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半岛电视台

胡塞武装是否在使用俄罗斯卫星?沙特阿拉伯正抵御袭击Are Houthis using Russian satellites as Saudi Arabia fends off strikes?

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沙特支持的也门政府武装人员与也门伊朗支持的胡塞武装在塔伊兹市以西的杰贝勒哈恩(Jabal Han)前线交战,一个袭击地点冒起浓烟[资料图片:法新社]Smoke billows from a site hit during battles between Saudi-backed Yemeni government fighters and Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis at the Jabal Han front, west of the city of Taiz [File: AFP]

一项调查显示,俄罗斯卫星正在协助与伊朗结盟的胡塞武装打击沙特阿拉伯的军事和能源基础设施,在美国对伊朗的战争背景下,这进一步颠覆了全球能源市场。

An investigation has revealed that Russian satellites are assisting the Iran-aligned Houthis to strike Saudi Arabia’s military and energy infrastructure, further upending global energy markets amid the US war on Iran.

获得沙特阿拉伯支持的获国际承认的也门政府与胡塞武装之间的敌对行动自7月以来一直在持续,并在9月份该叛军全面控制也门红海海岸时升级。

Hostilities between the internationally recognised Yemeni government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis have been ongoing since July and escalated in September when the rebel group seized full control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

上个月,胡塞武装还对沙特阿拉伯最重要的输油管道——东西输油管道的泵站实施了精确打击。总部位于日内瓦的私营企业AURORAH地理信号情报公司进行的一项调查显示,俄罗斯卫星在几天前一直在对该地区进行勘测,以收集有关该管道的情报。

Last month, the Houthis also carried out a precision strike on pumping stations on Saudi Arabia’s most important oil pipeline, the East-West pipeline. An investigation by Geneva-based private firm AURORAH GeoSignal Intelligence revealed that Russian satellites had been surveying the region days in advance to gather intelligence about the pipeline.

随着胡塞武装与沙特支持的也门政府之间关于也门控制权的战斗仍在继续,俄罗斯对胡塞武装的支持究竟有多重要?为什么得到美国支持的海湾国家中最强大的沙特阿拉伯,无法阻挡一个叛军武装团体?以下是我们所了解的情况:对俄罗斯卫星使用情况的调查显示了什么?

With fighting for control of Yemen between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government continuing, how significant is Russia’s support to the Houthis? Why can’t Saudi Arabia, the most powerful of the Gulf states that is backed by the US, hold back a group of rebel fighters? Here’s what we know:

正如美联社本周所披露的那样,在7月1日至10月19日期间,AURORAH地理信号情报公司检查了也门胡塞武装针对沙特阿拉伯发动的40起导弹和无人机袭击,并且在每一起案件中,都发现了俄罗斯政府和军用卫星在袭击发生前后对目标区域进行观测的规律。

What did the investigation into the use of Russian satellites show?

这家地理信号情报公司的创始人纳瓦夫·奥拜德向半岛电视台表示,通过重建俄罗斯的军事侦察架构,该组织识别出了单个卫星,计算了它们的轨道轨迹,然后确定了观测机会,并将它们的活动与沙特阿拉伯、约旦、巴林、科威特、卡塔尔、阿联酋和也门的军事进展进行了关联。

As revealed by The Associated Press news agency this week, between July 1 and October 19, AURORAH Geosignal Intelligence examined 40 missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia by Yemen’s Houthis and, in every case, found a pattern of Russian government and military satellites observing the targeted areas both before and after the attacks.

他表示,他们识别出的卫星包括俄罗斯的“巴尔斯-M”军事测绘卫星、“条子”光学侦察卫星、“莲花-S1”电子情报卫星、“皮翁-NKS”海上侦察系统和“秃鹰-FKA”雷达成像卫星。他们还检查了“叶卡托/苔原”红外预警星座。

Nawaf Obaid, founder of the geosignal intelligence firm, told Al Jazeera that by reconstructing Russia’s military reconnaissance architecture, the group had identified individual satellites, calculated their orbital trajectories and then established observation opportunities and correlated their activity with military developments across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Yemen. He said the satellites they identified include Russia’s Bars-M military mapping satellites, Persona optical reconnaissance satellites, Lotos-S1 electronic intelligence satellites, Pion-NKS maritime reconnaissance systems and Kondor-FKA radar-imaging satellites.

