿建造加固的飞机掩体及其他加固的空军基地基础设施。

Short- and long-range drone threats against parked aircraft have now morphed fully from theory to reality, as also demonstrated by losses in the course of the conflict with Iran , and even non-state actors are increasingly brandishing these capabilities. Despite the increasing dangers posed to planes out on open flightlines , the Pentagon continues to drag its feet on building hardened aircraft shelters and other fortified air base infrastructure .

在周日这些轰炸机仓促且意外地离开之前,B-1轰炸机自3月起便持续部署在雷丁空军基地(RAF Fairford),最初是为了支持针对伊朗的“史诗怒火行动”(Operation Epic Fury)。此前,一批B-52轰炸机也曾从该基地对伊朗发动打击,但已于7月返回。该基地是美国军队在英国的重要作战枢纽,经常部署战略飞机,包括轰炸机和U-2侦察机。

Before the hasty and unexpected departure of the bombers on Sunday , B-1s had been deployed to RAF Fairford continuously since March, initially in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. A contingent of B-52s had also conducted strikes on Iran from Fairford, but left back in July . The base is a major operational hub for the U.S. military in the United Kingdom, and regularly hosts strategic aircraft, including bombers and U-2 spy planes.

英国ITV新闻的美国记者丹·里弗斯(Dan Rivers)是周一最早报道此事的人之一。他援引一位匿名消息人士称,B-1轰炸机的迅速撤离,是由于担心伊朗可能下令发动类似“蜘蛛网行动”的无人机袭击。随后,其他媒体也报道了类似细节,所有消息均来自匿名的美国和英国官员。

Dan Rivers, U.S. correspondent for ITV News in the United Kingdom, was among the first to report on Monday that the B-1’s quick departure had been prompted by concerns about a potential Spiderweb-like drone attack ordered by Iran, citing an unnamed source. Other outlets have subsequently reported similar details , all sourced to anonymous U.S. and British officials.

去年,乌克兰发动了史无前例的“蜘蛛网行动”,通过携带炸药的四轴飞行器型无人机,对俄罗斯各地的空军基地同时发动了隐蔽的近距离袭击。至少10架俄罗斯轰炸机以及多种其他飞机,因停放在露天停机坪上而被摧毁。

Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb last year involved simultaneous covert near-field attacks using explosive-laden quadcopter-type drones on airbases across Russia. At least 10 Russian bombers, as well as a variety of other aircraft , all parked on open flightlines, were destroyed.

“他们并非意外飞离的,”美国总统唐纳德·特朗普周一在白宫接受记者群访时回答有关B-1轰炸机为何离开费尔福德的问题时表示,“当时存在一些威胁。”

“They didn’t fly out by accident,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters during a gaggle at the White House on Monday when asked about why the B-1s had left Fairford.

2026年7月29日,一颗卫星图像显示B-1轰炸机停放在费尔福德皇家空军基地的露天区域。照片 © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。

“There were some threats.”A satellite image showing B-1s parked in the open at RAF Fairford on July 29, 2026. PHOTO © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

“我不能告诉你具体情况,但如果他们真的这么做了,将会付出沉重代价,”特朗普在回答另一个关于伊朗是否可能成功将武装无人机带入英国的问题时补充道。

“I can’t tell you that, but if they did, they’ll suffer greatly,” Trump added in response to a separate question about whether Iran might have been managed to get weaponized drones into the United Kingdom.

“你看到的情况是,战争部长(皮特·赫格塞斯)出于极度谨慎的考虑,试图保护我们的士兵,”美国副总统J.D.万斯周一在另一场新闻发布会上表示。“我们相当确信,伊朗人正在——他们正试图做伊朗国家过去49年来一直在做的事,即针对美国以及许多其他国家实施恐怖主义活动。因此,我们正采取极其谨慎的态度。”另一张卫星图像展示了费尔福德皇家空军基地的全景。

“What you saw there was the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth], out of an abundance of caution, trying to protect our guys,” U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said during a separate press engagement on Monday. “We do feel, with some confidence, that the Iranians are – they’re trying to do what the Iranian state has done for 49 years, which is engage in acts of terrorism against the United States, and a lot of other people, as well. So, we are being extremely cautious.”Another satellite image offering an overall view of RAF Fairford. Google Earth

2026年7月29日费尔福德皇家空军基地,卫星图像显示B-1轰炸机停放在露天区域。图片版权 © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。A satellite image showing B-1s parked in the open at RAF Fairford on July 29, 2026. PHOTO © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

谷歌地球此外值得注意的是,英国当局曾在9月27日逮捕了五名男子,他们被怀疑驾驶载有炸弹的面朝该基地行驶。由于在车辆中未发现爆炸物,这些人随后被保释。美国和英国官员也提到了该事件可能与伊朗有关的可能性。

It’s also worth noting here that British authorities had arrested five men on suspicion of driving bomb-laden vans toward the base back on September 27. Those individuals were released on bail after no explosives were found in the vehicles. U.S. and British Officials have also raised the possibility of an Iranian link to that incident .

