民主党在参议院的重大胜利对最高法院具有重大影响——也影响他们应如何考虑改革最高法院。
The Democrats’ big win in the Senate has major implications for the Supreme Court — and for how they should think about reforming it.
这不仅仅是因为民主党控制的参议院能够保证唐纳德·特朗普总统不会再获得另一个最高法院大法官提名。更重要的是，控制参议院应该促使民主党人重新考虑扩充最高法院或剥夺其对某些问题管辖权的计划是否明智。如果民主党人在2028年赢得总统职位，并且民主党人保持参议院多数，民主党人将有机会将最高法院从6比3的保守派多数翻转为5比4的自由派多数。
It’s not just that a Democratic Senate will be able to guarantee President Donald Trump won’t get another Supreme Court pick. It’s that control of the Senate should cause Democrats to reconsider the wisdom of plans to pack the court or strip it of jurisdiction over certain issues. If a Democrat wins the presidency in 2028 and the Democrats hold the Senate, the Democrats will have a chance to flip the court from 6-3 conservative to 5-4 liberal.
即使撇开政治不谈，也请考虑一下寿命预期。两位最年长的大法官克拉伦斯·托马斯（78岁）和塞缪尔·阿利托（76岁）都是共和党任命的。1975年至1999年间，最高法院大法官的平均寿命为82.3岁。到2032年——假设一位民主党总统第一个任期结束时——托马斯将84岁，阿利托将82岁。
Even leaving aside the politics, consider the actuarial tables. The two oldest justices, Clarence Thomas (78) and Samuel Alito (76), are both Republican appointees. The average lifespan of a Supreme Court justice between 1975 and 1999 was 82.3 In 2032, the end of a hypothetical Democratic president’s first term, Thomas would be 84 and Alito 82.
不久之前，一位所属政党不控制参议院的总统仍然能够使其最高法院提名人获得确认。1988年，民主党控制的参议院一致确认了由罗纳德·里根提名的安东尼·肯尼迪大法官。两年后，民主党参议院确认了由乔治·H·W·布什提名的戴维·苏特，又过了一年，参议院确认了托马斯。
It wasn’t so long ago that a president whose party did not control the Senate could still get a Supreme Court nominee confirmed. In 1988, a Democratic-controlled Senate unanimously confirmed Justice Anthony Kennedy, who was nominated by Ronald Reagan. Two years later a Democratic Senate confirmed David Souter, who was nominated by George H.W. Bush, and a year after that it confirmed Thomas.
快进到2016年2月13日，安东宁·斯卡利亚大法官在巴拉克·奥巴马任内去世。一个月零三天后，奥巴马提名温和派法官梅里克·加兰接替斯卡利亚。共和党参议院行使了其宪法特权，通过拒绝将加兰提交表决来给出或保留其建议和同意。
Fast forward to Feb. 13, 2016, when Justice Antonin Scalia died during the presidency of Barack Obama. One month and three days later, Obama nominated moderate Judge Merrick Garland to replace him. The Republican Senate exercised its constitutional prerogative to give or withhold its advice and consent by refusing to put Garland up for a vote.
在奥巴马任期的最后342天里，最高法院仅以八名大法官运作。特朗普成为总统后，他迅速提名了尼尔·戈萨奇大法官，后者在不到三个月后获得参议院确认。
For the last 342 days of Obama’s term, the Supreme Court functioned with just eight justices. Once Trump became president, he quickly nominated Justice Neil Gorsuch, who was confirmed by the Senate less than three months later.
参议院拒绝确认加兰德，改变了确认游戏的不成文规则。现在，似乎几乎可以肯定，民主党控制的参议院会拒绝确认特朗普的提名，即使要等两年才等到特朗普离任。更甚的是，民主党对法院保守派宪法革命的愤怒，使得几乎无法想象民主党会采取不同的做法。
The Senate’s refusal to confirm Garland changed the unwritten norms of the confirmation game. Now, it seems all but certain that the Democratic Senate would refuse to confirm a Trump nominee, even if two years had to pass before Trump left office. What’s more, Democratic anger about the court’s conservative constitutional revolution makes it all but impossible to imagine the Democrats acting otherwise.
民主党在参议院的优势规模，让我们有理由把这个设想再推进一步。假设2028年，一名共和党人赢得总统大选，但民主党继续掌控参议院。届时，民主党是否还会拒绝确认共和党人的提名？宪法并未要求他们确认自己不想要的提名人。
The size of the Democrats’ Senate margin gives us reason to push the scenario a little further. Imagine that in 2028, a Republican wins the presidency but Democrats maintain their hold on the Senate. Would the Democrats continue to refuse to confirm a Republican nominee even then? Nothing in the Constitution requires them to confirm nominees they don’t want.
事实上，说到底，宪法实际上并未规定最高法院必须有多少名大法官。宪法设立了法院，并提及首席大法官，但将法院规模的确定权交给了国会。理论上，如果参议院拒绝确认总统提名，最高法院可能会因人员流失而缩减。可能会剩下八名大法官，或者七名，或者更少。
In fact, to get right down to it, nothing in the Constitution actually says how many justices have to sit on the Supreme Court. The Constitution creates the court and mentions a chief justice, but leaves it to Congress to determine the size of the court. In theory, the Supreme Court could shrink by attrition if the Senate refused to confirm presidential nominees. There could be eight justices, or seven, or fewer.
从法院的角度看，这并非理想状态。但从政治角度看，这将是民主党控制的参议院对拒绝确认共和党提名人所付政治代价的判断。民主党完全可能认为，确认一名共和党提名人带来的损失，会大于阻止一名提名人所带来的损失。
This would not be ideal, from the court’s perspective. But from a political standpoint, it would be a judgment by a Democratic Senate about the political cost of refusing to confirm a Republican nominee. It seems entirely plausible that Democrats would decide they had more to lose by confirming a Republican nominee than they would by blocking one.
可预见的未来出现一个多数大法官由民主党任命组成的最高法院，这一可能性也会带来政策后果。例如，对法官的伦理要求原则上是可取的。因此，可以预期民主党人会提出、并且很可能通过立法来实施这样的道德准则。（当然，该准则是否符合宪法，将由最高法院大法官们裁定。）相比之下，如果民主党人认真看待自由派重新夺回该机构的前景，那么通过增加成员来扩充法院、或剥夺法院对某些争议问题的管辖权等提议就没什么意义。
The possibility of a Supreme Court with a majority of Democratic-appointed justices in the foreseeable future has policy consequences, too. Ethics requirements for the justices, for example, are in principle desirable. So the Democrats can be expected to propose and probably pass legislation imposing such a code. (The constitutionality of the code would, of course, be up to the Supreme Court justices to decide.) In contrast, proposals to pack the court by adding more members, or to strip the court of its jurisdiction over some controversial issues, make little sense if Democrats take seriously the prospect of a liberal recapture of the institution.
如果最高法院的构成和权威已被激进的党派改革所重塑，那么就很难主张它应当在不考虑党派性的情况下运作——或被视为如此。在民主党人考虑其策略时，尤其是如果他们能设想出一种通过确认程序来阻止法院保守转向的办法，他们应当小心，不要损害这片土地上最高司法机构——它仍然是——的合法性。
If the Supreme Court’s composition and authority have been reshaped by aggressively partisan reforms, it will be hard to argue that it should proceed — or be perceived — without reference to partisanship. As Democrats consider their strategy, and especially if they can envision a way to arrest the court’s conservative turn through the confirmation process, they should be careful not to undermine the legitimacy of what is still the highest court in the land.