字号·· | 护眼
外交事务

中国否认经济学China’s Economics of Denial

点「原文对照」整页切到原文,或双击某段只看那段的原文。

中国深圳的一座国际机场,2026年9月 廷书·王 / 路透社At an international airport in Shenzhen, China, September 2026 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

中国已经正确诊断了其最紧迫的经济问题。中国共产党承认,经济过度依赖投资和出口,且持续疲软的居民消费是未来增长的核心威胁。领导层也清楚,这种不平衡的增长模式正导致与发达国家和新兴经济体的贸易摩擦,并将继续如此。他们知道,越来越多的经济学家(包括中国境内的许多低调声音)在发出警告:如果北京不尽快进行重大改革,中国将面临增长放缓、贸易争端连锁以及居民收入可能停滞的局面。

China has correctly diagnosed its most pressing economic problems. The Chinese Communist Party has acknowledged that its economy relies too much on investment and exports and that persistently weak household consumption is the core threat to future growth. The leadership also knows that this imbalanced growth model is causing trade friction with developed and emerging economies alike and will continue to do so. They know there is a growing chorus of economists (including many quiet voices in China) raising the alarm that, if Beijing does not make major changes soon, China will face ever-slower growth, cascading trade disputes, and potentially stagnating household income.

但令人困惑的是,国家领导人并未采取行动。北京仅宣布了有限的提振居民消费和国内需求的计划,其整体经济战略基本保持不变——仍侧重于扩大制造业投资,尤其是先进技术和新战略产业的投资。

But what is puzzling is that the country’s leaders are not acting. Beijing has announced only modest plans to boost household consumption and domestic demand, and its overall economic strategy remains essentially unchanged—focused on expanding investment in manufacturing, especially in advanced technologies and new strategic industries.

关于北京为何选择忽视这些警告,众说纷纭。许多人猜测,中国领导人习近平未能获得准确信息,或他与最亲近的盟友已将发展置于次要位置,转而优先考虑国家安全目标或控制全球产业的主导权。也有观点认为,北京知道该怎么做,但政治或制度约束阻碍了其采取决定性行动。

Theories abound as to why Beijing has chosen to ignore the warnings. Many speculate that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is not receiving accurate information or that he and his closest allies have abandoned development as a priority in favor of national security goals or a desire to control the commanding heights of global industry. Others argue that Beijing knows what it should do, but political or institutional constraints prevent it from taking decisive action.

事实上,虽然这些因素都在政策制定中发挥着作用,但真正的解释要简单得多。该党坚持这条道路,是因为领导层认为这条路行得通。它看到了同样令人担忧的数据——包括不断扩大的外部顺差、疲弱的消费、放缓的居民收入增长、疲软的信贷需求、上升的失业和不充分就业,以及持续的通货紧缩——但对这些发展所表明的含义以及北京应如何应对,得出了截然不同的结论。

In truth, while these factors all play a part in shaping policy, the real explanation is far simpler. The party is sticking to this path because the leadership believes it is working. It sees the same troubling data—including rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but it has reached wildly different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.

中国的经济政策嵌套在一个有条不紊的规划流程之中,旨在确保短期压力不会干扰长期优先事项。问题在于,长期战略建立在这样一个信念之上:掌控先进技术和产业将触发新一轮高速增长。这一经济战略可以被最好地理解为一种带有马克思主义色彩的新古典经济发展理论的误用:北京痴迷于对技术和物质资本的控制,并相信其超高水平的投资将加速生产率提升和工资增长。

Chinese economic policy is nested within a methodical planning process, which is meant to ensure that short-term pressures do not distract from long-term priorities. The problem is that the long-term strategy is predicated on the belief that control of advanced technologies and industry will trigger a new round of high-speed growth. This economic strategy can best be understood as a Marxism-infused misapplication of neoclassical economic development theory: Beijing is obsessed with control over technology and physical capital and believes that its ultrahigh levels of investment will accelerate productivity gains and wage growth.

但如果这些投资脱离市场需求和最终总需求趋势,过度聚焦制造业和技术就无法提高生产率或工资。对于中国这样一个体量的国家——已经是世界最大出口国——尤其如此,它无法依赖进一步出口来推动增长。

But a disproportionate focus on manufacturing and technology cannot increase productivity or wages if those investments are decoupled from the needs of the market and trends in aggregate final demand. This is especially true in a country as large as China—already the world’s largest exporter—that cannot rely upon further exports to fuel growth.

