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中期选举无法解决消费者的困境The Midterms Won’t Fix What Ails Consumers

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选民本周早些时候在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的一个投票站填写选票。(Rebecca S. Gratz/WSJ摄)Voters fill out their ballots at a polling place in Omaha, Neb., earlier this week. (Rebecca S. Gratz for WSJ)

许多选民将于周二前往投票站,期盼解决可负担性问题。他们将会失望。为何?请看这份清单。

A lot of voters head to the polls Tuesday hoping for a fix for affordability. They are going to be disappointed. Why? Check out this list.

注意到规律了吗?在近期真正推高可负担性压力的问题上,国会一直是旁观者。

Notice a pattern? On the issues that really drive affordability lately, Congress has been a bystander.

所有这一切,都是数代以来政治权力从立法部门向行政部门转移的产物。这应当让人们对国会控制权可能易手后在可负担性问题上能有何作为,进行一次现实核查。

All this is a product of the generations-long shift of political power from the legislative to the executive branch. This ought to be a reality check on what to expect on affordability from a possible change in control of Congress.

在美国连同以色列于2月底袭击伊朗后,不断攀升的石油、汽油和柴油价格推高了通胀。结束战争是降低物价的关键,也是民主党纲领的核心。

After the U.S., along with Israel, attacked Iran at the end of February, escalating oil, gasoline and diesel prices sent inflation up sharply. Ending the war is key to bringing prices down and central to the Democrats’ platform.

但国会对行政部门发动战争自由的掌控,已松动数代。因无力制止越战,国会于1973年通过《战争权力决议》,要求总统在向军事行动投入兵力后60至90天内撤军,或获得国会授权。

But Congress’s grip on the executive’s freedom to wage war has been slipping for generations. Its inability to halt the Vietnam War led Congress in 1973 to pass the War Powers Resolution requiring that—within 60 to 90 days of committing forces to military action—the president withdraw troops or obtain congressional authorization.

一块标牌显示今年早些时候加利福尼亚州托伦斯的汽油和柴油价格。(Caroline Brehman/彭博社摄)A sign displays gasoline and diesel prices in Torrance, Calif., earlier this year. (Caroline Brehman/Bloomberg News)

此后历任总统以新颖的理由声称已遵守法律,却并未真正停止敌对行动,也未获得国会授权:如罗纳德·里根总统1982至1984年派遣海军陆战队前往黎巴嫩,1987至1988年派遣海军护航波斯湾油轮;比尔·克林顿总统干预科索沃;巴拉克·奥巴马总统在利比亚、伊拉克和叙利亚采取军事行动;乔·拜登总统在伊拉克和叙利亚采取军事行动。

Presidents have since responded with novel claims of complying without an actual halt to hostilities or congressional authorization: such as when President Ronald Reagan sent Marines to Lebanon in 1982-84, and the Navy to escort tankers in the Persian Gulf from 1987-88; and when Presidents Bill Clinton intervened in Kosovo, Barack Obama in Libya, Iraq and Syria and Joe Biden in Iraq and Syria.

在伊朗问题上,特朗普政府告知国会,因4月8日的停火标志着与伊朗的敌对行动结束,故已遵守法律。国会随后通过联合决议要求结束战争,特朗普予以无视。

On Iran, the Trump administration told Congress it had complied with the law because a ceasefire on April 8 marked the end of hostilities with Iran. Congress later passed a joint resolution demanding an end to the war, which Trump ignored.

民主党控制的国会可尝试通过单独决议或法案切断战争经费,以此终止战争,但特朗普可对两者行使否决权。

A Democratic Congress could try to halt the war either through a stand-alone resolution or bill denying funding for the war, but Trump could veto either.

布鲁金斯学会学者斯科特·安德森表示,更有效的做法或许是在每年必须通过的国防授权法案中拒绝提供战争资金。但共和党人很可能会在大选后的跛脚鸭会议期间通过此类法案,因此民主党要等到明年晚些时候才会有机会。安德森说,特朗普可以像首任期修建边境墙那样,挪用其他资金继续战争,尽管这在宪法层面存疑。

More effective might be denying war funding in the annual must-pass defense authorization bill, said Scott Anderson, a scholar at the Brookings Institution. But Republicans will likely pass such a bill in the lame-duck session after the election, so Democrats won’t get an opportunity until late next year, Anderson said. And Trump, he said, could repurpose other funds to continue the war, as he did with his border wall in his first term, though that is constitutionally dubious.

美国海军陆战队在《战争权力决议》的一次早期测试中,于1982年黎巴嫩内战期间部署在贝鲁特。U.S. Marines, in an early test of the War Powers Resolution, deployed in Beirut in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War.

安德森表示,民主党也可以起诉特朗普越权,但法院何时裁决、谁会胜诉,目前无法预知。

Anderson said Democrats could instead sue Trump for exceeding his authority, but there’s no telling when courts would rule or who would win.

当然,特朗普自己也可以结束战争。不过,战争中敌人也有发言权。如果没有彻底投降或达成谈判停火,伊朗及其代理人仍可能威胁该地区的航运和能源基础设施,导致能源价格居高不下。

Of course, Trump could end the war himself. Still, in war the enemy gets a say. Absent total capitulation or a negotiated ceasefire, Iran and its proxies could still threaten the region’s shipping and energy infrastructure, keeping energy prices high.