“我们已经记录了上周[费尔福德附近]发生的情况。我不会直接将此事与这次调动联系起来,”美国国务卿兼国家安全顾问马可·卢比奥周一也对媒体表示。“你们之所以关注费尔福德有多少架飞机,完全是因为上周发生的威胁。”

“We’ve documented what happened [near Fairford] last week. I wouldn’t just directly tie that to the move that was made,” U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio also told members of the press on Monday . “The only reason why you guys are focused on how many planes are at Fairford is because of the threat that happened last week.”

另一张提供费尔福德皇家空军基地全景的卫星图像。Google EarthAnother satellite image offering an overall view of RAF Fairford. Google Earth

“我们对所有基地的安全都充满信心,因为理论上,我们所有的基地随时都可能受到威胁,”他补充道。

“We have confidence in the security of all of our bases, because all of our bases are [sic] theoretically could be threatened at any moment,” he added.

尽管鲁比奥发表了上述言论,但特朗普和范斯的发言清楚地表明,近期确实存在某些威胁情报,促使当局决定将轰炸机从费尔福德基地撤离。关于潜在袭击的具体性质以及危险究竟有多迫在眉睫,目前仍存在诸多疑问。

Rubio’s comments notwithstanding, the remarks from Trump and Vance make clear that there was some recent threat intelligence that contributed to the decision to pull the bombers from Fairford. There are still many questions about the exact nature of the potential attacks, and how imminent, or not, the danger may have been.

无论如何,如前所述,由近距离行动者对费尔福德这类基地发动近距离无人机袭击的可能性极高,而实施此类行动的技术门槛也相对较低。“蜘蛛网”行动或许以戏剧性的方式将这一现实推到了公众面前,但这种危险远早于该行动,甚至早于2022年俄罗斯对乌克兰的全面入侵。

Regardless, as mentioned, the prospect of a near-field drone attack on a base like Fairford carried out by actors in close proximity is extremely plausible, and the barrier to entry to such an operation is relatively low. Spiderweb may have thrust this reality into the public consciousness in dramatic fashion , but the danger well predates that operation, and even the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

在过去十年左右的时间里,TWZ一直在定期报道无人机侵入美国及外国军事设施、关键基础设施以及海外美国海军舰艇的事件,并重点揭示了正是这类威胁。弗吉尼亚州的兰利空军基地和路易斯安那州的巴克斯代尔空军基地,作为美国国内最具战略意义的空军基地之一,过去也曾面临过此类问题。尤其是兰利事件之后,公众终于意识到我们多年来一直报道的事实:美国甚至无法掌控其最核心军事设施上空的领空。

TWZ has been highlighting exactly these kinds of threats in the course of a decade or so now of regular reporting on drone incursions over U.S. and foreign military facilities and critical infrastructure , as well as American naval vessels operating offshore . Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana , some of America’s most strategic airbases domestically, are among the facilities that have had to grapple with this in the past. After the Langley incident, in particular, it had become clear to the larger public what we had been reporting for many years, that the United States does not control the airspace over even its most critical military installations.

这一问题同样延伸至海外。2024年11月,英国多个空军基地(包括费尔福德皇家空军基地)及其周边地区接连出现无人机。近年来,这种情况在欧洲范围内也日益普遍。今年8月,德国一机场试图对一架乌克兰安-124运输机发动无人机袭击,进一步凸显了这一问题,而德国当局已将此次袭击归咎于俄罗斯。

This all extends overseas, as well. In November 2024, there was a rash of drone sightings over and around several airbases in the United Kingdom, including RAF Fairford . This has been an issue more broadly in Europe in recent years , as well. This was only further underscored by an attempted drone attack on a Ukrainian An-124 at an airport in Germany in August, which authorities in that country have blamed on Russia .

