他以不满情绪建立了一场运动。反特朗普浪潮应该看起来很熟悉。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普于2025年6月12日星期四，在美国华盛顿特区白宫东厅的法案签署仪式上发表讲话。| Al Drago/Bloomberg/Getty Images 约翰·哈里斯是POLITICO的创始编辑兼主席。他的专栏在剧烈动荡的时刻，定期提供对政治的视角。
He build a movement on grievance. The anti-Trump wave should look familiar. US President Donald Trump speaks during a billg ceremony in the East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, US, on Thursday, June 12, 2025. | Al Drago/Bloomberg/Getty Images John Harris is founding editor and chairman of POLITICO. His column offers a regular perspective on politics in a moment of radical disruption.
也许现在还为时过早，距离总统唐纳德·特朗普在中期选举中遭受挫败的屈辱仅过去几个小时，他还无法看到光明的一面。但周二晚上席卷他和共和党的巨大拒绝浪潮，却蕴含着他渴望的认可的暗流。
Perhaps it’s a bit early yet, just hours past the humiliation of his mid-term rebuke, for President Donald Trump to look on the bright side. But the massive wave of rejection that crashed over him and the Republican Party on Tuesday night is infused with a subcurrent of the validation he craves.
大多数总统只是尽力应对他们所处时代的现有政治。只有极少数人能成为新历史时刻的主要推动者。相比之下，特朗普做到了两次。
Most presidents simply navigate the existing politics of their times as best they can. Only rare ones manage to be the primary agent of a new historical moment. Trump, by contrast, has done so twice.
他在成功中主导了时代，并塑造了一个新的政治运动。他在失败中再次做到了这一点。这两场运动都产生了新的、令人惊讶的联盟，它们因共同的不满情绪和对特朗普的单一执念而团结在一起——要么是将他推向权力，要么是迟来地制约这种权力。再次，一切都围绕着他。
He dominated his age and fashioned a new political movement in success. He’s done so again in defeat. Both movements produced new and surprising coalitions bound together by shared grievance and a singular obsession with Trump — either to vault him to power or belatedly check that power. Once again, it’s all about him.
很难夸大这股席卷共和党人并使其在得克萨斯州、俄亥俄州、堪萨斯州和南卡罗来纳州等昔日堡垒失去职位的浪潮的深度和力量。所有这些案例都有地方变体和特殊情况。但2026年的统一主题是显而易见的：一个大幅扩大的民主党选民群体，因特朗普及其第二任期的炫目过激行为而被激发起来反对，其热情不亚于让美国再次伟大运动在2016年因特朗普而被激发、震惊两党建制派，并在2024年卷土重来执政时的热情。
It is hard to overstate the depth and might of a wave that swept Republicans from office in former strongholds like Texas, Ohio, Kansas and South Carolina. There are local variants and peculiar circumstances in all these cases. But the unifying theme of 2026 is unmistakable: A vastly expanded Democratic electorate as energized in opposition by Trump and the pyrotechnic excesses of his second term as the Make America Great Again movement was energized by Trump when it shocked the establishment of both parties in 2016, and roared back to power in 2024.
特朗普所唤起的、过去曾精明利用的强烈情感，如今让他陷入了困境。
The visceral passions that Trump summons and in the past shrewdly exploited now leave him in a knot.
从某种角度看，他目前受限的新处境——民主党轻松赢得国会两院——并非新鲜事。自罗纳德·里根以来，每位连任两届的总统，无论是在第一个任期还是第二个任期，都曾遭遇中期选举的选民惩戒。
In one light, his new and constrained circumstances — with Democrats handily winning both chambers of Congress — are not novel. Every two-term president since Ronald Reagan has been handed a mid-term rebuke in either their first or second term.
总统对此的常规应对，是某种形式的自我批评、自我纠正和政治重新校准。比尔·克林顿在1994年共和党大胜后就是这样做的，贝拉克·奥巴马在2010年中期选举惨败后也被迫如此，乔治·W·布什在2006年陷入漫长且不得人心的伊拉克战争时亦是如此。通常，总统会撤换一些有争议的任命官员，并向不满的公众传达某种“收到信息——相信我，我听到了你”的版本。
The conventional response to this by presidents is some process of self-critique, self-correction and political recalibration. That’s what Bill Clinton did after a huge Republican sweep in 1994, what Barack Obama was forced to do after his mid-term disaster in 2010 and what George W. Bush did amid a grinding and unpopular Iraq war in 2006. Typically, presidents jettison some controversial appointees and also offer a disgruntled public some version of, “Message received — trust me, I heard you.”
