最近关于美国在油价创历史新高之际减免或取消对俄罗斯制裁的新闻，以及有关美国可能重新与伊朗发生冲突的传言，说明了俄罗斯和伊朗在乌克兰和海湾冲突方面的关联。理解这一点很重要，因为对俄罗斯制裁的减免并非发生在真空之中。伊朗一直支持俄罗斯，而俄罗斯也一直支持伊朗。因此，如果俄罗斯在一个战场上获得力量以在另一个战场上削弱伊朗，那么将其视为仍然是同一场全球冲突的一部分是有价值的。
Recent news about the US reducing or waiving sanctions on Russia, at a time of record-high oil prices, and rumors of a return to fighting with Iran illustrate how Russia and Iran are connected in terms of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gulf. This is important to understand because a reduction of sanctions on Russia does not happen in a vacuum. Iran has backed Russia, and Russia has backed Iran. Therefore, if Russia is empowered on one front to weaken Iran on another, it is worthwhile to see it as still part of the same global conflict.
理解我们是如何走到今天这一步也很重要。俄罗斯和伊朗之间的关系和联系可以追溯到几十年前，在这些年里，俄罗斯一直在支持伊朗政权。例如，俄罗斯曾参与伊朗的一座核电站建设。值得回忆的是，在奥巴马政府时期，俄罗斯和伊朗之间也曾出现类似的互动。当时美国减轻了对俄罗斯的压力，并被认为是在削减对欧洲盟友在导弹防御方面的支持，这显然促使俄罗斯加入对伊朗核协议的支持。
It's important to understand how we got here. Russia and Iran have a relationship and ties going back many decades, and Russia has been involved in supporting the Iranian regime over those decades. For instance, Russia was involved with a nuclear power plant in Iran. Back during the Obama administration, it's worth recalling that there was a similar interplay between Russia and Iran. The US reduced pressure on Russia and was perceived as reducing support for European allies regarding a missile shield, which apparently led to Russia getting on board with support for the Iran deal.
当时，奥巴马政府的首要任务是伊朗核协议。一种理论认为，美国可以重置关系并与俄罗斯相处融洽，或许可以减少对欧洲盟友支持的感知，而这种绥靖政策在某种程度上会导致俄罗斯在伊朗的核计划问题上施加压力。因此，值得理解的是，俄罗斯在这张牌和这个游戏上非常老练。俄罗斯明白美国有优先事项，但并不总是能够同时专注于多个优先事项。
At the time, the Obama administration's priority was the Iran deal. One theory was that the US could reset relations and get along with Russia, perhaps reducing the perception of support for European allies, and that appeasement would somehow lead to Russia putting pressure on Iran regarding its nuclear program. Therefore, it's worthwhile to understand that Russia is very adept at playing this card and this game. Russia understands that the US has priorities, but doesn't always appear able to keep a focus on multiple priorities simultaneously.
俄罗斯喜欢玩这样一个游戏：莫斯科等待美国被另一场冲突牵住，比如如今与伊朗的冲突，然后趁机介入以谋求自身利益。俄罗斯-伊朗关系早于乌克兰战争。俄罗斯和伊朗的联系也早于乌克兰战争的爆发。
Russia likes to play a game where Moscow waits until the US is tied up with another conflict, such as with Iran now, and then moves in to try to get things for itself. Russia-Iran ties predate war on UkraineThe Russia-Iran connection also predates the Ukraine war.
伊朗向俄罗斯提供了沙赫德-136无人机（单向徘徊弹药，或称单向攻击无人机），俄罗斯自2022年入侵乌克兰初期就开始使用这些无人机来恐吓乌克兰民众。这些无人机本身无法赢得战争，但它们确实在传播恐怖。伊朗向俄罗斯提供了数百甚至数千架此类无人机，随后俄罗斯开始在国内制造它们，这凸显了两国之间的密切关系。
Iran supplied Russia with its Shahed-136 drones (one-way loitering munitions, or one-way attack drones), and Russia used them from early in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to terrorize the Ukrainian population. These drones do not win wars by themselves, but they do spread terror. Iran supplied Russia with hundreds or thousands of these drones, and Russia then began manufacturing them domestically, illustrating the close relationship between the two nations.