又一段俄罗斯在欧盟境内实施恐怖主义活动的最新画面显示,一架载有炸药的无人机停放在莱比锡/哈勒机场的停机坪上,距离一架乌克兰安东诺夫An-124运输机仅数米之遥。据德国当局称,该无人机搭载的是一枚简易…… pic.twitter.com/DbRz87wgIv— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) 2026年8月5日对费尔福德发动无人机袭击,也不一定非得从附近地区发起。

New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft. According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised…pic.twitter.com/DbRz87wgIv — SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026 A drone attack on Fairford would also not necessarily have had to come from somewhere very close by.

远程单向攻击性无人机正不断扩散,它们既可以从地面阵地发射,也可以从海上舰艇发射。在三月份一份FBI警报泄露后,TWZ探讨了海上无人机袭击这一切实存在的威胁,包括秘密实施的袭击,以及伊朗在全球范围内执行此类袭击的具体能力。

Longer-range one-way attack drones are steadily proliferating, and can be launched using a variety of methods from positions on the ground, as well as vessels at sea. TWZ explored the very real threat of sea-based drone attacks, including ones conducted covertly, and Iran’s specific ability to carry them out globally, following the leak of an FBI alert back in March.

低端单向攻击性无人机的扩散,使得精确制导攻击“民主化”了,甚至非国家行为体也能使用。在人工智能和机器学习发展的推动下,自动化目标锁定能力的部署也变得越来越普遍。这项技术很快将能让这些武器自主寻找并攻击移动目标。即使无人操控,且无人机不发出任何可探测的无线电信号,仅凭基本的地图坐标或谷歌地球,仍然可以对固定目标(如空军基地内已知的飞机停放区)发动非常有效的精确攻击。

The proliferation of lower-end one-way-attack drones has ‘democratized’ precision-guided attacks, even for non-state actors . The fielding of automated targeting capabilities, driven by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is also becoming more and more widespread. That technology will soon enable these weapons to find and strike even moving targets on their own. Even without anyone at the controls and without the drone putting out any detectable radio emissions, very effective precision attacks can still be launched at static targets, like known parking areas for aircraft at airbases, just by using basic map coordinates or Google Earth.

此外还需要指出的是,“远程打击”的定义正变得越来越模糊,就连四轴飞行器也能飞越数英里,根据一组GPS坐标对目标发动自杀式袭击。

It’s also worth pointing out here that the definition of a stand-off attack is becoming increasingly blurry, with even quadcopter-type drones capable of flying miles away to conduct a kamikaze attack on a target based on a set of GPS coordinates.

具备人工智能能力的乌克兰“萨克尔”无人机。视频展示了其目标识别过程。据报道,该无人机已经多次用于打击俄罗斯目标。pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) 2024年1月25日总体而言,一个无可争议的事实是:停放在露天停机线上的飞机尤其容易受到无人机攻击以及其他威胁。美国军方官员自己也承认了这一点。

Ukrainian Saker UAV with AI capabilities. The video shows the process of target recognition. It has reportedly already been put to use several times against Russian targets. pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP — NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) January 25, 2024 Overall, it is an indisputable fact that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to drone attacks, as well as other threats. This is something U.S. military officials have acknowledged themselves .

在费尔福德基地,B-1轰炸机和其他轰炸机别无选择,只能停放在基地外围清晰可见的开阔区域,这反映了美国军用飞机在国内外通常的停放方式。正如我们在2017年就写过的:“类似的蜂群攻击也可能在战线后方发动,而价格昂贵、密度低但需求量大的战斗机尤其容易受到这种战术的威胁——詹姆斯·霍姆斯将军在与美国空军协会讲话时无意中提到了这一点:‘想象一下,有人驾驶数百架这样的无人机,其中一架仅携带小型武器,就能钻进我的F-22的进气口。’

Fairford, where B-1s and other bombers have no option but to park out in the open in well-established areas that are plainly visible from outside the base’s immediate perimeter, is indicative of how American military aircraft are generally positioned on the ground abroad and at home. As we wrote all the way back in 2017: “ Similar swarming strikes could be unleashed behind the front lines as well, with hugely expensive and low density/high demand combat aircraft being especially vulnerable to this sort of tactic—something General James Holmes alluded to inadvertently while speaking to the Air Force Association, stating: ‘Imagine a world where somebody flies a couple hundred of those and flies one down the intake of my F-22s with just a small weapon on it.’