“关键的发现不是单颗俄罗斯卫星的存在,而是其互补情报能力的排序与整合,”他说。

They also examined the EKS/Tundra infrared early-warning constellation.

奥拜得还向半岛电视台证实,基于这些调查结果,“俄罗斯军事地理空间和信号情报支持了由伊朗主导、协助胡塞武装在也门行动的情报架构”。他表示,这方面最具实质操作性的例子是胡塞武装沿也门西海岸向曼德海峡发起的进攻,在这一进攻中,源自俄罗斯的情报、伊朗的指挥整合以及当地的人力情报共同导致了“反对派也门军队战场协调的迅速恶化”。

“The critical finding was not the presence of individual Russian satellites, but the sequencing and integration of their complementary intelligence capabilities,” he said. Obaid also confirmed to Al Jazeera that based on the findings, “Russian military geospatial and signals intelligence has supported the Iranian-led intelligence architecture assisting Houthi operations in Yemen.”

“我们评估认为,这种情报关系也与胡塞武装针对沙特阿拉伯的导弹和无人机目标锁定有关。俄罗斯军事侦察提供了远超普通商业卫星影像的能力,特别是当光学、雷达和电子情报被整合在一起时,”他说。

He said the strongest operational example of this has been the Houthi offensive along Yemen’s western coast towards Bab al-Mandeb, where Russian-derived intelligence, Iranian command integration and local human intelligence all contributed to “the rapid deterioration of opposing Yemeni forces’ battlefield coordination”.

“9月份针对沙特阿拉伯东西输油管道的袭击说明了目标锁定问题的复杂性,”他说。当时,该管道“关键的高海拔西部路段”内的三个泵站——位于阿菲夫的PS8、位于达克拉的PS9以及位于米斯巴阿的PS11——遭到打击。

“We assess that this intelligence relationship is also relevant to Houthi missile and drone targeting against Saudi Arabia. Russian military reconnaissance provides capabilities far beyond ordinary commercial satellite imagery, particularly when optical, radar and electronic intelligence are integrated,” he said. “The September attacks against Saudi Arabia’s East-West Petroline illustrate the sophistication of the targeting problem,” he said.

“它们的遇袭选择反映了对该基础设施工程漏洞和战略重要性的理解,”他解释说。

That was when three pumping stations – PS8 at Afif, PS9 at Al-Dhekra and PS11 at Al-Mesba’ah – were struck within the pipeline’s “critical high-elevation western section”.

一张卫星照片显示了横跨阿拉伯半岛的沙特阿拉伯东西输油管道在沙特境内遇袭前的情况〔资料来源:Vantor/路透社手发照片〕这些调查结果有多重要?

“Their selection reflected an understanding of the infrastructure’s engineering vulnerabilities and strategic importance,” he explained.

总部位于布鲁塞尔的军事分析人士埃利亚·马格尼耶表示,AURORA的调查结果并不一定能反映出全貌。

A satellite image shows the Saudi Arabia East-West pipeline, located across the Arabian Peninsula, before a strike that hit it in Saudi Arabia [File: Vantor/Handout via Reuters] How significant are these findings?

他表示:“无法拦截情报传输并不能确定是谁获得了俄罗斯卫星信息、俄罗斯是否蓄意共享了这些信息,或者伊朗是否独立获取了这些信息。”他补充说,为此有四种可能的情景。他说:“首先,俄罗斯可能蓄意与伊朗共享了信息。”

Brussels-based military analyst Elijah Magnier said AURORA’s findings don’t necessarily show the whole picture. “Inability to intercept an intelligence transmission doesn’t establish who had access to the Russian satellite information, whether Russia deliberately shared it, or whether Iran obtained it independently,” he said, adding that for this, there are four possible scenarios. “First, Russia could have deliberately shared information with Iran,” he said.