中国的世界观将发展等同于资本积累,并认为生产力取决于对技术的控制和部署。它假定服务业增长、工资上涨和消费升级是这一物质基础的结果——一旦生产性产业繁荣,这些便会在发展后期自然随之而来。在这种经济发展观念中,正确的战略永远是更多投资、更多工业、更多技术。国家的角色是确保居民储蓄和工业利润通过国有银行体系或政府引导的资金流向优先投资领域,而非服务或消费等“琐碎活动”。

STICKING TO THEIR GUNS China’s worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and sees productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology. It posits that the growth of the service sector, higher wages, and higher consumption are the consequences of that physical underlying foundation—they follow naturally in later stages of the development process once the productive industries have flourished. In this conception of economic development, the right strategy is always more investment, more industry, and more technology. The role of the state is to ensure that household savings and industrial profits are recycled through the state-owned banking system or government-guided capital into priority investments rather than frivolous activities, like services or consumption.

由此导致的结构性失衡——削弱了居民收入增长、服务业和公共服务——因此并非意外;在中国的经济发展理论中,这被视为一种自律,将以更快的长期发展作为回报。

The resulting structural imbalance that weakens household income growth, the service sector, and public services was thus not an accident; in China’s economic development theory, this is seen as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.

这一观点的一个关键推论是,政府的宏观管理必须通过亲力亲为的干预来主动引导资源配置,而非通过利率和汇率被动调节。国家可以利用市场的活力与雄心在特定领域促进效率与创新,但政府的职责是确定投资的正确着力点,确保优先部门以最大速度增长,并在失衡不可避免地出现时进行干预以加以缓解。

A key corollary to this view is that the government’s macroeconomic management must guide resource allocation proactively through hands-on intervention, not impassively through interest rates and exchange rates. The state can harness the dynamism and ambition of markets to promote efficiency and innovation in defined spaces, but it is the government’s job to identify the correct focal points for investment to ensure that priority sectors grow at maximum speed and then to intervene to ameliorate imbalances when they inevitably arise.

在这种宏观经济学构想中,经济由一个庞大的投入产出表构成,矩阵中的每个单元格都是一个部门,它消费其他单元格的产出,并为其他生产者提供投入。如果某些产品的供需出现失衡——这会表现为价格过高或过低——可能是因为生产部门投资过度,或下游消费部门投资不足。政府政策旨在通过促进整个矩阵中的投资和生产,增加产出并稳步降低价格,在需要时调整资源配置的节奏和平衡,以应对某个单元格的产出超过其他单元格需求的情况。

In this conception of macroeconomics, the economy consists of a massive input-output table where every cell in the matrix is a sector that consumes other cells’ outputs and provides inputs to other producers. If there is an imbalance in supply or demand for certain products—which becomes evident in high or low prices—it may be because of overinvestment in the producing sector or underinvestment in downstream consuming sectors. Government policy seeks to increase output and steadily lower prices by facilitating investment and production throughout the matrix, adjusting the pace and balance of resource allocation as needed if one cell’s output exceeds the demands of the others.

目标不是在这些重点部门造成产能过剩或低盈利,但快速发展的最优路径必然会将部门推向那个方向。许多人推测,中国领导人习近平没有获得准确信息。

The goal is not to develop overcapacity or low profitability in these targeted sectors, but the optimal path for rapid development will inevitably push sectors in that direction. Many speculate that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is not receiving accurate information.

北京紧随这一行事手册。例如,当房地产行业在2022年崩盘、中国经济的结构性失衡已大到无法忽视时,北京的应对是加大力度微观管理信贷流向,扭转利率市场化和金融市场改革的尝试,同时收紧对资本市场和产业政策资金的监管。央行再贷款工具如今将低成本银行贷款导向优先支持的产业升级和设备购置领域。数千只政府运作的股权基金为支撑一张产业与技术战略网的企业提供低成本资金。

Beijing has followed this playbook closely. When, for instance, the real estate sector collapsed in 2022 and the structural imbalances in China’s economy became too big to ignore, Beijing responded by increasing its efforts to micromanage credit flows, reversing experiments with interest rate liberalization and financial market reforms while tightening oversight of capital markets and industrial policy funding. Central bank relending facilities now channel low-cost bank loans to prioritize industrial upgrading and equipment purchases for targeted sectors. Thousands of government-run equity funds provide low-cost capital to firms that support a web of industrial and technology strategies.