实际上,直接攻击停放在停机线上静止且毫无防备的战机甚至更容易。一个蜂群就能摧毁整个机群中密集排列的战斗机,而它们甚至没有机会反击。”

Actually, it would be even easier to just strike the jets as they sit idle and vulnerable on the flight line. One swarm could see a whole squadron of tightly packed fighters destroyed without even having a chance to fight back.

这张拍摄于3月7日费尔福德基地的B-1轰炸机照片,展示了轰炸机和其他飞机在该基地的典型停放方式。沿着围栏排成一列的摄影师也凸显了这些停机位距离基地外围有多近。 里,美国军界内部及外部围绕投资新建加固飞机掩体及其他防御性基础设施的价值问题,展开了一场激烈的辩论。

“This picture of a B-1 at Fairford on March 7 shows how bombers and other aircraft are typically parked at the base. The line of photographers along the fence line also underscores how close those parking spots are to the base’s immediate perimeter. JUSTIN TALLIS / AFP via Getty Images With all this in mind, a heated debate has emerged in the past few years in and around the U.S. military about the value of investing in new hardened aircraft shelters , as well as other fortified infrastructure.

迄今为止,尤其是美国空军,几乎将所有重点都放在了地对空导弹和其他主动防御手段,以及飞机分散部署上,而非物理加固。在与伊朗的冲突中,多架美军飞机在地面遭到无人机和导弹袭击而受损或被摧毁,这凸显了这些策略的局限性。第二角度。pic.twitter.com/NUupdRkdm9— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) 2026年3月29日“我不太喜欢加固基础设施,”肯尼斯·威尔斯巴赫将军在2023年航空航天力量协会年度主要研讨会的圆桌会议上表示,这一观点是这一立场的典型例子。

To date, the U.S. Air Force, in particular , has put virtually all emphasis on surface-to-air missiles and other active defenses , as well as the dispersal of aircraft , over physical hardening. The conflict with Iran, in which a number of American military aircraft have been damaged or destroyed on the ground by drone and missile attacks, has underscored the limits of these strategies. Second angle. pic.twitter.com/NUupdRkdm9 — OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 29, 2026 “I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said at a roundtable at the Air and Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium in 2023, offering a prime example of this viewpoint.

这张3月7日拍摄于费尔福德的B-1轰炸机照片展示了轰炸机和其他飞机在该基地的典型停放方式。围栏边的一排摄影师也凸显了这些停机位距离基地外围有多近。JUSTIN TALLIS / AFP via Getty ImagesThis picture of a B-1 at Fairford on March 7 shows how bombers and other aircraft are typically parked at the base. The line of photographers along the fence line also underscores how close those parking spots are to the base’s immediate perimeter. JUSTIN TALLIS / AFP via Getty Images

“原因在于精确制导武器的出现……你们看到了我们对伊拉克空军及其加固飞机掩体的所作所为。当你用一枚2000磅的炸弹直接穿透屋顶时,它们就不那么坚固了。”

“The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons … you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”

当时,威尔斯巴赫是太平洋空军(PACAF)的指挥官。他随后成为空中作战司令部(ACC)的负责人,目前担任美国空军参谋长,是该军种的最高军官。

Wilsbach was commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at the time. He subsequently became head of ACC and is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.

“我认为我不想在加固掩体上花太多钱。除非你打算把东西埋到地下100英尺或更深,否则我们可以炸毁它,他们也可以,”威尔斯巴赫在今年七月接受《Breaking Defense》采访时被明确问及他的立场是否改变时说道。“因此,建造一个能抵御打击的掩体在经济上是不划算的。”

“I think that I don’t want to spend a lot of money on hardening shelters. Unless you’re going to send something 100 feet or more underground, we can blow it up, and so can they,” Wilsbach said in an interview with Breaking Defense in July of this year when asked explicitly if his position changed. “So, the economics of building a shelter that is impervious to a strike doesn’t work.”

美国空军参谋长肯·威尔斯巴赫将军于2026年7月13日在英国米尔登霍尔皇家空军基地(RAF Mildenhall)与人员通话时发表讲话,该基地是位于英国的另一处基地。美国空军“我认为,从经济角度看,利用能够拦截来袭弹药的体系保卫你的领空和地面空间,比建造掩体更有优势,”他补充道。“有些人会争辩说,你应该两者都做。好吧,那会更昂贵。而且另一件事是,掩体是无法移动的。”

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach speaks during an all-call with personnel at RAF Mildenhall, another base in the United Kingdom, on July 13, 2026. USAF “I think the economics favor defending your airspace, defending your ground space with systems that can defeat the incoming rounds, versus building a shelter,” he added. “Some people would argue, well, you should do both. Well, that’s even more expensive. And the other thing is, the shelter doesn’t go anywhere.”