一张卫星照片显示了位于阿拉伯半岛横跨沙特阿拉伯的沙特阿拉伯东西输油管道,拍摄于沙特阿拉伯的一次袭击击中该管道之前[资料图片:Vantor/Handout via Reuters]A satellite image shows the Saudi Arabia East-West pipeline, located across the Arabian Peninsula, before a strike that hit it in Saudi Arabia [File: Vantor/Handout via Reuters]

他指出:“第二种是伊朗通过商业渠道获取了俄罗斯卫星图像……然而,俄罗斯军方的侦察图像通常不对公众开放,因此商业俄罗斯图像不一定能证明俄罗斯政府的参与。”

“The second is Iran obtained Russian satellite imagery through commercial channels… However, the Russian military’s reconnaissance imagery is generally not publicly accessible, so the commercial Russian imagery would not necessarily establish Russian government involvement,” he noted.

他补充说:“第三种是伊朗通过另一个中间人获取了信息,因此理论上第三方可能提供了源自俄罗斯系统的谍报,而目前尚无公开核实的证据证实存在这种安排。”

“The third is Iran obtained information through another intermediary, so a third party could theoretically have supplied the intelligence originated from the Russian system, and there is no currently publicly verified evidence establishing such an arrangement,” he added.

但奥拜德强调,区分俄罗斯支持的情报架构与“某个俄罗斯卫星为胡塞武装的单次打击提供了目标数据”的证据至关重要。

But Obaid highlighted that distinguishing a Russian-supported intelligence architecture from proof that a particular Russian satellite supplied the targeting data for an individual Houthi strike is essential.

他说:“我们的评估确立了更广泛的情报关系;将具体的卫星衍生情报归因于个别导弹发射需要更多的佐证。”

“Our assessment establishes the wider intelligence relationship; attribution of specific satellite-derived intelligence to individual missile launches requires additional corroboration,” he said.

三名官员(其中包括一名来自沙特阿拉伯的官员、一名胡塞武装高层官员)以及一名私营情报分析人士向美联社证实,胡塞武装和其他伊朗盟友受益于俄罗斯的情报以及中国的能力。

Three officials, including one from Saudi Arabia and another in the top ranks of the Houthis, as well as a private intelligence analyst, confirmed to The Associated Press that the Houthis and other Iranian allies have benefitted from Russian intelligence, as well as Chinese capabilities.

上周,沙特外交部公共外交副部长拉耶德·克里姆利(Rayed Krimly)对记者表示,胡塞武装从俄罗斯和中国获取情报。

Last week, the Saudi Foreign Ministry’s deputy minister for public diplomacy, Rayed Krimly, told reporters that the Houthis receive intelligence from Russia and China.

他说:“我们确实定期与中国和俄罗斯讨论这些事项,并将继续这样做。”俄罗斯卫星的使用权对伊朗和胡塞武装有多重要?

“We do discuss these matters regularly with China and Russia, and we will continue to do so,” he had said. How important is access to Russian satellites for Iran and the Houthis?

俄罗斯官员尚未就“极光”(AURORAH)的调查结果发表评论,但近年来,俄罗斯与伊朗的技术和军事联系已显著深化,其基础是联合战略协议、航天合作以及国防技术交流。

Russian officials have not yet commented on AURORAH’s findings, but in recent years, technological and military ties between Russia and Iran have deepened significantly, anchored by joint strategic agreements, space cooperation, and the exchange of defence technology.

国际危机组织也门问题高级分析师艾哈迈德·纳吉(Ahmed Nagi)表示,据报道莫斯科支持德黑兰的盟友如胡塞武装,这一点尤为重要,因为这将意味着也门冲突轨迹的转变。

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst on Yemen at the International Crisis Group, said Moscow reportedly supporting Tehran’s allies like the Houthis is particularly significant because it would mean a shift in the trajectory of the Yemeni conflict.