国有企业介入以帮助提振股市估值,监管部门优先批准战略领域企业上市。当某个行业出现过度投资时,“反内卷”等政策行动——一个新造词,形容一篮子不协调的政策,旨在化解产能过剩——会被部署出来,以减缓未来投资、通过固定价格来支撑盈利能力,或设定准则限制市场准入以放缓产出,同时让投入产出表中的其他环节赶上来、随时间恢复平衡。

State-owned enterprises intervene to help boost valuations in the stock market, and regulators prioritize firms in strategic sectors for new listings. When a sector is overinvested, policy campaigns such as “anti-involution”—a neologism that describes a basket of discordant policies to resolve overcapacity—are deployed to slow future investment, buttress profitability by fixing prices, or set standards to restrict market entry in a bid to slow output while the other cells in the input-output tables catch up and restore balance over time.

尽管在市场经济的语境下难以理解,但这种做法的某些方面在中国有其可理解的内在逻辑,尤其是在微观层面。房地产行业的崩溃——在其顶峰时期约占 GDP 的四分之一——通过经济中非常具体的供给和需求路径传导了巨大冲击。北京针对受影响行业调整政策、并在设计应对措施时以投入产出表为思考框架,这合乎情理。

Though hard to comprehend in the context of a market economy, some aspects of this approach have an understandable internal logic in China, especially at a micro level. The collapse of the property sector—roughly a quarter of GDP at its peak—sent massive shockwaves through very specific supply and demand pathways in the economy. It made sense for Beijing to calibrate policy for the affected sectors and think in terms of input-output tables as it designed its responses.

过去 15 年来,中国股市、大宗商品市场和房地产市场频繁出现泡沫,使决策者对对整个经济实施宽松货币政策深感警惕,这有助于解释为何他们正在尝试更多针对特定行业的精准工具。

The frequency of bubbles in China’s equity, commodity, and property markets over the past 15 years has left policymakers deeply wary of accommodative monetary policy for the entire economy, which helps explain why they are experimenting with more targeted tools aimed at specific sectors.

同样,北京的某种程度的得意情绪也是可以理解的,因为中国企业正在汽车、电信等主要传统产业中跻身领先地位,许多其他企业也有望在机器人技术、生物技术等前沿领域蓬勃发展——所有这些都发生在 GDP 遭受重创之后。对于一代在 1990 年代和本世纪第一个十年里通过努力振兴濒临停滞的计划经济而成长起来的经济决策者而言,世界领先(往往是民营)企业的涌现,是北京找到了制胜秘诀的确凿证据。

Likewise, a certain level of triumphalism in Beijing is understandable, given that Chinese companies are breaking into pole positions in major conventional industries, such as autos and telecommunications, and many others are poised to thrive in cutting-edge sectors, such as robotics and biotechnology—all in the wake of a massive hit to GDP. For a generation of economic policymakers who cut their teeth trying to revitalize a moribund planned economy in the 1990s and first decade of this century, the emergence of world-leading (often private) firms is definitive evidence that Beijing has found a winning recipe.

从这个角度来看,北京也将外界关于不公平市场干预或贸易失衡的指责,视为习惯了寻租式技术垄断的富裕国家的酸葡萄心理。

From this perspective, Beijing is also dismissive of foreign complaints about unfair market interventions or trade imbalances as the sour grapes of rich countries that had grown accustomed to rent-seeking technology monopolies.

中国领导人也认为,部分通货紧缩是来之不易的效率提升成果:瓶颈的消除、制造业集群的规模经济、世界级基础设施的建设、物流的改善,以及消除了贯穿制造业供应链上下游、降低了成本的市场壁垒。他们会辩称,来自效率提升的一次性成本降低,或建筑活动突然减少,必须由经济自行消化,而非通过刺激政策来抵消。

China’s leaders also see some deflation as the fruits of hard-won efficiency gains: the elimination of bottlenecks, economies of scale in manufacturing clusters, construction of world-class infrastructure, improved logistics, and removal of market barriers that have lowered costs up and down manufacturing supply chains. One-off cost reductions from efficiency gains or the abrupt loss of construction activity must be digested by the economy, they would argue, not offset by stimulus.

尽管外国评论员和要人警告贸易反制措施日益增多,但数据讲述了一个令人惊讶的不同故事:即使特朗普政府征收全面关税,欧盟针对电动汽车等少数行业设立防御措施,中国的出口增长几乎未放缓。

And while foreign commentators and dignitaries warn of growing trade pushback, the data tells a surprisingly different story: China’s export growth barely slowed as the Trump administration imposed sweeping duties and the European Union set up defenses against a handful of sectors, like electric vehicles.