2026年7月13日,美国空军参谋长肯·威尔斯巴赫(Ken Wilsbach)将军在英国另一个基地米尔登霍尔皇家空军基地与人员进行全体会议时发表讲话。美国空军U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach speaks during an all-call with personnel at RAF Mildenhall, another base in the United Kingdom, on July 13, 2026. USAF

需要指出的是,典型的地上加固飞机掩体并非坚不可摧,尤其在面对弹道导弹、巡航导弹以及某些空射威胁时更是如此。此外,任何大型军事建设项目都还需要考虑高昂的成本及其他诸多因素。

It is fair to point out that typical above-ground hardened aircraft shelters are not invulnerable, especially to attacks involving ballistic, cruise, and certain air-launched threats. There are also substantial cost and other factors to consider when it comes to any major military construction effort.

话虽如此,拥有更多加固基础设施也会给对手带来成本与复杂性的负担,因为他们必须投入更先进、更昂贵的弹药和其他资源,才能确保目标被彻底摧毁。首先,掩体还有一个附带好处:它通过模糊飞机实际部署的位置,使敌人的目标锁定过程变得更加困难。即使掩体内部空无一人,对手也必须将其视为满载状态。

That being said, having more hardened infrastructure also imposes costs and complexities on opponents, who have to dedicate more advanced and costly munitions and other resources to ensure targets are neutralized. Shelters have the knock-on benefit of complicating the targeting process for an enemy by obscuring where aircraft are or are not positioned, to begin with. An opponent has to treat shelters like they are full even if they are empty.

当人们想到加固飞机掩体时,通常会联想到冷战时期典型的钢筋混凝土结构。然而,只要实用,这些掩体并不一定都必须按照统一的标准建造,也不必在所有方面都具备同等程度的加固能力。短程无人机攻击通常由携带小型爆炸物或专门设计用于投掷小型子炸弹的平台执行。即便是射程更远、用于单向攻击的无人机,其弹头通常也小于传统导弹,而且撞击时产生的动能也更低。

When thinking about hardened aircraft shelters, stereotypical Cold War-era reinforced concrete structures typically come to mind. However, they do not all have to be built to a one-size-fits-all standard with the same degree of hardening across the board to be useful. Shorter-range drone attacks are typically carried out by platforms carrying small explosive charges or that are designed to drop small bomblets . Even longer-range one-way-attack drones generally have smaller warheads than traditional missiles, they also hit with less kinetic energy.

一架美国空军F-16战斗机停放在传统的加固飞机掩体内。美国空军一种能够抵御小型爆炸和弹片(包括可轻易在广阔区域散开的集束弹药)的结构,就需要更强大的武器才能有效摧毁。这甚至可能包括能够提供足够隐蔽性和保护力的移动或临时掩体。

A US Air Force F-16 fighter sits inside a traditional hardened aircraft shelter. USAF A structure that shields against smaller blasts and shrapnel, also including from cluster munitions that can be readily scattered across wide areas, is one that then has to be addressed by more capable weapons. This could even include mobile or otherwise temporary shelters that offer sufficient concealment and protection.

一架美国空军F-16战斗机停放在传统的加固型飞机掩体中。美国空军A US Air Force F-16 fighter sits inside a traditional hardened aircraft shelter. USAF

这张照片展示了美国空军在2023年“胡杜海”演习中使用的“便携式伪装、隐蔽与欺骗机库原型”。美国空军国民警卫队。该便携式机库原型旨在支持伪装、隐蔽与欺骗行动,于2023年在一场由空军国民警卫队主导的演习中投入使用。美国空军国民警卫队消除或至少大幅降低最低层级的威胁,会给对手制造困境,迫使他们判断是否值得尝试某些类型的攻击。

This picture shows what the Air Force described as a “prototype portable camouflage, concealment, and deception hangar” in use during Exercise Hoodoo Sea in 2023. Air National Guard The prototype portable hangar intended to support camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in use during an Air National Guard-led exercise in 2023. Air National Guard Eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the lowest rung of threats creates a dilemma for opponents, who then have to decide whether it is even worthwhile to attempt certain types of attacks.