对特朗普而言，挑战在于，如果自我批评或自我纠正是他的特质，他根本不可能在最初进入白宫，也不可能在2020年失利后于2024年赢得第二个任期——更不用说屈服于传统的华盛顿期待了。围绕个人崇拜建立运动的总统，从来不是这样的行为方式。
The challenge for Trump is that he would never have reached the presidency in the first place, or won a second term in 2024 after losing in 2020, if self-critique or self-correction were his thing — much less bowing to traditional Washington expectations. That’s not how presidents who build movements around a cult of personality behave.
在接受《华尔街日报》采访时，他谈到国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯时说，“我觉得他实际上很棒”。许多两党人士认为赫格塞斯是被不体面地撤换的首要候选人。在另一场选举夜对《政治新闻》的采访中，特朗普说，他会在能与民主党合作时进行合作，在不能时动用否决权。特朗普的声音明显低沉，他试图传达一种无所谓的态度来回应选举结果。
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal he said of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who many in both parties believe is a prime candidate for an unceremonious departure, “I think he’s terrific actually.”In another election-night interview with POLITICO, Trump said he would work with Democrats when he can and use his veto pen when he can’t. Trump’s voice sounded notably subdued as he tried to convey a no-big-deal response to the results.
而这些结果，说得委婉些，对特朗普来说都是重大事件——这就是他如此努力地试图阻止这些结果的原因，包括通过非同寻常的中期选区重划之争，以及花费数亿美元的政治资金。不用说，很难想象特朗普在80岁时，最终会屈服于他前任们用来恢复民望的传统政治手段。
Those results, to put it mildly, are huge deal for Trump — that’s why he worked so hard to forestall them, including through unusual mid-decade redistricting battles and spending hundreds of millions of dollars under his political control. Also needless to say: It is very hard to imagine Trump, at age 80, submitting at last to the conventional political methods that his predecessors used to revive their standing.
巧合的是，特朗普的两大运动，其主要动力都来自反弹的力量。大约十二年前，他让自己成为那些憎恨奥巴马的人、那些认为自身身份、价值观和生计正受全球化以及经济和文化精英威胁的人、那些与特朗普一样相信美国例外主义和未来前景正在被稀释和挥霍的人，最重要的载体。
Both Trump movements, as it happens, were principally created by the power of reaction. Starting a dozen years ago, he made himself the most important vessel for people who loathed Obama, who felt their identity, values and livelihood were being threatened by globalism and by economic and cultural elites, who shared Trump’s conviction that American exceptionalism and future prospects were being diluted and squandered.
历史学家将花很长时间来阐明一个问题，这个问题针对特朗普及其最亲近的助手：他们深知反弹和不满所具有的惊人政治力量——他们自己也从中获益——难道不认为，这些相同的力量也可能被用来对付他们吗？
There’s a question for Trump and his closest aides that historians will spend a long time illuminating. Knowing the breathtaking political power of reaction and grievance — having benefited from it themselves — did they not think these same forces also could be harnessed against them?
他们是否认为，那些对伊朗战争感到警觉的人、那些记得特朗普曾承诺降低通胀的人、那些认为司法部不应被指派去执行特朗普对敌人的个人怨恨的人、那些对自我吹嘘的建设项目感到反感的人，就没有政治出路，因为民主党的品牌在2024年已经变得如此脆弱？毫无疑问，特朗普团队在某个认知层面上知道其中的风险。但特朗普政治的独特之处——至少在本周之前——在于，它并非主要在认知层面运作。部落心理——愤怒、恐惧、自尊、要求“你站在哪一边”的本能——要重要得多。
Did they think people who are alarmed by the Iran war, who remember that Trump pledged to lower inflation, who think that the Department of Justice should not be assigned to carry out Trump’s personal grievances against foes, who bridle at self-aggrandizing building projects had no political recourse, because the Democratic brand had become so weakened in 2024? Surely at some cognitive level Trump’s team knew the hazards. But the distinctive feature of Trump politics — at least until this week — is that it does not operate primarily at the cognitive level. Tribal psychology — anger, fear, pride, the instinct to demand “which side are you on” — are far more important.