他对半岛电视台表示:“这场冲突正日益超越其国内层面,并与更广泛的地区动态交织在一起。支持胡塞武装不再仅仅是伊朗单方面的利益所在。我们现在看到其他行为体,特别是俄罗斯,向伊朗提供情报支持和先进武器,胡塞武装也从中受益。”

“It is increasingly moving beyond its domestic dimensions and becoming intertwined with wider regional dynamics. Supporting the Houthis is no longer a matter of interest to Iran alone. We are now seeing other actors, particularly Russia, providing Iran with intelligence support and sophisticated weaponry, from which the Houthis are also benefitting,” he told Al Jazeera.

他补充道:“问题是这种支持是直接输送给胡塞武装,还是通过伊朗间接输送。我认为这种区分并不重要。底线是,胡塞武装正从日益多元化的外部支持中受益,涉及多个国家。”

“The question is whether this support is being channelled directly to the Houthis or indirectly through Iran. I don’t think that distinction is important. The bottom line is that the Houthis are benefitting from increasingly diversified external support involving several countries,” he added.

但纳吉警告称,俄罗斯对胡塞武装的支持对也门政府和沙特阿拉伯都有影响。

But Nagi warned that Russian support to the Houthis has implications for both the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia.

他补充道:“俄罗斯的作用还延伸至外交领域,莫斯科在联合国安理会采取立场,反对针对胡塞武装采取更强有力的国际行动。综合这些发展来看,表明俄罗斯与该武装团体的接触正在更广泛地扩大。”胡塞武装在沙特阿拉伯袭击了哪些目标?

“Russia’s role also extends into the diplomatic arena, where Moscow has taken positions at the United Nations Security Council opposing stronger international action against the Houthis. Taken together, these developments point to a broader expansion of Russian engagement with the group,” he added. Where have the Houthis struck in Saudi Arabia?

也门胡塞武装自夏季战事升级以来,已袭击沙特阿拉伯多个地点,范围涵盖东西海岸、首都及南部地区。

Yemen’s Houthis have attacked multiple locations across Saudi Arabia, spanning from the eastern and western coasts to the capital and southern regions, since fighting escalated over the summer.

胡塞武装发言人叶海亚·萨雷阿周五在X平台发布声明称,袭击目标为重要商业和军事基础设施,覆盖沙特东西海岸、首都利雅得及南部纳杰兰地区。

In a statement on X on Friday, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed attacks have hit vital commercial and military infrastructure, which spanned Saudi Arabia from its east and west coasts to Riyadh and the southern region of Najran.

萨雷阿表示,胡塞武装以弹道导弹袭击拉斯塔努拉炼油厂,以导弹袭击阿布盖格的阿美石油设施,以多枚导弹袭击利雅得哈立德国王国际机场,以无人机袭击达曼法赫德国王国际机场,以弹道导弹袭击拉比格炼油厂,并袭击纳杰兰地区的一处沙特军事总部。不过,目前尚无独立来源证实这些具体指控。

Saree said the Houthis targeted the Ras Tanura oil refinery with a ballistic missile, an Aramco facility in Abqaiq with a missile, King Khalid International airport in Riyadh with multiple missiles, King Fahd International airport in Dammam with a drone, the Rabigh oil refinery with a ballistic missile and a Saudi military headquarters in the Najran region. There has, however, been no independent corroboration of these specific claims.

但总体而言,胡塞武装的袭击已在沙特造成多人死亡伤。据沙特官员称,本月初对利雅得哈立德国王国际机场的一次猛烈袭击造成至少12人死亡、300人受伤。袭击导致该机场暂时关闭,迫使沙特旗舰投资会议推迟至2027年举行,并打乱数千名乘客的出行计划。

However, Houthi attacks generally have resulted in multiple deaths and injuries in Saudi Arabia. A severe strike on King Khalid International airport in Riyadh earlier this month killed at least 12 people and injured 300, according to Saudi officials. The attacks led to the airport’s temporary closure, forcing the postponement of Saudi Arabia’s flagship investment conference until 2027 and disrupting travel plans for thousands of passengers.