这张照片展示了空军所称的“原型便携式伪装、隐蔽和欺骗机库”,该机库在2023年的“巫毒海”(Hoodoo Sea)演习中使用。空军国民警卫队,该原型便携式机库旨在支持伪装、隐蔽和欺骗工作,在空军演习中使用。This picture shows what the Air Force described as a “prototype portable camouflage, concealment, and deception hangar” in use during Exercise Hoodoo Sea in 2023. Air National Guard The prototype portable hangar intended to support camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in use during an Air

缩小敌方可选方案的范围具有明显价值,能迫使对手消耗更高端、更昂贵且数量有限的弹药,而传统主动防御系统可能更擅长应对这类目标。例如,拦截一小批来袭的巡航导弹,可能比拦截数十架无人机组成的蜂群更具可行性。

There is clear value in narrowing the available options for the enemy and pushing them toward having to expend higher-end, more expensive munitions, that are available in smaller quantities, and that traditional active defenses may be better optimized to handle. As an example, it may be more viable to shoot down a small barrage of incoming cruise missiles than a swarm of dozens of drones.

主动防御系统,尤其是地对空导弹发射单元及其配套拦截器,历来造价高昂。低端反无人机拦截器和定向能武器在一定程度上有助于降低这些成本。即便如此,这些能力依然代价不菲。

Active defenses, especially surface-to-air missile batteries and interceptors to go with them, have historically been very expensive . Lower-end counter-drone-focused interceptors and directed energy weapons are helping to bring these costs down in some regards. Even so, those capabilities come at a significant cost.

这里还涉及弹药储备和库存深度的问题。与伊朗的冲突也凸显了这一点,加剧了人们对防空拦截器、其他关键弹药库存是否充足,以及快速补充能力的长期担忧。英国政府等也在应对这一问题,正如你所此外,地面飞机的损失本身也代价高昂,如果对手能够直接使用成本较低的察打一体无人机,这种代价失衡的情况就会更加严重。

There are magazine and stockpile depth issues at play here, too. This is something that has also been brought front and center by the conflict with Iran , which has fueled already long-standing concerns about the sufficiency of stockpiles of air defense interceptors, other critical munitions, and the capacity to replenish them quickly. This is something the British government, among others, is also grappling with, as you can Furthermore, losses of aircraft on the ground are not without their own costs, which are even more lopsided if an opponent can simply use lower-cost weaponized drones.

与需求量相比,美国轰炸机数量稀少,是极为昂贵且珍贵的资产,正如今年早些时候针对伊朗的高强度作战行动中所看到的那样。具体到B-1轰炸机,目前现役的仅剩45架。一次性损失十几架将在战略上产生重大影响。哪怕只损失一架,对于任何可能的肇事方来说也是一场宣传政变。

U.S. bombers are particularly expensive and prized assets that are in short supply compared to the level of demand, as seen during the height of combat operations earlier this year against Iran. When it comes to B-1s, specifically, there are only 45 of them left in service today. A dozen of them being knocked out in one go would have major repercussions strategically. Losing even one would also be a propaganda coup for whoever might be responsible.

我们用一艘很可能在10年后就被拆解的“朱姆沃尔特”级驱逐舰的升级费用,能建造多少个机库呢?— 泰勒·罗戈威(@Aviation_Intel)2026年10月5日最重要的是,美军根本不可能总是拥有能够针对威胁迅速重新部署飞机的奢侈条件。在短时间内转移十几架轰炸机需要消耗巨额资源。不仅需要重新部署飞机,还需要转移配套人员和资产,以及武器和燃料。

How many shelters can we build for the upgrade cost of one Zumwalt class DDG that will probably be parted out in 10 years anyway? — Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 5, 2026 On top of all this, the U.S. military simply will not always have the luxury of being able to rapidly relocate aircraft in response to threats. Moving a dozen bombers on short notice takes massive resources. It is not just aircraft that have to be repositioned, but supporting personnel and assets, as well as weapons and fuel.

被迫转移到备用地点很容易对行动节奏和其他方面产生负面影响,尤其是在实际冲突爆发期间。英国费尔福德皇家空军基地是全球为数不多的能够长期支持轰炸机行动的基地之一。

Having to shift to alternate locations could easily have negative impacts on tempo and other aspects of operations, especially in the midst of actual conflict. RAF Fairford is one of only a few bases globally that can support bomber operations for a prolonged period.

