Indonesia could gain critical defence technology, investment and export opportunities through a new multi-nation defence pact with Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan, but analysts warn its success hinges on turning high-level ambition into concrete projects.

The four Muslim-majority nations signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding in Doha on Wednesday. The agreement outlines a framework for defence “cooperation and integration” across joint research and development, training exchanges and industrial capability building.

“We believe that the Badr MOU will contribute to transforming the complementary capabilities of Qatar, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey into concrete projects,” Haluk Gorgun, head of Turkey’s Defence Industry Agency, said in a statement last week.

Vahd Nabyl Achmad Mulachela, a spokesperson for Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told reporters on Thursday that the pact would increase domestic production capabilities as Jakarta partners with countries that “have the qualifications and compatibility to support” its modernisation goals. He added that the agreement aligned with Indonesia’s broader efforts to diversify its defence partnerships.

Analysts view the Badr agreement as a logical next step rather than a sudden change, formalising ties among partners with existing bilateral defence programmes.

“Through Badr, Indonesia benefits by gaining leverage to secure access to weapons and other new defence deals with the countries in the Middle East,” said Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, an international relations researcher at Aberystwyth University. Indonesia also stood to gain from “technology transfer, particularly with Pakistan and Turkey”, he added.

Muhammad Zulfikar Rahmat, director of the Indonesia-Middle East and North Africa division at Jakarta-based think tank Centre for Economic and Law Studies, said that the tangible benefits fell into three main areas: technology, capital and market expansion.

“The technology and know-how [will come] mostly from Turkey. The second benefit is funding, because Qatar can invest and buy. The third benefit is a bigger market for our defence companies, such as Pindad, PAL and Dirgantara Indonesia,” Muhammad said.

Jakarta already has hardware agreements with Ankara. In 2019, state-owned arms supplier Pindad signed a deal with Turkish manufacturer FNSS to co-produce 18 Kaplan MT medium-weight tanks, which were completed in 2024. Jakarta also signed an agreement last year to purchase 48 Turkish-made fifth-generation Kaan fighter jets, a deal estimated at over US$10 billion.

Qatari capital is already flowing into Indonesia’s defence industries. In January, Barzan Holdings, an investment arm owned by Qatar’s Ministry of Defence, signed a US$2.3 billion joint venture with Indonesian firm Republikorp to modernise the military’s land and maritime systems.

In a statement on Saturday, Norman Joesoef, chairman of Republikorp, said the venture “is an example of an industrial partnership to develop defence industry cooperation within the framework of the Badr initiative”.

“This collaboration opens up opportunities for joint production, research and development, technology transfer and technical training to strengthen the defence industry’s capabilities and build a more resilient supply chain,” Joesoef, who attended the MOUg event in Doha, said, as cited by state news agency Antara.

Cooperation with Islamabad is also gaining momentum. Marina Eka Sari, a researcher with the Asean Studies Programme at the non-profit think tank The Habibie Centre, noted a marked increase in high-level exchanges since President Prabowo Subianto visited Pakistan in December, followed by bilateral ministerial visits and meetings with the Pakistani Air Force chief of staff in Jakarta.

“Indonesia is considering procuring 40 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan, but the process is currently still in the exploratory stage,” Sari said. “Pakistan has experience in producing and maintaining defence systems such as military aircraft, warships and land-based weapons.”But integrating different platforms into Indonesia’s existing inventory presents logistical challenges.

“The problem is that the JF-17 is made together with China, so there is a question of how it will fit with our Rafale and Kaan jets,” Muhammad said.

Indonesia has ordered 42 Dassault Rafale fighter jets from France – six of which have been delivered, with 18 more due between 2027 and 2029 – while also purchasing defence equipment from South Korea, Italy and India.

Experts agreed that Badr was an industrial and technical framework rather than a collective defence pact, meaning it did not violate Indonesia’s long-standing (independent and active) foreign policy doctrine. Nonetheless, Jakarta must navigate external perceptions carefully.

“Pakistan maintains close ties with China and plays a strategic role in the conflict between the United States and Iran. Turkey and Qatar have their own positions in the Middle East. Other countries such as Iran, the United States or Israel might perceive Indonesia as moving closer to the Turkish bloc,” Ahmad said.

“It can be easily clarified that this defence cooperation is not an alliance or a mutual defence agreement. It is merely a step-up of an existing bilateral framework.”Muhammad said that while Badr signalled Jakarta’s aspiration to play a more proactive role in the Islamic world beyond diplomatic advocacy on Palestine, it should not be misconstrued as an “Islamic military bloc”.

“Indonesia still needs to keep good relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the US and China. In the end, our image in the Muslim world depends on whether Badr can deliver real results.”

Sari agreed, adding that Jakarta must avoid being treated simply as an end-market: “Badr’s success will be determined by Indonesia’s diplomatic ability to prioritise substantive projects that align with Indonesia’s defence needs.”