该机场此后已重开,航班于周日恢复,但胡塞武装警告旅客避开该设施,称其为“军事目标”。

The airport has since reopened, and flights resumed on Sunday with the Houthis warning travellers to avoid the facility, calling it a “military target”.

10月21日对达曼法赫德国王国际机场的袭击也造成2人死亡、8人受伤。胡塞武装为何装备精良?

An October 21 attack on King Fahd International airport in Dammam also killed two people and wounded eight. Why are the Houthis so well-armed?

自2014年夺取也门首都萨那及西北部大片领土以来,胡塞武装要求获承认其为也门合法执政当局。

Since seizing Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and swaths of northwest Yemen in 2014, the Houthis have demanded to be recognised as the legitimate governing authority in Yemen.

夺取首都和国家机构后,胡塞武装获得也门军队大量军火库的使用权,并与效忠前总统阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的部队结盟。国际公认的政府迁往亚丁。

After taking the capital and state institutions, the Houthis gained access to large arsenals belonging to the Yemeni military and formed an alliance with forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The internationally recognised government decamped to Aden.

曾被视为资源不多的武装团体,分析人士称,自胡塞武装夺取也门国家军火库、获得伊朗的外部支持并提升军事能力以来,这一情况已发生改变。

Once regarded as an armed group without many resources, analysts say this has changed since the Houthis seized Yemen state arsenals, received external backing from Iran, and evolved their military capabilities.

战略航空研究公司首席分析师萨吉·艾哈迈德告诉半岛电视台,除了掌握武器组装技术,胡塞武装还搜罗国际黑市获取零部件,并进行了多次军事交锋,从而发掘出一个隐秘但强劲的武器销售市场。

Saj Ahmad, chief analyst at StrategicAero Research, told Al Jazeera that besides learning the art of weapons assembly, the Houthis have scoured international black markets for components and carried out many military engagements to unearth a clandestine, but robust, market for sales, too.

他说:“因此,虽然胡塞武装在消耗其武器储备,但也在发展和壮大——我们已看到他们发动远程导弹袭击,打击远至以色列的目标——相比之下,打击沙特阿拉伯的高价值目标对他们来说易如反掌。”

“So while the Houthis have been expending their cache of weapons, they have been developing and expanding too – and we have seen that with their long-range missile attacks as far away as Israel – so targeting high-value targets in Saudi Arabia in contrast is very easy pickings for them,” he said.

纳吉说,2022年胡塞武装与沙特领导的联盟之间的停火生效并持续到今年早些时候时,也门政府内部许多人指望这能为政治解决铺平道路。

When a truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition took effect in 2022 and continued until earlier this year, many within the Yemeni government expected it to pave the way for a political settlement, Nagi said.

他说:“与此同时,胡塞武装正为冲突可能重燃做准备。他们利用这段相对平静的时期增强军事地位。这种准备的程度在过去几周变得显而易见。其部队展现出相当的军事备战状态,使他们能在多个地区推进,并给也门政府军造成重大挫败。”

“The Houthis, meanwhile, were preparing for the possibility that the conflict would resume. They used the relative lull to strengthen their military position. The extent of that preparation has become evident over the past few weeks. Their forces have demonstrated considerable military readiness, enabling them to advance across several areas and inflict significant setbacks on Yemeni government forces,” he said.

然而据马尼耶称,胡塞武装先进的导弹推进和制导技术仍严重依赖外国专长。

According to Magnier, the Houthis’ sophisticated missile propulsion and guidance technology remains heavily dependent on foreign expertise, however.

胡塞武装获得伊朗大量的支持、训练和武器装备。这包括伊朗产和伊朗衍生型弹道导弹、巡航导弹和单程攻击无人机——如“巴勒斯坦-2”和“图凡”系统——尽管伊朗官方否认向其提供这些装备。

The Houthis receive substantial backing, training and weaponry from Iran. This includes Iranian-origin and-derived ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones – such as the Palestine-2 and Toufan systems – although Iran officially denies supplying them.