最近,美军在加固阵地这一问题上的思维模式出现了一些转变迹象。今年1月,五角大楼去年为应对无人机努力而设立的核心机构——第401联合跨机构特遣部队(JIATF-401),就基地和其他关键基础设施周围使用网兜、缆绳以及其他被动物理防御设施发布了明确指导意见。3月的一份采购公告也引起了人们对卡塔尔乌代德空军基地新建加固地下设施计划的关注。

More recently, there have been signs of changing mindsets on the matter of hardening across the U.S. military . In January, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), a focal point for counter-drone efforts the Pentagon established last year, issued explicit guidance regarding the use of netting , cables , and other kinds of passive physical defenses around bases and other critical infrastructure. A contracting notice in March also called attention to plans for new hardened underground facilities at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

“针对小型无人威胁,采取一些轻度防护还是有价值的,”威尔斯巴赫将军今年7月也向《Breaking Defense》表示。“其中一些措施——比如架设防护网,就能阻止价值仅几百美元的小型无人机靠近一架价值20亿美元的飞机。这种方法确实有效,而且成本非常低。”

“There is value in some light protection against small, unmanned threats,” Gen. Wilsbach also told Breaking Defense in July. “Some of them — just nets that are up that keep a small, few-$100 drone from getting next to a $2 billion aircraft. That actually works, [and is] really cheap.”

一张图表中包含了兰利空军基地当局于2024年发布的一份采购通知,展示了该基地的遮阳式机库可能如何配备反无人机网。美国空军“这并非二选一的问题,”威尔斯巴赫在今年7月接受《航空与空间部队杂志》的另一次采访时说。“防护网可以防止小型无人飞行系统(UAS)接近需要保护的飞机……这是一种非常经济的方式,能在不耗费巨额资金购买精密防御系统的前提下,提供一定程度的保护。”

A graphic included a contracting notice put out by authorities at Langley Air Force Base in 2024 showing how sunshade-type shelters at the base might be equipped with anti-drone nets. USAF “It’s not either or,” Wilsbach said in a separate interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine in July. “The net keeps the small UAS [uncrewed aerial system] from getting close to an aircraft that you’re trying to protect… That’s a very inexpensive way to give you some modicum of protection without killing your checkbook on really exquisite defensive systems.”

兰利空军基地当局于2024年发布的一份合同公告中包含的图示,展示了基地内的遮阳式掩体如何配备反无人机网。美国空军A graphic included a contracting notice put out by authorities at Langley Air Force Base in 2024 showing how sunshade-type shelters at the base might be equipped with anti-drone nets. USAF

尽管机构层面取得了这些进展,但要广泛实施此类建议的行动却迟迟未能跟进。目前似乎仍未出现任何大规模、跨部门的行动,以在全球各设施中建造新的加固飞机掩体或其他防御性结构。不过,美国空军目前在一些基地确实已配备了一定数量的加固飞机掩体,尤其是在太平洋地区和欧洲。

In spite of these institutional developments, action to implement such recommendations on a broad basis has continued to lag. There still does not appear to be any major department-wide push to build new hardened aircraft shelters or other fortified structures at facilities globally. The U.S. Air Force does have a certain number of hardened aircraft shelters at bases now, especially in the Pacific and Europe.

这一切发生之际,全球其他地区——包括中国、俄罗斯、朝鲜和伊朗——正在大规模建设新的飞机掩体和其他加固基础设施,这一趋势十分明显。甚至在“蜘蛛网行动”之前,俄罗斯就已经启动了一项大规模计划,在多个基地建造新的加固掩体,尤其是在被占领的克里米亚半岛,以应对乌克兰无人机和导弹攻击的持续升级。如今,这项计划已扩展至为该国轰炸机部队建造巨型加固掩体,这是俄罗斯前所未有的举措。

This is all despite a very visible trend in the construction of new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure elsewhere around the globe, including in China , Russia , North Korea , and Iran . Even before Operation Spiderweb, Russia had already initiated a large-scale effort to build new hardened shelters at various bases, especially on the occupied Crimean Peninsula , in the face of expanding Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This effort has now extended to building the huge hardened shelters for the country’s bomber force, something the country has never done before.