基础有缺陷 然而,中国经济战略的核心问题在于,国内总需求持续远低于国内总供给。除非国内工人购买中国工业生产的商品,否则中国规划者的投入产出表无法平衡。否则,其他一切都必须出口,往往以更低的价格。领导层原则上理解这一点,但认为掌控先进产业和技术将当然导致生产率上升,支撑未来经济增长,并带来更高工资,从而带来更高消费。

FLAWED FOUNDATION The core problem with China’s economic strategy, however, is that aggregate domestic demand consistently falls far short of domestic supply. Chinese planners’ input-output tables will not balance unless domestic workers are buying the goods that China’s industries produce. Otherwise, everything else must be exported, often at lower prices. The leadership understands this in principle but believes that the control of advanced industries and technology will, ipso facto, cause productivity to rise, sustain economic growth into the future, and generate higher wages and therefore higher consumption.

这就是北京做法中的缺陷——残留马克思主义和错误应用的新古典增长理论留下的危险遗产。现实是,国家对市场的干预可能压低整体生产率,即使中国成功推动先进产业,工人工资也可能停滞不前。

This is the flaw in Beijing’s approach—the dangerous legacy of vestigial Marxism and misapplied neoclassical growth theory. In reality, state intervention in markets can depress overall productivity and workers can see flat wages even when China succeeds at promoting advanced industries.

确实,在运作良好的市场经济中,资本和技术能够创造生产率提升。但如果资源配置是由与投资回报脱节的政策干预决定的,这种因果关系通常就会失效。控制或拥有先进产业本身并不会导致经济增长,因为它们在经济中所占份额太小。相反,只有当新产品或新技术在整个经济中得到分布和应用,从而提高效率或增加产出时,才会产生生产率。

It is true that capital and technology create productivity gains in well-functioning market economies. But the causality usually breaks down if resources are allocated by policy interventions that are divorced from returns on investment. The control or ownership of advanced industries does not inherently cause economic growth, because they are far too small a share of the economy. Instead, new products or technologies generate productivity when they are distributed and used throughout the economy in ways that improve efficiency or increase output.

例如,带来效率提升的不是机器人企业本身的成功,而是其机器人在工厂中的部署,以节省生产成本——即取代工人——并提高产出。如果这些收益不超过新工业机器人的真实成本——即使有层层补贴——那么净效应就不是正面的,无论工厂本身多么令人印象深刻,或者机器人企业本身看起来多么成功。中国的通缩压力溢出至全球经济。

It is not the success of a robotics firm that leads to efficiency gains, for example, it is the deployment of its robots in factories to save production costs—namely by displacing workers—and boost output. If those benefits do not exceed the true cost of the new industrial robots—even with layers of subsidies—then the net effect is not positive, no matter how impressive the factories themselves are, or how successful the robotics firm itself appears. Deflationary pressures in China spill over to the global economy.

采用新生产技术还需要一定程度的创造性毁灭,而北京自身的产业政策干预却抑制了这一点。当政府而非价格敏感的企业做出技术和投资决策时,政策制定者不仅是在赌他们比市场更懂得如何提振长期表现。他们还在赌他们知道如何利用这些技术创造创新的新商业模式。然而在中国,国家对资源配置的影响使市场僵化,特别是通过减少破产,从而限制了创新和效率提升在更广泛经济中的成果。

The use of new production technologies also requires a degree of creative destruction that Beijing’s own industrial policy interventions have inhibited. When governments, not price-conscious firms, make technology and investment decisions, policymakers are not just gambling that they know better than the market how to boost long-run performance. They are also betting that they know how to use those technologies to create innovative new business models. Yet in China, state influence over resource allocation has ossified markets, especially by reducing bankruptcies, in ways that limit the fruits of innovation and efficiency gains in the broader economy.

此外,中国产业政策的很大一部分旨在建立自给自足,这由定义决定,侧重于重复性投资,以巩固国内工业实力,而不一定增加效率。

Additionally, much of China’s industrial policy aims to build self-reliance, which, by definition, focuses on duplicative investments that buttress domestic industrial prowess without necessarily adding efficiency.