除了伊朗之外,马格尼尔表示,伊朗在黎巴嫩的盟友真主党也提供了军事训练和组织经验方面的贡献。“所有从对抗以色列中收集到的经验都被转化并提供给了也门安萨尔真组织(胡塞武装的另一个名称),”他说。

Besides Iran, Magnier said Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah, has also contributed with military training and organisational experience. “All the experience gathered from fighting Israel was transformed and offered to Ansar Allah [the name the Houthis are also known by] in Yemen,” he said.

“这种合作还扩大到了伊拉克武装组织,双方在一个广阔的区域内进行了军事人员的交流以及作战经验的交流,”他补充说。

“The cooperation has also extended to Iraqi armed groups, with the exchange involving military personnel and again operational experience in a vast area,” he added.

“这种组合(国内扩张与外部依赖)有助于解释为什么沙特阿拉伯领导的多年军事行动,以及随后的美国和以色列打击,未能消除其军事能力,”他补充说。沙特阿拉伯是如何对胡塞武装进行反击的?

“This combination [of domestic expansion and foreign dependence] helps explain why years of Saudi-led military operation, followed by American and Israeli strikes, have failed to eliminate its military capability,” he added. How has Saudi Arabia struck back at the Houthis?

沙特领导的联军通过空袭和军事行动对也门境内的胡塞武装目标进行了报复。

The Saudi-led coalition has retaliated against Houthi targets in Yemen through air attacks and military operations.

周五,也门联军报告称,其拦截了一架由胡塞武装向沙特阿拉伯麦加地区发射的无人机。

On Friday, the coalition in Yemen reported that it intercepted a drone launched by the Houthis towards Saudi Arabia’s Mecca region.

联军发言人图尔基·马拉基在社交媒体上发文称,这架无人机于周五上午被“拦截并摧毁”。另据报道,一枚瞄准沙特阿拉伯西部的导弹早些时候被击落,随着利雅得支持的也门政府与伊朗支持的胡塞武装之间的敌对行动不断升级。

The drone was “intercepted and destroyed” on Friday morning, coalition spokesman Turki al-Malki said in a social media post. It was also reported that a missile aimed at western Saudi Arabia was earlier brought down, as hostilities between the Riyadh-backed Yemen government and Iran-backed Houthis continue to escalate.

周四,沙特领导的联军表示,其摧毁了一枚胡塞武装向该王国东部地区发射的弹道导弹。随后该联军表示,针对沙特首都利雅得发射的两枚弹道导弹也被拦截并摧毁。

On Thursday, the Saudi-led coalition said it destroyed a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis towards the kingdom’s eastern region. It later said two ballistic missiles launched towards the Saudi capital, Riyadh, were also intercepted and destroyed.

马拉基于周五早些时候报告称,联军的防空系统拦截并摧毁了一枚瞄准沙特阿拉伯西部的胡塞武装巡航导弹。

Al-Malki reported early on Friday that the coalition’s air defences intercepted and destroyed a Houthi cruise missile which had targeted western Saudi Arabia.

马拉基周一表示,其部队还摧毁了四个弹道导弹发射器以及胡塞武装用于储存导弹的五个地道。

Al-Maliki said on Monday its forces also destroyed four ballistic missile launchers and five tunnels used by the Houthis to store missiles.

他在X平台的一篇贴文中曾表示,联军袭击了一座导弹库,并补充说,该行动“重点在于切断胡塞民兵在其控制区之间的补给线”。

In a post on X, he had said coalition forces attacked a missile depot, adding that the operation “focused on cutting off Houthi militia supply lines between areas under their control”.

这次行动还以也门境内前线沿线的胡塞武装“防御工事、人员集结地及其军事装备”为目标。

The operation also targeted Houthi “fortifications, gatherings of their members, and their military equipment along the front lines inside Yemen”.

阿尔-马利基周一表示,沙特防空系统“拦截并摧毁了恐怖主义胡塞民兵向利雅得发射的一枚弹道导弹”。

Al-Maliki said on Monday that Saudi air defences “intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched by the terrorist Houthi militia towards Riyadh”.

