Proposing a non-aggression pact amid regional hostilities may seem premature. Yet agreements to stop war matter most when distrust is the deepest. The key question is whether regional governments can agree on rules that make their disagreements less destructive.

In a recent lecture at Cambridge University in the UK, Oman’s Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, called for a non-aggression pact among all eight Gulf littoral states: the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council along with Iraq and Iran. He described it as the essential prerequisite for an inclusive regional security architecture.

Could such a pact work? As Albusaidi conceded, it would be hard to achieve. But as another major escalation looms between Iran and the United States, the region urgently needs a diplomatic path forward.

Indeed, the ongoing conflict has proved so hard to resolve because the region’s security arrangements have remained underdeveloped, relying for too long on external powers. The way forward then can be an inclusive agreement.

Reviving the promise of 1976 The Omani proposal is anchored in a historic precedent. In November 1976, the foreign ministers of all eight Gulf littoral states met in Muscat to pursue collective security after Britain’s withdrawal from the region.

It remains the only time all eight have sat at one table. The Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq war then pushed the region towards defensive arrangements that later hardened into exclusion.

For decades, Iran, in particular, was seen as a threat to the rest of the region. Yet, given that the country holds roughly half the Gulf coastline, any security architecture without it is structurally unsound.

It was not until 2019 that the idea of a regional security arrangement was revived. In May of that year, then Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif proposed a regional non-aggression pact with Gulf neighbours during a visit to Baghdad, which Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov endorsed.

That September, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani launched the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) at the UN General Assembly, envisaging a non-aggression pact among Hormuz states. Gulf reactions were largely dismissive, citing Iranian support for armed groups threatening regional stability.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has revived the idea on the Arab side. In May, the Financial Times reported that Saudi Arabia was discussing a non-aggression framework with Iran, reportedly modelled on the Helsinki process between the US and Russia during the Cold War.

This month, Qatar’s defence minister called for GCC–Iran dialogue, joined by Turkiye and Pakistan, towards a non-aggression agreement.

Oman’s proposal comes as the latest iteration of this regional shift. Muscat is in a unique position to mediate given its history of acting as a mediator and its recent record of hosting US-Iran talks in 2025 and February 2026. It has access that few others have.

Concluding a pact that works The strongest objection against a Gulf pact with Iran is simple: Why trust a state whose conduct has threatened the region’s security? Gulf concerns about Iranian actions are not misunderstandings. Oman itself formally protested to Iran after drone attacks targeting Musandam and Al Wusta in July.

Reassurance is therefore insufficient. Inclusion must mean obligation. Membership in a regional pact would have to bind Iran as much as any other signatory, providing a means to constrain threatening behaviour and address legitimate grievances.

A pact must rest on observable conduct, reciprocal restraint and consequences for violations. At minimum, it would need commitments against the threat or use of force, interference in internal affairs, attacks on civilian infrastructure and support for armed groups conducting cross-border attacks, alongside protection of navigation.

To reach a workable agreement, negotiations can adopt a gradual approach. Consultations among the eight countries could first identify minimum shared interests: territorial security, functioning ports, reliable energy exports, civilian protection and uninterrupted trade. Oman can facilitate, but each state would represent itself; Muscat’s channel to Tehran confers no mandate to negotiate for its neighbours.

Initial talks should yield limited, reciprocal measures: military hotlines, rules for maritime encounters, notification of exercises and rapid communication after attacks. An understanding about protecting energy facilities, desalination plants and commercial shipping would offer an early test of compliance.

Hormuz is the obvious starting point, though progress could be hard. Oman-Iran talks have already outlined a temporary navigation arrangement. However, as Albusaidi conceded, it cannot be implemented unless Washington and Tehran compromise, including by reversing wartime actions that halted maritime traffic. Any wider framework must respect international navigation rights.

Armed groups would be the hardest issue to resolve. Governments should undertake neither to direct nor materially support cross-border attacks by such actors, and demonstrate compliance through verifiable steps. Where control is contested, the pact would need procedures for establishing evidence and requiring corrective action.

Compliance with initial measures could open cooperation on maritime safety, environmental protection and emergency response. Serious violations should trigger investigation, urgent consultation and agreed diplomatic consequences, while the right of self-defence would remain intact.

A regional pact would not settle every conflict touching the Gulf. The United States and Israel, both parties to this year’s war on Iran, would remain outside it and Yemen’s war involves actors whose agendas a Gulf arrangement could not easily bind. But a framework need not end every war to be worth having. It need only make it harder for any of them to become a war among its signatories.

The pact’s credibility will depend on whether it changes conduct. Fewer or no attacks, functioning crisis channels and demonstrable respect for sovereignty will matter more than signatures.

Present hostilities make the task difficult, but they also expose the cost of postponing it. The first achievement would be modest but consequential: establishing that disagreement entitles no state to endanger another’s security.