In American politics, even presidential power has its limits. And now, the laws of political gravity may be catching up with Donald Trump's hyper-aggressive exercise of executive authority.

Following what political scientist Ian Bremmer describes as the most consequential electoral reversal for a governing party in more than half a century, the founder and CEO of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media argues that the United States has entered a new political phase: the beginning of the end of Trump's ability to dominate the political agenda, at home and abroad.

Joining François Picard for a wide-ranging Spotlight interview, Bremmer revisits his provocative thesis that America has already reached "peak Trump." This is not to suggest that the president has become powerless. Rather, Bremmer argues that his political authority is increasingly constrained by an emboldened congressional opposition, growing Republican discontent, unpopular economic and foreign policy decisions, and a dawning realization among world leaders that the clock is ticking on the Trump presidency.

The reversal, in Bremmer's account, is extraordinary: "Trump back in 2024 engineered for himself the biggest political comeback in American political history. And now, only two years later, the biggest loss in 50 years." At the heart of his argument lies a fundamental distinction between the formal powers of the presidency and the political influence required to wield them effectively. Trump remains commander-in-chief, commands the machinery of executive government and continues to dominate the media landscape. Yet Bremmer contends that the president's capacity to turn those advantages into lasting political victories and meaningful policy outcomes is rapidly diminishing.

The consequences extend far beyond Washington. From the war in Iran and the unresolved conflict in Ukraine to transatlantic relations under extraordinary strain, America's allies and adversaries alike are beginning to recalibrate their strategic calculations, looking beyond the present administration toward the political landscape that will follow. As Bremmer puts it: "Those foreign leaders will start to engage more with the America that they expect to deal with after Trump is gone." At home, Bremmer points to mounting economic disillusionment, the perceived betrayal of campaign promises, and allegations of corruption and self-dealing reminiscent of America's Gilded Age.

Together, these forces threaten to erode the electoral coalition that returned Trump to the White House. Meanwhile, the president's apparent preoccupation with monuments, personal projects and his own legacy raises a deeper question: At what point does the spectacle of power begin to undermine the substance of governance?

Bremmer also questions the president's capacity to sustain the relentless demands of the office, describing Trump as increasingly distracted and less focused on the issues that matter most. His assessment is stark: "He's focusing on things that don't really matter. And ultimately that's going to weaken his power and weaken his disruptive capacity. Yes, two more years to go. But nowhere near the level of disruption that he had on the global stage at the beginning of this term." The larger question is one of profound significance for American democracy and the international order: Can a president retain the formidable constitutional powers of the world's most consequential political office while progressively losing the political influence needed to exercise them?

Donald Trump has built his political identity on superlatives, from the extraordinary comeback that returned him to the White House to his ambitions to reshape the global order. But if Bremmer's diagnosis is correct, the president who once appeared capable of bending political reality to his will may now be confronting a reality he cannot bend: the limits of his own power.

The presidency still has two years to run. The era of peak Trump, Bremmer argues, may already be over.