本月,也门政府军发起了代号为“也门黎明”的反攻,旨在夺回被胡塞武装控制的领土。

This month, Yemen’s government forces launched the “Operation Yemen Dawn” counteroffensive, aimed at recapturing territory held by the Houthis.

周日,沙特领导的军事联盟表示,防空系统拦截了至少10枚弹道导弹。

On Sunday, the Saudi-led military coalition said air defences intercepted at least 10 ballistic missiles.

该王国的民防机构称,南部有两人被坠落的碎片砸伤,并报告多栋建筑物和车辆受损。为什么沙特在遏制胡塞武装时举步维艰?

The kingdom’s civil defence agency said two people were injured in the south by falling debris, and reported damage to several buildings and vehicles. Why are the Saudis struggling to contain the Houthis?

尽管诸如沙特和伊朗官员最近在德黑兰会晤等高级别外交会谈旨在缓和紧张局势,但分析人士表示,胡塞武装正在积极试探沙特军事克制和防空能力的极限,将也门冲突转化为对利雅得更广泛的国家安全考验。

While high-level diplomatic talks such as recent meetings in Tehran involving Saudi and Iranian officials have aimed to de-escalate tensions, analysts say the Houthis are actively testing the limits of Saudi military restraint and air defence capabilities, transforming the Yemeni conflict into a wider national security test for Riyadh.

据马格尼耶称,沙特之所以举步维艰,是因为“没有人能通过轰炸赢得战争”。他表示:“轰炸有助于地面部队利用空军的成果,并为地面部队开辟道路。如果地面部队没有足够的推进动力、不愿作出牺牲并接受重大损失,那么就没有必要去奇怪为什么沙特会举步维艰了。”

According to Magnier, the Saudis have been struggling because “nobody wins a war by air bombing.”“The air bombing helps for the ground forces to capitalise on what the air force is doing and opens the road for the ground forces. If the ground forces are not sufficiently motivated to advance and offer sacrifices and accept large losses, then there is no point in wondering why the Saudis are struggling,” he said.

危机组织的纳吉也持类似观点。他补充说,沙特支持的也门政府阵营同样四分五裂、组织涣散且在军事上毫无准备。

Crisis group’s Nagi shared a similar view. He added that the Saudi-backed Yemeni government camp has also remained fragmented, poorly organised and militarily unprepared.

他表示:“曾有一种预期,即快速解决的办法,特别是强化的空袭,能够带来迅速的战果。但政府及其盟友并未具备维持与胡塞武装长期对抗所需的军事能力或组织。”

“There was an expectation that quick fixes, particularly intensified air strikes, could produce rapid gains. But the government and its allies had not developed the military capabilities or organisation necessary to sustain a confrontation with the Houthis,” he said.

据分析师萨吉·艾哈迈德(Saj Ahmad)称,尽管在美欧武器上花费了数十亿美元,沙特人却未能有效利用其军事能力。

According to analyst Saj Ahmad, despite the billions spent on US and European weapons, the Saudis have failed to make effective use of their military capabilities.

他表示:“胡塞武装从伊朗的军事战略家以及萨达姆·侯赛因倒台后多年与美军作战的伊拉克境内及各地的民兵那里学到了很多东西。在此期间,沙特政权大举采购武器,但在如何使用或部署这些武器方面几乎没有什么技能,并且在有效打击像胡塞武装这样的游击队方面的能力更是少之又少。”

“The Houthis have learned a great deal from Iran’s military strategists as well as those militias in and across Iraq that battled US troops for years after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And in that intervening period, the Saudi regime has made big weapon buys but has little skill in how to use or deploy them and has even less capability to effectively combat a guerrilla group like the Houthis,” he said.

他还表示:“鉴于利雅得处于围困之中,如果沙特人最终像阿联酋那样离开这个交战区,我也不会感到惊讶。”

“With Riyadh under siege, I would not be surprised if the Saudis eventually leave this combat zone, like the UAE did,” he added.

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