此外,尽管中国多层次的产业政策帮助孵化了成功的企业,并建立了一支令人印象深刻的超现代化工厂队伍,但也存在巨大的低效率和浪费,这些从未成为头条新闻。必须全面计算总体生产率,将净产出增益与政府提供的所有产业补贴、不良债务、放弃的利润以及对投资的间接支持进行评估。现实情况是,中国的总体成功率远低于那些耀眼明星企业所暗示的水平:比亚迪、宁德时代、理想汽车等电动汽车和电池制造商令人瞩目的全球影响力,掩盖了整个行业及其供应链中数十家失败企业产生不良贷款、吞噬无利可图的资本补贴的事实。

Moreover, even though China’s many layers of industrial policy have helped launch successful companies and built an impressive fleet of ultramodern factories, there are also tremendous inefficiencies and waste that never make the headlines. Overall productivity must be calculated comprehensively, evaluating the net output gains against all the industrial subsidies, bad debts, foregone profits, and indirect support for investment that the government has provided. The reality is that China’s aggregate success rate is far lower than the shining stars would suggest: the remarkable global reach of electric vehicle and battery makers such as BYD, CATL, and Li Auto masks the dozens of failed companies that generated nonperforming loans and ate up unprofitable capital subsidies throughout the bulk of the sector and its supply chain.

国际货币基金组织估计产业政策支出高达占 GDP 的 4%,其投资净回报率是否为正远非显而易见,尽管存在成功的局部领域,但净回报率可能是深度为负的。

It is far from obvious that the net return on investment from industrial policy spending, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to be up to four percent of GDP, is positive, and it could be deeply negative, despite pockets of success.

最后,北京押注,超高效制造和战略产业的成功最终将带来更高的工资,进而导致消费激增。确实,在竞争性市场经济中,生产率增长会导致实际收入上升。但如果对节省劳动力技术的投资是由国家政策驱动,而非投资回报驱动,即使企业变得更高效,工资也可能下降。家庭收入上升需要一个关键的中间环节:就业,而这并非中国资本密集型、先进制造业投资战略的核心特征。

Finally, Beijing is betting that superefficient manufacturing and success in strategic industries will eventually lead to higher wages, which will then cause consumption to surge. It is true that productivity growth causes real incomes to rise in a competitive market economy. But if investments in labor-saving technologies are driven by state policy, not returns on investment, wages can fall even as firms become more efficient. Rising household income requires a key intermediate step: employment, which is not a core characteristic of China’s capital-intensive, advanced manufacturing investment strategy.

事实上,国家资金帮助中国——一个中等收入经济体——成为高科技“黑灯工厂”的世界领导者,这类工厂无需为人类提供光线等干扰性设施即可运行。这可能会增加投入产出表中备受重视的制造业部门的产出,但如果劳动力总需求没有增长,整个等式就开始瓦解。中国梦的延宕尽管如此,北京经济模式最有害的后果是根深蒂固的通货紧缩。

Indeed, state funding has helped China—a middle-income economy—become a world leader in high-tech “dark factories” that operate without distracting human accommodations, such as light. This may increase output in prized manufacturing cells in the input-output tables, but if demand for labor is not growing in aggregate, the whole equation starts to fall apart. A CHINA DREAM DEFERRED Still, the most pernicious consequence of Beijing’s economic model is entrenched deflation.

扩大生产的重点与中国疲软的消费需求相结合,导致过去十年间生产者价格指数下跌的时间比上涨的时间更长。这对中国经济的威胁远大于单纯的部门失衡之扰。通货紧缩降低了私营部门的信贷需求;削弱了新投资的激励;并打击了就业、工资预期,进而打击消费者信心,导致国内需求走弱——并非在精心划定的投入产出关系中,而是贯穿整个经济。

The focus on expanding production combined with China’s weak consumer demand has caused the producer price index to fall for longer than it has risen over the past decade. This is a far larger threat to China’s economy than a mere nuisance of sectoral imbalances. Deflation reduces private-sector credit demand; undercuts incentives for new investments; and crushes employment, wage expectations, and, therefore, consumer confidence, which leads to weaker domestic demand—not in carefully demarcated input-output relationships but throughout the economy.

通货紧缩还消耗财政收入,给金融机构施加压力,随着时间推移,严重限制了国家果断行动的能力。中国的通货紧缩压力还通过更廉价的出口和实际汇率走弱溢出至全球经济,加剧了北京与其贸易伙伴之间的紧张关系。

Deflation also saps fiscal revenues and puts pressure on financial institutions in ways that severely limit the state’s capacity to act decisively the longer it lasts. Deflationary pressures in China also spill over to the global economy through cheaper exports and a weakening real exchange rate, driving more tensions between Beijing and its trading partners.