2024年12月,俄罗斯在占领的克里米亚半岛上的贝尔贝克空军基地正在建设新的加固飞机掩体及其他基础设施。照片 © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。

Work underway in December 2024 on new hardened aircraft shelters and other infrastructure at Russia’s Belbek Air Base on the occupied Crimean Peninsula. PHOTO © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

2024年12月,俄罗斯在被占领的克里米亚半岛贝尔贝克空军基地进行新的加固型飞机掩体及其他基础设施的施工。图片版权 © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。Work underway in December 2024 on new hardened aircraft shelters and other infrastructure at Russia’s Belbek Air Base on the occupied Crimean Peninsula. PHOTO © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

另一张摄于2026年6月20日的卫星图像显示,位于俄罗斯东南部的恩格斯空军基地正在建造加固飞机掩体,该基地是重要的轰炸机枢纽。照片 © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。

Another satellite image taken on June 20, 2026, showing hardened aircraft shelters being built at Engels Air Base in southeastern Russia, which is a major bomber hub. PHOTO © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

另一张拍摄于2026年6月20日的卫星图像,显示俄罗斯东南部主要轰炸机枢纽恩格斯空军基地正在建造加固型飞机掩体。图片版权 © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. 保留所有权利。经许可转载。Another satellite image taken on June 20, 2026, showing hardened aircraft shelters being built at Engels Air Base in southeastern Russia, which is a major bomber hub. PHOTO © 2026 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

“讨论情报事务并不恰当,我们也不会谈论具体的部队保护措施。”美国空军发言人昨日在被问及伊朗无人机威胁是否导致B-1轰炸机近期从费尔福德撤离一事时回应道。“国防部将继续评估我们基地周边的威胁环境,并采取适当措施,保护我们的人员、装备以及部队部署的基地。”

“It is inappropriate to discuss matters of intelligence, and we will not discuss specific force protection measures,” a U.S. Air Force spokesperson told TWZ yesterday when asked about the reports that Iranian drone threats prompted the recent removal of the B-1s from Fairford. “The Department will continue to assess the threat environment surrounding our installations and take appropriate actions to protect our people, our platforms and the bases where our forces operate from.”

我们仍然不清楚近期针对费尔福德B-1轰炸机的威胁究竟有多严重或迫在眉睫,以至于导致它们仓促撤离。但无论如何,有关潜在无人机攻击的担忧报告仍然非常可信。现实是,在对手甚至尚未开一枪的情况下,十几架轰炸机就被紧急撤出了欧洲的前线部署地点。这个问题正日益严峻,尤其是在乌克兰战争中积累的低成本武器化无人机作战经验与教训正迅速向全球扩散之际。

We still do not know exactly how serious or imminent any recent threat to the B-1s at Fairford was that contributed to their hasty departure. Regardless, the reports of concerns about potential drone attacks remain very plausible. The reality here is that a dozen bombers were yanked from a forward operating location in Europe without an adversary ever having to fire a shot. This is a problem set that is only growing, especially as lessons and expertise on low-end weaponized drones from the war in Ukraine are spreading around the globe.

2026年3月15日,一架B-1轰炸机停放在英国费尔福德皇家空军基地的露天区域。Matthew Horwood/Getty Images此外还需要指出,这一问题正在迅速恶化:乌克兰战争的经验,尤其是在低成本武器化无人机领域的专业知识,正在全球范围内传播。如果连飞行区都不再安全,将会发生什么?

A B-1 bomber seen parked out in the open at RAF Fairford on March 15, 2026. Matthew Horwood/Getty Images Also needs to state this problem is growing rapidly, the war in Ukraine and expertise from it when it comes to low end weaponized drones is spreading around the globe. What happens if no flightline is safe

2026年3月15日,一架B-1轰炸机停在费尔福德皇家空军基地的露天停机坪上。Matthew Horwood/Getty ImagesA B-1 bomber seen parked out in the open at RAF Fairford on March 15, 2026. Matthew Horwood/Getty Images

单独建造新的飞机掩体和其他加固基础设施,本身并不能完全解决这些威胁。与此同时,它们确实会构成一层宝贵的额外防御,而且这种被动防御在初始投资完成之后,其运行将带来巨大的后勤负担。美国在全球范围内未能采取更有效的措施来加固其空军基地,这一问题正变得越来越明显。目前尚不清楚,是否必须等到以极其不幸的方式吸取教训之后,才会采取真正的行动。

Erecting new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure would not be a full solution to those threats by themselves. At the same time, they would be a valuable added layer of defense, and a passive one that would have a huge logistical footprint to operate once the initial investment is made. The lack of movement to better fortify American airbases globally is only becoming more and more glaring, and it remains to be seen if real action will not occur until lessons are learned in a most unfortunate way.