那种心态现在会怎样？周二特朗普失去的东西之一，是他那种神秘的光环。2024年表明特朗普主义是一场真正的运动而非偶然，这一点已无可辩驳，甚至连民主党人也开始认为他拥有某种难以捉摸的力量（在他们看来，或许有点像《恶魔之子》电影里的那个孩子）。对特朗普力量的神秘理论，可能特朗普本人是最大的信徒。2026年一直都能看到这一点——特朗普恳求选民假装他就在选票上，并认为如果他在集会上发表足够多的两小时演讲，就能再次让政界和新闻媒体感到惊讶和尴尬。
What becomes of that psychology now? Among the things Trump lost on Tuesday was an aura of mysticism. After 2024, which showed irrefutably that Trumpism was a genuine movement rather than a fluke, even Democrats came to regard him as having some kind of imponderable power (perhaps, in their view, a bit like Damien in The Omen films.) Probably the greatest believer in the mystical theory of power was Trump himself. It was on display all through 2026 — Trump’s pleas to voters to pretend he was on the ballot, and that if he did enough two-hour speeches at rallies he would surprise and embarrass the political class and news media once again.
然而，与神秘主义相对的是选举数据中平淡（却依然惊人）的现实：几乎每个投票群体都出现了巨大的转向。《纽约时报》的数据分析估计，与2024年结果相比，向民主党转向了15个百分点，其中西班牙裔选民向民主党转向了28个百分点。
Against mysticism, however, are the prosaic (yet still astonishing) realities of election data: massive swings in nearly every voting bloc. A New York Times data analysis estimated a 15-point swing toward Democrats compared to the 2024 results, which includes a 28-point swing toward Democrats among Hispanic voters.
接下来还有大量政治分析，但毫无疑问，民主党在德克萨斯州表现强劲——包括让吉娜·希诺霍萨击败资深现任州长格雷格·阿博特当选州长——没有合法西班牙裔选民对特朗普大规模驱逐政策的强烈反应是不可能的。民主党赢得南卡罗来纳州一个参议院席位，并可能赢得密西西比州一场势均力敌的选举，如果没有黑人选民大规模投票，也是不可能的，这些选民对特朗普的重新划区努力以及削弱对他们有利的投票权措施的最高法院裁决感到警觉。
There is lots more political analysis ahead, but there is no chance that Democrats ran strongly in Texas — including electing Gina Hinojosa as governor over veteran incumbent Greg Abott — without a massive reaction among legal Hispanic voters to Trump’s sweeping deportation policy. There is no way Democrats won a South Carolina Senate seat, and may yet win a too-close-to-call race in Mississippi, without massive turnout among Black voters alarmed by Trump’s redistricting efforts and Supreme Court rulings weakening voting-rights measures that have benefited them.
特朗普尤其要对两场参议院失利负责。他的介入直接导致了德克萨斯州肯·帕克斯顿和南卡罗来纳州达琳·格雷厄姆的提名——两人都是以不同方式的弱势候选人，两人都在选举之夜落败。
Trump owns two of the Senate losses in particular. His involvement directly led to the nominations of Ken Paxton in Texas and Darline Graham in South Carolina — both weak candidates in different ways, both election-night losers.
特朗普在接受《华尔街日报》采访时，将自己描绘成一位失望但看得开的选举之夜观察者——如果他本人在选票上，结果本会不同。“球有时候就是这样弹的，”他说。
In his interview with the Journal, Trump cast himself as a disappointed but philosophical election-night observer — the result would have been different if he personally was on the ballot. “It’s just the way the ball bounces sometimes,” he said.
特朗普对自己功劳估计不足。他反复要求选民将这次选举与他本人挂钩——而选民也同意了。
Trump gives himself too little credit. He asked the electorate repeatedly to make this election about him — and they agreed.