在对抗通货紧缩方面落后于形势存在巨大风险,但如果北京继续相信其战略将在长期内提高生产率并启动国内需求,就不大可能改变方针。一些分析人士推测,北京可能会因失业压力或外贸摩擦激增而被迫重新评估其愿景,但它已经亮出了底牌。中国家庭和工人面临的失业、就业不足和低工资积累已相当显著,北京却仅以适度的新增家庭补贴和社会服务的增量投入作为回应。

There is immense risk in falling behind the curve in fighting deflation, but Beijing is not likely to change course if it continues to believe its strategy will boost productivity and jumpstart domestic demand in the long run. Some analysts speculate Beijing could be forced into a reappraisal of its vision in response to unemployment pressures or the proliferation of foreign trade friction, but it has already shown its cards. The accumulation of unemployment, underemployment, and low wages for Chinese households and workers are already significant, yet Beijing has responded with only modest new household subsidies and incremental investment in social services.

同样,随着外部贸易紧张局势升级,北京将这些逐国争端作为外交问题处理,通过威胁与谈判相结合的方式,以维持中国出口市场的大局。

Likewise, as external trade tensions have risen, Beijing has managed these country-by-country disputes as diplomatic issues, through a mix of threats and negotiations, to preserve the bulk of China’s export markets.

政府决定采取短期权宜之计来应对疲软的劳动力市场和外贸摩擦,乍看之下令人费解。对于一个激光般聚焦于自力更生、消除外部依赖的政府而言,却将经济增长的主要驱动力越来越多地寄托于其几乎无法控制的外部需求,这实属奇特策略。同样,对于一个痴迷于社会稳定的政权来说,似乎更审慎的做法是更多地关注工资和劳动力需求。

The decision to pursue short-term Band-Aid measures for a weak labor market and foreign trade tensions is confusing at first pass. For a government laser-focused on self-reliance and eliminating foreign dependencies, it is a curious strategy to become ever more dependent upon foreign demand—over which Beijing has little control—as its primary driver of economic growth. Likewise, for a regime that is obsessed with social stability, it would seem prudent to focus more on wages and labor demand.

然而,若从领导层认为中国正处于过渡期的视角来看,这一策略倒也说得通。这一过程或许令人不快且艰难,却是通往技术驱动型增长模式必经且不可避免的一步。

Yet the strategy makes a degree of sense when viewed from the leadership’s perspective that China is in a transitional period. It may be unpleasant and difficult, but it is an unavoidable step on the path to a technology-led growth model.

领导层对这一过渡进程当前的信心,意味着在内部已显现的预警信号变得足以令人信服之前,可能还要过很多年。这几乎注定了北京将继续推迟采取行动,而通缩压力和外部贸易摩擦却在不断积聚。通缩和企业盈利疲弱已在侵蚀中国的财政收入,自2019年以来,财政收入名义上基本持平。通缩和不断累积的债务负担也在腐蚀金融体系,最终将需要政府预算进行大规模核销和注资,以防止信贷增速进一步放缓。两个月前刚刚进行了一次540亿美元的银行注资,但对放贷几乎未产生效果。

The leadership’s current confidence in this transition process means that it could be many years before the warning signs, already visible, become persuasive internally. This all but guarantees that Beijing will continue to defer action while deflationary pressures and external trade tensions build. Deflation and weak corporate profitability are already eroding China’s fiscal revenues, which have basically been flat in nominal terms since 2019. Deflation and the growing debt burden are also corroding the financial system, which will ultimately require large write-offs and recapitalization from the government budget to prevent credit growth from slowing further. A $54 billion bank recapitalization just took place two months ago, with little effect on lending.

北京对其专注于工业和技术的的发展战略的意识形态承诺,正在制造一个危险的循环,这很可能导致消费减弱、收入增长放缓,并与世界其他地区产生更大的贸易摩擦。此外,面对这些挑战,中国的经济领导层正通过扩大国家对经济的干预来进行弥补,其干预方式进一步削弱了市场力量和民营部门的独立性。照此速度,即便领导层最终认识到改变战略的必要性,中国也可能不再具备财政或金融空间,来将经济重新平衡转向更具可持续性和多样化的增长模式。

Beijing’s ideological commitment to its industry- and technology-focused development strategy is creating a dangerous cycle that will likely produce weaker consumption, slower income growth, and even greater trade friction with the rest of the world. Moreover, in the face of such challenges, China’s economic leadership is compensating by expanding state intervention in the economy in ways that further undermine market forces and the independence of the private sector. At this rate, even if the leadership eventually recognizes the need to change strategy, China may not have the fiscal or financial space to rebalance the economy toward a more sustainable and diversified growth model.

阅读媒体原文 ↗