还值得回忆的是，伊朗也向也门的胡塞武装出口了同型号的无人机，时间大约是在2020年或2021年。当时显然可以看出，伊朗正在利用胡塞武装作为测试平台，以威胁以色列和其他国家。伊朗和俄罗斯倾向于将这些冲突视为相互关联的。例如，俄罗斯在2022年入侵乌克兰之前，曾观察到美国从阿富汗的混乱撤离。后来，当哈马斯于2023年10月7日袭击以色列时，俄罗斯利用了这种混乱局面。
It's also worth recalling that Iran exported the same type of drones to the Houthis in Yemen, probably in 2020 or 2021. It was clear then that Iran was using the Houthis as a testbed to threaten Israel and other countries. Iran and Russia tend to see most of these conflicts as interconnected. For instance, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 after watching the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Later, when Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Russia took advantage of that chaos.
莫斯科很高兴看到以色列——美国的亲密盟友——陷入一场大规模战争，这使得国际注意力转向中东，而远离乌克兰。俄罗斯继续从中东策略中获益。俄罗斯继续从中东发生的事件中获益：只要美国在那里陷入冲突，莫斯科就会获益，并且它将继续推行这一策略。俄罗斯非常清楚特朗普政府内部对乌克兰存在的一些怀疑。
Moscow was pleased to see Israel, a close ally of the United States, tied up in a massive war, shifting the international spotlight to the Middle East and away from Ukraine. Russia continues benefiting from Middle East strategyRussia continues to benefit from what happens in the Middle East: whenever America is tied up in conflicts there, Moscow benefits, and it continues to pursue this strategy. Russia is very keenly aware of some of the skepticism within the Trump administration regarding Ukraine.
因此，俄罗斯一直很乐意尝试利用乌克兰冲突来谋取自身利益，并试图利用华盛顿与基辅之间的这种紧张关系。在美国于2026年2月对伊朗发动战争之后，俄罗斯显然将此视为一个机会。这意味着俄罗斯可以通过获得制裁解除或能源销售来获利，并且这是俄罗斯整体全球大战略的一部分。俄罗斯认为自己正在与由美国主导的世界秩序对抗。
Russia, therefore, has always been happy to try to use the Ukraine conflict to its benefit, and it has tried to exploit these types of tensions between Washington and Kyiv. After the US began a war on Iran in February 2026, Russia has clearly seen this as an opportunity. That means Russia can gain through getting sanctions relief or energy sales, and it is part of the overall Russian grand global strategy. Russia views itself as confronting the American-led world order.
它希望重振俄罗斯的影响力和权力；它希望与伊朗和中国合作，并认为2026年伊朗的冲突只是世界秩序加速向多极化发展的又一种方式。因此，当俄罗斯审视可能的制裁解除时，它看到俄罗斯与伊朗之间的这种联系将继续给美国人制造麻烦，并将继续利用这一点来实现其目标和利益。那么，美国面临的问题是，是否认为自己能够实现其目标和利益，无论是关于乌克兰和和平协议，还是关于伊朗和与伊朗的协议。只要伊朗和俄罗斯能够让美国政策自相矛盾，美国就很难实现其目标。
It wants to revive Russian influence and power; it wants to work with Iran and China, and it believes that the conflict in Iran in 2026 is just one more way that the world order will accelerate in terms of becoming a more multipolar world. Therefore, when Russia looks at possible sanctions relief, it sees how this nexus between Russia and Iran can continue to bedevil the Americans, and it will continue to exploit this in order to achieve its goals and interests. The question then for the United States is whether or not they think they can achieve its goals and interests, whether regarding Ukraine and a peace deal, or Iran and a deal with Iran. So long as Iran and Russia are able to play US policy off against itself, it will be difficult for the United States to achieve its goals.