根据宪法,国会拥有关税权力,其中部分授权给了总统。特朗普对这项授权权力采取了前所未有的自由裁量,将关税提升至20世纪30年代以来的最高水平。

Under the Constitution, Congress has authority over tariffs, some of which it delegates to the president. Trump took unprecedented liberties with that delegated power to raise tariffs to their highest since the 1930s.

曾为拜登提供建议的国际经济法专家彼得·哈雷尔在2024年大选前表示,他认为来自业界、法院和国会的阻力会阻止特朗普兑现关税威胁。然而哈雷尔说:“他基本上都做到了……国会的反击令人震惊地微弱。”民主党承诺要限制特朗普废除关税的权力,但单独法案需要足够多的共和党票数才能推翻特朗普的否决。哈雷尔表示,一种选择是将有限的废除条款——也许是最近用于对加拿大加征关税的1930年《斯姆特-霍利关税法》第338条——附加到某些必须通过的立法中,例如国防授权法案。

Peter Harrell, an international economic law expert who advised Biden, said before the 2024 election that he thought resistance from industry, courts and Congress would keep Trump from carrying out his tariff threats. Yet, Harrell said, “He has, by and large, done it…(with) shockingly little pushback from Congress.”Democrats have promised to curb Trump’s authority to repeal tariffs, but a stand-alone bill would need enough Republican votes to override Trump’s veto. One option, said Harrell, would be to attach a limited repeal, perhaps Section 338 of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff law recently used against Canada, to some must-pass legislation, such as a defense reauthorization bill.

本月,集装箱堆放在洛杉矶港。Shipping containers stacked at the Port of Los Angeles this month.

前共和党众议院助手、现任职于派珀·桑德勒公司的唐·施奈德表示,特朗普过于看重其对关税的自由裁量权,不会接受任何此类限制。“我唯一看到的可能性是,共和党人倒戈、与他决裂,并推翻他的否决。”法院比国会更有可能叫停关税。最高法院裁定特朗普利用一部法律征收关税的做法违法,针对剩余关税的诉讼正在进行中。但解决可能要等到2028年。

But Don Schneider, a former Republican House aide now with Piper Sandler, said Trump values his discretionary power over tariffs too much to accept any such curb. “The only way I see that happening is if Republicans get off the wagon, are done with him, and override his veto.”The courts are more likely to halt tariffs than Congress. The Supreme Court ruled Trump acted illegally with his use of one law to impose tariffs, and lawsuits are pending on remaining levies. But a resolution may not come until 2028.

可负担性取决于价格和收入两方面。华盛顿可通过税收、转移支付和补贴来影响后者。在此方面,正如战争和关税一样,国会本应掌握主导权。确实,立法推动了最具影响力的税收和支出变化,例如2020年的新冠疫情救助、2021年的刺激计划以及2025年的减税。

Affordability is a function of both prices and income. Washington can influence the latter via taxes, transfers and subsidies. Here, as with war and tariffs, Congress is supposed to be in charge. And indeed, legislation did drive the most consequential tax and spending changes such as Covid-19 relief in 2020, stimulus in 2021, tax cuts in 2025.

然而,总统们不断攫取更多财政大权,鲜有人能超越拜登,后者曾寻求免除4300亿美元学生债务。最高法院否决该举措后,拜登通过其他渠道免除了超过1000亿美元债务。他还扩大了食品券福利,使长期赤字增加2000亿美元,并将《平价医疗法案》(奥巴马医改)补贴延伸至法律原为控制成本而排除在外的部分人群。他的国税局(IRS)通过将部分合规截止日期推迟两年,实际上向纳税人赠予了80亿美元。

Presidents, though, have seized ever more power over the purse, few more than Biden who sought to forgive $430 billion in student debt. After the Supreme Court struck that down, Biden used other channels to forgive more than $100 billion. He also made food stamps more generous, adding $200 billion to long-term deficits and extended Obamacare subsidies to some people that the law had excluded to contain costs. His IRS effectively gifted $8 billion to taxpayers by delaying some compliance deadlines by two years.

特朗普的行政行动往往是削减而非增加支出,并招致践踏国会职权的指责。埃隆·马斯克领导的政府效率部(DOGE)大幅裁撤了整个政府部门。

Trump’s executive actions have often reduced rather that increased spending and brought accusations of trampling on Congress’s prerogatives. Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency slashed entire government divisions.

近几个月来,特朗普开始通过一些鲜为人知的资金来源发放现金:从医疗保险改进基金向数百万医疗保险受益人每人发放90美元,向《平价医疗法案》参保人发放500美元用户费退税,并通过商品信贷公司(CCC)向农民提供80亿美元燃料援助。

In recent months, Trump started doling out cash often using obscure sources: $90 each to millions of Medicare beneficiaries from the Medicare Improvement Fund, $500 user-fee rebates to Obamacare enrollees and $8 billion in fuel assistance to farmers via the Commodity Credit Corporation.

就整体而言,这笔钱并不算多。民主党人若与特朗普达成协议,本可解锁规模大得多的资金,例如以恢复已过期的“奥巴马医改”补贴为交换,换取更多五角大楼拨款。

In the scheme of things, that’s not a lot of money. Democrats could unlock much bigger sums by striking a deal with Trump, for example to restore expired Obamacare subsidies in exchange for more Pentagon funding.

问题在于:此类协议可能扩大本已惊人的赤字,给通胀和利率带来压力。这对负担能力而言可不是好事。

The caveat: such a deal could expand an already eye-watering deficit, pressuring inflation and interest rates. Not great for affordability.

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